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Abstract 
The central objective of this inquiry is to outline an ecocentric Green 
political theory in the course of a critical evaluation of the principal ideas that form 
the current melting pot of Green political thought. In Part I, I set the stage for this 
inquiry by providing a general overview of the emergence and development of 
ecopolitical thought over the last three decades in order to locate and distinguish 
Green political theory from other kinds of ecopolitical thought (i.e., Green political 
theory is seen as a subset of ecopolitical thought in general). I identify three major 
themes in the development of ecopolitical thought over the last three decades - a 
participatory theme, a survivalist theme, and an emancipatory theme. I argue that 
whereas other kinds of ecopolitical thought have tended to emphasize the themes of 
democratic participation and/or human survival, Green political theory can be 
characterized by its concern to reconcile these themes through the more 
encompassing theme of emancipation. I then divide Green or emancipatory 
ecopolitical theory into an anthropocentric and an ecocentric stream. The first stream 
is principally concerned with developing an ecologically safe and sustainable society 
that offers new opportunities for human emancipation and fulfilment. The second 
stream pursues these same goals within the context of a broader concept of 
emancipation that also respects the freedom of the nonhuman world to unfold in its 
many diverse ways. I argue that it is this latter ecocentric stream that offers the most 
comprehensive and promising framework for social and ecological emancipation. 
In the remainder of Part I, I articulate and defend an ecocentric philosophical 
perspective in the course of a discussion of some of the central debates and arguments 
that have been advanced in the emerging domain of environmental philosophy. I also 
show how the anthropocentric/ecocentric cleavage may be used to shed light on the 
normative debates that are currently taking place within the international Green 
movement. 
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In Part 11,1 articulate, critically examine, and evaluate the principal 
emancipatory (i.e., Green) currents of ecopolitical thought. These currents are 
identified under the broad, generic names of Orthodox eco-Marxism, humanist 
eco-Marxism (including Critical Theory), democratic ecosocialism, ecoanarchism, 
and ecofeminism (liberal and conservative responses to the ecological crisis are dealt 
with summarily in Chapter 1). My principal concern is to determine the extent to 
which these new syntheses of ecological and political thought are anthropocentric or 
ecocentric, and to defend an ecocentric orientation. I also assess the internal 
theoretical coherence of each synthesis, critically examine theoretical claims  
concerning the relationship between social domination and the domination of the 
nonhuman world, and draw out the political priorities that flow from these theoretical 
claims. 
I conclude that, in terms of long term vision and general orientation, 
ecofeminism and ecoanarchism (excepting, to some extent, social ecology) are the 
most ecocentric of the Green theories examined whereas orthodox eco-Marxism, 
humanist eco-Marxism (including Critical Theory), and democratic ecosocialism are 
anthropocentric (albeit in decreasing degrees respectively). Notwithstanding this 
finding, I argue that the anti-statist political framework defended by ecoanarchism 
(and implicitly supported by ecofeminism) is neither the only nor the most 
appropriate political framework for the realization of ecocentric goals in the 
foreseeable future in view of the urgency of the ecological crisis and the need for 
international eco-diplomacy. Instead I argue that the democratic ecosocialist case for 
the retention of a democratic state as an "enabling institution" to promote social 
justice and ecological integrity is more likely, in practice, to realize ecocentric goals 
than the ecoanarchist case - notwithstanding the fact that democratic ecosocialism has 
so far been defended only on anthropocentric grounds. I conclude that a much revised 
version of democratic ecosocialism that rests on ecocentric foundations provides the 
most comprehensive and defensible political framework for emancipation writ large. 
However, the success of this framework will depend on the cultivation of an 
appropriate ecocentric emancipatory cithan and in this respect ecoanarchism and 
ecofeminism will have a vital and continuing role to play. 
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Prologue 
Our ecologic crisis is the product of an emerging, entirely novel, democratic 
culture. The issue is whether a democratized world can survive its own 
implications. Presumably we cannot unless we rethink our axioms. 
Lynn White, Jr. 1 
I have undertaken the present inquiry in the belief that mainstream political 
philosophy is too narrowly focused to deal with the ubiquity and magnitude of the 
environmental crisis. My main concern is therefore to establish a more encompassing 
political framework that takes full cognizance of the environmental crisis and, in 
particular, of the myriad nonhuman life-forms with which we share our evolutionary 
odyssey. 
The challenging and distinctive feature of what I shall identify as the 
ecocentric stream in Green political theory is that it has sought to widen the ambit of 
political inquiry to include the question of our relationship to, and impact upon, the 
nonhuman world. Questions of this kind have rarely been aired explicitly by political 
(as distinct from environmental) philosophers, let alone given any prominence. In the 
main, political philosophers have confined their attention to social questions and 
affairs of state, that is, inter-human relations rather than human-nonhuman relations. 
This is not to say that political philosophers have not held biological and 
cosmological views that have exerted an influence on their political vision. Aristotle, 
St. Thomas Aquinas, and Karl Marx, to name three influential political thinkers from 
classical, medieval, and modern times, each held quite distinct views on the 
relationship of humans to the nonhuman world that exerted a powerful sway on their 
respective political philosophies. Nor are these thinkers exceptional. Every political 
world-view incorporates certain assumptions bearing on the relationship of humans to 
the rest of nature. The main point I wish to emphasize, however, is that in these and 
1. Lynn White, Jr., "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis, Science 155 (1967): 
1203-7 at p. 1204. 
1 
most other cases of political theorizing the nonhuman world has generally been 
accorded the status of a background or stage upon which the human drama unfolds. 
Invariably, this background has been considered relevant only insofar as it helps us to 
see what is special about humans vis-a-vis the nonhuman world or only insofar as it is 
instrumentally valuable to human actors, whether as a material resource or as some 
other means to human self-realization. Invariably, too, these background assumptions 
concerning the relationship between the human and nonhuman worlds are opaque and 
uncontroversial since they usually form part of the stock assumptions of the Age. Yet 
it is surprising how the fragments of certain cultural and political assumptions 
characteristic of one particular Age can persist in subsequent times even when the 
foundations upon which these assumptions originally rested have been supplanted or 
seriously challenged by, say, new scientific discoveries or new philosophical 
investigations. As Lynn White has observed: 
Despite Copernicus, all the cosmos rotates around our little globe. Despite 
Darwin, we are not, in our hearts, part of the natural process. We are,superior 
to nature, contemptuous of it, willing to use it for our slightest whim. 4 
More generally, Alvin Goulciner has noted how "old background assumptions" - the 
"inherited intellectual 'capital' with which a theorist is endowed" - may come to 
operate in new conditions and act as boundaries that confine and inhibit the further 
development of a particular theoretical enterprise. 3 It is part of the burden of this 
inquiry to uncover and challenge some of the inherited anthropocentric intellectual 
capital that remains embedded in the stock assumptions of modern political theory 
and to show how it has inhibited a deeper appreciation of our environmental ills and 
perpetuated or at least legitimated (albeit often unwittingly) the very processes of 
environmental destruction. 
This critique of the anthropocentric assumptions of Western political 
thought will prepare the way for the development of a more encompassing political 
framework with which to approach social and ecological problems. This alternative 
2. Ibid., p. 1206. 
3. Alvin Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (London: Heinemann, 
1973), p. 34. 
2 
framework, which rests on an ecocentric or ecology-centred philosophical 
perspective, will emerge in the course of a critical evaluation of the principal new 
ideas that make up the contemporary melting pot of Green political thought. 
Whether the ecocentric political theory defended in this inquiry is 
understood as breaking new ground or simply re-working familiar themes in political 
theory ultimately depends on the criterion that is used to distinguish one political 
theory from another. From the perspective of the familiar left/right spectrum of 
political thought, the ecocentric political theory defended in this inquiry might be 
seen as just another permutation, albeit a significant revision and enlargement, of 
democratic socialism or social democracy. Viewed in the light of the anthropocentric 
and cornucopian assumptions of post-Enlightenment political thought, however, such 
an ecocentric political theory may be seen as a genuinely new constellation of 
political ideas. 
3 
Part I 
4 
Staking Out the Green Terrain 
Chapter 1 
The Development of Modern Ecopolitical Thought: From 
Participation and Survival to Emancipation 
Introduction 
In this chapter I argue that the development of political thought in the last 
three decades in response to the environmental crisis and popular environmental 
concern can be divided into three broad themes - "participation," "survival," and 
"emancipation." To some extent, these three themes may be seen as roughly 
characterizing the general ecopolitical preoccupation of the last three decades 
respectively, although this temporal association is a loose one only and should not be 
pressed too far (i.e., "later" ecopolitical themes are discernible in earlier periods just 
as "earlier" themes are discernible in subsequent periods). Indeed, I intend to show 
that the last three decades have seen a general broadening of ecopolitical dialogue as a 
result of the gradual interpenetration of these themes or phases of inquiry. That is, the 
participatory, survivalist, and emancipatory phases may be seen as representing the 
thesis, anti-thesis, and higher synthesis respectively in the ecopolitical dialogue of the 
last three decades. It is this third, emancipatory phase of ecopolitical thought that I 
intend to articulate and critically examine in this inquiry. 
For the purposes of this inquiry, the phrases "Green political theory" and 
"emancipatory ecopolitical theory" will be used interchangeably. Of course, the label 
"Green" is an extraordinarily elastic one that has been applied to, or appropriated by, 
all manner of environmental and ecopolitical positions. My equation of Green 
political theory with what I identify as emancipatory ecopolitical theory is, however, 
an attempt to clarify and delineate what I take to be the essential (and most 
promising) contours of Green political discourse. My tripartite characterization of 
ecopolitical thought is, then, the means I use to locate and distinguish Green political 
5 
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theory (i.e., emancipatory ecopolitical theory) from other kinds of ecopolitical 
approaches (i.e., participatory and survivalist ecopolitical theory). 
Having distinguished emancipatory ecopolitical thought from other kinds of 
ecopolitical approaches, I further subdivide this third phase of inquiry into two 
streams - an anthropocentric stream and an ecocentric stream. I will be arguing 
throughout this inquiry that it is the ecocentric stream of emancipatory ecopolitical 
thought that provides the most comprehensive and promising theoretical framework 
with which to address the ecological and social crises of the late 20th century. 
The Environmental Problematic as  
a Crisis of Participation  
The 1960s marked the beginning of widespread public concern over 
environmental degradation in the developed countries of the West. (The birth of the 
modern environmental movement is typically associated with the publication of 
Rachel Carson's international best seller Silent Spring in 1962. 1 The U. S. Earth Day 
[22 April 1970] is often regarded as the major landmark for the "take off" - as distinct 
from the birth - of popular environmental concern in the West. 2) Agitation emerged 
and persisted in the form of grassroots protests and lobbying over local, national, and 
international issues (e.g., pesticides, nuclear power plants, toxic waste dumps, large 
scale industrial developments, and pollution) so that in the space of roughly a decade 
an "environmental crisis" was officially recognized as a matter of local, national, and 
1. Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (New York: Fawcett Crest Books, 1962; reprint ed., 
Harmondsworth, U. K.: Penguin, 1970). This book eloquently documented the 
destruction of wildlife and the disruptions caused to ecological cycles by the 
indiscriminate use of pesticides. It gave rise to an international public outcry and 
raised popular awareness of environmental degradation. As one commentator put it: 
"[Silent Spring] ... was exceptional in its ability to combine a grim warning about 
pesticide poisoning with a text that celebrated the living world." See Ralph H. Lutts, 
"Chemical Fallout: Rachel Carson's Silent Spring,, Radioactive Fallout, and the 
Environmental Movement," Environmental Review 9 (1985): 211-25 at p. 211. 
2. Indeed, Neil Evernden argues that "the environmental movement was conceived 
with the Carson book, but it had a gestation of eight years before its symbolic birth on 
Earth Day (April 22, 1970)." See Neil Evernden, "The Environmentalist's Dilemma," 
in The Paradox of Environmentalism. Symposium Proceedings, ed. by Neil Evernden 
(Downsview, Ontario: Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, 1984), 
pp. 7-17 at p. 8. 
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international concern. 3 In addition to the Earth Day celebrations in 1970, the 
emergence of a panoply of new environmental laws in Western countries in the late 
1960s and early 1970s and the United Nations Conference.on the Human 
Environment at Stockholm in 1972 represent significant landmarks of national and 
international recognition of environmental problems. 
Yet much of this official recognition, such as new environmental legislation, 
also helped to define and contain environmental problems as essentially matters of 
poor planning rather than as indicators that the cornucopian assumptions of the post-
World War II growth consensus might need to be revised. In particular, the notion 
that there might be ecological limits to economic growth that could not be overcome 
by human technological ingenuity and better planning was not seriously entertained 
until after the much publicized "limits to growth" debate of the early 1970s (more on 
these debates below). As John Rodman observed in the context of the United States, 
environmental problems were originally perceived in the 1960s as a "crisis of 
participation" whereby excluded groups sought to ensure a more equitable distribution 
of environmental "goods" (e.g., urban amenity) and "bads" (e.g., pollution). 4 This is 
not surprising given that the early wave of environmental activism was generally seen 
as but a facet of the civil rights movement in its concern for democratic participation 
in societal decision-making, in this case, land and resource usage. The growth in 
public concern over environmental problems was thus widely interpreted as being 
primarily concerned with participatory and distributional issues, that is, issues 
concerning "who decides" and "who gets what, when, and how." The upshot was that 
by the 1970s environmental problems were, as Rodman has put it: 
... domesticated by mainstream political science, reduced to the study of 
pollution control and environmental interest groups and eventually absorbd 
within the framework of "the policy process" and the "politics of getting."' 
3. For a general overview, see John McCormick, Ttg_Q_l_objtEnvironmental 
Movement: Reclaiming Paradise  (London: Belhaven Press, 1989), Chapter 3 (The 
Environmental Revolution [1962-1970]). 
4. John Rodman, "Paradigm Change in Political Science: An Ecological Perspective," 
American Behavioral Scientist 24 (1980): 49-78 at p. 65. 
8 
This kind of characterization of the problem was widely shared by both 
policy makers and political theorists. This is not to say that new critiques, 
sensibilities, and theoretical paths did not emerge in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, Murray Bookchin's Our Synthetic Environment, and, 
to a lesser extent, Charles Reich's prophetically titled The Greening of America 
represent three important landmarks in the emergence of a new sensibility that 
celebrated the living world and was deeply critical of dominant Western attitudes 
toward the nonhuman world.6 These contributions, however, were exceptions. By 
and large, there were few major theoretical innovations in social and political thought 
in the 1960s that arose specifically from a consideration of the environmental crisis. 
This tendency to treat environmental protest as an aspect of the wider pursuit of 
distributive justice and democratic planning was especially marked among socialist, 
social democratic, and liberal welfare theorists - a tendency that has continued 
through to the 1980s. Perhaps the exemplar of this kind of social democratic analysis 
is Hugh Stretton's award winning book Capitalism. Socialism and the Environment, 
which opens with the unequivocal declaration that: 
This book is about the distribution of environmental goods: the shares that go to 
rich and poor in,the developed democracies of Europe, North America, Japan 
and Australasia.' 
Although distributional questions remain crucial questions in any ecopolitical inquiry, 
I will be arguing that to circumscribe the problem in this way serves to reinforce 
rather than challenge the prevailing instrumental orientation toward the environment 
as essentially a resource for humans (albeit a resource to be utilized more efficiently 
and equitably). 
5. Ibid. For an overview of environmental policy studies in the United States, see 
Dean Mann, "Environmental Policy Studies," Policy Studies Journal 1 (1972): 17-22. 
6. Murray Bookchin [pseud. Lewis Herber], Our Synthetic Environment (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1962) and Charles Reich, The Greening of America 
(Harmondsworth, U. K.: Penguin, 1971). 
7. Hugh Stretton, Capitalism. Socialism and the Environment (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976), p. 1. 
9 
By virtue of the radical democratic and participatory nature of 
environmental protest in the 1960s, political commentators tended to regard it as an 
adjunct of the New Left. Yet even this association was soon to come under challenge 
as a rearguard action developed against environmentalism by socialist and liberal 
welfare theorists. The discovery of the socially regressive consequences of some 
environmental reforms (e.g., the costs of pollution abatement being passed on as 
higher prices and unemployment resulting from the closing down of polluting 
industries) soon gave rise to the now familiar accusation that environmental protest 
was an elitist, middle class phenomenon that threatened the hard won material gains 
and jobs of the urban working class. 8 Such social conflicts provide a significant 
indication of the gradual re-alignment of political cleavages that has been . taking place 
in the industrially developed countries of the West between, on the one hand, the so-
called New Class (or New Middle Class) that furnishes the core activists of the 
environmental movement, and, on the other hand, the two traditional classes of 
industrial society, namely, the owners/controllers of capital and the working class. 9 
The growing tension that developed between the demand for environmental reform, 
on the one hand, and redistributive justice and economic security, on the other hand, 
has remained an enduring and essential theme of ecopolitical discussion. These 
developments have also encouraged the articulation of a range of new political 
cleavages (such as materialist/post-materialist, technocentric/ecocentric) that cut 
across the traditional left/right divide. 10 
8. For an influential critique of this kind, see Hans Magnus Enzensberger, "A Critique 
of Political Ecology," New Left Review 84 (1974): 3-31. For a reply, see Robyn 
Eckersley, "The Environment Movement as Middle Class Elitism: A Critical 
Analysis," Regional Journal of Social Issues 18 (1986): 24-36. 
9. See, for example, Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and  
Political Styles Among Western Publics  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977) 
and Ronald Inglehart, "Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity," The  
American Political Science Review  75 (1981): 880-900. For a critical evaluation of 
the major sociological explanations (including Inglehart's) put forward to account for 
the predominant New Class composition of the ecology movement and broader Green 
movement, see Robyn Eckersley, "Green Politics and the New Class: Selfishness or 
Virtue?" Political Studies 37 (1989): 205-23. 
10. See, for example, Inglehart, The Silent Revolution and Timothy O'Riordan, 
Environmentalism, 2nd ed. (London: Pion, 1981). These and other similar 
distinctions are discussed below. 
10 
The 1960s and early 1970s were also a time of theoretical stock-taking and 
revision for socialist theory - a revision spearheaded by the rise of the New Left. In 
particular, Herbert Marcuse's One Dimensional Man and the essays collected in 
Jurgen Habermas's Toward a Rational Society  played an influential role in tracing 
many of the problems of industrial society - including its environmental dislocations - 
to an instrumental or technocratic rationality that had overreached itself. 11 This 
contributed to the widening of the New Left's agenda to include questions of life-
style, technology, and the exploitation of nature. The ready absorption of these ideas 
by the counterculture and "back-to-nature" movements of the 1960s was defended 
eloquently by political theorists and cultural historians such as Murray Bookchin, 
Theodore Roszak, and Charles Reich. 12 Many of the issues raised by these writers, 
such as the importance of consciousness change and alternative world-views, remain 
significant currents in modern emancipatory/Green theorizing. 
Yet, with the exception of the work of Roszak and to some extent Marcuse 
and Bookchin, none of these early theoretical developments mounted a serious 
challenge to anthropocentrism or argued for a new humility and compassion in our 
dealings with the nonhuman world. 13 Rather, the growing concern for environmental 
quality was incorporated into the New Left's agenda for greater individual and 
community autonomy and control. After all, the overriding revolutionary goal of the 
New Left, as George Katsiaficas describes it in his comprehensive international study, 
was "the decentralization and self-management of power and resources."14 
11.Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1964; reprint ed. London: Abacus, 1972) and Jurgen Habennas, Toward a Rational 
Society: Student Protest, Science. and Politics, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (London: 
Heinemann Educational Books, 1971). 
12.See, for example, Bookchin [pseud. Lewis Herber], Our Synthetic Environment; 
Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism (Berkeley: Ramparts Press, 1971); Theodore 
Roszak, The Making of a Counterculture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society  
and its Youthful Opposition (London: Faber, 1970, 1973); Roszak, Where the 
Wasteland Ends: Politics and Transcendence in Postindustrial Society (New York: 
Doubleday, 1972; reprint ed., London: Faber and Faber, 1973); and Reich, iha 
Greening of America. 
13.Marcuse is discussed in Chapter 5 and Bookchin and Roszak are discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
11 
To most New Left thinkers, then, questions concerning humanity's power 
vis-a-vis the rest of nature were dealt with in terms of who exercised such power and 
on whose behalf. These were (and still are) of course crucial questions, as I have 
already noted, yet they remained embedded in an essentially anthropocentric 
framework and were firmly wedded to the "participatory" ethos of the times. As I 
show in Chapter 5, even the innovative attacks on the ideology of "scientism" and 
instrumental rationality waged by Critical Theorists such as Marcuse and Habermas 
only partially transcended this framework (enough, however, for me to identify these 
theorists as emancipatory ecopolitical theorists, albeit in the anthropocentric rather 
than ecocentric stream). Their overriding concern was to open up improved channels 
of communication in order to facilitate the achievement of a democratic consensus 
that would direct the development and use of technology toward more human 
liberatory ends. This was also the major thrust of William Leiss's critique of "the 
domination of nature." 15 Although these critiques were innovating and provocative 
and remain fruitful themes that have been incorporated into emancipatory ecopolitical 
thought, their overriding objective was the liberation of "inner" rather than "outer" 
nature (i.e., human instincts or human communication rather than the nonhuman 
community). As I show in Chapter 5, Critical Theory's objection to the domination of 
nature ultimately rests on the human-centred argument that it has led to the 
domination of people. 
This brief introductory outline and critique of the participatory theme in 
ecopolitical thought should not be interpreted as a rejection of the early theoretical 
contribution of the New Left. Questions concerning citizen participation, self-
management, and distributive justice remain central issues in ecopolitical discussions 
and form a basic plank in grassroots environmental protest and in the platforms of the 
international Green movement that has been gradually gathering momentum since the 
late 1970s. These themes are reflected, for example, in two of the so-called "four 
14.George Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968  
(Boston, Massachusetts: South End Press, 1987), p. 5. 
15.See William Leiss, The Domination of Nature  (Boston: Beacon Press, 1974). 
12 
pillars" upon which the platforms of most Green parties rest, namely, grassroots 
democracy and social justice. 16 Yet these are not the distinguishing characteristics of 
the ecocentric Green political thought that will be defended in this inquiry (although 
they form an essential part of this body of thought). The "discovery" of "ecological 
interconnectedness" - which was brought to public attention in the early 1960s with 
the publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring but did not gather momentum until 
the late 1970s and early 1980s - was to set in train significant theoretical innovations 
the political repercussions of which are only beginning to be worked out in any 
degree of detail. As we shall see, the most significant of these has been the attempt 
by ecologically oriented theorists to revise and incorporate the principles of individual 
and community autonomy into a broader, earth-centred theoretical matrix. 
The Environmental Problematic  
as a Crisis of Survival  
The "crisis of survival" theme in ecopolitics rose to prominence in the early 
1970s following the publication of the Club of Rome's The Limits to Growth and the 
Ecologist magazine's Blueprint for Survival. 17 Although evidence of widespread 
environmental deterioration had been steadily accumulating since the 1950s, the 
sensational and widely publicized findings of these two reports posed a considerable 
challenge to the sanguine belief that we could continue with business and politics as 
usual. 18 The mounting evidence of environmental degradation stemming from the 
16. The other two pillars are ecology and non-violence. See, for example, Die 
Grunen, Programme of the German Green Party  (London: Heretic Books, 1983), 
PP. 7-9 - 
17. Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers, and William W. 
Behrens III., The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the  
Predicament of Mankind (New York: Universe Books, 1972) and Edward Goldsmith 
et al., Blueprint for Survival (Harmondsworth, U. K.: Penguin, 1972). 
18. Earlier warnings can be found in Harrison Brown, The Challenge of Man's Future 
(New York: Vilcing, 1954); Bookchin, Our Synthetic Environment (1962); Carson, 
Silent Spring (1962); Stuart L. Udall, The Quiet Crisis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 
and Winston, 1963); and Paul Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (New York: Ballantine 
Books, 1970; revised ed., London: Pan/Ballantine, 1972). Other warnings in the early 
1970s include Paul Ehrlich and Anne Ehrlich, Population. Resources. Environment 
(San Francisco: Freeman, 1970); Richard A. Falk, The Endangered Planet (New 
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exponential growth in resource consumption and human population was shown to 
pose very real threats to the earth's biological support systems. Although there were 
important differences between the two reports they both shared the same general 
message. That is, the environmental crisis amounted to much more than a crisis in 
participation; what was at stake was the very survival of humanity. 19 The metaphor 
of our planet as "spaceship earth" - which had become popular following the 
circulation of images of the "whole earth" taken from outer space by NASA - was 
widely employed to emphasize a new appreciation of the fragility and finiteness of 
the earth as an "oasis in the desert of infinite space." 2° This marked the emergence of 
a new appreciation of the sight dimensions of environmental degradation and the 
common fate of humanity, although some of the ecopolitical solutions offered in the 
wake of the new awareness of global environmental degradation and resource scarcity 
(such as Garrett Hardin's "life-boat ethics," discussed below) were not always 
"brotherly." 
Not surprisingly, the dire projections of The Limits to Growth and Blueprint 
for Survival (which carried the endorsement of many eminent British scientists) had a 
notable impact on the world's media and prompted calls for a swift and multifaceted 
response from national governments. (The ensuing debate was intensified by the 
1973-74 oil crisis, which came as a timely reminder of the heavy oil dependence and 
hence vulnerability of industrialized countries.) Indeed, The Ecologist's detailed 
York: Vintage, 1971); and Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature. Man and 
Technology (New York: Bantam, 1972). 
19.The Ecologist magazine's "blueprint" proposed a quite radical and specific set of 
measures to deal with the crisis and advocated the need for a decentralized, steady 
state society. This went much further than the Club of Rome's call for more research 
and for concerted national and international action to attain a state of "global 
equilibrium." (See the commentary by the Executive Committee of the Club of 
Rome, in Meadows et al., The Limits to Growth, pp. 185-97.) Robert Golub and Joe 
Townsend have argued that the success of the Club of Rome's report may be partly 
accounted for by the fact that it actually suited business interests and governments at 
the time (i.e., they were seeking greater international economic controls to smooth out 
the growing instability of the world's economy brought about by the spread of 
multinational companies.) See Golub and Townsend, "Malthus, Multinationals, and 
the Club of Rome," Social Studies of Science 7 (1977): 201-22. 
20. Joseph Campbell, Myths to Live By (New York: Bantam, 1973), quoted by 
Yaakov Jerome Garb in "The Use and Misuse of the Whole Earth Image," Whole 
Earth Review, March 1985, pp. 18-25 at p. 18. 
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solution outlined in Blueprint for Survival provided the impetus for the formation in 
1973 of Europe's first Green party - the British People's Party - which later became 
the Ecology Party in 1975 and the British Green Party in September 1985. This party 
adopted The Ecologist's radical "blueprint" as its basic theoretical statement. 21 
Blueprint for Survival has proved to be a landmark publication in Green politics in 
foreshadowing many of the goals and policies that are found in the platforms of the 
various Green parties that formed in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
In concentrating mainly on the physical limits to growth, however, the 
M.I.T. study commissioned by the Club of Rome spawned a plethora of 
counterarguments to the effect that the problems were susceptible to "technological 
fix" and pricing solutions that would alleviate the "negative externalities" of 
economic growth without the need for any fundamental changes in political values or 
the pattern and scale of economic activity. Moreover, the particular projections of the 
M.I.T. team were criticized for containing methodological flaws and resting on 
unduly pessimistic assumptions. 22 
Yet the methodological problems that have been discovered in The Limits to 
Growth have not, by and large, seriously detracted from its essential message. The 
Club of Rome's 1974 updated survey (prepared in response to criticisms of its 1972 
21. The aims of the British party were "to create a self-reliant, community based way 
of life within the framework of a stable economy and a just, democratic society, so 
that people may live in harmony with each other and the rest of the natural 
environment by acknowledging and adapting to the limitations of the earth's finite 
resources." See Alistair McCulloch, "The Ecology Party and Constituency Politics: 
The Anatomy of a Grassroots Party," Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the 
Political Studies Association, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, April 1983. The 
quotation is taken from an Ecology Party pamphlet, The Politics of Ecology (London: 
n.p., 1979), p. 4. For a more recent discussion of the changing fortunes of this party, 
see Jonathon Porritt and David Winner, The Coming of the Greens (London: Fontana, 
1988), pp. 60-62 and 76-78. 
22. For a methodological critique, see H. S. D. Cole, C. Freeman, M. Jahoda and 
K. L. R. Pavitt, Thinking About the Future: A Critique of the Limits to Growth  
(London: Chatto and Windus, 1973). For an optimistic alternative, see Herman Kahn, 
William Brown, and Leon Martel, The Next 200 Years (London: Associated Business 
Programmes, 1976; London: Abacus, 1978). For a general discussion of the debate, 
see John Gribbon, Future Worlds (London: Abacus, 1979), Chapter 1 ("Boom or 
Gloom? The Great Debate"). 
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report) concluded, in a slightly more optimistic tone, that growth was possible 
provided it was ecologically benign: 
For the first time in man's life on earth, he is being asked to refrain from doing 
what he can do; he is being asked to restrain his economic and technical 
advancement, or at least to direct it differently from before; he is being asked by 
all future generations of the earth to share his good
4 	
e with the unfortunate 
- not in a spirit of charity, but in a spirit of survival. 
Indeed, many of those who have been most critical of this body of so-called 
"doomsday literature" have acknowledged that the crisis is real and that far-reaching 
changes in both our values and institutions are required if ecological and social 
catastrophe is to be averted. 24 Moreover, the basic message of The Limits to Growth 
and Blueprint for Survival has been reinforced by later, more refined studies of global 
trends in population growth, resource consumption, and ecological deterioration. For 
example, the major study of the world's environmental problems commissioned by 
President Carter in The Global 2000 Report to the President of the U.S. summarized 
its findings as follows: 
If present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be more crowded, more 
polluted, less stable ecologically, and more vulnerable to disruption than the 
world we live in now. Serious stresses involving population, resources, and 
environment are clearly visible ahead. Despite greater material qgtput, the 
world's people will be poorer in many ways than they are today.-' 
The annual State of the World reports, published by the Washington based 
Worldwatch Institute, and the recent Brundtland Report (Our Common Future) have 
continued to reinforce this same message. 26 
Not surprisingly, many of the ecopolitical publications that appeared in the 
climate of the early 1970s - especially those that appeared in the immediate aftermath 
23. Mihajlo Mesarovic and Eduard Pestel, Mankind at the Turning Point (New York: 
Dutton, 1974), p. 142. 
24. See, for example, Enzensberger, "A Critique of Political Ecology." 
25. Gerald 0. Barney, study director, The Global 2000 Report to the President:  
Entering the Twenty-First Century, vol. I. (Harmondsworth, U. K.: Penguin, 1982), 
IL 1 . 
26. Lester Brown, gen. ed., State of the World 1984 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984) 
and annually thereafter, World Commission on Environment and Development 
(Chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland), Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987). See also Richard J. Barnet, The Lean Years: Politics in the  
Age of Scarcity (London: Abacus, 1980). 
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of the "limits to growth" debate - shared an overriding preoccupation with human 
survival, a sense of great urgency, a new, practical and empirical frame of mind, and a 
preparedness to call for tighter governmental controls. 27 Gone were the heady New 
Left pleas for freedom, citizen participation, and the "good life." In their stead came 
sober discussions of resource rationing, increasing government intervention, 
centralization, and population control. The new message, expressed eloquently by 
Robert Heilbroner in the closing pages of An Inquily into the Human Prospect  (a 
landmark "survivalist" publication that typified the mood and temper of the period), 
was that the individualistic Promethean spirit must give way to the example of Atlas - 
the spirit of fortitude, resolutely bearing whatever burdens were necessary to sustain 
life.28 Appropriately, the cover of Heilbroner's book bears a picture of a doleful 
Atlas, stoically bearing the load of the earth on his shoulders. 
As early as 1968, Garrett Hardin set the tone of this phase of the discussion 
in his influential essay "The Tragedy of the Commons" with his warning that freedom 
in the unregulated commons brings ruin to al1. 29 Hardin's well-known parable of the 
27. The leading examples of this "survivalist" school were Garrett Hardin, Exploring 
New Ethics for Survival (Baltimore: Penguin, 1972); William Ophuls, "Leviathan or 
Oblivion?" in Toward a Steady State Economy, ed. Herman E. Daly (San Francisco: 
Freeman, 1973), pp. 215-30; William Ophuls, Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity: A  
Prologue to a Political Theory of the Steady State  (San Francisco: Freeman, 1977); 
and Robert L. Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 1974). It should be noted that Ophul's contribution is particularly wide-
ranging and eclectic (e.g., he draws on elements of Plato, Aristotle, Benedictine 
communalism, Hobbes, Rousseau, Burke, Jeffersonian democracy, and Utopian 
Socialism) and it is possible to fmd in his work all three of the ecopolitical themes 
identified in this chapter. His "bottom line" orientation is, however, survivalist. 
Edward Goldsmith, a key author of Blueprint and long time editor of The Ecologist, 
may also be seen as partially belonging to this survivalist school. Although he 
advocates (unlike the survivalists) the immediate transition toward a society made up 
of decentralized, self-sufficient eco-communities he envisages that such a society 
would be planned and engineered by the nation state. This idiosyncratic mixture of 
paternalism, utopianism, and radical conservatism is particularly evident in the final 
chapter of his recent book The Great U-Turn: De-Industrializing Society  (Hartland, 
U.K.: Green Books, 1988) where he emphasizes the importance of traditional, 
stabilizing institutions (such as the family and religious hierarchies) and rejects public 
social security institutions in favour of community self-help. 
28. Heilbroner, Human Prospect, see pp. 14244. 
29. Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science 162(1968): 1243-48. 
Reprinted in K. S. Shrader-Frechette, ed., Environmental Ethics (Pacific Grove, C.A.: 
Boxwood Press, 1981), pp. 242-52 (all citations refer to this reprint.) 
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medieval herdsmen overstocking the commons vividly demonstrates the tragic 
dynamic that arises when people are motived by an economic "rationality" that has as 
its sole objective the maximisation of individual gain in the short term. Hardin argues 
that when people act according to such an economic rationality they will inevitably 
despoil the commons, even when they have full knowledge of the mounting public 
cost that the pursuit of private gain will bring. 30 Hardin's answer to the tragedy - 
"mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected" - 
marked this "survivalist" school as one whose overriding preoccupation was to find 
the means of warding off disaster and discover a minimally acceptable way of life 
rather than search for the "good life." 31 
Hardin did not, however, extend his eco-social contract theory (which rested 
on mutual agreement by the majority of the people affected) to the global population 
problem. His notorious neo-Malthusian "life-boat ethic," which argued against a 
more equitable distribution of the world's resources on the grounds that we would al 
"go under," has been widely condemned for protecting the advantages of the affluent 
and pronouncing a death sentence for the poor. 32 As Richard Barnet has argued: 
The specter of the hungry mob supports Hobbesian politics, a world of struggle 
over inadequate resources that cries out for Leviathan, the authoritarian state 
that can keep minimal order. The Malthusian fantasy offers an alternative to the 
Leviathan state. There is no need for a civil authority to regulate scarce goods, 
because ature, cruel only to be kind, periodically thins the surplus by 
famine. 
30. That traditional commons were mostly managed on a sustainable basis by local 
people for mutual benefit (see Susan Jane Buck Cox, "No Tragedy on the Commons," 
Environmental Ethics 7 [1985]: 49-61; and John Reader, "Human Ecology: How 
Land Shapes Society," New Scientist, 8 September 1988, pp. 51-55, especially p. 51) 
does not detract from the force of Hardin's parable in highlighting the "free rider" and 
Prisoner's Dilemma problems in public choice theory. Moreover, Hardin has replied 
to John Reader's critique by pointing out that his article was essentially about, and 
should have been titled, "The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons." See Hardin, 
"Commons Failing," New Scientist, 22 October 1988, p. 76. 
31. Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," p. 10. Hardih's formula ("mutual 
coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected") is often 
referred to disparagingly as an apology for authoritarianism yet it has much more in 
common with the democratic "self-limiting" social contract theory of Lockean 
liberalism (with its concern for limited government) than it does with a heavy handed 
totalitarian state or absolute sovereign. 
32. See, for example, Barnet, The Lean Years, pp. 297-98. 
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As we have seen, the general preoccupation with survival also stamped 
Heilbroner's somber inquiry, which opens with the searching and troubling question: 
"Is there hope for humanity?" After exploring world demographic trends in the 
context of the persistent threat of nuclear war and the escalation of environmental 
degradation, Heilbroner reached a reluctant and pessimistic conclusion. Given 
"human nature" (which Heilbroner saw as fundamentally selfish), our only hope for 
survival lies in our obedient rallying behind a centralized, authoritarian nation - the 
only institutional form that Heilbroner saw as capable of extracting the necessary 
sacrifices, regulating distribution, and redirecting agriculture and industry along 
ecologically sustainable lines. 
Since Heilbroner's major concern is the fundamental issue of human 
survival, he does not address (and would probably think it a luxury to consider) the 
question of how to preserve and foster the more agreeable aspects of human nature, at 
least during the convulsive period of transition. Faced with the urgency of the 
interrelated crises confronting humankind (particularly the environmental crisis) 
Heilbroner adopts an empirical frame of mind, focusing on how people are likely to 
behave rather than on what people might eventually become. In this context, he 
insists that we cannot afford to ignore obdurate human characteristics and build a 
future on unrealistic beliefs. 34 In Heilbroner's assessment, people will not willingly 
acquiesce in giving up a way of life, particularly where it entails the enjoyment of 
relative privileges. It is this premise that sets the tone of Heilbroner's entire analysis. 
Indeed, Heilbroner offers the provocative thesis that perhaps our main hope for 
survival lies in our latent yearning for obedience to, and identification with, authority. 
According to Heilbronner, such a yearning - which he sees as a "psychological 
substratum" of the human personality that can be traced back to our long period of 
33. Ibid., p. 296-97. 
34. Heilbroner saw an "ultimate certitude" in environmental destruction, which placed 
it in an altogether different category from the threat of nuclear war (Human Prospect, 
p. 47). 
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helplessness and dependency as infants - will enable us all to rally behind an 
authoritarian government! 35 
It deserves mention, however, that although Heilbroner sees centrally 
planned, authoritarian states as the necessary transitional scenario, it is clear that this 
is not what he would personally wish for. Rather, his preference is for 
... a diminution in scale, a reduction in the size of the human community from 
the dangerous level of immense nation states toward the "pglis" that defined the 
appropriate reach of political power for the ancient Greeks. 3° 
In Heilbroner's view, however, this vision (which is the one generally promoted in 
Blueprint for Survival) is highly improbable in the short and immediate term. 37 
Heilbroner's political conclusion (that macro-constraints on human freedom 
are essential to make possible the transition from a growth oriented to a steady state 
society) has also been endorsed to a large extent by William Ophuls, although Ophuls 
argues for the retention of certain micro-freedoms so that we have a macro-autocracy 
and micro-democracy.38 Like Heilbroner, Ophuls also admits his preference for a 
smaller scaled, face-to-face democracy of the Greek city state or Jeffersonian type, 
which he sees as the most appropriate vehicle for the pursuit of "the good life," but he 
considers that "reforming a 'corrupt people' is a Herculean task" (recall Heilbroner's 
Atlas!). In Ophuls' view, we are ultimately confronted with a limited choice between 
"Leviathan or oblivion." 39 Although Ophuls has since moderated his position by 
placing a greater emphasis on the need for self restraint than on the need for external 
35. Ibid., see pp. 118-22 and 131-32. 
36. Ibid., p. 135. 
37. It is interesting to note that Heilbroner prophesises that the society that will 
eventually emerge in the long term (i.e., after the difficult transitional period) will be 
one that will stress parsimony, an end to the giant factory, the huge office, and 
perhaps the urban complex. He also speculates that society will turn in the direction 
of many pre-industrial societies, emphasizing tradition and ritual and "the exploration 
of inner states of experience rather than the outer world of fact and material 
accomplishment." He sees the ethos of science and the work ethic as playing a much 
less prominent role while individual expression will give way to a greater extent to 
the dictates of the community. Ibid., see pp. 139-40. 
38. See Ophuls, "Leviathan or Oblivion?" and Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity. 
39. Ophuls, "Leviathan or Oblivion?" p. 227. 
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coercion, he continues to maintain that the latter must be resorted to if calls for the 
former are unsuccessful.4° 
Ophuls and Heilbroner may be seen as offering more interventionist variants 
of Hardin's call to "legislate temperance" by "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon" 
• in order to mitigate the ecologically and socially destructive rationality that 
characterizes human behaviour in the "free" or unmanaged commons. Heilbroner's 
and Ophul's fellow Americans are seen as sharing the same characteristics as Hardin's 
herdsmen insofar as they are understood as "selfish hedonists rationally seeking 
private gain." They therefore have much in common with the model of the self-
interested human who roamed in Hobbes's and Locke's state of nature insofar as they 
are seen as being in perpetual (Hobbes) or intermittent (Locke) conflict with the 
interests of the larger natural and social community to which they belong. In such a 
context, salvation can only come from the surrendering of a considerable degree of 
individual liberty to a central authority. Indeed, Ophuls has frequent recourse to the 
social contract theories of the 17th and 18th centuries, suggesting that the 
constitutional limits of the central authority of the future might be struck in 
accordance with a new "ecological contract" that would (hopefully) be based on 
prudent self-restraint and seek harmony not only between humans but also between 
humans and nature.41 However, unlike the social contract of Locke (which was 
based on cornucopian assumptions), the ecological contract would be based on the 
Hobbesian premise of scarcity and would therefore require an all powerful Leviathan, 
not just a limited government. 42 That is, if freedoms are not voluntarily surrendered 
by citizens, then they would have to be imposed externally by a sovereign power. 43 
40. Ophuls, Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity,  see Chapter 8. 
41. Ibid., pp. 164-65. 
42. Ken Walker has argued that Ophuls has mistaken the postulates that underpin 
Hobbes's grim conclusion as to the necessity for Leviathan. According to Hobbes, the 
central characteristic of humans in the state of nature was the desire for eminence - to 
be better than one's neighbours - whether or not there was material scarcity. This 
includes not only a desire for more material goods than others but also a desire for 
more status and power. Such a characteristic is relational and scarce by definition; a 
society of "eminence seeking individuals" would be engaged in perpetual conflict 
regardless of whether the society was large or small, well or poorly endowed. Hence 
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The authoritarian solutions proffered by Heilbroner and Ophuls and the life-
boat ethics of Hardin have prompted a number of critics to ask just what is to be 
sacrificed in the name of human survival and to ponder whether perhaps the price 
might be too high. 44 In particular, the dire analyses of this "survivalist" school have 
been widely criticized (particularly, but not only, by socialist theorists) for displaying 
an insensitivity to old conflicts such as national rivalry and the gap between rich and 
poor. As Andrew Feenberg has observed, this insensitivity 
... leads to a politics of despair that would freeze the current relations of force in 
the world - and with hem the injustices they sustain - as a condition for solving 
the issue of survival. 
Similarly, Enzensberger has criticized those who employ the "brotherly" rhetoric of 
"space-ship earth" for conveniently overlooking "the difference between first class 
steerage, between the bridge and the engine room." 46 Others, re-asserting the 
participatory theme, have argued that it is the very erosion of liberal democracy that 
has enabled powerful elites to pursue, with the backing of the State, environmentally 
destructive growth.47 What is needed is more rather than less participation in 
the necessity for an absolute sovereign. Ophuls, however, mistakes Hobbes as 
identifying material scarcity as the source of social disorder and therefore wrongly 
believes that only a centralized autocracy can secure the necessary social order. Yet 
material scarcity need not necessarily lead to autocracy in the context of a non-
eminence model of rational behaviour. A more co-operative social contract might 
just as easily provide a rational solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma and "free rider" 
problems. See K. J. Walker, "The Environmental Crisis: A Critique of 
Neo-Hobbesian Responses," Polity 21(1988): 67-81. 
43. Ophuls has framed the central question as follows: "How is the common interest 
of the collectivity to be achieved when men throughout history have shown 
themselves to be passionate creatures prey to greed, selfishness and violence?" 
William Ophuls, "Reversal is the Law of Tao: The Immanent Resurrection of Political 
Philosophy," in Environmental Politics, ed. Stuart S. Nagel (New York: Praeger, 
1974), pp. 34-48 at p. 37. Indeed, Ophuls has heralded the conservative political 
thinker Edmund Burke to be "the last great spokesman for the premodern point of 
view" and has endorsed his view that (i) humans are by nature passionate, (ii) there 
must therefore be checks on will and appetite, and (iii) if these checks are not self-
imposed then they must be imposed externally by a sovereign power. See Ophuls, 
Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity, p. 235. 
44. Michael E. Kraft, "Analyzing Scarcity: The Politics of Social Change," 
Alternatives (Winter, 1978): 30-33, see p. 31. 
45. Andrew Feenberg, "Beyond the Politics of Survival," Theory and Society 7 
(1979): 319-61 at p. 323. 
46. Enzensberger, "A Critique of Political Ecology," pp. 15-17. 
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government; the survivalists, according to this view, have seriously overestimated the 
capabilities of centralized institutions and underestimated the capabilities of 
decentralized, democratic political institutions to respond to the crisis. 48 
While agreeing with the need for more participation, other theorists have 
expressed more deep-seated reservations about the capacity of liberal democracy to 
meet the ecological challenge. As Susan Leeson has put it: 
... if authoritarianism is the response to the inability of popular governments to 
impose the limits required to avoid ecological disaster, such a response merely 
reflects the crisis to whicjxmodem political philosophy and liberalism have led; 
it is not itself a solution." 
What is needed, these critics argue, is a fundamental re-examination of the basic 
axioms of liberalism such as possessive individualism, private property, limited 
government, and market freedom. According to Leeson: 
... it was the unleashing of the passion for material abundance, legitimized by 
Hobbesian natural right, amplified by Locke, combined with the rejection of the 
classi commitment to reason and proper limits that caused the ecological 
crisis. 
It was this kind of ecological critique of liberalism that led many 
ecopolitical theorists to turn to the broad socialist tradition as an alternative. Yet, as 
we shall see in the following section, other ecopolitical theorists found many of the 
ecologically problematic assumptions of liberalism to be also embedded in the 
socialist tradition. 51 From this important dialogue between survivalists and their 
47. Volkmar Lauber, "Ecology, Politics and Liberal Democracy," Government and 
Opposition 13 (1978): 199-217. 
48. See, for example, David W. Orr and Stuart Hill, "Leviathan, the Open Society, 
and the Crisis of Ecology," The Western Political Ouarterly 31(1978): 457-69, and 
Robert Holsworth, "Recycling Hobbes: The Limits to Political Ecology," The  
Massachusetts Review 20 (1979): 9-40. Robert Paehlke has pointed out that at the 
time Ophuls and Heilbroner wrote their pessimistic theoretical treatises, 
environmental interest groups were busily expanding opportunities for democratic 
participation in resource management. See Robert Paehlke, "Democracy, 
Bureaucracy, and Environmentalism," Environmental Ethics 10 (1988): 291-308. 
Paehlke argues (contra John Passmore, who believes there is a readiness among 
environmentalists to approve of coercive measures [Man's Responsibility for Nature 
(London: Duckworth, 1974), pp. 60-61, 96, and 99]) that the new wave of 
environmentalism is overwhelmingly pro-democratic. 
49. Susan M. Leeson, "Philosophic Implications of the Ecological Crisis: The 
Authoritarian Challenge to Liberalism," Polity 11(1979): 303-18 at p. 305. 
50. Ibid., p. 317. 
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critics there emerged the highly contested question: is socialism ecologically 
salvageable or must we look elsewhere, that is, beyond liberalism mcl socialism for 
ecopolitical enlightenment? This question is addressed in the following section. 
Despite the widespread criticism of the authoritarian response to the 
deepening ecological crisis, it would be wrong to dismiss the survivalists' contribution 
out of hand. First, they have done much to draw attention to the seriousness of the 
ecological crisis and have challenged the widespread complacency concerning the 
ability of existing political values and institutions to respond to the crisis. Second, the 
controversial nature of the authoritarian solutions that surfaced in the wake of the 
"limits to growth" debate has encouraged the search for more deep seated cultural 
transformations along with alternative, nonauthoritarian institutions that would foster 
a more co-operative and democratic response to the environmental crisis. In this 
respect, the above authoritarian scenarios have become sobering reminders of what 
can and might happen if remedial action is too little or too late. These scenarios have 
thus served as a useful foil for later democratic and ecologically oriented theorists 
who have sought to develop an alternative solution to the environmental crisis that 
incorporates yet revises and transcends the general participatory ethos of the 1960s, 
which had been largely premised on cornucopian assumptions. 
The Environmental Problematic as a Crisis of Culture and  
Character and as an Opportunity for Emancipation 52 
Many of those who were critical of the survivalist school responded by 
extending ecopolitical debate beyond the realm of "physical externalities" to the very 
51. For a general overview see Robert Paehlke, Environmentalism and the Future of 
Progressive Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), Chapter 7. Although 
Paehlke notes that environmentalists occupy a wide range of positions on the 
traditional ideological spectrum, he nonetheless concludes that environmentalism 
"implies some doubt about the liberal tradition of technocratic management. It 
suggests that we need to find new means of intervening deeply in the market process - 
an idea foreign to liberalism and moderate progressivism" (p. 211). On the general 
incompatibility of American liberalism with environmentalism, see Walter Truett 
Anderson, "Editor's Introduction: The Crisis of Liberalism," in Rethinking 
Liberalism, ed. Walter Truett Anderson (New York: Avon Books, 1983), pp. 1-22. 
52. The phrase "culture and character" is a taken (albeit in reversed form) from the 
title given to Chapter 10 in Bill Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living as 
if Nature Mattered (Layton, Utah: Gibbs M. Smith, 1985). 
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notion of material progress and to the social and psychological costs of the 
instrumental rationality that facilitated it: alienation, loss of meaning, the coexistence 
of extreme wealth and extreme poverty, welfare dependence, dislocation of tribal 
cultures, the growth of an urban monoculture, and the concomitant reduction in 
cultural diversity.53 For those who took this step, the sanguine reliance on future 
"technological fixes" and better planning - seen by many other critics of survivalism 
as the defmitive rejoinder to the "limits to growth" projections - was increasingly 
recognized as part of the problem rather than the solution. By the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, a growing number of ecopolitical thinkers were pointing to the new 
cultural opportunities that lay in what had hitherto been pessimistically approached by 
the "survivalists" as a dire crisis with a limited range of options. In short, these 
ecopolitical theorists began to draw out what they saw as the new emancipatory 
potential that they believed was latent within the ecological critique of industrialism. 
Moreover, this new project entailed much more than a simple re-assertion of the 
modern emancipatory ideal of human autonomy or self-determination; it also entailed 
a reevaluation of the foundations of, and the conditions for, human autonomy or 
self-determination in Western political thought. 
The general tenor of this third emancipatory phase of ecopolitical inquiry 
may be best introduced in the voices of some of its leading contributors. According 
to William Leiss: 
No elaborate argument should be necessary to establish that there are some 
limits to economic and population growth. But everything depends upon 
whether we regard such limits as a bitter disappointment or as a welcome 
opportunity to turn from quantitative to qualitative improvement in the course 
of creating a conserver society."4 
John Rodman has sounded a similar theme: 
... to the extent that limits are perceived as external to us, they may have to be 
imposed on us by authoritarian governments; whereas the more they are 
perceived as arising from within personal and social experience - e.g., in the 
form of frustration resulting from the limits to consumption ... or in the form of 
53. See, for example, Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth  (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1976) and William Leiss, The Limits to Satisfaction: On 
Needs and Commodities (London: Marion Boyars, 1978). 
54. Leiss, The Limits to Satisfaction, p. 112. 
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dissatisfaction with the one-dimensionality of the life of 
product-ion/consumption ... then the more the "limits to [industrial] growth" 
emerge "naturally," and the appropriate role for government appears, which is 
not to repress grpvth, but to stop forcing it ... and to facilitate the transition to 
the steady state.° 
As early as 1965 Murray Bookchin argued, in a prophetic and pioneering 
essay entitled "Ecology and Revolutionary Thought," that the insights of ecology 
offered a critique of society "on a scale that the most radical systems of political 
economy have failed to attain." 56 Since that time Bookchin has maintained the 
argument that the cultivation of an ecological society, resting on the principles of 
social ecology, will serve to expand rather than narrow the realm of freedom or self-
directedness of al members of the ecocommimity, nonhumans included. 
Theodore Roszak, another pioneer of this emancipatory approach to 
ecopolitics, has pointed to what he sees as the "vital reciprocity" between person and 
planet: 
My purpose is to suggest that the environmental anguish of the earth has 
entered our lives as a radical transformation of human identity. The needs of 
the planet and the needs of the person have become one, and together they have 
begun to act upon the central institutions of our society with a force that 
profoundly subversive, but which carries the promise of cultural renewal.° 
Rudolf Bahro, in a somewhat ironic tone, has signalled his indebtedness to 
the environmental crisis because it has forced us to re-examine the question of 
emancipation in fresh terms. According to Bahro, if the earth were infinite and if 
there were no problems of energy shortages and resource depletion, we would 
continue to believe (falsely, in Bahro's view) that the road to freedom lay in material 
expansion.58 Balm has argued that the environmental crisis, which he has claimed to 
be the "quintessential crisis of capitalism," has forced us to re-examine not only the 
psychological costs of the competitive and expansionary ethos of our materialist 
culture but also our imperialist attitude towards other species. 
55. Rodman, "Paradigm Change in Political Science," p. 72. 
56. Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism p. 58. 
57. Theodore Roszak, Person/Planet: The Creative Disintegration of Industrial  
Society (London: Paladin, 1981, originally published 1979), p. 15. 
58. Rudolf Bahro, "Socialism, Ecology and Utopia: An Interview," History Workshop 
16 (1983): 91-99, see p. 94. 
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In a similar vein, Christopher Stone, in his eloquent defence of the "rights" 
of nonhuman beings, has regarded the environmental crisis as offering an opportunity 
for metaphysical reconstruction and moral development. In voicing the approach 
taken by a growing number of ecophilosophers, Stone argued: 
... whether we will be able to bring about the requisite institutional and 
population growth changes depends in part upon effecting a radical shift in our 
feelings about "our" place in the rest of Nature. 
A radical new conception of man's relationship to the rest of nature would not 
only be a step towards solving the material planetary problems; there are strong 
reasons for suck,a changed consciousness from the point of making us better 
human beings.J 
On this note, Bill Devall and George Sessions have argued for the cultivation of new 
"character and culture." By this they mean the "development of mature persons who 
understand the immutable connection between themselves and the land community or 
person/planet" and who act in ways that "serve both the vital needs of persons and 
nonhumans."6° 
What is common to these various responses to the ecological crisis? First 
and foremost, the environmental crisis is regarded not only as a crisis of participation 
and survival but also as a crisis of culture in the broadest sense of the term, that is, 
"the total of the inherited ideas, beliefs, values, and knowledge, which constitute the 
shared bases of social action."61 Indeed, this was exemplified as early as 1972 in the 
manifesto of the New Zealand Values Party - the world's first national Green party - 
which spoke of New Zealand being in a "new depression ... a depression of human 
values, a downturn not in the national economy but in the national spirit." 62 
59. Christopher Stone, ,Should Trees Have Standing?: Toward Legal Rights for 
Natural Objects (Los Altos, California: Kaufman, 1974), P.  48. On this theme, see 
also Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural 
Environments," Environmental Ethics 5 (1983): 211-24. 
60. Devall and Sessions, Deep Ecology, p. 180. 
61. Collins English Dictionary  (London: Coffins, 1983). 
62. See Stephen Rainbow, "Eco-politics in Practice: Green Parties in New Zealand, 
Finland and Sweden," Paper presented to the Ecopolitics IV conference, University of 
Adelaide, South Australia, 21-24 September 1989, p. 5. It has been argued that the 
world's first Green party was the United Tasmania Group, formed in 1972 in the 
Australian state of Tasmania shortly before the founding of the New Zealand Values 
Party in the same year. See Pamela Walker, "The United Tasmania Group: An 
Analysis of the World's First Green Party," in Environmental Politics in Australia and 
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Second, this theme of cultural malaise and the need for cultural renewal has 
meant that emancipatory ecopolitical theorists have directed considerable attention 
toward the revitalization of civil society rather than, or in addition to, the state. This 
is reflected in the concern of emancipator), theorists to find ways of theoretically 
integrating the concerns of the environmental movement with other new social 
movements, particularly those concerning feminism, peace, and Third World aid and 
development (see Chapter 3). This new theoretical project sought ways of 
overcoming the destructive logic of capital accumulation, the acquisitive values of 
consumer society, and, more generally, all systems of domination (including class 
domination, patriarchy, imperialism, racism, totalitarianism, and the domination of 
nature). 
This was indeed a bold and ambitious theoretical project and one for which 
the two major political philosophies of modern times - liberalism and Marxism - 
seemed either poorly or only partially equipped. Indeed, the limitations in these two 
political philosophies have served as general theoretical points of departure for 
emancipatory ecopolitical theorists, as I show in the following section. 
Before introducing this emancipatory critique of liberalism and Marxism, 
however, I should briefly explain why I do not consider it necessary to examine the 
relationship between the conservative tradition of political thought and emancipatory 
ecopolitical thought. The reason is that conservatism's opposition to social and 
political experimentation and cultural change and its endorsement of hierarchical 
authority and the established order of things put it at considerable odds with the 
culturally innovative and egalitarian ethos of emancipator), ecopolitical thought. This 
is not to deny that there are certain links and resonances to be found between 
conservatism and Green thought - such as prudence, the desire to conserve existing 
things (buildings, nature reserves, endangered values) to maintain continuity with the 
past, and the rejection of totalitarianism. Indeed, some conservative thinkers have 
New Zealand, ed. Peter Hay, Robyn Eckersley, and Geoff Holloway (Hobart: 
University of Tasmania, 1989), pp. 161-74, and Stephen Rainbow, "New Zealand's 
Values Party: The Rise and Fall of the First National Green Party," in Hay, Eckersley, 
and Holloway, eds., Environmental Politics in Australia and New Zealand, 
pp. 175-88. 
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made an indirect contribution to emancipatory ecopolitical thought (e.g., Thomas 
Carlyle via William Moths, Edmund Burke via William Ophuls). 63 However, these 
interesting resonances and links are substantially overshadowed by the conservative 
tradition's fundamental resistance to the experimental, egalitarian, and nonhierarchical 
ethos of Green theory and practice. It is for this reason that I have summarily 
dismissed conservatism as a serious contender in the emancipatory ecopolitical 
stakes. 
The Emancipatory Ecopolitical Critique of Liberalism 
and Marxism: An Introduction  
Emancipatory ecopolitical theorists have done much to draw attention to the 
similarities between liberalism and Marxism. They have noted, for example, that 
while social relations between humans are theoretically different under capitalism and 
socialism, the relationship between humans and the rest of nature appears to be 
essentially the same. This has also proved to be the case historically. As Langdon 
Winner has remarked: 
A crucial failure in modern political thought and political practice has been an 
inability or unwillingness even to begin ... the critical evaluation and control of 
our society's technical constitution. The silence of liberalism on this issue is 
matched by an equally obvious neglect in Marxist theory. Both pgsuasions 
have enthusiastically sought freedom in sheer material plenitude. °" 
Indeed, the international nature of environmental degradation, extending as it does 
beyond the "iron" and "bamboo" curtains, has lent force to the broader claim by 
emancipatory theorists that the modern ecological crisis is the quintessential crisis of 
industrialism rather than just Western capitalism. Industrialism encompasses the 
"state capitalism" of communist nations as well as the largely privately controlled 
market capitalism of Western nations, both of which are seen by emancipatory 
63. Although I have characterized Ophuls's "bottom line" position as "survivalist," an 
emancipatory approach is nonetheless discernible as a sub-theme in his highly 
eclectic and wide-ranging ecopolitical writings. 
64. Landon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor A Search for Limits in an Age of 
High Technology (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986), p. 57, quoted by Alan 
Drengson in his review of Winner's book in Environmental Ethics 9 (1987): 377-80 at 
p. 377. 
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theorists as resting upon the ideologies of growth and technological optimism. 65 This 
ecological critique is therefore concerned to emphasize the shared expansionary ethos 
of both East and West. In the Soviet Union, this ethos is encapsulated in the 
Programme of the Soviet Communist Party approved in 1961 at the twenty second 
party Congress, which stated that "Communism elevates man to a tremendous level of 
supremacy over nature and makes possible a greater and fuller use of its inherent 
forces."66 One could just as easily substitute Western capitalism for communism in 
this confident assertion of modern humanity's technological mastery of nature. 
To be sure, it was classical liberalism, underpinned by laissez faire  
economics and defended in the writings of John Locke and Adam Smith, rather than 
communism that originally underscored the fundamental direction of modern 
bourgeois political economy by basing it on cornucopian assumptions and an 
expanding economy. As Susan Leeson has argued: 
Lockean thought legitimated endless accumulation of material goods; helped 
equate the process of accumulation with liberty and the pursuit of happiness; 
helped implant the idea that with ingenuity man can go beyond the fixed laws of 
nature, adhering only to whatever temporary laws he establishes for himself in 
the process of pursuing happiness; and helped instill the notion that the 
"commons" is served best through each man's pursuit of private ,gain, because 
there will always be enough for those who are willing to work.° 1 
Within this Lockean framework, the nonhuman world was seen in purely instrumental 
terms, that is, as no more than various kinds of means to human ends. After all, 
according to Locke, the earth had been given to humans for "the support and comfort 
of their being"; moreover, the mixing of human labour with nature was an act of 
65. For a discussion of ecological problems in the growth oriented and state 
controlled economy of Russia, see Marshall I. Goldman, The Spoils of Progress:  
Environmental Pollution in the Soviet Union (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 
1972); D. Powell, "The Social Costs of Modernization: Ecological Problems in the 
U.S.S.R.," World Politics 22 (1972) 329-34; and Fred Singleton, "Eastern Europe: Do 
the Greens Threaten the Reds?," The World Today 42 (1986): 159-62. For a sample 
of problems in Asia and Africa, see Robert Eagle, "China and Tanzania: Economic 
Development and Environmental Problems," in International Dimensions of the  
Environmental Crisis, ed. Richard Barrett (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1982), pp. 239-52 at pp. 243-46. 
66. Singleton, "Eastern Europe," p. 160. 
67. Leeson, "Philosophic Implications of the Ecological Crisis," p. 306. 
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appropriation that created something valuable (i.e., property) out of something 
otherwise valueless (the earth in its state of "natural grace"). 68 
Of course, it must be noted that some influential liberal philosophers have 
challenged this instrumental and expansionary ethos and introduced important 
qualifications concerning the extent to which it is permissible for humans to dominate 
the nonhuman world. Scattered among the writings of J. S. Mill, for example, one 
can find a defence of ecological diversity and a brief but eloquent case for a stationary 
state economy.° And Jeremy Bentham's extension of his utilitarian calculus to all 
sentient beings has provided the philosophical touchstone for contemporary animal 
liberation theorists such as Peter Singer. 7° 
While some emancipatory theorists, such as John Rodman, have noted and 
discussed these by-ways in liberal thought, the general tendency has been to look to 
other political traditions for the ideals and principles that would underpin a 
sustainable and just post-liberal society.71 In Rodman's own words: 
... it seems unlikely, however, that a moral political philosophy that remains 
within the liberal paradigm of salvation through the insatiable transformation of 
nature into property will suffice today, no matter how much the social system 
resultin om acquisition is allowed to be regulated by considerations of 
scarcity. 
68. Ibid., see pp. 305-6. 
69. See J. S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy,  ed. Donald Winch 
(Harmondsworth, U. K.: Penguin, 1979), Chapter 6, pp. 111-17. For a discussion, see 
John Rodman, "The Liberation of Nature?," Inquiry 20 (1977): 83-145 at pp. 115-19. 
70. Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York: Avon Books, 1975). These ideas are 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
71. According to Rodman, J. S. Mill displayed an "ecological sensitivity" in his plea 
for individuality and diversity and his critique of monoculture, both of which Rodman 
interprets as indirectly affirming the intrinsic value of the nonhuman world ("The 
Liberation of Nature?," p. 116). Despite these observations, Rodman nonetheless 
delivers in this article a lengthy and convincing critique of attempts to extend the 
liberal notion of "rights" to the nonhuman world. Moreover, he has elsewhere made it 
clear that liberalism is incompatible with an ecocentric perspective (although he 
carries forward the liberal principles of diversity and tolerance.) See, for example, 
John Rodman, "What is Living and What is Dead in the Political Philosophy of T. H. 
Green," The Western Political Quarterly 26 (1973): 566-86. 
72. Ibid., p. 580. 
31 
Indeed, the classical liberal defenders of individualism and laissez-faire economics 
are seen by emancipatory ecopolitical theorists as apologists for the very dynamic that 
has led to the "tragedy of the commons." And, as the survivalists had shown, the 
logical sequel of this dynamic is authoritarianism from above rather than self-
limitation from below. Moreover, emancipatory theorists largely accept the 
democratic socialist critique of liberalism that the exercise of economic freedom by 
the privileged renders the exercise of both economic and political freedom largely 
illusory to the mass of ordinary working people, the unemployed, and the peoples of 
developing countries. In other words, the exercise of the inalienable rights of the 
individual heralded by liberalism, particularly property rights (which confer the right 
of exclusive use and disposal of land, labour, and capital) together with freedom of 
contract and market incentives, leads to the concentration of ownership and a system 
of power relations that negates the otherwise laudable liberal goal of free, 
autonomous development for everyone. Moreover, emancipatory theorists (like 
democratic socialists) do not consider it an acceptable solution merely to rely on the 
redistributive largesse of the welfare state to iron out excessive inequalities, since this 
merely brings the dispossessed into the market as passive consumers rather than self-
determining producers (their only area of effective choice being how to spend their 
limited welfare cheques). Accordingly, emancipatory ecopolitical theorists re-assert 
the New Left theme of participation and self-management, but in a new ecological 
(rather than cornucopian) context. 
More importantly, since liberal ideals were born in and depended upon a 
frontier setting, claims for distributive justice could only be appeased by the "trickle 
down" effect, providing the stock of wealth continued to expand (thereby maintaining 
relative inequalities in wealth and power). But once the frontier had been exhausted, 
the gap between rich and poor would be bound to intensify and the prospect of 
distributive justice would become more remote. In Rodman's view: 
In our time the Liberal-democratic-welfare-state seems to totter towards the 
ash-heap of history, its originally simple structure encumbered by a thousand 
adaptions, amendments, and compromises. John Rawl's magistral effort to 
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make this monstros,ily intelligible only made more glaring its internal tensions 
and its limitations. 
Similarly, Carl Boggs has argued that the high ideals of liberalism that had been 
proclaimed by Locke, Jefferson, Bentham, and Mill have been 
... transformed into a ritualized belief system barely masking a highly 
centralized and expansionist corporate system. In economic terms liberalism 
failed to generate any new priorities that could encourage a shift away from 
outmoded patterns of production, work, and consumption ... liberalism, 
whatever its claims, is now compromised by a state system with ever shrinking 
ideological boundaries at a time when popular movements are striving to 
broaden those boundaries,„ The two forces - liberalism and the new movements 
- occupy polar extremes. 
This combined ecological and social critique of liberalism led emancipatory 
ecopolitical theorists to eschew the philosophy of "possessive individualism" and turn 
toward alternative political theories that, on the one hand, were more consonant with 
an ecological perspective or, at the very least, respectful of "ecological limits," and, 
on the other hand, were able to foster some kind of democratic, cooperative, and 
communitarian social arrangement. 75 
However, the socialist alternative, while seen by many emancipatory 
theorists to be theoretically preferable to liberal political philosophy insofar as it made 
room for collective economic decision-making and a fairer distribution of society's 
stock of wealth, was found to be ultimately wedded to the same expansionary ethos 
and anthropocentric framework as liberalism. As I show in Chapter 4, Marxists, by 
and large, merely disagreed with liberals on how the drive to cornucopia was to be 
realized and on how the "spoils of progress" were to be managed and divided. Like 
73. John Rodman, "Analysis and History; Or, How the Invisible Hand Works 
Through Robert Nozick," Western Political Quarterly 29 (1976): 197-201 at p. 199. 
As to liberalism's ability to deal with the ecological crisis, it is noteworthy that John 
Rawls has himself acknowledged that his theory of justice is limited to human 
relations and that it may need to be revised in order to encompass our moral relations 
with the nonhuman world. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1976), see pp. 17 and 512. 
74. Carl Boggs, Social Movements and Political Power: Emerging Forms of 
Radicalism in the West (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), pp. 6-7. 
75. Mark Sagoff has likewise observed that "environmentalism may seem, then, to 
involve a sort of communitarianism that is inconsistent with principles traditionally 
associated with a liberal state." See Sagoffs chapter "Can Environmentalists be 
Liberals?" in The Economy of the Earth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), pp. 146-70 at p. 147. 
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Locke, Marx saw economic activity, the act of producing via the appropriation of 
nature, as essential to human freedom. Indeed, Marx's labour theory of value, 
according to which the exchange value of a commodity is determined by labour and 
labour alone, had been heavily influenced by the ideas of the British classical 
economists. Where Marx differed from liberal theorists was in his rejection of the 
institution of private property on the grounds that it gave rise to class domination and 
the appropriation of surplus value from the worker. His was, however, essentially an 
immanent critique of liberalism; that is, he sought to call it to account on the basis of 
its own standards, pointing out its internal contradictions and arguing that universal 
autonomy demanded the extension of democracy beyond political life to include 
social and economic life - especially the workplace. However, like Locke, Marx 
regarded the nonhuman world as no more than the ground of human activity, 
acquiring value if and when it became =stormed by human labour or its extension - 
technology. Despite the Marxist challenge to the inequities of capital accumulation 
and to the contradictions inherent in the liberal ideal of freedom, the Marxist concept 
of freedom was also found to be premised on an anthropocentric outlook and, to adopt 
Langdon Winner's phrase, "sheer material plenitude." Moreover, from a social 
perspective, sceptical critics pointed to two rather disparate and contradictory strains 
in Marxism, namely 
... a commitment to popular self-activity as the basis of social transformation, 
and a rationalizing impulse that gave primacy to a Jacobin-style political 
mobilization from above [i.e., controlby,an autocratic cadre or vanguard that 
determines what is the public interest]. I° 
Was it possible to avoid the latter tendency, which had been borne out in the major 
Marxist revolutions of the modern world? 
The upshot of this critical re-reading of the two most influential pillars of 
modern political philosophy had been sobering. From Hobbes and Locke through to 
Marx the notion of human self-realization through the domination and transformation 
of nature persisted as an unquestioned axiom of political inquiry. As Rodman has 
shown, in the modem era the solution to poverty, injustice, and inequality had become 
. 76. Boggs, Social Movements and Political Power,  p. 7. 
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dependent on the abolition of scarcity via technological innovation and industrial 
growth - an approach that has been traced to the Enlightenment ideal of the 
progressive liberation of humans from all traditional and natural limits. 77 Now, 
however, emancipatory ecopolitical theorists accept the survivalist argument that the 
modern era must be seen as but a temporary suspension of the tradition of scarcity, as 
an aberrant period in human history. Some have likened it to the "pioneer" stage of 
ecological succession (i.e., where rapid growth and aggressive exploitation takes 
place) that must soon phase into a more mature, steady-state, climax community. 78 
As we have seen, orthodox socialist theory - despite its more egalitarian 
promise - did not appear suitable as an alternative framework for an ecologically 
benign, conserver society, at least not without extensive theoretical revision. A key 
question posed for emancipatory theorists was whether there were other strands in the 
broad socialist tradition that were ecologically salvageable. If not, it would be 
necessary to look elsewhere for ecological enlightenment, that is, beyond liberalism 
socialism and toward such alternatives as communitarianism, anarchism, and 
feminism. 
As we shall see in Chapters 4 to 8, however, this new breed of emancipatory 
theorists rapidly divided over the question as to what kind of post-liberal social and 
political theory could best address the interrelated social and environmental problems 
of the modem world: was it Neo-Marxism, Democratic Socialism, Anarchism, 
Feminism, or some revised combination thereof? 
At a more fundamental ecophilosophical level, deep divisions also 
developed over the question concerning our proper relationship to the nonhuman 
world. That is, while most emancipatory theorists agreed that it was not enough 
simply to return to the participatory and counter-cultural ethos of the 1960s (with its 
cornucopian assumptions of an ever growing stock of wealth), serious disagreement 
77. Rodman, "Paradigm Change in Political Science," see p. 61. 
78. See, for example, William R. Catton, Jr. and Riley E. Dunlap, "A New Ecological 
Paradigm for Post-Exuberant Sociology," American Behavioral Scientist  24 (1980): 
15-47, and Ophuls, Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity,  p. 229. 
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developed as to how far the anthropocentric assumptions and technological 
aspirations of the modern world needed to be revised. This, I will argue below, has 
given rise to thg most fundamental division within emancipatory ecopolitical thought. 
The Anthropocentric/Ecocentric Cleavage Within  
Emancipatory Ecopolitical Inquiry 
It should be clear from the above brief introduction to emancipatory 
ecopolitical inquiry that it is best understood as representing a spectrum of thought 
rather than a single political theory or an internally coherent bundle of ideas - a 
situation that reflects the current state of Green political thought. As a means of 
crystallizing the salient features of the ecophilosophical divisions within this spectrum 
of thought and providing a framework within which it may be approached, I divide 
emancipatory ecopolitical thought into two major streams: the anthropocentric 
emancipatory stream and the ecocentric emancipatory stream. The first stream is 
characterized by its concern to articulate an ecopolitical theory that offers new 
opportunities for human emancipation and fulfilment in the context of an ecologically 
sustainable society. The second stream pursues these same goals within the context 
of a broader notion of emancipation that also recognizes the nonhuman world and 
seeks to ensure that it too may unfold in its many diverse ways. This 
anthropocentric/ecocentric cleavage follows the ecophilosophical cleavage that is 
central to the relatively new but rapidly expanding field of environmental philosophy. 
The centrality of this distinction is reflected in the large number of broadly similar 
distinctions that have been coined not only in ecopolitical thought and environmental 
philosophy but also in environmental history and environmental sociology. It is 
reflected, for example, in Arne Naess's influential distinction between shallow 
'ecology and deep ecology; in Timothy O'Riordan's characterization of 
"technocentrism" and "ecocentrism"; in the "Imperialist" and "Arcadian" traditions in 
ecological thought identified by the environmental historian Donald Worster; in 
Murray Bookchin's distinction between "environmentalism" and "social ecology"; and 
in William Catton and Riley Dunlap's distinction between the dominant "Human 
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Exemptionalism Paradigm" of mainstream sociology and the "New Ecological 
Paradigm" of the "post-exuberant age."79 
Although some of these distinctions bear different nuances, they all contrast 
an anthropocentric (i.e., human-centred) approach to the nonhuman world with an 
ecocentric (i.e., ecology-centred or earth-centred) approach to the nonhuman world. 
In the case of the former, the nonhuman world is reduced to a storehouse of resources 
and is considered to have instrumental value only, that is, it is valuable only insofar as 
it can serve as an instrument, or as a means, to human ends. The latter approach, on 
the other hand, also values the nonhuman world - or at least aspects of it - for its own 
sake. 
While Naess's brief but fertile characterization of deep and shallow ecology 
has proved to be the most influential in ecophilosophical circles, I adopt the more 
general ecocentric/anthropocentric distinction for the purposes of this inquiry since it 
is more immediately descriptive of the two opposing orientations it represents. 80 
Besides, as Fox has convincingly shown in the most detailed analysis to date of the 
deep ecology approach to ecophilosophy, the shallow/deep ecology distinction 
79. Arne Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. A 
Summary," Inquiry 16(1973): 95-100. For a thorough account of how and why this 
distinction (which was not the first of its kind) has become so influential in 
ecophilosophical and wider circles, see Warwick Fox, Toward a Transpersonal  
Ecology: Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism  (Boston: Shambhala, 
1990), forthcoming, especially Chapters 2 and 3 (all subsequent page citations refer to 
the prepublication ms). See also O'Riordan, Environmentalism, p. 1; Donald Worster, 
Nature's Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985), P.  xi; Murray Bookchin, Toward an Ecological Society (Montreal: Black 
Rose Books, 1980), pp. 58-59; and Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom (Palo Alto, 
California: Cheshire, 1982), p. 21; William R. Catton, Jr. and Riley E. Dunlap, "A 
New Ecological Paradigm for Post-Exuberant Sociology"; and Canon and Dunlap, 
"Environmental Sociology: A New Paradigm," American Sociologist 13 (1978): 
41-49. 
Although the above list indicates something of the pervasiveness of the deep/shallow 
and comparable distinctions, it is by no means exhaustive. For the most thorough 
survey and discussion of comparable bi-partite distinctions in the ecophilosophical 
literature to date, see Fox, Transpersonal Ecology, pp. 25-41. 
80. I prefer ecocentrism to biocentrism for the reasons given by Fox in "The Deep 
Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate and its Parallels," Environmental Ethics 11(1989): 
5-25 at pp. 7-8. In particular, the prefix "eco" (unlike the prefix "bio") encompasses 
not only individual organisms that are biologically alive but also such things as 
species, populations, and cultures considered as entities in their own right. 
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actually subsumes three fundamental ideas or different senses: a popular sense (which 
argues against anthropocentrism and in favour of a general ecocentric outlook); a 
formal sense (which is concerned with asking deeper questions and deriving norms • 
from fundamentals in accordance with Naess's normative systems approach to 
ecophilosophy); and a philosophical sense (which is concerned to cultivate a mode of 
being that sustains the widest possible identification with all beings and entities). 81 
Fox shows that there is nothing distinctive about the popular sense of deep ecology 
(since many other ecophilosophical schools adopt an ecocentric approach) and that 
the formal sense of deep ecology is untenable (since one can just as easily derive 
anthropocentric norms from fundamental premises as nonanthropocentric norms). 
The philosophical sense of deep ecology, on the other hand, offers both a distinctive 
and tenable approach to ecophilosophy. However, Fox argues that it is more accurate 
to refer to this sense as "transpersonal ecology" - rather than deep ecology - since it 
refers to "the realization of a sense of self that extends beyond (or that is 'trans-) one's 
egoic, biographical, or personal sense of self' (the realization of this expansive sense 
of self is brought about by the process of identification). 82 In this inquiry I will 
therefore use the label "transpersonal ecology" to replace the label "deep ecology" 
unless the context of the discussion requires reference to the older label. 
Transpersonal ecology may be seen as representing one very promising and 
distinctive kind of ecocentric emancipatory approach. 83 
An alternative approach to classification might have been to locate 
emancipatory ecopolitical theory on the familiar left/right political spectrum. 
However, as we have seen, most contributors to this third phase of ecopolitical 
inquiry tend, in any event, to cluster to the left of this traditional spectrum insofar as 
they are seeking some kind of communitarian, co-operative, or democratic socialist 
solution (and here, it is not clear which of these approaches are supposed to be "more 
81.Fox, Transpersonal Ecology, Chapter 4. 
82. Ibid., Chapters 5 and 7. 
83. Examples of other ecocentric approaches are provided in Chapter 2. 
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to the left"). Its use as an analytical framework in this context is therefore decidedly 
limited. 
Another dimension that might be more profitably applied to these various 
left-leaning emancipatory approaches is that of community versus state control. In 
terms of my tripartite characterization of ecopolitical theory, this dimension would 
shed light on the different attempts by emancipatory theorists to resolve the tension 
between the participatory and survivalist themes of ecopolitical thought already 
discussed. It would also bring into sharp relief the differences between emancipatory 
ecopolitical theorists on matters such as political organization and strategy. However, 
as important as these themes are to Green theory (particularly with respect to the 
debates between ecoanarchists and ecosocialists, as I show in Chapters 6 and 7), the 
community versus state control dimension does not highlight what is distinctive about 
the emancipatory approach vis-a-vis the participatory and survivalist approaches to 
ecopolitics (i.e., the emphasis on cultural renewal, the emphasis on developing an 
ecological consciousness, and the critique of industrialism). More importantly, such a 
dimension does not adequately register the major Dcophilosophical debates in 
emancipatory thought between anthropocentric and ecocentric Greens theorists. 
Nonetheless, the community versus state control dimension can serve as a useful' 
adjunct to a more overarching ecophilosophical dimension. 
The anthropocentric/ecocentric dimension registers the major 
ecophilosophical differences within emancipatory ecopolitics and brings into sharp 
focus the novel and challenging scope of these new ideas. Moreover, it does this in a 
way that helps to explain some of the diverging political responses to different 
ecological issues adopted by different schools of emancipatory thought, as I show 
below in my discussion of what I identify as two "litmus test" ecological issues. 
For the reasons developed in the next chapter, I will be arguing that the most 
comprehensive, promising, and distinctive stream in this new emancipatory phase of 
ecopolitical theory is the ecocentric stream. Accordingly, the different emancipatory 
ecopolitical theories examined in the major part of this inquiry will be assessed in 
terms of where they fit on the anthropocentric/ecocentric emancipatory dimension. 
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• To the extent that they fall short of the more comprehensive ecocentric perspective, 
they will be judged inadequate. To the extent that they point to problems associated 
with an ecocentric perspective, their critique will be addressed and evaluated. And to 
the extent that they contribute to the rounding out or further elaboration of an 
ecocentric ecopolitical perspective, particularly on social and institutional questions 
where much work needs to be done, their contribution will be incorporated 
accordingly. 
What, then, are the salient features of the ecocentric emancipatory stream of 
ecopolitical thought? In terms of fundamental priorities, an ecocentric approach 
regards the question as to our proper place in the rest of nature as logically prior to the 
question of what are the most appropriate social and political arrangements for human 
communities. That is, the determination of social and political questions must 
proceed from, or at least be consistent with, an adequate determination of this more 
fundamental question. As exemplified in some of the quotations selected to introduce 
this third phase of inquiry, ecocentric ecopolitical theorists are distinguished by the 
emphasis they place on the need for a radical reconception of humanity's place in 
nature. In particular, ecocentric theorists take exception to the widely held view that 
humans are the pinnacle of evolution and the sole locus of value and meaning in the 
world. Instead, ecocentric theorists adopt an ethical position that regards all of the 
various multilayered parts of the biotic community as valuable for their own sake. 
(There are, of course, different degrees of anthropocentrism and ecocentrism, as I 
show in the following chapter. Here I am characterizing a thoroughgoing ecocentric 
perspective.) 
This special emphasis given to ecological interconnectedness by ecocentric 
theorists provides the basis for a new sense of both empathy and caution. By this I 
mean, on the one hand, a greater sense of compassion for the fate of other life-forms 
(both human and nonhuman) and, on the other hand, a keener appreciation of the fact 
that many of our activities are likely to have a range of unforeseen consequences for 
ourselves and other life-forms. 84 The magnitude of the environmental crisis is seen 
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by ecocentric theorists as evidence of, among other things, an inflated sense of human 
self-importance and a misconceived belief in our capacity to fully understand 
biospherical processes. The ecocentric perspective is presented as a corrective to 
these misconceptions insofar as it underscores the need to proceed with greater 
caution and humility in our "interventions" in ecosystems. 
It was the adoption of this thoroughgoing ecocentric perspective that most 
set this particular group of emancipatory ecopolitical thinkers apart from most of the 
influential New Left theorists of the 1960s who had addressed the problem of 
environmental degradation. To be sure, there has been an important re-assertion by 
ecocentric Green theorists of New Left themes (such as autonomy, self-management, 
and the critique of technocratic rationality) in response to authoritarian ecopolitical 
solutions. However, these themes are now relocated in a new ecocentric theoretical 
framework that draws inspiration from the insights of ecology rather than from the 
essentially human-centred orientation of the New Left. As we shall see in later 
chapters, from the perspective of this new ecocentric framework many of the New 
Left claims of the 1960s are now viewed as either metaphysically misguided (e.g., the 
claim for radical autonomy of thought and action) or too limited in ethical terms (e.g., 
the exclusive focus on human well-being). Anthropocentric emancipatory theorists, 
on the other hand, have maintained greater continuity with the New Left themes of 
the 1960s. The main point of difference, however, is that anthropocentric 
emancipatory theorists have revised the cornucopian assumptions of the 1960s in the 
wake of the "limits to growth debate" of the early 1970s. The result is a more 
ecologically informed (albiet still human-centred) emancipatory theory that provides 
a much more comprehensive critique of economic growth and technocratic 
rationality. 
Emancipatory ecopolitical theory in general, but ecocentric emancipatory 
ecopolitical theory in particular, may be understood as challenging ecopolitical 
84. I use the term "life-forms" throughout this inquiry to include not only individual 
living organisms but also self-regenerating ecological entities such as populations, 
species, ecosystems, and the biosphere. The criterion of self-regeneration, or 
"autopoiesis," is explained and discussed in Chapter 2. 
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discourse and widening its agenda on three interrelated levels: human needs, 
technology, and self-image. At the political level, emancipatory theorists took the 
claims of the ecology movement seriously and began a critical inquiry into the 
structures of human needs and the "appropriateness" of many modern technologies. It 
was no longer considered adequate merely to challenge, say, the site of a nuclear 
power plant, freeway or chemical industry, or merely to insist on better safety devices 
or pollution filters. Instead, this third phase of ecopolitical inquiry sought to draw 
attention to the more fundamental question: to what extent do we really need these 
kinds of energy sources, these means of transport, these industries and technologies, 
and the like? Surely more of us can live richer and fuller lives if we can become less 
dependent on this kind of technological infrastructure and the kinds of commodities 
and lifestyles it offers? As Cornelius Castoriadis observed, whereas the working class 
movement had merely tackled the theme of authority (hence its focus on participatory 
and distributional issues), the ecology movement has questioned 
... the scheme and structure of needs and the way of life. And that constitutes a 
very important transcendence of what could be seen as the unilateral character 
of former movements ... What is at stake in the ecological movement is the 
whole conception, the total position and relation between humanity and the 
world and, fmallyb the central and eternal question: what is human life? What 
are we living for?°° 
As we have seen, ecocentric theorists argue that the political questions as to what are 
legitimate human needs and lifestyles and what are "appropriate" technologies are 
inextricably linked to the more fundamental, philosophical question as to what is 
humanity's proper relationship with the rest of nature. And it is this more 
fundamental layer of questioning into our dominant orientation toward the world that 
has prompted the examination of the stock assumptions of the modern age, most 
notably anthropocentrism and its outgrowth, technological optimism. Moreover, the 
priority accorded to this fundamental layer of questioning by ecocentric Green 
theorists has meant that whatever social and political alternative is to be ultimately 
85. Cornelius Castoriadis, "From Ecology to Autonomy," Thesis Eleven 3 (1981): 
7-22 at p. 20. 
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adopted, it will have to be theoretically compatible with an ecocentric philosophical 
matrix. 
Notwithstanding the important differences between ecocentric and 
anthropocentric theorists, then, it is clear that there are significant commonalities 
between these two streams of emancipatory ecopolitical thought. As we have seen, 
both streams are distinguishable from other ecopolitical approaches in terms of their 
more penetrating diagnosis of environmental problems (i.e., these are seen as 
representing not just a crisis of participation and survival but also a crisis of culture 
and character). Both streams are also united in their optimistic attempt to offer a 
creative synthesis of the themes of participation and survival through the more 
encompassing theme of emancipation, which promises new opportunities for 
universal human self-realization. At the policy level, both streams are critical of 
indiscriminate economic growth, large scale organizations, "hard" (as distinct from 
"soft") energy paths, and ecologically and socially destructive technologies. Where 
these two approaches differ, however, is in the way they integrate these critiques 
theoretically and in the ecophilosophical justifications they provide for their 
alternative theoretical approaches. As we shall see, these different theoretical 
frameworks produce diverging responses to a range of important practical social and 
ecological issues. In particular, I would point to two "litmus" ecopolitical issues that 
highlight these ecophilosophical differences: human population growth and 
wilderness preservation. The ecocentric stream is noted for its greater willingness to 
advocate not simply a lessening of the growth rate of the human population but also a 
long term reduction in human numbers. Rather than address the matter of absolute 
numbers, the anthropocentric stream, on the other hand, tends to emphasise the social 
causes of population growth and argue the case for a more equitable distribution of 
resources between the rich and poor. The ecocentric stream is also noted for its 
greater readiness to advocate the setting aside of large tracts of wilderness, regardless 
of whether such preservation can be shown to be useful in some way to humankind. 
The anthropocentric stream, on the other hand, tends to be more preoccupied with the 
urban and agricultural human environment. Large scale wilderness preservation tends 
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not to be supported unless a human-centred justification can be demonstrated. These 
different emphases (along with numerous others) will emerge in the course of the 
ensuing critical exploration of the major emancipatory theories that are currently 
vying for ascendancy in Green political discourse. 
* * * 
Having located the ecocentric emancipatory stream in the larger body of 
ecopolitical thought, the central questions to be examined in this inquiry can now be 
presented: (i) does an ecocentric approach have a natural ally within the existing 
pantheon of modern political traditions with which it can forge a theoretical linkage; 
or (ii) can an ecocentric approach be assimilated into any one of a number of different 
political traditions after appropriate revisions; or (iii) must ecocentric theorists 
develop an entirely novel social and political arrangement? 
In order to narrow down the field of choice, it will be useful at this stage to 
outline a response to these questions from the perspective of emancipatory 
ecopolitical thought in general. This will provide the general parameters for the 
ensuing inquiry. 
Although there is at present no unanimity among emancipatory ecopolitical 
theorists in response to these questions, definite leanings are discernible. First, as we 
have seen, emancipatory ecopolitical theorists are united by their intention to "head 
off' the acknowledged possibility of the survivalist solution, namely, that only a 
centrally planned, authoritarian state is capable of steering modern industrialized 
society through the convulsive process of de-industrialization into an ecologically 
sustainable, post-industrial society. 
Second, the conservative political tradition may be ruled out as a serious 
contender in the ecopolitical stakes, notwithstanding the resonances with 
emancipatory ecopolitical thought that have been briefly noted in this chapter. This is 
because conservatism's endorsement of the established order, hierarchical authority, 
and paternalism and its resistance to cultural innovation and social and political 
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experimentation put it at considerable odds with the egalitarian and innovative 
orientation of emancipatory ecopolitical thought. 
Third, all emancipatory ecopolitical theorists roundly reject neo-
conservative or "free market" liberalism, since this is understood as giving free rein to 
the very dynamic that has given rise to the "tragedy of the (unmanaged) commons." 
This does not, however, entail an outright rejection of entrepreneurial activity or of 
the market as a method of resource allocation - only that the market become 
subordinate to ecological and social justice considerations. Beyond this, however, 
emancipatory ecopolitical theory, particularly the ecocentric stream, is still very much 
in its infancy and there is so far little agreement as to what mix of private and public 
economic endeavour would best secure a socially just and ecologically sustainable 
society. The arguments for the rejection of classical liberal philosophy have already 
been canvassed earlier in this chapter and will not (apart from a brief discussion in the 
following chapter) be pursued in any detail in the remainder of this inquiry. It should 
be noted, however, that the emancipatory critique of liberalism has not led to an 
outright rejection of the entire cluster of liberal values. The (usually 
unacknowledged) retention by emancipatory theorists of the enduring liberal values of 
tolerance for diversity, basic human rights (e.g., freedom of speech, assembly, and 
association), and (for some) limited government indicates that emancipatory political 
theory is decidedly mg- rather than i-liberal. 
Fourth, although Marxist and neo-Marxist theories have also attracted their 
due share of ecological critiques, they have, on the whole, proved to be more resilient 
than classical liberalism. Marxism's penetrating critique of capitalist relations and its 
promise of universal human self-realization has continued to exert a considerable 
sway on the anthropocentric, and to a much lesser extent, ecocentric streams of 
emancipatory ecopolitical thought. For these reasons, Marxist and neo-Marxist 
responses will be critically explored in detail in Chapters 4 and 5 (if only to show that 
both are ultimately incompatible with an ecocentric perspective). 
Fifth, in view of the broad egalitarian and democratic ethos of emancipatory 
ecopolitical thought and its sympathy with the concerns of new social movements, 
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democratic socialist, utopian socialist, anarchist, and certain feminist approaches have 
enjoyed widespread support among emancipatory theorists of both persuasions. 
Accordingly, these political theories will be examined in Chapters 6, 7, and 8. 86 
Sixth, no emancipatory theorist has been able to come up with an entirely 
novel social and political arrangement, that is, one that has not already been mooted 
in modern social and political theory. By this I am not meaning to argue that there is 
nothing new or distinctive about emancipatory ecopolitical thought, only that the 
newness or distinctiveness of emancipatory ecopolitical thought is not primarily to be 
found in the various social and political forms defended by its theorists. Rather, the 
principal newness or distinctiveness of emancipatory ecopolitical thought (and this 
applies more to the ecocentric than the anthropocentric stream) lies in the different 
ecophilosophical perspective that is brought to bear upon contemporary problems, the 
different and more encompassing kind of critique that is applied to existing social and 
political institutions, and the different and more encompassing ethical and political 
justifications provided for the various (not unfamiliar) social and political 
arrangements that are proposed. 
Having now narrowed down the field of political choice, the central 
questions in this inquiry that I posed above may be reduced to the following single 
question: to what extent are the various post-liberal, neo- and post-Marxist, 
cornmunitarian, and egalitarian traditions identified above (including their various 
tributaries) theoretically compatible with an ecocentric perspective? I intend to show 
that all of these communitarian and egalitarian traditions have certain important 
affinities with an ecocentric perspective, but that significant revisions are also 
required. Generally speaking, this theoretical compatibility with ecocentrism 
increases as we move from ecosocialism, on the one hand, to ecoanarchism and 
ecofeminism, on the other. Nonetheless, I argue that the post-Marxist version of 
ecosocialism provide an important corrective to what may be described as some of the 
86. For a general discussion of the relationship of environmentalism to political 
theory, see P. R. Hay, "Ecological Values and Western Political Traditions: From 
Anarchism to Fascism," Politics (U. K.) 8 (1988): 22-29. 
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"utopian excesses" of ecoanarchism, particularly in underscoring the advantages of 
retaining a democratically accountable state. In this respect, despite the concerted 
emancipatory critique of the modem liberal/welfare democratic state, I argue that, 
from an ecocentric perspective, the case for its circumvention or abolition is 
misguided, or at the very least, considerably premature. 
These various debates within emancipatory ecopolitical theory are examined 
in Part II. In the following chapter I propose to clarify and defend the ecocentric 
perspective that will inform my exploration of this new terrain of Green political 
thought. I will then, in the remaining chapter of Part I, discuss and clarify the socio-
historical context in which emancipatory ecopolitical thought has arisen by relating it 
to the new forms of social opposition that have emerged in Western industrialized 
countries. 
Chapter 2 
Exploring Environmentalism: Why Ecocentrism? 
Introduction 
Although "ecology" is the first of the four pillars of Green politics, there is a 
diversity of views among Green theorists as to its meaning, scope, and political 
consequences. As I argued in Chapter 1, the most fundamental division over the 
meaning of this principle is the division between an anthropocentric and an ecocentric 
ecological orientation. However, these two orientations merely represent the 
opposing poles of a wide spectrum of differing orientations toward nature. In this 
chapter, I will be examining some of the major positions that fall between these two 
poles. In particular, I will be drawing on recent work in environmental philosophy to 
provide an overview and discussion of the major streams of environmentalism. This 
discussion will also provide the conceptual tools that will enable me to evaluate the 
particular kind and degree of anthropocentrism or ecocentrism that is manifest (or 
latent) in the various emancipatory ecopolitical theories to be examined in Part 
This chapter will also outline the case against anthropocentrism and address some of 
the more common criticisms and misunderstandings that are often levelled against, or 
associated with, the ecocentric perspective that is adopted in this inquiry. 
My main concern in this chapter is to distinguish, explain, and defend the 
normative framework that will inform my political inquiry in Part II. It is, of course, 
impossible to prove that one kind of normative framework or set of values is true or 
false in the way in which one can attempt to prove the truth or falsity of an empirical 
statement or a mathematical theorem. Rather, an interpretive inquiry such as this is 
necessarily concerned with determining what kind of normative framework or set of 
values is the most plausible and appropriate candidate with respect to the problem 
under discussion.' As Fox points out, to say that this is "the best that we can do" - as 
1. I am grateful for discussions with Warwick Fox in which he has stressed the 
significance of the criteria of plausibility and appropriateness in normative inquiry. 
47 
48 
if values are a poor relation to scientific facts - is to misunderstand the nature of 
normative argument. Rather, critical discussion of competing values or norms is the 
only way in which one can hope to discover the most plausible and appropriate values 
by which to live.2 
Major Streams of Environmentalis- m3 
In presenting the following overview of the major streams of 
environmentalism, I have drawn heavily on the pioneering typologies of 
environmentalism developed by John Rodman and, more recently, Warwick Fox, who 
elaborates the most exhaustive classificatory scheme in the ecophilsophical 
literature.4 The concern of these thinkers has been to characterize the major 
See also Fox's "New Philosophical Directions in Environmental Decision-Making," 
ms. 1990 (in preparation). See also Ken Wilber, Eye to Eye: The Ouest for the New  
Eggligm (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1983), Chapters 1 and 2, for a 
very clear and succinct discussion of the differences between empiric-analytic inquiry 
and hermeneutic or interpretive inquiry (which includes normative or ethical inquiry), 
and Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest,  trans. Jeremy Shapiro 
(London: Heinemann, 1972), p. 314 (Habermas's ideas are critically examined in 
Chapter 5). 
2. Fox, personal discussions. 
3. Although the phrase "streams of environmentalism" is now in fairly common 
usage, I first came across it in Bill Devall's 1979 manuscript "Streams of 
Environmentalism." A thoroughly revised version of this manuscript appeared as two 
papers: William B. Devall, "Reformist Environmentalism," Humboldt Journal of 
Social Relations 6 (1979): 129-57; and Bill Devall, "The Deep Ecology Movement," 
Natural Resources Journal 20 (1980): 299-322. 
4. John Rodman, "Theory and Practice in the Environmental Movement: Notes 
Towards an Ecology of Experience," in The Search for Absolute Values in A 
Changing World: Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on the Unity of 
the Sciences, vol 1 (San Francisco: The International Cultural Foundation, 1978), 
pp. 45-56; Rodman, "Four Forms of Ecological Consciousness Reconsidered," in 
Ethics and the Environment, eds. Donald Scherer and Thomas Attig (Englewood 
Cliffs, N. J.: 1983), pp. 82-92; Warwick Fox, "Ways of Thinking Environmentally 
(and Some Brief Comments on their Implications for Acting Educationally)," in 
Thinking Environmentally ... Acting Educationally: Proceedings of the Fourth 
National Conference of the Australian Association of Environmental Education,  eds., 
J. Wilson, G. Di Chiro, and I. Robottom (Melbourne: Victorian Association for 
Environmental Education, 1986), pp. 21-29; Warwick Fox, Toward a Transpersonal 
Ecology: Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism  (Boston: Shambhala, 
1990), forthcoming, Chapter 6 (all page citations refer to the prepublication ms). I 
have also drawn on the overview of environmentalism provided by Devall in 
"Reformist Environmentalism"; on John Livingston's critique of anthropocentrism in 
The Fallacy of Wildlife Conservation  (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1981), 
especially Chapter 2; on J. Baird Callicott's comparison of Animal Liberation with 
Leopold's land ethic in "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair," Environmental 
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arguments that underpin, and the problems associated with, different environmental 
positions in order to distinguish and defend an "ecological sensibility" as the basis for 
a general environmental ethic (Rodman) or a similar, but more detailed, 
"transpersonal ecology" approach to ecophilosophy (Fox). Whereas Rodman has 
sought to crystalise the major currents in the history of the environmental movement 
in order to uncover their complexities and ambiguities, Fox has developed a more 
general, analytical map that is intended to provide a close to exhaustive categorization 
of the range of ecophilosophical positions (i.e., whether or not they are represented by 
a particular historical movement). 5 My approach here will be primarily historical 
since my main concern is to relate clusters of particular environmental ideas to 
particular movements and to point out the contribution of, ambiguities in, and 
potential for alliance between these various movements. Above all, I am concerned 
to identify the major currents of contemporary environmentalism that have fed, in 
varying degrees, into the central "ecological pillar" of Green politics. It is very 
important to undertake such a survey in a political inquiry of this kind for the simple 
reason that most Green political theorists (as distinct from ecophilosophers) have so 
far paid insufficient attention to articulating the ambit of the central pillar of ecology 
in any kind of detail or to exploring the social and political implications of different 
kinds of environmental postures. 
Ethics 2 (1980): 311-38; and on John Rodman's critique of Animal Liberation in "The 
Liberation of Nature?," Inquiry 20 (1970): 83-131. 
5. Rodrnan's typology (as presented in "Four Forms") is (i) resource conservation, 
(ii) wilderness preservation, (iii) moral extensionism, and (iv) ecological sensibility. 
Fox, on the other hand, (in Transpersonal Ecology, Chapters 6 and 7) distinguishes 
between (i) instrumental value theory, (ii) intrinsic value theory, and 
(iii) transpersonal ecology. Fox subdivides instrumental value theory approaches into 
(i) unrestrained exploitation and expansionism, (ii) resource conservation and 
development, and (iii) resource preservation. He subdivides intrinsic value theory 
approaches into (i) ethical sentientism, (ii) biological ethics, (iii) autopoietic ethics 
(which includes ecosystem ethics and ecosphere - or "Gaian" - ethics), and 
(iv) cosmic purpose ethics. In contrast to these axiological (i.e., value theory) 
approaches, transpersonal ecology represents a psychological approach to 
ecophilosophy. A considerably earlier version of Fox's categories (in "Ways of 
Thinking Environmentally") has also been used by Alan Drengson in "Protecting the 
Environment, Protecting Ourselves: Reflections on the Philosophical Dimension," in 
Environmental Ethics, vol. 2, ed. R. Bradley and S. Duguro (Vancouver: Simon 
Fraser University, 1989), pp. 35-52, see p. 44. 
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Moving from the anthropocentric toward the ecocentric poles, the major 
positions that I will be discussing are Resource Conservation, Human Welfare 
Ecology, Preservationism, Animal Liberation, and Ecocentrism. 6 This spectrum 
represents a general movement from an economistic and instrumental environmental 
ethic towards a comprehensive and holistic environmental ethic that is able to 
accommodate the concerns of human centred environmentalists (for, say, a 
sustainable "natural resource base," a safe environment, or "urban amenity") while at 
the same time respecting the integrity of other life-forms. However, since part of my 
concern is to draw out the ambiguities in, and the potential for forming alliances 
between, some of these historical currents of environmentalism, the general 
movement from anthropocentrism to ecocentrism will not appear as a strict linear 
progression. For example, some of the arguments for Preservationism are more 
ecocentric than those for Animal Liberation while other Preservationist arguments 
represent a variation of some of the arguments used by the Human Welfare Ecology 
stream. 
This general overview of environmentalism will also help to explain how 
some currents of environmentalism have had more influence in some countries than 
others and how this has influenced both the nature and goals of the Green movement 
and the expression of Green theory in those countries. For example, the Human 
Welfare Ecology stream has played a relatively more prominent role in Europe 
whereas the Preservationist stream has had more influence in "New World" regions 
such as North America and Australasia (where there are considerably more areas of 
wilderness to preserve!). 7 This has given rise to different emphases in Green theory 
and practice in those regions. Moreover, I will show in later chapters how those 
environmental streams clustering toward the anthropocentric end of the spectrum can 
be easily accommodated within most modern political traditions whereas those 
6. I do not discuss the most blatant anthropocentric environmental position, which 
Fox characterizes as unrestrained exploitation and expansionism, since no 
emancipatory ecopolitical theorist would support this position. 
7. This point is developed further in Robyn Eckersley, "Green Theory and Practice in 
the Old and New Worlds: A Comparative Perspective," 1990, ms. 
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clustering toward the ecocentric end cannot easily mesh with these traditions, at least 
not in the absence of major theoretical revisions. 
It is interesting to note, by way of comparison, that Samuel Hays, in his 
major historical survey of environmental politics in the United States from 
1955-1985, distinguishes between what he calls the older conservation movement 
(concerned with the scientific management of physical resources - this mostly 
corresponds with my Resource Conservation category) and the new environmental 
movement (a post-World War IL popular movement concerned with the pursuit of 
"environmental quality").8 Hays describes the new movement as encompassing three 
interrelated concerns - Beauty (i.e., aesthetic quality), Health (broadly construed to 
include safety and well being in the domestic environment), and Permanence (i.e., 
ecological balance and sustainability). Although there is a considerable resonance 
between these three categories and my Preservationism, Human Welfare Ecology, and 
Resource Conservation categories respectively, there are also important differences. 
In particular, Hays does not discuss the Animal Liberation movement and he pays 
scant attention to the philosophical and political implications of the critique of 
anthropocentrism that has developed out of the Preservationist and Animal Liberation 
movements (a critique that has been taken up and considerably developed by 
ecocentric theorists). 
There is, of course, a considerable overlap between the various major 
currents of environmentalism to be discussed in terms of their practical upshot. 
However, I hope to show that these currents vary markedly in their 
comprehensiveness and philosophical basis and that this has important implications 
when it comes to deciding which perspective (or synthesis of perspectives) is best 
able to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the central ecological pillar in Green 
political thought. 
8. Samuel P. Hays, Beauty. Health and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the 
United States. 1955-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), see 
Chapter 1. 
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(i) Resource Conservation 
Although the idea of conservation, in the sense of the "prudent husbanding" 
of nature's bounty, can be traced back as far as Cicero and the Old and New 
Testaments, its 20th century scientific and utilitarian manifestation is intricately 
bound up with the rise of modern science from the 16th century. 9 Those who have 
inquired into the historical roots of the modern conservation doctrine have generally 
traced its popularization in North America to Gifford Pinchot, the first chief of the 
U. S. Forest Service, who has been described by Devall as the "prototype figure in the 
[conservation] movement" 10 Central to Pinchot's notion of conservation was the 
elimination of waste, an idea that the environmental historian Samuel P. Hays has 
dubbed "the gospel of efficiency" lying at the heart of the doctrine of conservation. 11 
Yet Pinchot's ideas were also deeply imbued with the ethos of the Progressive era to 
which he belonged; indeed, in his book The Fight for Conservation, he identified 
"development" as the first principle of conservation, with "the prevention of waste" 
and development "for the benefit of the many, and not merely the profit of the few" 
forming the second and third principles respectively. 12 Moreover, as McConnell 
9. See Clarence J. Glacken, "The Origins of the Conservation Philosophy," in 
Readings in Resource Management and Conservation,  ed. Ian Burton and Robert W. 
Kates (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965), pp. 158-63 at p. 158. 
10. Deva11, "Reform Environmentalism," p. 140. See also Grant McConnell, "The 
Environmental Movement: Ambiguities and Meanings," Natural Resources Journal 
11(1971): 427-35; Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency  
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959); and Rodman, "Four Forms." Glacken, 
on the other hand, has cited the geographer George Perkins Marsh's treatise Man and 
Nature: or Physical Geography as Modified by Human Action  (1864) as providing the 
first systematic treatise establishing the need to carefully husband the lands of the 
New World so as to avoid disturbing "the balance of nature." (See Glacken, "The 
Origins of the Conservation Philosophy," p. 161.) 
11. Devall has described Pinchot's autobiography Breaking New Ground (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1947) as "a succinct statement of the values of this 
reformist movement and a description of the origins of the U. S. Forest Service, one 
of the largest resources development agencies in the world" ("Reform 
Environmentalism," p. 141). 
12. Pinchot, The Fight for Conservation  (New York: Doubleday Page and Co., 1910), 
p. 46. McConnell notes that the principle of development was "in part a reply to those 
critics who claimed that the goal of conservationists was the mere 'withholding of 
resources for future generations,' a form of hoarding." However he also notes that, in 
any event, the principle of development was one to which "the movement under 
Pinchot's guidance was deeply committed." Grant McConnell, "The Conservation 
Movement: Past and Present," in Readings in Resource Management and 
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observes, it was taken for granted that the principle of waste prevention meant 
"maximising output of economic goods per unit of human labour." 13 According to 
Devall, the Pinchot-led conservation movement in the United States helped to 
"professionalize 'resource management" and further the centralization of power in 
large public bodies (such as the U.S. Forest Service) based on principles of "scientific 
management " 14 
Rodman has labelled this modern scientific and utilitarian approach to land 
management the "Resource Conservation" movement and has described it as "an 
unconstrained total-use approach, whose upshot is to leave nothing in its natural 
condition (for that would be a kind of 'waste,' and waste should be eliminated)." 15 
Similarly, Devall and Fox refer to this perspective as the "Resource Conservation md 
Development" perspective in order to underscore the point that waste meant not only 
the inefficient use of natural resources but also their nonutilization. 
The Resource Conservation perspective may be seen as the first major stop, 
as it were, as one moves away from an unrestrained development approach. Not 
surprisingly, it is the least controversial stream of contemporary environmentalism - 
indeed, it has become somewhat of a foe to more radical streams of 
environmentalism. This perspective conforms to an essentially utilitarian framework 
that seeks the "greatest good for the greatest number" (including future generations) 
by reducing waste and inefficiency in the exploitation and consumption of 
nonrenewable "natural resources" (e.g., oil) and ensuring a maximum sustainable 
yield in respect of renewable resources (e.g., fisheries, soil, crops, and timber). 16 As 
Conservation, ed. by Ian Burton and Robert W. Kates (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1965), pp. 189-201 at p. 191. 
13.McConnell, "The Environmental Movement," p. 430. 
14.Devall, "Reform Environmentalism," p. 140. 
15.Rodman, "Four Forms," p. 83. 
16.I am using the term "utilitarian" here in the Pinchot sense to mean the wise-use 
and management of resources to ensure "the greatest good for the greatest number of 
people." This is not, strictly speaking, part of the modem school of utilitarian moral 
philosophy founded by Bentham (referred to below in my discussion on Animal 
Liberation) since Bentham's hedonistic (i.e., pleasure maximising and pain 
minimising) principles were extended to JJ sentient creatures. 
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such, it is a perspective that is inextricably tied to the production process and, by 
virtue of that fact, necessarily regards the nonhuman world in use-value terms. This 
is reflected, inter alia, in the language used by adherents of this stream of 
environmentalism; after all, "resources" are, as Neil Evernden points out, "indices of 
utility to industrial society. They say nothing at all of experiential value or intrinsic 
worth." 17 Similarly, Laurence Tribe has argued that to treat human material  
satisfaction as the only legitimate referent of environmental policy analysis and 
"resource management" leads to "the dwarfing of soft-variables" such as the aesthetic, 
recreational, psychological, and spiritual needs of humans and the different needs of 
pther life-forms. 18 While the recognition of the use-value of the nonhuman world 
must form a necessary part of any comprehensive environmental ethic, Resource 
Conservation is too limited a perspective to form the exclusive criterion of even a 
thoroughly anthropocentrically based environmental ethic. 
(ii) Human Welfare Ecology 
Like the Resource Conservation stream, the movement for a safe, clean, and 
pleasant human environment has a long pedigree, although the pace, reach, and 
expectations of such concern has grown considerably since the onset of the industrial 
revolution, and even more so since the 1960s. Whereas the labour movement had 
been in the forefront of the early wave of demands for a safer and more agreeable 
work environment (and Engels' classic 1845 critique of the conditions of the Victorian 
working class must be seen as a major milestone in the development of this 
movement), the late 20th century bearers of this stream have increasingly been 
citizens, consumers, and "householders" rather than waged employees. 19 This is 
17. Neil Evernden, "The Environmentalist's Dilemma," in The Paradox of 
Environmentalism, ed. Neil Evernden (Downsview, Ontario: Faculty of 
Environmental Studies, York University, 1984): 7-17 at p. 10. See also Livingston, 
The Fallacy of Wildlife Conservation, pp. 43-46. 
18.Laurence Tribe, "Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for 
Environmental Law," The Yale Law Journal 83 (1974): 1315-48. See also 
Livingston, The Fallacy of Wildlife Conservation, pp. 24-34. 
19.Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England, trans. and ed. 
W. 0. Henderson and W. H. Chaloner, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971). 
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reflected in the increasing role played by women in urban ecological protest and in 
the changing sites of political struggle - from the factory to the household, street, 
shopping mall, and local municipal government. That Human Welfare Ecology 
protest may appear today to be a peculiarly late 20th century phenomenon is 
attributable as much to the rapid escalation in urban and agricultural environmental 
problems since the Second World War as to the emergence of "postmaterial" values 
borne by the so-called "new middle class." 20 The accumulation of toxic chemicals or 
"intractable wastes"; the intensification of ground, air, and water pollution generally; 
the growth in new "diseases of affluence" (e.g., heart disease, cancer); the growth in 
urban and coastal high rise development; the dangers of nuclear plants and nuclear 
wastes; the growth in the nuclear arsenal; and the problem of global warming and the 
thinning of the ozone layer have posed increasing threats to human survival, safety, 
and well-being. 
The goals of the Human Welfare Ecology stream for a cleaner, safer, and 
more pleasing human environment are relatively straightforward and represent a more 
generalized form of prudence and enlightened self-interest than the Resource 
Conservation stream - indeed they provide an important challenge to the narrow, 
economistic focus of Resource Conservationists. Whereas the Resource Conservation 
movement has been primarily concerned with improving economic productivity by 
achieving the maximum sustainable yield of "natural resources" the major 
preoccupation of the Human Welfare Ecology movement has been the health, safety, 
and general amenity of the urban and agricultural environments - a concern that is 
often encapsulated in the term "environmental quality. " 21 Expressed slightly 
differently, the Resource Conservation stream may be seen as primarily concerned 
20. On the rise of post-material values, see Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution:  
Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1977) and Inglehart, "Post-Materialism in an Environment of 
Insecurity," The American Political Science Review 75 (1981): 880-900. For a 
critical discussion of Inglehart's thesis see Robyn Eckersley, "Green Politics and the 
New Class: Selfishness or Virtue?" Political Studies 37 (1989): 205-23. See also 
Hays, Beauty. Health and Permanence, pp. 34-35. 
21. Livingston, The Fallacy of Wildlife Conservation, pp. 34-41. 
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with the waste and depletion of natural resources whereas the Human Welfare 
Ecology stream may be seen as primarily concerned with the degradation or state of 
health and resilience of the general physical and social environment. For the Human 
Welfare Ecology stream, then, "sustainable development" means not merely 
sustaining the natural resources base but also sustaining human health and security. 
In focussing on both the physical m.d social limits to growth, Human Welfare 
Ecology has done much to draw attention to those "soft variables" neglected by the 
Resource Conservation perspective, such as the health, amenity, recreational, and 
psychological needs of human communities. 
More significantly, the Human Welfare Ecology stream, unlike the Resource 
Conservation stream, has been highly critical of economic growth and the idea that 
science and technology alone can deliver us from the ecological crisis (although it 
has, of course, been dependent on the findings of ecological science to mount its 
case). Indeed, the kind of ecological perspective that has informed this stream of 
environmentalism is encapsulated in Barry Commoner's "four laws of ecology": 
everything is connected to everything else, everything must go somewhere, nature 
knows best (i.e., any major human intervention in a natural system is likely to be 
detrimental to that system), and there is no such thing as a free lunch. 22 These 
popularly expressed ecological insights have challenged the technological optimism 
of modern society and the confident belief that, in time, we can successfully manage 
all our large-scale interventions in natural systems without any negative consequences 
for ourselves. The realization that there is no "away" where we can dump our 
garbage, toxic and nuclear wastes, and other kinds of pollution has given rise to calls 
for a new stewardship ethic - that we must protect and nurture the biological support 
system upon which we are dependent. Practically, this has led to widespread calls for 
"appropriate technology" and "soft" energy paths, organic agriculture, alternative 
medicine, public transport, recycling, and, more generally, a revaluation of human 
needs and a search for more ecologically benign lifestyles. 
22. Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature. Man and Technology (New York: 
Bantam, 1972), pp. 29-44. 
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Since it is in urban areas that we find the greatest concentration of 
population, pollution, industrial and occupational hazards, traffic, dangerous 
technologies, planning and development conflicts, and hazardous wastes, it is hardly 
surprising that cities and their hinterlands have provided the major locale and focus of 
political agitation for the Human Welfare Ecology stream. Nor is it surprising that 
Human Welfare Ecology has been the strongest current of environmentalism in Green 
politics in the most heavily industrialized and domesticated regions of the West, most 
notably Europe. In particular, the many different popular environmental protests or 
"citizen's initiatives" in West Germany that provided the major impetus to the 
formation of Die Grunen have primarily been urban ecological protests falling within 
this general rubric. Not surprisingly, the ecological pillar in pie Grunen's platform is 
generally couched in the language of Human Welfare Ecology. 23 
By virtue of its primary concern for human welfare in the domesticated 
environment, however, this stream has generally mounted its case on the basis of an 
anthropocentric perspective. That is, the public justification given for environmental 
reforms by Human Welfare Ecology activists has tended to appeal to the enlightened 
self-interest of the human community (e.g., for giff survival, for our children, for =- 
future generations, for our health and amenity). Indeed, the Human Welfare Ecology 
stream has no need to go any further than this in order to make its case: it is enough to 
point out that "we must look after nature because it looks after Li." Moreover, 
defenders of this perspective can say to their ecocentric critics that Human Welfare 
Ecology reforms would, in any event, directly improve the well-being of the 
nonhuman community as well. Why, they ask, should we challenge the public and 
lose the support of politicians with perplexing and off-beat ideas like "nature for its 
own sake" when we can achieve substantially the same ends as those sought by 
ecocentric theorists on the basis of our own acceptable anthropocentric arguments? 
The ecocentric rejoinder, however, is that if we restrict our perspective to a Human 
23. Die Grunen, Programme of the German Green Party (London: Heretic Books, 
1983), P.  7. Concern for the protection of other species can, however, be found at 
pp. 34-35. 
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Welfare Ecology perspective we can provide no protection to those species that are of 
no present or potential use or interest to humankind. At best wildlife might "emerge 
as a second-generation [i.e., derivative] beneficiary" from Human Welfare Ecology 
reforms.24 More generally, an anthropocentric framework is also likely to wind up 
reinforcing attitudes that are detrimental to the achievement of a comprehensive 
environmental reform in the long run because human interests will always 
systematically trump the interests of the nonhuman world. 25 As Fox puts it, 
employing only anthropocentric arguments for the sake of expediency might win the 
occasional environmental battle in the short term. However, in the long term "one is 
contributing to losing the ecological war by reinforcing the cultural perception that 
what is valuable in the nonhuman world is valuable only insofar as it is valuable to 
humans. 1126 
Preservationism 
If the essence of the Resource Conservation stream is the "wise-use" of 
"natural resources," and the essence of the Human Welfare Ecology stream is the 
health, amenity, and safety of the domesticated environment, then the essence of the 
early Preservationist stream may be described as reverence, in the sense of the 
aesthetic and spiritual appreciation of wilderness (i.e., nonhuman nature that has not, 
or only marginally, been domesticated by humans). 27 In North American 
environmental history, the conflict between Gifford Pinchot and the U. S. Forest 
Service, on the one hand, and John Muir and the Sierra Club, on the other hand, is 
generally taken as the archetypical example of the differences between Resource 
Conservation and Preservation, a difference that came to a head in the battle over 
24. Livingston, The Fallacy of Wildlife Conservation, p. 42. 
25. For a similar discussion, see Evernden, "The Environmentalist's Dilemma." 
26. Fox, Transpersonal Ecology,  p. 304. 
27. On the distinction between Resource Conservation and Preservationism, see 
Rodman, "Four Forms," p. 84. 
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Hetch Hetchy.28 In short, whereas Pinchot was concerned to conserve nature Loi. 
development, Muir's concern was to preserve nature from development. 29 
The precedent for the reservation of large wilderness areas was set in the 
latter half of the 19th century, the most significant milestone being the designation of 
over two million acres of northwestern Wyoming as Yellowstone National Park in 
1872. According to Nash, this designation was "the world's first instance of large-
scale wilderness preservation in the public interest." 3° However, similar 
developments were also occurring in Australia; the eighteen thousand acre Royal 
National Park, near Sydney (set aside in 1879 "for the use of the public forever as a 
national park"), is often cited as the second oldest national park. 31 Whereas the early 
reservations were made primarily in order to preserve "scenery" and provide 
recreational facilities for public use, the 20th century has witnessed a considerable 
broadening of the case for preservation along with its base of popular support. 
It is noteworthy that, whereas wilderness was once feared by the early 
European colonists in New World regions such as Australasia and North America as a 
hostile force to be tamed, to an increasing number of Westerners wilderness has 
become, for a complex range of reasons, a subject of reverence, enlightenment, and a 
locus of tangible and symbolic values both threatened and new. The recent success of 
28. This conflict concerned the building of a dam at Hetch Hetchy (a canyon formed 
by the Tuolumne River in Yosemite national park), with Pinchot arguing for the 
economic and public benefits of the dam in providing a much needed water supply to 
the inhabitants of San Francisco and Muir arguing that Hetch Hetchy was a holy place 
that must be protected from "desecration" at any cost. See Rodman, "Four Forms," 
and Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind,  3rd ed. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1982). 
29. On the difference between conservation and preservation, see John Passmore, 
Man's Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions,  2nd 
ed. (London: Duckworth, 1980), p. 73. 
30. Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind,  p. 108. 
31. J. G. Mosley, "Toward a History of Conservation in Australia," in Australia as  
Human Setting, ed. Amos Rapaport (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1972), 
pp. 136-54 at p. 148. It appears that Australia was the first country to use the name 
"national park," although the United States was the first to reserve a large area of 
wilderness. As Nash puts it, "the United States (in fact) and Australia (in name) both  
invented the national park." See Roderick Nash, "The Confusing Birth of National 
Parks," Michigan Ouarterly Review 19 (1980): 216-26 at p. 226. 
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the Tasmanian Wilderness Society's campaign to "save" the Franklin river from a 
proposed dam by the Hydro-Electric Commission of Tasmania is one of the latest in a 
series of preservationist campaigns that have drawn support from a growing 
wellspring of popular Sentiment and concern for the flourishing of pristine 
wilderness.32 Indeed, it is arguably the campaigns for wilderness preservation, more 
than any other environmental campaigns, that have generated the most radical 
philosophical challenges to stock assumptions concerning our place in the scheme of 
things, thereby forcing theorists to confront the question of the moral standing of the 
nonhuman world. Despite John Muir's pious and outmoded vocabulary, his public 
defence of "wild nature" has made a lasting impression on the modern environmental 
imagination: 
The world we are told was made for man. A presumption that is totally 
unsupported by the facts ... Nature's object in making animals and plants might 
possibly be first of all the happiness of each one of them, not the creation of all 
for the happiness of one. Why ought man to value himself as more than an 
infinitely small composing unit of the one great unit of creation, and what 
creature of all that the Lord has t en the pains to make is less essential to the 
grand completeness of that unit? 
The link between Muir's particular pantheistic world-view and the ecocentric 
philosophy of more recent times is widely acknowledged although there are important 
differences. Rodman, for example, has argued that Muir's egalitarian orientation 
toward other species was "faint in comparison to the religious/esthetic theme" in his 
life and writings - and that an ethic that is primarily based on awe has significant 
limitations. 34 Insofar as wilderness appreciation has developed into a cult in search 
of sublime settings for "peak experiences" or simply places of rest, recreation, and 
aesthetic delight - "tonics" for jaded Western souls - it tends to converge with the 
Resource Conservation and Human Welfare Ecology positions in offering yet another 
32. The assertion of an ecocentric/biocentric ethic was central to this campaign. See 
Gary Easthope and Geoff Holloway, "Wilderness as the Sacred: The Franklin River 
Campaign," in Environmental Politics in Australia and New Zealand, ed. by Peter 
Hay, Robyn Eckersley, and Geoff Holloway (Hobart: Centre for Environmental 
Studies, University of Tasmania, 1989), pp. 189-201. 
33. Stephen Fox, John Muir and His Legacy (Boston: Little Brown, 1981), pp. 52-53. 
34. Rodman, "Theory and Practice," p. 51, and "Four Forms," pp. 84-86. 
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kind of human-centred justification for restraining development. Moreover, this kind 
of preservationism has sometimes been unduly selective in that it has traditionally 
tended to single out those places that are aesthetically appealing according to Western 
cultural mores (e.g., pristine lofty mountains, grand canyons, and wild rivers). These 
areas are often considered holier and therefore more worthy of being "saved" than 
places that lack the requisite grandeur or sublime beauty (e.g., wetlands and degraded 
farm land) - even though the latter may be more ecologically significant or contain 
threatened species. This trend has been gradually reversed, however, as the 
preservationist movement has become more ecologically informed and flowered into 
what I call "ecocentric environmentalism" (this more comprehensive stream of 
environmentalism is explained and discussed below). 
Finally, from an ecological point of view, it is self-defeating to focus 
exclusively on setting aside pockets of pristine wilderness while ignoring the growing 
problems of overpopulation and pollution since these problems will sooner or later 
impact upon the remaining fragments of wild nature. As Rodman has perceptively 
observed, "the logic of preserving wilderness and wildlife on artificial islands 
surrounded by the sea of civilization seems to involve its own mode of 
destruction."35 In this respect, the Human Welfare Ecology movement is an essential 
complement to the Preservationist movement, as most contemporary wilderness 
activists now recognize. This is because most of the environmental reforms pursued 
by Human Welfare Ecology activists help, albeit indirectly, to secure the ecological 
integrity of wilderness areas (e.g., by minimising pollution, conserving energy, and 
recycling resources). 
More recently, environmental philosophers have pointed to the wide range 
of anthropocentric utilitarian arguments that have been advanced in favour of 
wilderness preservation (some of which have already been canvassed above). Fox 
provides the most exhaustive classification of these arguments to date. 36 Building on 
35. Rodman, "The Liberation of Nature?," p. 112. 
36. See the section on "Resource Preservation" in Fox, Transpersonal Ecology, 
Chapter 6. 
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and adding to work by William Godfrey-Smith and George Sessions, Fox identifies 
nine kinds of argument for preserving the nonhuman world on the basis of its 
instrumental value. He refers to these as the "life-support," "early warning system," 
"laboratory," "silo," "gymnasium," "art gallery," "cathedral," "monument," and 
"psychogenetic" arguments. He also divides these nine arguments into five general 
categories of argument that emphasize the "physical nourishment value," the 
"informational value," the "experiential value," the "symbolic instructional value," 
and the "psychological nourishment value" of the nonhuman world to humans. 
It is easy to see how many of the more tangible arguments for the 
preservation of wilderness can be quite persuasive politically, especially the more 
economically inclined arguments such as those that refer to the recreational potential 
of wilderness or those that demonstrate the importance of maintaining genetic 
diversity to provide new applications in medicine and agriculture. However, it is 
important not to underestimate the political potency of some of the less tangible 
arguments for wilderness preservation. For example, the preservation of wild nature 
is seen by many as both a symbolic act of resistance against urban and cultural 
monoculture and the materialism and greed of consumer society gal a defence (both 
real and symbolic) of a certain cluster of values such as freedom, spontaneity, 
community, diversity, and, in some cases, national identity. 37 Many of these 
sentiments have been forcefully expressed in the observations of the novelist and 
Franklin River blockader James McQueen who wrote in his tribute to the Franklin 
campaign that the Franklin was "not just a river" but rather 
... the epitome of all the lost forests, all the submerged lakes, all the tamed 
rivers, all the extinguished species. It is threatened by the same mindless beast 
that has eaten our past, is eating our present, and threatens to eat our future: that 
civil bet of mean ambitions and broken promises and hedged bets and tawdry 
profits?' 
37. For example, Brian Norton has argued that when "we manipulate and control 
natural processes, we strike at our own freedom, symbolically and actually" (see 
Brian Norton, "Sand Dollar Psychology," The Washington Post Magazine,  1 June, 
1986, pp. 10-14 at p. 14) while Mark Sagoff has argued that wilderness is part of 
America's heritage and forms an important symbol of the nation's character and 
history (see Mark Sagoff, "On Preserving the Natural Environment," The Yale Law 
launal 84 [1974]: 205-67). 
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Part of the political potency of arguments of this latter kind lies in the fact 
that the defence of wild nature is at the same time a defence of a certain cluster of 
values of social consequence, that is, they represent not only a defence of biological 
diversity and of "letting things be" but also a renewed assault on the one-
dimensionality of technological society. In this respect, Thoreau's oft-quoted dictum - 
"in wilderness is the preservation of the world" - may be seen as a taking on a both an 
ecological mcl political meaning. 
While many of the arguments discussed above are essentially instrumental 
and anthropocentric (since they are primarily concerned with defending the material 
and experiential benefits of wilderness to humankind), some also address deep-seated 
questions concerning human identity in a way that has invited a shift in our general 
orientation toward the world, both human and nonhuman. This is because examining 
our relationship to other life-forms tells us something about ourselves - about our 
modern character and the kinds of values and dispositions that our society encourages 
or discourages.39 The most radical argument to emerge from this kind of 
ecophilosophical soul searching - an argument foreshadowed by Muir - is that we 
should not only value nature for its instrumental value to lla but also for its intrinsic 
value (i.e., for its own sake, regardless of its instrumental value to us). It is in this 
particular respect that the Preservationist stream of environmentalism may be seen as 
the harbinger of ecocentrism. 
(iv) Animal Liberation 
Alongside the three major streams of environmentalism discussed above is a 
fourth stream that has developed relatively independently and has its origins in the 
various "humane" societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals that emerged in 
the 18th and 19th centuries. The modern Animal Liberation movement, unlike the 
38. See James McQueen, The Franklin: Not Just a River  (Ringwood, Victoria: 
Penguin, 1983), p. 2. 
39. See Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural 
Environments," Environmental Ethics 5 (1983): 211-24. Hill suggests that 
indifference to nonsentient nature, while not a moral vice, is nonetheless "likely to 
reflect either ignorance, a self-importance, or a lack of self-acceptance which we must 
overcome to have proper humility" (p. 222). 
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Resource Conservation, Human Welfare Ecology, and Preservation movements, has 
from its inception consistently championed the moral worthiness of certain members 
of the nonhuman world.' ° However, while the Animal Liberation movement might 
have been one of the first streams of environmentalism to have stepped 
unambiguously over what might be called the "great anthropocentric divide," such a 
step, as many ecophilosophical critics have recently pointed out, was not as 
momentous as it might first appear. In the view of these critics the philosophical 
foundations of the Animal Liberation movement are unduly limited and fall well short 
of a rounded ecocentric world-view.41 
The popular case for the protection of the rights of animals is a relatively 
straightforward revival of the arguments of the modern utilitarian school of moral 
philosophy founded by Jeremy Bentham. In enlarging the conventional domain of 
ethical theory, Bentham had argued that human obligation ought to extend to all 
beings capable of experiencing pleasure and pain, regardless of what other 
characteristics they may possess or lack. The important question for Bentham in 
respect of whether beings were morally considerable was "not, Can they reason? nor, 
Can they WI? but, Can they Suffer?" 42 
In drawing on Bentham's moral philosophy, the contemporary animal rights 
theorist Peter Singer has argued in favour of the moral principle of equal 
consideration (as distinct from treatment) of the interests of all sentient beings 
40. I have used the description "Animal Liberation movement" in view of the 
popularity of Peter Singer's influential defence of the rights of animals in _ALi_ng  
Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: Avon Books, 
1975). See also Peter Singer, ed., In Defence of Animals (London: Basil Blackwell, 
1985). 
41. Rodman, "The Liberation of Nature?"; Paul Shepard, "Animal Rights and Human 
Rites," North American Review, Winter 1974, pp. 35-41; Tribe, "Ways'Not to Think 
About Plastic Trees," pp. 1344-45; J. Baird Callicott, "Animal Liberation"; Rodman, 
"Four Forms," pp. 86-88; John Livingston, "The Dilemma of the Deep Ecologist," in 
The Paradox of Environmentalism, ed. Neil Evemden (Downsview, Ontario: Faculty 
of Environmental Studies, York University, 1984), pp. 61-72; and Warwick Fox, 
"Towards a Deeper Ecology?" Habitat Australia, August 1985, pp. 26-28. 
42. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 
(1789) Chapter 17, quoted by Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 8. 
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regardless of what kind of species they are. 43 The criterion of sentience is pivotal. 
For example, Singer has insisted that the "capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a 
prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can 
speak of interests in a [morally] meaningful way" - indeed, he has argued that the 
criterion of sentience it is the "only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of 
others." 	question as to what is a sentient being is not always easy to 
determine. Singer has sought to show that there is ample evidence that mammals, 
birds, reptiles, fish and, to a lesser extent, crustaceans all feel pain. He concedes that 
determining the exact cut-off point is difficult but that "somewhere between a shrimp 
and an oyster seems as good a place to draw the line as any, and better than most." 45) 
To Singer, then, it is morally irrelevant whether a being possesses such 
capacities as linguistic skills, self-consciousness, or the ability to enter into reciprocal 
agreements (which represent some of the usual kinds of justification given for 
according humans exclusive moral standing) if that being is otherwise sentient. In 
this respect, Singer has done much to expose the logical inconsistency in the practice 
of taking into account and protecting the interests of handicapped or immature 
humans such as brain damaged people, infants, or the senile, yet continuing to ignore 
the suffering imposed on nonhuman animals in such practices as "factory farming" 
and vivisection. After all, as Singer provocatively asks, if there are some 
43. In this general overview of the case for animal liberation, I have singled out the 
particular arguments of Peter Singer in his popular book Animal Liberation since this 
represents the classic, and still the most influential, defence of animal liberation. 
There are, however, other philosophical justifications for ascribing moral rights to 
nonhuman animals that do not rest on utilitarianism (although they still acknowledge 
the importance of sentience). For example, Tom Regan argues for the humane 
treatment of a more restrictive class of animals ("mentally normal mammals of a year 
or more") on the basis that they enjoy a mental life of their own and therefore possess 
"inherent value" and ought to be respected as having moral rights (see Tom Regan, 
The Case for Animal Rights [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983] and 
Regan, "Animal Rights, Human Wrongs," Environmental Ethics 2 [1980]: 99-120) 
while Stephen Clark places less emphasis on pain and more emphasis on the need to 
enable animals as well as humans to realize their special potentialities (see S. L. R. 
Clark, The Moral Status of Animals [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975]). For a 
comparison of Clark's and Singer's approach, see John Benson, "Duty and the Beast," 
Philosophy 53 (1978): 529-49. 
44. Singer, Animal Liberation, pp. 8-9. 
45. Ibid., pp. 178-79. 
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handicapped humans who are no more rational than nonhuman animals, then why not 
use them in scientific experimentation? By analogy with racism, Singer, following 
Richard Ryder, has called such discrimination against animals "speciesism" - "a 
prejudice or attitude of bias toward the interests of members of one's own species and 
against those of members of other species."46 
The implication of Singer's argument is that, where practicable, we must 
avoid inflicting any suffering on sentient beings. Accordingly, supporters of Animal 
Liberation advocate the prohibition of the hunting and slaughtering of all sentient 
beings (the corollary of which is vegetarianism), the prohibition of vivisection, and 
the prohibition of "factory farming." Although Singer's major focus has been the 
abuse of domestic animals, his argument also provides a justification for the 
protection of the habitat of wild animals, fish, and birds. That is, forests and wetlands 
ought to be protected on the grounds that they are instrumentally valuable to sentient 
beings for their "comfort and well-being" in providing nesting sites, breeding habitat, 
and sustenance. 
The attractiveness of Singer's method of argument is that it employs a 
familiar principle that is widely accepted (i.e., that pleasure is good and pain is bad) 
and then proceeds to logically press this rationale in such a way that those who accept 
the premise are forced to accept his conclusion. Moreover, the analogy with racism 
also underscores the point that the Animal Liberation movement is but the latest in a 
series of humanitarian or emancipatory movements that began with the anti-slavery 
campaigns and later broadened to include the anti-colonial and women's movements, 
all of which have sought to expose and eradicate discriminatory practices on behalf of 
oppressed groups. In this respect, it is presented as part of a praiseworthy trend of 
moral and political progress - as one more step along the path toward universal 
justice, or, as the environmental ethicist J. Baird Callicott has described it, "the next 
and most daring development of political liberalism."47 
46. Ibid., p. 7. Richard Ryder, Speciesism: The Ethics of Vivisection (Edinburgh: 
Scottish Society for the Prevention of Vivisection, 1974). 
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Ecocentric philosophers, however, have been critical of Singer's moral 
philosophy for regarding nonsentient beings as morally inconsequential. As Rodman 
has observed, Singer's philosophy leaves the rest of nature 
... in a state of dfinghood, having no intrinsic worth, acquiring instrumental 
value only as resources for the well-being of an elite of sentient beings. 
Homocentritjationalism has widened out into a kind of zoocentrist 
sentientism. 
Trees, for example, are considered to be valuable only insofar as they provide habitat, 
can be turned into furniture, or otherwise rendered serviceable to the needs of sentient 
life-forms. To the extent that synthetic substitutes can be made to perform the 
services of nonsentient life-forms, then the latter will be rendered dispensible. 
Some environmental philosophers have also mounted a more subtle critique 
of the Animal Liberation perspective. According to John Rodman, not only does this 
approach render =sentient beings morally inconsequential but it also subtly 
degrades 5entient nonhuman beings by regarding them as analogous to "defective" 
humans who likewise cannot fulfil any moral duties. 49 Rodman sees this tendency to 
regard sentient nonhumans as having the same standing as inferior human beings as 
analogous to dolphins regarding humans "as defective sea mammals who lack sonar 
capabilities."50 The result is that the unique modes of existence and special 
capabilities of these nonhuman beings are overlooked. 
A further criticism levelled against Singer's moral philosophy is that it is 
atomistic and therefore unsuitable for dealing with the complexities of environmental 
problems, which demand an understanding and recognition of not only the behaviour 
of whole species but also the interrelationships between different natural cycles, 
47. Callicott, "Animal Liberation," p. 313. See also Roderick Nash, "Rounding Out 
the American Revolution: Ethical Extensionism and the New Environmentalism," in 
Deep Ecology, ed. Michael Tobias (San Diego: Avant Books, 1985), pp. 170-81, and 
Roderick Frazier Nash, The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics  
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989). 
48. Rodman, "The Liberation of Nature?," p. 91. See also Callicott, "Animal 
Liberation," p. 318. 
49. Rodman, "Four Forms," see p. 87. See also Fox, "Towards a Deeper Ecology?" 
p. 27. 
50. Rodman, "The Liberation of Nature?," p. 94. 
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systems, and populations. According to Rodman, the progressive extension model of 
ethics (which includes Christopher Stone's argument for the legal protection of the 
rights of nonsentient entities, discussed in the following section) tends 
... to perpetuate the atomistic metaphysics that is so deeply imbedded in modern 
culture, locating intrinsic value only or primarily in individual persons, anim2ls, 
plants, etc., rather than in communities or ecosystems, since individuas are our 
paradigmatic entities for thinking, being conscious, and feeling pain.-' 
Finally, critics have pointed to the tension between Singerian justice and an 
ecological perspective by noting that Animal Liberation, when pressed to its logical 
conclusion, would be obliged to convert all nonhuman animal carnivores to • 
vegetarians, or, at the very least, replace predation in the food chain with some kind 
of "humane" alternative that protects, or at least minimises the suffering of, sentient 
prey. As Fox argues, besides representing "ecological lunacy," animal liberation 
... would serve, in effect, to endorse the modern project of totally domesticating 
the nonhuman world. Moreover, it would also condemn as immoral thosq, 
"primitive" cultures in which hunting is an important aspect of existence.J 4 
Singer has in fact admitted that the existence of nonhuman carnivores poses a 
problem for the ethics of Animal Liberation. Despite this concession, he is still 
prepared to allow the modification of the dietary habits of at least some domestic 
animals in referring his readers to recipes for a vegetarian menu for their pets! 53 
To conclude, then, Animal Liberation has mounted a compelling challenge 
to anthropocentrism in pointing to its many logical inconsistencies. However, 
Singer's criterion of moral considerability (i.e., sentience), while a relevant factor, is 
51. Rodman, "Four Forms," p. 85. See also Callicott, "Animal Liberation." 
52. Fox, Transpersonal Ecology,  p. 314. Similarly, J. Baird Callicott describes the 
issue of predation as the "Achilles' heel" of the case for animal rights put forward by 
Tom Regan. He argues that while Regan "is not willing to embrace the implications 
of his theory regarding predators," others, such as Steve Sapontzis, have been more 
forthright. In particular, Sapontzis has argued that it would be a morally better world 
if there were no carnivores at all. See J. Baird Callicott, review of The Case for 
Animal Rights, by Tom Regan, Environmental Ethics 7 (1985): 365-75 at p. 371, and 
Steve S. Sapontzis, "Predation," Ethics and Animals 5 (1984): 27-36. 
53. Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 238-39. In particular, Singer rejects the idea of 
policing nonhuman carnivores in the wild on the grounds that (i) any attempt to 
change ecological systems on a large scale would do more harm than good, and (ii) 
we ought not to claim dominion over other species: "Having given up the role of 
tyrant, we should not try to play Big Brother" (ibid). It should be noted, however, that 
these objections are ad hoc in that they do not flow from Singer's sentience criterion. 
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too limited and not sufficiently ecologically informed to provide the exclusive 
criterion of a comprehensive environmental ethics. As I show in the following 
section, ecocentric ethical theorists have identified broader, less "human analogous" 
and more ecologically relevant criteria to determine whether a being or entity has 
"interests" deserving of moral consideration. 
(v) Ecocentrism 
The contemporary social bearers of an ecocentric perspective may be 
loosely described as "radical environmentalists" or, following Naess's influential 
characterization, participants in the "deep ecology movement" 54 In many respects, 
this stream of ecocentric environmentalism may be seen as a more wide-ranging and 
more ecologically informed variant of Preservationism. Whereas the early 
Preservationists were primarily concerned to protect wilderness as sublime scenery 
and were motivated mainly by aesthetic and spiritual considerations, ecocentric 
environmentalists are concerned to protect threatened populations, species, habitats, 
and ecosystems wherever situated and irrespective of their use value or importance to 
humans. (This kind of concern is well illustrated by the activities of the international 
environmental organization Greenpeace.) In particular, ecocentric environmentalists 
strongly support the preservation of large tracts of wilderness as the best means of 
enabling the flourishing of a diverse nonhuman world. Accordingly, in what I have 
called the New World regions such as North America and Australasia (where 
significant areas of wilderness still remain), the greatest concentration of ecocentric 
activists is usually to be found in organizations, campaigns, or movements that 
promote the protection of wilderness. Two noteworthy examples here are the Earth 
First! movement in the United States and The Wilderness Society in Australia. 
Much of the basic outline of an ecocentric perspective has already been 
foreshadowed in Chapter 1 and in the criticisms made of the streams of 
environmentalism discussed above. I now want to tie these threads together and 
54. Arne Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. A 
Summary," Inquiry 16 (1973): 95-100. 
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present the perspective that will inform this inquiry into emancipatory ecopolitical 
thought. This perspective offers a more encompassing approach than any of those 
discussed above in that it (i) recognizes the full range of human interests in the 
nonhuman world; (ii) recognizes the interests of the nonhuman community; 
(iii) recognizes the interests of future generations of humans and nonhumans; and 
(iv) adopts a holistic rather than an atomistic perspective insofar as it values 
populations, species, ecosystems, and the ecosphere as well as individual organisms. 
Now defenders of an Animal Liberation perspective might argue that their 
perspective is quite adequate to secure the protection of many non-sentient entities, 
such as ecosystems, and that for all grachggi purposes it is as good as an ecocentric 
perspective. This is because, as we saw in the previous section, if we attribute 
intrinsic value to all sentient beings, then we must also recognize whatever is 
instrumentally valuable to them (e.g., ihcal habitats and food sources). This would 
provide a case for the protection of forests, wetlands, and any other habitat upon 
which sentient nonhuman beings depend for their survival and wellbeing. However, 
as we saw in the previous section, ecocentric theorists have argued that this kind of 
approach not only leaves the rest of nature in a state of "thinghood" - the only purpose 
of which is to service an elite of sentient beings - but that it is also too atomistic and, 
therefore, "unecological" in the way in which it distributes intrinsic value in the 
world. For example, this kind of approach would attribute equal intrinsic value and, 
hence, equal moral consideration to the individual members of a native species or an 
endangered species as it would to the individual members of an introduced species or 
an abundant species (assuming the degree of sentience of each species to be roughly 
equivalent). This approach to the distribution of intrinsic value means that it would 
be considered no worse to kill, say, twenty members of a native species than it would 
be to kill ("weed out") twenty members of an introduced, feral species; for the same 
reason, it would be considered no worse to kill the last twenty members of a sentient 
endangered species than it would be to kill twenty members of an equally sentient 
species that exists in plague proportions. Similarly, an Animal Liberation perspective 
would attribute the same value to the individual animals that inhabit a flourishing, 
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wild ecosystem as the equivalent number of domesticated or captive wild animals that 
might be managed by humans on a farm or in a zoo. 
Even if one extends intrinsic value to all living organisms (i.e., animals, 
plants, and micro-organisms) the same general kinds of problems apply. This is 
because such an approach still remains atomistic (i.e., it only attributes intrinsic value 
to(UNthA_Ali 	living organisms) and therefore does not extend any moral recognition to 
populations, species, ecosystems, and the ecosphere considered as entities in their 
own right. (I do not discuss a specifically "Life-based" stream of environmentalism 
in this survey of the major streams of environmentalism for the simple reason that, 
sociologically and politically speaking, this approach does not represent a major 
stream of environmentalism. Environmentalists who have moved beyond 
anthropocentrism tend, on the whole, to gravitate toward either the Animal Liberation 
approach or a straight-out ecocentric approach.) 
In view of the above, it is clear that ecocentric theorists are concerned to 
develop an ecologically informed approach that is able to value (for their own sake) 
not just individual living organisms but also ecological entities and ecological 
relationships at different levels of aggregation, such as populations, species, 
ecosystems, and the ecosphere. What, then, does an ecocentric approach look like? 55 
There are many different ways of arguing for an ecocentric perspective. 
Examples include axiological (i.e., value theory) approaches that argue for the 
intrinsic value of all living entities as well as such "systemic" entities as populations, 
species, ecosystems, and the ecosphere; the psychological-cosmological approach that 
is being developed under the name of "deep" or, more recently, "transpersonal 
ecology"; certain Eastern philosophies such as Taoism and Buddhism that emphasize 
the interconnectedness of all phenomena and the importance of humility and 
compassion; and the animistic cosmologies of many indigenous peoples (such as the 
55. In the following discussion I draw on many of the categories and arguments 
presented by Fox in Transpersonal Ecology on the differences between intrinsic value 
theory approaches and psychological-cosmological approaches (these approaches are 
explained in the text). Fox provides the clearest and most exhaustive overview in the 
ecophilosophical literature of the different kinds of mutes that may be taken in 
defending an ecocentric perspective. 
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North American Indians and the Australian Aborigines) who see and respect the 
nonhuman world as alive and enspirited. 56 
If we stay within the Western tradition for the purposes of this inquiry, then 
we can defend ecocentrism by employing either an intrinsic value theory approach or 
the psychological-cosmological of transpersonal ecology. Although I will show that 
the latter approach has the most in common with the kind of ecocentric emancipatory 
politics that is defended in this inquiry, it is also important to point out that there is at 
least one kind of intrinsic value theory approach that provides a sound alternative 
theoretical basis for ecocentrism. This approach is outlined by Fox under the name of 
"autopoietic ethics." 
An autopoietic approach attributes intrinsic value to all entities that display 
the property of autopoiesis, which means "self-production" or "self-renewal" (from 
the Greek autos, "self," and midi "to produce"). 57 Autopoietic entities are entities 
that are "primarily and continuously concerned with the regeneration of their own 
organizational activity and structure." 58 It is precisely this characteristic of 
self-production or self-renewal that distinguishes living entities from self-correcting 
machines that appear to operate in a purposive manner (such as guided missiles). In 
56. On intrinsic value theory approaches, see J. Baird Callicott, "The Conceptual 
Foundations of the Land Ethic," in Companion to A Sand County Almanac,  ed. J. 
Baird Callicott (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), pp. 186-217, and 
Fox, Transpersonal Ecology, Chapter 6; on deep/transpersonal ecology, see 	Bill 
Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered, (Layton, 
Utah: Gibbs M. Smith, 1985) and Fox, Transpersonal Ecology, Chapters 7 and 8; on 
Taoist and Buddhist approaches, see Ip Po-Keung, "Taoism and the Foundations of 
Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 5 (1983): 335-43, and Andrew 
McLaughlin, "Images and Ethics of Nature," Environmental Ethics 7 (1985): 293-19; 
and on animistic cosmologies, see J. Donald Hughes, American Indian Ecology (El 
Paso, Texas: Texas Western Press, 1983) and J. Baird Callicott, "Traditional 
American Indian and Western European Attitudes Toward Nature: An Overview," 
Environmental Ethics 4 (1982): 293-318. 
57. The concept of "autopoiesis" derives from the biological work of Francisco 
Varela, Humberto Maturana, and Ricardo Uribe. See Francisco J. Varela, Humberto 
R. Maturana, and Ricardo Uribe, "Autopoiesis: The Organization of Living Systems, 
Its Characterization and a Model," Biosystems 5 (1974): 187-96, and Humberto R. 
Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of 
Human Understanding (Boston: Shambhala, 1988). Fox is responsible for 
introducing this idea to the environmental philosophy literature (see Transpersonal 
Ecoloey, Chapter 6). 	 (- 
58. Fox, Transpersonal Ecology, p. 288. 
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other words, "the primary product of the operations of living systems [as distinct from 
mechanical systems] is themselves, not something external to themselves." 59 In 
short, autopoietic processes are cnds in themselves. As Fox explains, 
... this amounts to the classical formulation of intrinsic value: by definition, any 
entity or process that is merely a means to an end has only an instrumental 
value whereas any entity or process that is an end jp itself has an intrinsic value, 
and is therefore deserving of moral consideration.w 
An autopoietic approach provides a sounder theoretical basis for 
ecocentrism than the ethical holism of Aldo Leopold's famous land ethic, which 
declares that "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and 
beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it does otherwise." 61 The problem 
with this ethic, as Animal Liberation proponents point out, is that it is vulnerable to 
the charge of "environmental fascism" in that it provides no recognition of the value 
of inithdaust organisms. This is because, considered on its own, it can be interpreted 
as suggesting that individuals are dispensible - indeed, might need to be sacrificed for 
the good of the whole.62 
An autopoietic approach to intrinsic value is not vulnerable to the objections 
that are associated with either extreme atomism or extreme holism. Whereas 
atomistic approaches attribute intrinsic value only to individual organisms, and 
whereas an unqualified holistic approach attributes intrinsic value only to whole 
ecosystems (or perhaps only the ecosphere itself), an autopoietic approach recognizes 
the value of "a, process-structures that continuously strive to generate their own 
organizational activity and structure." 63 That is, an autopoietic approach recognizes 
59. Ibid., p. 285. 
60. Ibid., p. 288. On the meaning of intrinsic value, see also William Godfrey-Smith, 
"The Value of Wilderness," Environmental Ethics 1(1979): 309-19 at p. 309. 
61. Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949), 
pp. 224-25. See also Callicott, "The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic," and 
James D. Heffernan, "The Land Ethic: A Critical Appraisal," Environmental Ethica 4 
(1982): 235-47. 
62. Defenders of Leopold's land ethic have sought to get around this problem by 
presenting their ethic as a much needed addition, rather than alternative, to atotnistic 
approaches to intrinsic value theory such as Animal Liberation or Life-based ethics. 
See, for example, Callicott, "The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic," p. 207. 
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the value not only of individual organisms but also of species, ecosystems, and the 
ecosphere ("Gala"). 
In contrast to the autopoietic approach, which proceeds via an axiological 
(i.e., value theory) route, transpersonal ecology proceeds by way of a 
psychological-cosmological route and is concerned to address the way in which we 
experience the world. The primary concern of transpersonal ecology is the cultivation 
of a wider sense of self through the common psychological process of identification. 
Whereas axiological approaches issue in moral injunctions or a code of conduct (i.e., 
"you ought to respect other beings, regardless of how you might personally 
experience them"), transpersonal ecology is concerned to cultivate a lived sense of 
identification with other beings. Indeed, as Fox points out, transpersonal ecology 
explicitly rejects approaches that issue in moral injunctions and advances instead an 
approach that seeks "to invite and inspire others to realize, in a this-worldly sense, as 
expansive a sense of self as possible."64 As Anie Naess says, if your sense of self 
embraces other beings, then "you need no moral exhortation to show care" toward 
those beings.65 
The transpersonal ecology approach is described as both cosmological and 
psychological because it proceeds from a particular picture of the world or cosmos - 
that we are, in effect, all "leaves" on an unfolding "tree of life" - to a psychological 
identification with all phenomena (i.e., with all leaves on the tree). Fox refers to this 
approach as transpersonal ecology because it is concerned to cultivate a sense or 
experience of self that extends beyond one's egoic, biographical, or personal sense of 
self to include all beings. 66 
63. Fox, Transpersonal Ecology, p. 288. 
64. Warwick Fox, "The Meanings of 'Deep Ecology," Island Magazine, Autumn 
1989, pp. 32-35 at p. 34. 
65. Anne Naess, "Self-realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World," 
The Trumpeter 4 (1987): 35-42 at p. 39. 
66. Transpersonal ecology should moi be confused with a "New Age" perspective. 
Indeed, transpersonal or deep ecologists have been quite critical of New Age ideas, 
particularly those of the Christian theologian Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. See George 
Sessions, review of The Soul of the World: the w 	flin) 	, 
by Conrad Bonifazi, Environmental Ethics 3 (1981): 275-81; George Sessions, review 
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Some critics might object that this kind of approach attempts to derive an 
"ought" from an "is" in that it proceeds from the fact of our interconnectedness with 
the world to a particular kind of normative orientation toward the world. However, as 
Fox explains, transpersonal ecologists are 
... not in the business of attempting to claim that this fact logically implies that 
we ought to care about the world. The fact of our interconnectedness with the 
world does not logically imply either that we ought to care about the world of 
which we are a part or that we ought not to care about it ... [Rather] For 
transpersonal ecologists, given a deep enough understanding of the way things 
are, the response of being inclined to care for the, unfolding of the world in all 
its aspects follows 'naturally' - not as a lggiggl consequence but as a 
psychological consequence; as an exxession of the spontaneous unfolding 
(development, maturing) of the self.°' 
The above two ways of defending an ecocentric perspective - the autopoietic 
intrinsic value theory approach and the transpersonal ecology approach - each have 
different advantages and are appropriate in different contexts. For example, the 
autopoietic intrinsic value theory approach is more suitable to translation into legal 
and political practice than the transpersonal ecology approach (it makes sense to enact 
legislation that demands the recognition of certain intrinsic values whereas it makes 
no sense to enact legislation that demands that people identify more widely with the 
world around them). Indeed, there are already existing legislative precedents that 
recognize the intrinsic value of ecosystems, as I show below. The transpersonal 
ecology approach, on the other hand, is more appropriately pursued in the community 
through educational and cultural activities (although these activities can, of course, be 
encouraged and financially supported by the state). Transpersonal ecology, in other 
words, lends itself far more to a "bottom-up" rather than a "top down" approach to 
social change. 
Transpersonal ecology may be seen as forming part of the vanguard of the 
cultivation of a new world-view, a new culture and character, and new political 
horizons that are appropriate to our times. As we saw in Chapter 1, it is precisely this 
of Eco-Philosophy: Designing New Tactics for Living, by Henryk Skolimowslci, 
Environmental Ethics 6 (1984): 167-74; and Devall and Sessions, Deep Ecology, 
pp. 5-6 and 138-44. For the historical roots of the transpersonal ecology approach 
one needs to look in the direction of people as diverse (in some senses) as Spinoza 
and Gandhi (see Fox, Transpersonal Ecology, Chapter 4). 
67. Fox, Transpersonal Ecology, pp. 387-88. 
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kind of emphasis on cultural renewal and re-envisioning our place in nature that forms 
the essence of ecocentric emancipatory ecopolitics. This is why I regard 
transpersonal ecology as having more in common with the kind of ecocentric 
emancipatory stream of ecopolitical defended in this inquiry than an autopoietic 
intrinsic value theory approach (although I regard the latter as a useful complement). 
Given this special affinity between transpersonal ecology and ecocentric 
emancipatory ecopolitics, I now want to devote some consideration to the kind of 
cosmology (or general picture of the world) that informs these different levels of 
discourse. I will also use this opportunity to point out the many ways in which the 
general perspective of ecocentrism is superior to that of anthropocentricism. 
Essential to the cosmology that informs ecocentrism is the recognition that 
humans are part of, rather than separate from or above, nature. This recognition is 
based on an ecologically informed philosophy of internal relatedness according to 
which all organisms are profoundly interrelated with their environment - indeed, 
constituted by their interrelationships. 68 According to Birch and Cobb, it is more 
accurate to think of the dynamic, inextricably interconnected phenomenon that is life 
in terms of "events" or "societies of events" rather than "substances": 
Events are primary, and substantial objects are to be viewed as enduring 
patterns among changing events ... The ecological model is a model of internal 
relations. No event first occurs and tlIfin relates to its world. The event is a 
synthesis of relations to other events.°' 
According to this picture of reality, the world is an intrinsically dynamic, 
interconnected web of relations in which there are no absolutely discrete entities and 
no absolute dividing lines between the living and the nonliving, the animate and the 
inanimate, or the human and the nonhuman. This model of reality undermines 
anthropocentrism insofar as whatever faculty we choose to underscore our own 
uniqueness or specialness as the basis of our moral superiority (e.g., rationality, 
68. For a clear exposition of this model, see Charles Birch and John B. Cobb, Jr., The 
Liberation of Life: From the Cell to the Community (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981). See also J. Baird Callicott, "The Metaphysical Implications 
of Ecology," Environmental Ethics 8 (1986): 301-316; and McLaughlin, "Images and 
Ethics of Nature." 
69. Birch and Cobb, The Liberation of Life, p. 95. 
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language, or our tool-making capability), we will invariably find either that there are 
some humans who do not possess such a faculty or that there are some nonhumans 
who glo.7° Nonanthropocentric ethical theorists have used this absence of any 
Absolute dividing line between humans and nonhumans to point out the logical 
inconsistency of conventional anthropocentric ethical and political theory that 
purports to justify the exclusive moral considerability of humans on the basis of our 
separateness from, say, the rest of the animal world. Indeed, we saw in the previous 
section how Singer used this kind of argument to criticize human-centred ethical 
theory and defend Animal Liberation. While there are undoubtedly many important 
differences in degree (as distinct from kind) between all or some humans and 
nonhumans, as Fox points out, this cuts both ways; for example, there are countless 
things that other animals do better than us. 71 (And there are also innumerable 
differences in capacities that separate nonhuman life-forms from each another!) From 
an ecocentric perspective, to single out Qui particular forms of excellence as the basis 
of our exclusive moral considerability is simply human chauvinism that conveniently 
fails to recognize the particular forms of excellence of other life-forms: it assumes 
that what is distinctive about humans is more worthy than, rather than simply 
different to, the distinctive features of other life-forms. John Rodman has called this 
the "differential imperative," that is, the selection of what humans do best (as 
compared to other species) as the measure of human virtue and human superiority 
over other species. Rodman traces this idea in Western thought as far back as 
Socrates - who saw the most virtuous human as "the one who most fully transcends 
their animal and vegetative nature." 72 The upshot, of course, is that one becomes a 
better human if one maximises one's "species-specific differentia." (In this respect, 
the putative human/animal opposition may also be seen as serving "as a convenient 
symbolic device whereby we have attributed to animals the dispositions we have not 
70. Fox, Transpersonal Ecology, see pp. 15-17. 
71. Ibid., see p. 16. 
72. John Rodman, "Paradigm Change in Political Science," American Behavioral 
Scientist 24 (1980): 49-78 at p. 54. 
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been able to contemplate in ourselves." 73) Indeed, as Fox has argued, a variety of 
human/nonhuman distinctions have served as the fundamental legitimating ideology 
not only for the domination of the nonhuman world but also for different kinds of 
intra-human oppression. For example, the fundamental legitimating ideology of 
patriarchy, racism, and imperialism has been that men, whites, and Westerners are 
seen to possess - or possess to a greater extent than their counterparts (i.e., women, 
blacks, or non-Westerners) - certain qualities that are deemed to be of the essence of 
humanness (e.g., rationality, civilization, being more favoured by God). These 
classes of people have therefore seen themselves as "more fully human" than, and 
hence as morally superior to, their counterparts. 74 
Ecocentric theorists have also pointed out how new scientific discoveries 
have served to challenge long standing anthropocentric prejudices. As the 
Copernican and Darwinian revolutions have shown, scientific discoveries can have a 
dramatic impact on popular conceptions of, and orientations toward, nature. This is 
not to argue that science can or ought to determine ethics or politics but merely to 
acknowledge that in modern times the credibility of any Western philosophical world-
view is seriously compromised if it is not at least cognizant of, and broadly consistent 
with, current scientific knowledge. It is indeed ironic that while an ecocentric 
orientation is often wrongly criticized for resting on an "anti-science," mystical 
idealization of nature, many proponents of ecocentrism are quick to point out that the 
fundamental philosophical premises of ecocentrism (i.e., the model of internal 
relations) are more consistent with modern science than the premises of 
anthropocentrism, which posit humans as either separate from and above the rest of 
nature (or if not separate from the rest of nature then nonetheless the acme of 
73. Ted Benton, "Humanism = Speciesism: Marx on Humans and Animals," Radical 
Philosophy (Autumn 1988): 4-18 at p. 11. Benton is summarizing here an argument 
of Mary Midgley's from Animals and Why They Matter (Harmondsworth, U. K.: 
Penguin, 1983), Chapter 2. 
74. Warwick Fox, "The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate and its Parallels," 
Environmental Ethics  11(1989): 5-25 at pp. 21-25. This argument will be taken up 
again in Chapter 8 on ecofeminism in my discussion of the conceptual links between 
the domination of women and the domination of nonhuman nature. 
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evolution). In this respect, ecocentric theorists, far from being anti-science, often 
enlist science to help undermine deeply ingrained anthropocentric assumptions that 
have found their way into many branches of the social sciences and humanities, not 
the least of which are the major political philosophies of the modern world - 
liberalism and Marxism - as I showed in Chapter 1. As George Sessions has argued, 
modern science has "been the single most decisive non-anthropocentric intellectual 
force in the Western world." 75 Indeed, it was the mechanistic, materialistic world-
view of the Enlightenment (an intellectual movement that Scruton describes as having 
been "prodigious of political theory") that has most come under challenge by these 
new scientific discoveries. 76 Just as the Copernican and Darwinian revolutions 
helped to undermine the Judaeo-Christian, medieval world-view of the "great chain of 
being" (according to which the number of life-forms were fixed in a static hierarchy 
with humans standing above the beasts and below the angels), the picture of 
ecological and subatomic reality that has emerged from new discoveries in biology 
and physics has now made inroads into many of the assumptions of the Newtonian 
world-view.77 The most pervasive of these are technological optimism - the 
confident belief that with further scientific research we can rationally manage (i.e., 
predict, manipulate, and control) all the negative unintended consequences of large-
scale human interventions in nature; atomism - the idea that nature is made up of 
discrete building blocks and that the observer is therefore completely separate from 
the observed; and anthropocentrism - the belief that there is a clear dividing line 
between humankind and the rest of nature, that humankind is the only or principal 
source of value and meaning in the world, and that therefore nonhuman nature is there 
for no other purpose but to serve humankind. 78 
75. George Sessions, "Anthropocentrism and the Environmental Crisis," Humboldt 
Journal of Social Relations  2 (1974): 71-81 at p. 73. 
76. Roger Scruton, A Dictionary of Political Thought (London: Pan Books, 1983), 
p. 149. 
77. Fritjof Capra, The Turning Point: Science. Society. and the Rising Culture 
(London: Fontana, 1983). 
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Clearly, ecocentric theorists are not against science or technology per se; 
rather they are against scientism (i.e., the conviction that empiric-analytic science is 
the only valid way of knowing) and technocentrism (i.e., anthropocentric 
technological optimism) The distinction is crucial. Indeed, many ecocentric 
theorists are keenly interested in the history and philosophy of science and are fond of 
pointing out the reciprocal interplay between dominant images of nature (whether 
derived from science, philosophy, or religion) and dominant images of society. 79 
This mutual reinforcement is reflected in the resonance between medieval Christian 
cosmology and the medieval political order (both of which emphasized a hierarchy of 
being) and between the Newtonian world-view and the rise of modem democracy 
(both of which emphasized atomism). Ecocentric theorists are now drawing attention 
to what Fox has referred to as the "structural similarity" between the ecological model 
of internal relatedness and the picture of reality that has emerged in modern biology 
and physics, although it is too early to say what the societal implications of these 
developments might be. 8° Unlike Capra, I see nothing inevitable about the 
78. George Sessions has noted ("Ecocentrism and the Greens: Deep Ecology and the 
Environmental Task," The Trumpeter 5 (1988): 65-69 at p. 67) that the idea of a 
hierarchical chain of being can be traced back to Aristotle, who "rejected the 
Presocratic ideas of an infinite universe, cosmological and biological evolution, and 
heliocentrism, and proposed instead an Earth-centred, finite universe, wherein 
humans were differentiated from, and seen as superior to, the rest of the animals by 
virtue of their rationality. Also found in Aristotle is the hierarchical concept of the 
'great chain of being' which holds that Nature made plants for the use of animals, and 
animals were made for the sake of humans (Politics I, 88)." Sessions points out that 
the Presocratics, on the other hand, had been much more interested in cosmological 
inquiry and nature in general rather than just the subset humans. For a sustained 
critique of anthropocentrism, see David Ehrenfeld, The Arrogance of Humanism 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1981). For a more exhaustive and succinct 
critique of anthropocentrism, see Fox, Transpersonal Ecology, pp. 14-24. Fox 
concludes that anthropocentrism is self-serving, "empirically bankrupt and 
theoretically disastrous," logically inconsistent, morally objectionable, and 
incongruent with a genuinely open approach to experience. 
79. Rodman, "Paradigm Change in Political Science," p. 67; Capra, The Turning 
Point; Sessions, "Anthropocentrism and the Environmental Crisis"; and Sessions, 
"Ecocentrism and the Greens." 
80. Warwick Fox, "Deep Ecology: A New Philosophy of Our Time?" The Ecologist 
14 (1984): 194-200. See also J. Baird Callicott, "Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, 
and Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 7 (1985): 257-75, and Capra, Tht 
Turning Point. 
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possibility of a new, ecologically informed cultural transformation, although there are 
certainly many exciting possibilities "in the wind." 81 
The structural similarity between the ecological model of internal 
relatedness that informs ecocentrism and the picture of reality delivered to us by 
certain branches of modern science is, of course, no substitute for an ethical and 
political justification of an ecocentric perspective (although it does serve to 
undermine the opposing perspective of anthropocentrism). As I noted earlier, in 
modern times general consistency with science is merely a necessary as distinct from 
a sufficient condition for the acceptance of an alternative philosophical world-view in 
the West. In this respect, I agree with Michael Zimmerman's observations concerning 
the relevance of science to environmental ethics and politics: that it may help to 
inspire and prepare the ground for a new orientation toward nature and "give 
humanity prudential reasons for treating the biosphere with more care" but that "a 
change in scientific understanding alone cannot produce the needed change of 
consciousness." 82 It is no argument, then, simply to appeal to the authority of nature 
as a justification for a particular political world-view. It is, on the other hand, 
perfectly reasonable to question an opposing world-view on the ground that the 
assumptions on which it is based have been shown by science to be erroneous. 
The ecocentric recognition of the interelatedness of all phenomena together 
with its prima facie orientation of inclusiveness of all beings means that it is far more 
protective of the earth's life-support system than an anthropocentric perspective. As 
Michael Zimmerman has argued in addressing the practical consequences of an 
anthropocentric perspective: 
If humankind is understood as the goal of history, the source of all value, the 
pinnacle of evolution, and so forth, then it is not difficult for humans to justify 
the plundering of the natural world, which is not human and therefore 
"valueless."° 3 
81. For Capra's somewhat deterministic conclusions, see The Turning Point, 
pp. 464-66. 
82. Michael Zimmerman, "Quantum Theory, Intrinsic Value, and Panentheism," 
Environmental Ethics 10 (1988): 3-30 at p. 5. 
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When anthropocentric assumptions of this kind are combined with a powerful 
technology, the capacity for environmental destruction increases dramatically. As 
Bateson once forcefully put it: 
If this is your relationship to nature and you have an-advanced technology, your 
likelihood of survival will be that of a snowball in hell. You will die either of 
the toxic by-products of your own hate, or, simply, of over-population and over-
grazing.84 
Anthropocentrism of this extreme kind may be seen as a kind of ecological myopia or 
unenlightened self-interest that is blind to the ecological circularities between the self 
and the external world, with the result that it continues to inflict unintended and 
unforeseen ecological damage. (As I note in Chapter 5, this ecological boomerang 
effect resulting from humanity's hubris has been described metaphorically by the 
Frankfurt school as the "revenge of nature.") An ecocentric perspective, on the other 
hand, recognizes that nature is not only more complex than we presently know but 
also quite possibly more complex, in principle, than we can know. 85 
Although the anthropocentric Resource Conservation and Human Welfare 
Ecology streams of environmentalism adopt a general ethic of prudence and caution 
based on an ecologically enlightened self interest, they differ from an ecocentric 
perspective insofar as they see the ecological tragedy as essentially a human one. 
Those belonging to the ecocentric stream, on the other hand, see the tragedy as both  
human and nonhuman. This is because a thoroughgoing ecocentric perspective is one 
that, "within obvious kinds of practical limits, allows all entities (including humans) 
he freedom to unfold in their own way unhindered by the various forms of human 
83. Michael Zimmerman, "Marx and Heidegger on the Technological Domination of 
Nature," Philosophy Today 23 (1979): 99-112 at p. 103. 
84. Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind  (Frogmore, St. Albans: Paladin, 
1973), pp. 436-37. 
85. The complexity and unpredictability of many physical and social phenomena is 
underscored by the new body of scientific inquiry known as chaos theory, which 
shows that many systems that behave deterministically (i.e., according to laws that 
can be described mathematically) are nonetheless inherently unpredictable beyond a 
certain point. This is due to the fact that these systems exhibit nonlinear dynamical 
properties, which means that they are extraordinarily sensitive to initial conditions, 
together with the fact that it is impossible in principle to specify the initial conditions 
of any system precisely. That is, some degree of approximation is always involved. 
For a general introduction, see James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science  
(London: Cardinal, 1987). 
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domination." 86 Such a general perspective may be seen as seeking what I refer to as 
"emancipation writ large." In according ontological primacy to the internal 
relatedness of all phenomena, an ecocentric perspective adopts an "existential attitude 
of mutuality" in recognition of the fact that one's personal fulfilment is inextricably 
tied up with that of others.87 This is often encapsulated in the maxim "unity-in-
diversity" whereby "the development and fulfilment of the part can only proceed from 
its complex interrelationship and unfolding within the larger whole." 88 This is not 
seen as resignation or self sacrifice but rather as a positive affirmation of the fact of 
our embeddedness in ecological relationships. As we have seen, this is expressed by 
transpersonal ecology theorists in the concept of Self-realization - the cultivation of a 
mode of being that sustains the widest possible identification with all beings. The 
cultivation of this mode of being means that compassion and empathy naturally flow 
as part of an individual's way of being in the world rather than as a duty or obligation 
that must be performed regardless of one's personal inclination. 89 
The ecological model of internal relatedness upon which ecocentrism rests 
applies not only in respect of human-nonhuman relations but also in respect of intra-
human relations: in a biological, psychological, and social sense we are all constituted 
by our interactions between other humans, and our social, economic, and cultural 
institutions. As Birch and Cobb emphasize, we do not exist as separate entities and 
then enter into these relations. From the moment we are born, we are constituted by, 
and coevolve within the context of, such relations. 9° According to this model, we are 
neither completely passive and determined beings (as crude behaviourists would have 
86.Fox, "The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate," p. 6. The term "unfold" is used 
here and throughout this inquiry to mean "develop" or "grow" and is not intended 
imply any predestination. 
87.Trevor Blake, "Ecological Contradiction: The Grounding of Political Ecology," 
Ecopolitics H Proceedings (Hobart: Centre for Environmental Studies, University of 
Tasmania, 1987), pp. 76-83 at p. 79. 
88. John Clark, The Anarchist Moment: Reflections on Culture. Nature and Power 
(Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1984), p. 28. 
89.Fox,rilmapraatto Ecology,  Chapter 7. 
90. Birch and Cobb, The Liberation of Life, see p. 95. 
84 
it) nor completely autonomous and self-determining beings (as some existentialists 
would have it). Rather, we are relatively autonomous beings who, by our purposive 
thought and action, help to constitute the very relations that determine who we are. 91 
Of course, this kind of social interactionist model is not new to the social sciences. 
For example, in social psychology it is found in the theories of symbolic 
interactionism and phenomenology. In political philosophy a similar social model is 
implicit in the many communitarian and socialist political philosophies that seek the 
mutual self-realization of all in preference to the individual self-realization of some. 
This helps to explain why there is a much greater elective affinity - and hence a much 
greater potential for theoretical synthesis - between ecocentrism and communitarian 
and socialist political philosophies than there is between ecocentrism and 
individualistic political philosophies such as liberalism, as I pointed out in Chapter 1. 
Ecocentric emancipatory ecopolitical theorists have generally discarded what 
Callicott has aptly described as "the threadbare metaphysical cloth from which 
classical utilitarianism [and, I would add, Lockean liberalism] is cut." That is 
because, as Callicott puts it, 
Utilitarianism [indeed liberalism in general] assumes a radical individualism or 
rank social atomism completely at odds with the relational sense of self that is 
consistent with a more fully informed evolutiomry and ecological 
understanding of terrestrial and human nature.' 4 
What is new about an ecocentric perspective is that it applies this 
interactionist model of internal relations to a broader and more encompassing pattern 
of layered interrelationships that extend beyond personal and societal relations to 
include relations with the rest of the biotic community. This means that the 
nonhuman world is no longer posited simply as the background or means to human 
self-realization, as is the case in most modern political theorizing. Rather, the 
91. For more on the concept of relative autonomy, see Warwick Fox, Approaching 
Deep Ecology: A Response to Richard Sylvan's Critique of Deep Ecology, 
Environmental Studies Occasional Paper no. 20 (Hobart: Centre for Environmental 
Studies, University of Tasmania, 1986), section 3. 
92. J. Baird Callicott, "What's Wrong with the Case for Moral Pluralism," Paper 
presented to the Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophy Association, 
Berkeley, 23 March 1989, pp. 32-33. 
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different members of the nonhuman community are also appreciated as important in 
their own terms, as having their own (varying degrees of) relative autonomy, and their 
own modes of being. The implications of applying this expanded model of internal 
relations to social and political thought are far-reaching. As Zimmerman has put it, 
... the paradigm of internal relations lets us view ourselves as manifestations of 
a complex universe; we are not apart but are moments in the openended, 
novelty-producing process of cosmic evolution?" 
Some Common Criticisms and Misunderstandings  
Concerning an Ecocenttic Perspective  
Ecocentrism's challenge to cultural and political orthodoxy has been widely 
resisted and misunderstood by critics for a variety of reasons: that it is impossible, 
misanthropic (or at least insulting to some humans, notably the oppressed), 
impractical, and/or based on an all too convenient idealization of nature. Some 
resistance is, of course, to be expected of a perspective that, as George Sessions has 
put it, is mounting a philosophical challenge to "the pervasive metaphysical and 
ethical anthropocentrism that has dominated Western culture" since the rise of 
classical Greek humanism. 94 But is such resistance warranted? In the remainder of 
this chapter I address what I see as five common objections that have contributed to 
this resistance to ecocentrism. 
One common criticism is that it is impossible to perceive the world other 
than from an anthropocentric perspective since we are, after all, human subjects. This 
criticism, however, entirely misses the point of the ecocentric critique of 
anthropocentrism by conflating the identity of the perceiving subject with the content 
of what is perceived and valued, a conflation that Fox refers to as the "anthropocentric 
fallacy."95 In particular, this kind of understanding conflates the weak, trivial, 
93. Zimmerman, "Quantum Theory, Intrinsic Value, and Panentheism," p. 17. 
94. George Sessions, "The Deep Ecology Movement: A Review," Environmental 
Review 11(1987): 105-25 at p. 105. 
95. Fox, Transpersonal Ecology, p. 23 and Chapter 1 generally (this chapter provides 
the most concise summary in the ecophilosophical literature of the main arguments 
against anthropocentrism and of the main fallacies that people tend to commit in 
objecting to these arguments against anthropocentrism). 
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tautological sense of the term anthropocentrism (i.e., that we can only ever perceive 
the world as human subjects - who can argue against this?) and the strong, 
substantive, informative sense of the term (the unwarranted, differential treatment of 
other beings on the basis that they do not belong to our own species). As Fox points 
out, it is like saying that a male cannot be nonsexist or that a white person cannot be 
nonracist because they can only perceive the world as male or white subjects. This 
understanding ignores the fact that males and whites are quite capable of cultivating a 
nonsexist or nonracist consciousness or, in this case, that humans are quite capable of 
cultivating a nonanthropocentric consciousness. 
A second misconception of ecocentrism is to interpret its sustained critique 
of anthropocentrism as anti-human and/or as displaying an insensitivity to the needs 
of the poor and the oppressed. However, this criticism fails to appreciate the clear 
distinction between a =anthropocentric and a miaanthropic perspective (Fox calls 
this misinterpretation "the fallacy of misplaced misanthropy"). 96 Ecocentrism is not 
against humans per se or the celebration of humanity's special forms of excellence; 
rather, it is against the ideology of human chauvinism. Ecocentric theorists see each 
human individual and each human culture as just as entitled to live and blossom as 
any other species, provided they do so in a way that is sensitive to the needs of other 
human individuals, communities, and cultures, and other life-forms generally. 
Moreover, many critics of ecocentrism fail to realize that a perspective that seeks 
emancipation writ large is one that necessarily supports social justice at the intra-
human level. Given that it is patently the case that not all humans are implicated in 
ecological destruction to the same degree, then it follows that ecocentric theorists 
would not expect the costs of environmental reform to be borne equally by all classes 
and nations, regardless of relative wealth or privilege. That many ecocentric theorists 
have given special theoretical attention to human/nonhuman relations arises from the 
fact that these relations are so often neglected by theorists in the humanities and social 
96. Ibid., p. 19. 
87 
sciences. It does not arise from any lack of concern or lack of theoretical 
inclusiveness with regard to human emancipatory struggles. 97 
Before leaving this point, it should be noted that some ecophilosophically 
minded writers (e.g., David Ehrenfeld in The Arrogance of Humanism) have been 
critical of humanism in general rather than just anthropocentrism. This is misleading, 
however, since humanism does not represent one single idea, such as human self-
importance or the celebration of humanity as the sole and sufficient source of value 
and inspiration in the world, although these have been central ideas in humanism and 
are the main bone of contention of nonanthropocentric ecophilosophers. 98 Rather, 
humanism is a complex tapestry of ideas, many strands of which are anthropocentric 
yet some strands of which are worthwhile and consistent with an ecocentric 
perspective. As Blackham puts it, "the 'open mind,' the 'open society,' and the 
sciences and the 'humanities' are the glory of humanism and at the same time a widely 
shared inheritance." 99 In view of this, it is more accurate simply to criticize the many 
anthropocentric assumptions embedded in our humanist heritage rather than to equate 
anthropocentrism with humanism and thereby condemn humanism in its entirety. 
A third criticism, which is related to the fallacy of misplaced misanthropy, is 
that ecocentrism is a passive and quietistic perspective that regards humans as no 
97. For a sustained argument along these general lines, see Fox, "The Deep 
Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate." 
98. Humanist ideas have a long pedigree in Western political thought, beginning with 
the Sophists in the Athenian city-state of the fifth century B. C. who shifted the focus 
of theoretical attention away from the phenomenon of nature to the activities of 
citizens: "Neither nature nor the gods but humanity 'was the measure of all things." 
See George Novack's chapter on the "Varieties of Humanism" in Humanism and 
Socialism (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1973), p. 106. According to Roger Scruton, 
there are two related notions of humanism in Western political thought. The first is 
that outlook, prevalent particularly in Renaissance Europe, "which emphasizes the 
human, as opposed to or at least in addition to the divine, as a centre of significance, a 
repository of virtue, a source of strength, purpose and discovery, and a principle of 
artistic, moral and political expression." The second is the more modern, atheist view 
expressed by the 18th century encyclopaedists, yet more characteristic of this century, 
"which emphasizes the human [as distinct from the divine, or indeed any other source, 
e.g., Nature] as the sole but sufficient source of all our values." See Scruton, A 
Dictionary of Political Thought, p. 209. The influence of humanism on socialist 
thought is critically discussed in Chapter 6. 
99. See H. J. Blacldiam, Humanism (New York: International Publishing Service, 
1976), p. 102. 
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more valuable than, say, ants or the AIDS virus. However, a nonanthropocentric 
perspective is simply a prima facie orientation of nonfavouritism; it does not mean 
that humans cannot act to defend threatened species or defend themselves from life-
threatening diseases. In this respect, the degree of sentience of an organism and its 
degree of self-consciousness and capacity for richness of experience is a relevant 
factor (as distinct from an exclusive criterion) in any ethical choice situation 
alongside other factors, such as whether a particular species is threatened or whether a 
particular population is crucial to the maintenance of a particular ecosystem. 100  A 
nonanthropocentric perspective is one that ensures that the interests of nonhuman 
species and ecological communities (of varying levels of aggregation) are not ignored 
by us in our decision-making simply because they are not human or because they are 
not of value to humans. It does not follow from this prima facie orientation of 
nonfavouritism, however, that the actual outcome of human decision-making must 
always favour non-interference with other life-forms. Humans are just as entitled to 
live and blossom as any other species, and this inevitably necessitates some killing of, 
suffering by, and interference with, the lives and habitats of other species. 101 When 
faced with a choice, however, those who adopt an ecocentric perspective will seek to 
choose the course that will minimise such harm and maximise the opportunity of the 
widest range of organisms and communities - including ourselves - to flourish in 
their/our own way. This is encapsulated in the popular slogan "live simply so that 
others [both human and nonhuman] may simply live." 
A fourth criticism against ecocentrism is that it is difficult to translate into 
social, political, and legal practice. How, many sceptics ask, can we ascribe rights to 
nonhumans when they cannot reciprocate? My primary answer to this kind of 
criticism is that it is neither necessary nor ultimately desirable that we ascribe legal 
rights to nonhuman entities to ensure their protection, as I argue below. However, it 
100.For an example of a nonanthropocentric intrinsic value approach that seeks to 
maximise richness of experience while taking into account populations and 
ecosystems, see Birch and Cobb, The Liberation of Life, especially at pp. 173-74. 
101.Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement," see p. 95. 
89 
also needs to be pointed out that there is no A priori reason why legal rights cannot be 
ascribed to nonhuman entities. As Christopher Stone has argued, the idea of 
conferring legal rights on nonhumans is not "unthinkable" when it is remembered that 
legal rights are conferred on "nonspeaking" persons such as infants and foetuses, on 
legal fictions such as corporations, municipalities and trusts, and on entities such as 
churches and nation states. 102 Given that there is no common thread or principle 
running through this anomalous class of right holders, Stone argues that there is no 
good reason Against extending legal rights to natural entities. 103 Stone proposes that 
the rights of nonhuman entities (or, in his language, "natural objects") be defended in 
the same way as "human vegetables," that is, by the appointment of a Guardian or 
Friend who would ensure that the natural object's interests were protected (e.g., by 
administering a trust fund and instigating legal actions on its behalf in order to make 
good any injury inflicted on it.) Stone's proposal may be seen as an even more daring 
adventure in liberalism than Animal Liberation insofar as it seeks to provide the 
means of legally protecting the special interests of nonhuman and nonsentient entities 
such as forests, rivers, and oceans. 104 
While Stone's proposals may serve an important educative and protective 
purpose in respect of nonhuman interests, there is nonetheless an element of absurdity 
in the notion of extending rights to nonhumans on the basis of a contractarian notion 
of rights, whereby a right must be accompanied by a correlative duty. Stone appears 
to lean toward such a view in his suggestion that the trust funds established for the 
102. Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?: Toward Legal Rights for 
Natural Objects (Los Altos, California: William Kaufmann, 1974). 
103. For a thing to be a holder of legal rights, (i) the thing (or its guardian) must be 
able to institute legal actions at its behest (or on its behalf), (ii) in determining the 
granting of legal relief, the court must take injury to it into account, and (iii) the relief 
must be for the benefit of the thing. Ibid., see p. 11. 
104. Rodman (in "The Liberation of Nature?") argues that Stone, like Singer, 
reinforces the anthropocentric moral pecking order in nature by likening the 
relationship of a tree and its human guardian to that of "defective human" and its 
guardian. This claim seems unwarranted since Stone treats rights as no more than a 
convenient human construct by which legal standing is accorded to a diverse and 
anomalous range of entities rather than as something having a special ontological 
status. Moreover, unlike Singer, Stone does not single out the possession of human 
analogous characteristics as the basis for according moral and legal standing. 
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benefit of a natural object might also be used to satisfy judgments against that entity 
(e.g., a river might be liable for the damage inflicted by its flooding and destroying 
crops!) although he admits that such an idea would prove to be troublesome. As 
Stone asks: "When the Nile overflows, is it the 'responsibility' of the river? the 
mountains? the snow? the hydrological cycle?" 105 Stone also canvasses the 
possibility of "an electoral apportionment that made some systematic effort to allow 
for the representative 'rights' of nonhuman life. .406 Of course, the first kind of 
scenario could be avoided by employing a noncontractarian theory of rights (i.e., as 
not necessarily entailing reciprocal duties), yet there is still something strained and 
ungainly in the attempt to extend to the nonhuman world political concepts that have 
been especially tailored over many centuries to protect uniquely human interests. 
This highlights the need to search for simpler and more elegant ways of enabling the 
flourishing of a rich and diverse nonhuman world without resorting to the extension to 
the nonhuman realm of peculiarly human political and legal models such as justice, 
equality, and rights. 1°7 As Livingston points out, extending liberal egalitarian ideals 
in this way "anthropomorphizes the nonhuman world in order to include it in a human 
ethical code." 108 Similarly, Rodman has argued that the "liberation of nature" 
requires not the extension of human-like rights to nonhumans but the liberation of the 
nonhuman world from "the status of human resource, human product, human 
caricature." 109 It is indeed noteworthy that one of the doyens of modern liberal 
theory - John Rawls - in discussing the limits of his liberal theory of justice, has 
stated in passing that 
... it does not seem possible to extend the contract doctrine so as to include them 
[i.e, creatures lacking a capacity for a sense of justice] in a natural way. A 
105. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?,  p. 34. 
106. Ibid., p. 40. 
107. Paul Shepard, "Animal Rights and Human Rites," p. 35. 
108. Livingston, The Fallacy of Wildlife Conservation, pp. 62-63. 
109. Rodman, "The Liberation of Nature?," p. 101. 
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correct conception of our relations to animals and to nature would seeqam 
depend [instead]upon a theory of the natural order and our place in it. lu 
The above reservations concerning the appropriateness of extending legal 
rights to nonhumans are hardly fatal to ecocentrism; nor do they provide any 
argument for resorting to anthropocentrism through want of appropriate legal 
mechanisms. Rather, they emphasise the importance of a general change in 
consciousness and suggest that a gradual cultural, educational, and social revolution 
involving a reorientation of our sense of place in the evolutionary drama is likely to 
provide a better long term protection of the interests of the nonhuman world than a 
more limited legal revolution of the kind envisaged by Stone. In the short term, the 
above reservations concerning the applicability of liberal categories to the nonhuman 
world highlight the need for us to rethink the ways in which we might legally protect 
the interests of the nonhuman world. Indeed, there are already existing alternative 
legislative precedents that avoid the language of rights but nonetheless ensure that 
government departments and courts consider both human ald nonhuman interests 
when administering environmental legislation or adjudicating land-use conflicts. 111 
Moreover, these legislative precedents are consistent with an autopoietic intrinsic 
value theory approach rather that an atomistic intrinsic value approach in that they 
value for their own sake both individual living organisms as well as entities such as 
ecosystems. 
110. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), 
p. 512. 
111. New Zealand is in the forefront of comprehensive environmental legislation of 
this kind. For example, the preamble to the New Zealand Environment Act 1986  
states that the purpose of the Act is, inter alia, to "ensure that, in the management of 
natural and physical resources, full and balanced account is taken of (i) the intrinsic 
value of ecosystems; and (ii) all values which are placed by individuals and groups on 
the quality of the environment; and (iii) the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi [i.e., 
an agreement between White settlers and Maories]; and (iv) the sustainability of 
natural and physical resources; and (v) the needs of future generations." A further 
example is the New Zealand Conservation Act 1987, which defines conservation to 
mean "the preservation and protection of natural and historic resources for the  
purpose of maintaining their intrinsic values, providing for their appreciation and 
recreational enjoyment by the public, and safeguarding the options of future 
generations" (section 2[1] - my emphasis). "Natural resources" are defined in the Act 
to include not only plants and animals, but landscapes and landforms, geological 
features and "systems of interacting living organisms, and their environment." 
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Finally, some critics are cynical of ecocentrism because they consider that it 
interprets nature selectively as something that is essentially harmonious, kindly, and 
benign (ignoring suffering, unpredictability, and change), thus providing an all too 
convenient model for human relations. Alternatively, critics have argued that the 
popular ecological views of some Green thinkers lean toward an idealization of nature 
or employ outmoded ecological notions (such as the "balance of nature") that have 
little to do with the way nature in fact operates. 112 My response to these criticisms is 
that it is simply not necessary to an ecocentric perspective to depict nature as having a 
kindly human face or to show that nature is essentially benevolent or benign in order 
that humans respect it and regard it as worthy. If we try to judge the nonhuman world 
by human ethical standards as to what is "kindly" we will invariably find it 
wanting. 113 Nonhuman nature knows no human ethics, it simply k. Moreover, 
appealing to the authority of nature (as known by ecology) is no substitute for ethical 
argument. 114 As Neil Evernden as observed 
Persons with contrasting viewpoints can draw upon this discipline [i.e., 
ecology], one group regarding it as a revealer of the natural and proper, the 
other as a source of power and control (which it is natural for us to use). Each 
group belicyes its stance to be correct and expects endorsement from 
ecology.'" 
112.Charles Elton, the founder of modern animal ecology, has bluntly stated that "the 
balance of nature does not exist and perhaps never has existed" (Charles Elton, 
Animal Ecology and Evolution [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930], p. 17, 
quoted in Birch and Cobb, The Liberation of Life, pp. 36-37). Birch and Cobb 
suggest that it is more precise to speak of certain kinds of activity as being 
"unsustainable" rather than as upsetting the "balance of nature," since the latter 
suggests that nature is static, that is, that the distribution and abundance of plants and 
animals in a community does not change. See also Frank N. Egerton, "Changing 
Concepts of the Balance of Nature," Quarterly Review of Biology 48 (1978): 322-50, 
and Daniel Simberloff, "A Succession of Paradigms in Ecology: Essentialism to 
Materialism and Probabilism," Synthese 43 (1980): 3-39. 
113.Livingston, The Fallacy of Wildlife Conservation, p. 75. 
114.Elsewhere I have been critical of this tendency in the work of Murray Bookchin 
(see Robyn Eckersley, "Divining Evolution: The Ecological Ethics of Murray 
Bookchin," Environmental Ethics 11 [1989]: 99-116 at p. 107). Indeed, ecoanarchism 
in general (i.e., both the anthropocentric and ecocentric varieties) is prone to this kind 
of reasoning, as I show in Chapter 7. 
115.Neil Evernden, "Constructing the Natural: The Darker Side of the Environmental 
Movement," The North American Review, March 1985, pp. 15-19 at p. 16. 
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Of course, a general familiarity with new developments in science is 
important to an ecocentric perspective (the employment of outmoded concepts of 
nature does serve to detract from the force and credibility of ecopolitical argument). 
As I argued above, a general familiarity with new developments in science by social 
and political theorists can enhance our understanding of the world around us, improve 
the general grounding and credibility of an ecopolitical theory, and provide the basis 
for challenging opposing world-views on the grounds that the assumptions on which 
they are based have been shown by science to be erroneous. However, science cannot 
perform the task of normative justification in respect of an ecocentric political theory 
because it does not tell us why we ought to orient ourselves toward the world in a 
particular way. It can inspire and redirect our ethical and political theorizing, but it 
cannot justify it. ILI is the task of ethical and political theory, and I have already 
outlined why an ecocentric perspective represents a more plausible and appropriate 
normative framework than an anthropocentric perspective. 
* * * 
This chapter has been concerned to indicate the range of different 
orientations that make up modern environmentalism, to distinguish and defend an 
ecocentric orientation vis-a-vis other orientations, and to meet some common 
objections that have been made against ecocentrism. This provides the perspective 
that will inform the major part of this inquiry, which is concerned to articulate and 
critically examine the major strands of Green political thought. Before embarking on 
this part of the inquiry, however, I want to show how the major new ecopolitical and 
ecophilosophical ideas discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 may be used to clarify the 
various normative debates that are currently taking place in the world of Green 
political practice. 
Chapter 3 
The Green Movement: The Social Bearer of Emancipatory 
Ecopolitical Thought 
Introduction 
In Chapter 11 outlined the participatory, survivalist, and emancipatory 
themes that have informed the development of ecopolitical thought over the last three 
decades. In this chapter I relate these developments in ecopolitical thought to the 
evolving concerns of new social movements since the 1960s and, in particular, to the 
development of the Green movement from the late 1970s. In particular, I show how 
my three themes of ecopolitical inquiry may be used to make sense of the evolution of 
the Green movement. I argue that the Green movement (and its many political party 
manifestations) may be seen as the social and political embodiment of the third of 
these streams of ecopolitical thought, which seeks to incorporate and transcend the 
participatory and survivalist concerns in a positive and ambitious project of 
fundamental political, economic, and cultural renewal. I also show how the 
anthropocentric/ecocentric cleavage that I explored in Chapter 2 may be used to shed 
light on the normative debates that are currently taking place within the international 
Green movement. 
One of the purposes of this chapter is to show that the themes and issues 
explored in this inquiry are not only of interest to academic observers. They are very 
much "live" questions that are currently being vigorously debated by the participants 
of what has become an increasingly influential social and political movement. 
Indeed, many of the emancipatory ecopolitical theorists discussed in this inquiry have 
played a key role in galvanizing the Green movement and in shaping and clarifying its 
social and political agenda. 
The social history of the Green movement is a recent one spanning little 
more than a decade, yet it has already been told and analyzed from many different 
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perspectives. What began as a modest trickle of literature on Green politics in the 
1970s has grown to become a significant stream in the 1980s. 1 Moreover, the 
phenomenon of Green politics has not been confuied to any one country or region, 
notwithstanding the special publicity given to the West German Greens. Rather, 
Green ideas have found expression in a range of different forms in the industrially 
developed countries of the West and, more recently, are now beginning to influence 
reform movements behind the crumbling iron curtain as well as in the developing 
countries of the Third World.2 Green parties have now formed in Western Europe, 
North America, and Australasia, and although there is considerable variation in terms 
of the level (i.e., local, state, and national) and extent of representation in different 
countries, Green candidates have generally met with increasing electoral success 
during the 1980s.3 Moreover, despite local differences, many of these Green parties 
1. The literature on Green politics is now too vast to list exhaustively here. The major 
books specifically devoted to Green politics include Maurice Ash, Green Politics: The  
New Paradigm (London: The Green Alliance, 1980); Rudolf Bahro, Socialism and 
Survival (London: Heretic Books, 1982); also by Bahro, From Red to Green (London: 
Verso, 1984) and Building the Green Movement (London: Heretic Books, 1985); 
Elim Papadalds, The Green Movement in West Germany (London: Croom Helm, 
1984); Fritjof Capra and Charlene Spretnak, Green Politics: The Global Promise  
(New York: E. P. Dutton, 1984); Jonathon Porritt, Seeing Green: The Politics of 
Ecology Explained (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984); Peter Bunyard and Fern 
Morgan-Grenville, eds., The Green Alternative: Guide to Good Living (London: 
Methuen, 1987); Brian Tokar, The Green Alternative: Creating an Ecological Future  
(San Pedro: R. & E. Miles, 1987); Drew Hutton, ed., Green Politics in Australia:  
Working Towards a Peaceful. Sustainable and Achievable Future (Sydney: Angus and 
Robertson, 1987); Jonathon Porritt and David Winner, The Coming of the Greens  
(London: 1988); Werner Hulsberg The German Greens: A Social and Political Profile  
(London: Verso, 1988); Sandy Irvine and Alec Ponton, A Green Manifesto: Politics  
for a Green Future (London: Optima, 1988); and Sara Parkin, Green Parties: An 
international Guide (London: Heretic Books, 1989). 
2. See Michael Redclift, "Turning Nightmares into Dreams: The Green Movement in 
Eastern Europe," The Ecologist 19 (1989): 177-83. Notable examples of Green 
movements or parties in developing countries include the Mexican Greens, the 
Brazilian Greens, the Sarvodaya movement in Sri Lanka, the Chipko movement in 
India, and the Green belt movement in Kenya. On Mexico, India, and Kenya see 
Michael Redclift, Sustainable Development: Exploring the Contradictions (London: 
Methuen, 1987), especially pp. 159 and following; also by Redclift, "Mexico's Green 
Movement," The Ecologist 17 (1987): 44-46. See also Sara Parkin, "The Best of 
Brazil," Resurgence, July-August 1989, pp. 14-15; Jayanta Bandyopadhyay and 
Vandana Shiva, "Chipko: Rekindling India's Forest Culture," The Ecologist 17 
(1987): 26-34; Joanna Macy, Dharma and Development: Religion as Resource in the  
5arvodaya Self-Help Movement (Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1983); A. T. 
Ariyaratne, "Awakening of Sri Lanka," Resurgence, no. 99 (1983), pp. 13-15; and 
Ariyaratne, "No Poverty Society," Resurgence, no. 108 (1985), pp. 4-8. 
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share similar historical roots and have produced more or less similar programmes 
based on the so-called four pillars of Green politics: ecology, social justice, grassroots 
democracy, and non-violence. 4 In those countries where the national electoral system 
militates against the formation of minority parties or the running of independent 
candidates, there have usually been alternative initiatives that have sought to either 
foster the development of a distinctly Green movement (e.g., the U. S. Green 
Committees of Correspondence) or at least explore common ground and establish 
national links between the ecology movement and various other new social 
movements.5 
3. For a recent survey up until the beginning of 1989, see Parkin, Green Parties. 
Since the publication of this survey, Green Independents in the Australian state of 
Tasmania gained 18% of the statewide vote and the balance of power in the 
Tasmanian legislative Assembly in May 1989. Moreover, Green parties in Europe 
increased their vote in the elections for the European Parliament in June 1989, with 
the British Green party polling 14.9%, the Belgian Greens 13.9%, the French Greens 
10.5%, and the Luxembourg Greens 10.4% (on the European results, see Michael 
Jacobs, "Green Blues in Europe," Australian Society, August 1989, p. 32). It is also 
noteworthy that in May 1989 the Dutch government led by Prime Minister Lubbers 
became the first government to fall on an environmental issue (i.e., its failure to 
remove a tax concession on private commuting to encourage use of public transport). 
4. See, for example, Horst Mewes, "The West German Green Party," New German 
Critique 28 (1983): 51-85; Pam Waud, "A New Way of Doing Politics," Report from 
Meetings with European Green Parties, ms., 1985; Ferdinand Muller-Rommel, "The 
Greens in Western Europe: Similar But Different," International Political Science  
Review 6 (1985): 483-99, esp. at p. 491; Raymond Dominick, "The Roots of the 
Green Movement in the United States and West Germany," Environmental Review 12 
(1988): 1-30; Stephen Rainbow, "Eco-politics in Practice: Green Parties in New 
Zealand, Finland and Sweden," Paper presented to the Ecopolitics IV conference, 
University of Adelaide, South Australia, 21-24 September 1989; and Parkin, Green  
Parties. 
5. The U. S. Committees of Correspondence (C.o.C.) were founded in August 1984 as 
a nationwide network of grassroots Green organizations dedicated to promoting 
"Green values." They act as a central clearing house of information on Green ideas 
for local member groups (of which there are approximately seventy) that come 
together to form Regional Confederations. The C.o.C. sponsored America's first 
national Green conference, entitled "Building a Green Movement - A National 
Conference for a New Politics," which was held at Hampshire College at Amherst, 
Massachusetts on 2-7 July 1987. For reports on the conference, see Green Letter 3(6) 
(1987), pp. 7-15 and Synthese, 26 December 1987, pp. 6-7. The C.o.C. has expanded 
the four pillars of Green politics to Ten Key Values: ecological wisdom, grassroots 
democracy, personal and social responsibility, non-violence, decentralization, 
community-based economics, postpatriarchal values, respect for diversity, global 
responsibility, and future focus. For a full account of how these values have evolved 
through the Green C.o.0 's SPAKA (Strategy and Policy Approaches in Key Areas) 
see Green Letter, Autumn 1989. 
In Australia, an exploration of common ground between new social movements took 
place at the "Getting Together Conference" held in Sydney in Easter 1986. The 
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The Green movement and its various parliamentary representatives have 
been widely hailed as the bearers of a new kind of politics in Western democracies at 
a time when the labour movement is experiencing a period of relative stagnation and 
the neo-conservative right is enjoying a period of relative ascendancy. 6 The Green 
movement may be understood as arising from a widespread sense of disillusionment 
with the ability of established political parties and the policy making infrastructure to 
address adequately what movement participants see as the critical issues of the day - 
environmental degradation, the arms race, poverty, social discrimination, the crisis of 
the welfare state, Third World problems and, for many, personal and spiritual 
alienation. As Horst Mewes has observed in the West German context, the Greens 
are important because they 
... are attempting to unite under the aegis of "ecological politics" the myriad 
social groups in opposition to contemporary advanced industrial society. 
Ecological politics is, of course, in and of itself a momentous and trenchant 
development of the last 15 years. The attempt to combine all other current 
opposition groups under the rubric of radical ecology, however, and insp,ire 
them to joint action is an unprecedented, portentous experiment indeed. 
The "myriad social groups" Mewes refers to are the so-called new social movements 
that have emerged in recent years, the most prominent being the environmental, anti-
nuclear, women's, and peace movements. 8 My reference to "recent years" is 
Conference resolved to establish a working group to set up an Australian Coalition of 
Community Organizations to facilitate networking between community groups. See 
Ian Foletta, "Easter In Sydney," Chain Reaction, Autumn 1986, p. 14, and Joan 
Staples, "An Inside Look at the Getting Together Conference," Habitat Australia, 
June 1986, pp. 34-35. 
6. Hulsberg, The Greens at the Crossroads, see p. 5. 
7. Mewes, "The West German Green Party," p. 52. 
8. I will not be using the term "social movement" in any analytical or technical sense 
in the following discussion. Rather, it will be used merely as a broad descriptive 
category encompassing all forms of collective action seeking social and political 
change or cultural innovation, whether operating as formal associations or informal 
"submerged" networks. This description is ideologically neutral in that it may be 
applied to both progressive and conservative movements. However, I will be using 
the qualifier "new" only in relation to certain kinds of progressive social movements. 
(The question as to what makes a social movement "new" is discussed in the text.) I 
agree, however, with Alberto Melucci that the concept of "movement" itself seems 
inadequate to describe the ways in which much "new" social conflict is mobilized; 
Melucci suggests that it might be more useful, then, to speak of "movement networks' 
or 'movement areas' as the network of groups and individuals sharing a conflictual 
culture and collective identity." This acknowledges the considerable cross network 
sympathy that exists between different alternative protest groups - sympathy that can 
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deliberately vague because there is no clear agreement as to whether these new social 
movements (and the so-called "new politics" that they have generated) are to be dated 
from the 1960s, 1970s, or 1980s. Moreover, as Jean Cohen (who dates the 
"proliferation" of new social movements - listed as those concerned with peace, 
feminist, ecological, and local autonomy issues - from the mid-1970s), has remarked: 
... there is little agreement among theorists in the field as to just what a 
movement is, what would qualify theoretically as a new we of movement, and 
what the meaning of a 5gcial movement as distinct from a political party or 
interest group might be.' 
Obviously, the period from which we date the rise of new social movements has an 
important bearing on what kinds of movements are to be included in the phrase (e.g., 
whether the civil rights movement and counter-culture are to be included along with 
those already mentioned above) and what kinds of characteristics are taken to give 
rise to their "newness"; clearly, the adjective "new" presupposes an "old" form of 
protest from which the new movements have departed. Before further clarifying the 
relationship of the Green movement to other new social movements it will be helpful, 
then, to explore the nature and characteristics of these new forms of collective action. 
What is "New" About New Social Movements?  
One general (and useful) benchmark of comparison frequently referred to is 
the "old" social movements of the bourgeoisie and the working class that 
characterized the immediate post-World War II period, where growth dependent 
"welfare capitalism" was widely perceived as a "positive sum" game by these two 
major social antagonists. With hindsight, these antagonists are, despite their 
differences, now seen by many participants and supporters of new social movements 
as part of a pragmatic and ultimately destructive consensus characterized by a 
_often be mobilized at short notice for various forms of collective action on a number 
of different issues (e.g., ecological, anti-nuclear, peace). Moreover, such movement 
networks often oscillate from one organizational form to another, from cultural 
networks united by no more than a newsletter and interlocking affinity groups through 
to incorporated organizations and political parties and back again, depending on the 
political and institutional context. See Alberto Melucci, "The Symbolic Challenge of 
Contemporary Movements," Social Research 52 (1985): 789-816 at pp. 798-99. 
9. Jean Cohen, "Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary 
Social Movements," Social Research 52 (1985): 663-716 at p. 663. 
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relatively unswerving faith in economic expansion and material progress. Indeed, it 
was partly the widespread tacit agreement regarding State economic goals in the 
1950s that enabled Daniel Bell to apply his "end of ideology" thesis to thatripe od. 10 
Yet, as Krishan Kumar has observed, this broad consensus was short-lived: 
The 1950s ... marked something of a watershed in the history of industrialism, 
as a social system and as an ideology. On the one side there is the confident 
expression of a triumphant industrialism, the belief that for the first time in 
history a particular form of society had resolved the fundamental problems of 
social survival and growth. On the other side, starting at some point in the 
1960s, this belief begins to break up ... The economic benefits of industrialism 
are seen to be purchased at the cost of increasing "dis-economies" to the society 
at large: pollution, crowding, the exhay§tion of the natural fossil fuels on which 
the industrial economy itself depends. 
The conflicts generated within the growth oriented consensus shared by 
capital and labour were primarily concerned with balancing claims for distributive 
justice with the dictates of capital accumulation. These conflicts had, by and large, 
become relatively institutionalized by the 1950s, that is, they were channelled through 
established political parties and specialized organizations such as trade unions and 
employer organizations and were usually settled by courts or state arbiters. In return 
for institutionalized recognition and the incremental material gains that were thereby 
promised (at least during prosperous periods), the labour movement had generally 
come to limit its political agenda to demands that were achievable within this settled 
framework. Political life under the modern state had thus been largely reduced to the 
"politics of getting." 12 It was at about this time that intellectuals of the Left began to 
10. In Bell's view, "the problem is that the old politico-economic radicalism 
(preoccupied with matters such as the socialization of industry) has lost its meaning, 
while the stultifying aspects of contemporary culture (e.g., television) cannot be 
redressed in political terms ... The irony, further, for those who seek 'causes' is that the 
workers, whose grievances were once the driving energy for social change, are more 
satisfied with the society than the intellectuals. The workers have not achieved 
utopia, but their expectations were less than those of the intellectuals, and the gains 
correspondingly larger." See Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of 
Political Ideas in the Fifties (New York: The Free Press, 1960, 1962), p. 404. 
11. ICrishan Kumar, Prophecy and Progress: The Sociology of Industrial and  
Post-Industrial Society (Harmondsworth, U. K.: Penguin, 1978) P.  187. See also 
Suzanne Berger, "Politics and Antipolitics in Western Europe in the Seventies," 
Daedalus 108 (1979): 27-50. 
12. John Rodman, "Paradigm Change in Political Science: An Ecological 
Perspective," American Behavioral Scientist  24 (1980): 49-78 at p. 65. 
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debate the question as to whether the working class had become so integrated into 
(many would say "co-opted" by) capitalist/consumer society as to be incapable of 
fulfilling its Marxian role as the historic bearer of socially progressive politics. 
New social movements, particularly the environmental, and-nuclear, peace, 
women's, and Third World movements, may be distinguished by their success in 
politicizing new issues and generating new lines of conflict that have served to erode 
the established left-right political cleavage between labour and capital to the point 
where, as Ronald Inglehart has observed, it can no longer be automatically applied as 
"a universal solvent" absorbing whatever conflicts are present in a political system. 13 
As Elim Papadalds explains: 
To most theorists of new social movements it is the attempt to alter radically 
social relationships at all levels and in all spheres that distinguishes new social 
movements and party formations from other organizations and imparts on them 
a role wIlich is central both to the understanding of and outcome of social 
conflict. 1 14 
The shifting and heterogeneous character of new social movements is such 
that venturing anything more than broad generalizations concerning these diverse new 
forms of opposition in Western society is a hazardous undertaking. In view of the 
importance of the relationship between new social movements and the Green 
movement, however, it will be helpful to crystallize what I take to be four of the 
salient characteristics of new social movements that have attracted the attention of 
close observers: 
(i) The new politics is gl a class but not fa a class. 15 That is, while there 
are certain recognizable patterns in the class composition of the actors in these new 
conflicts (see [ii] below), such background does not generally determine the collective 
13. Ronald Inglehart and Jacques-Rene Rabier, "Political Realignment in Advanced 
Industrial Society: From Class-Based Politics to Quality-of-Life Politics," 
Government and Opposition 21(1986): 456-79 at p. 470. 
14. Elfin Papadakis, "The Greens in West Germany: Social Movement, Interest 
Group, or Political Party?" Ecopolitics II Proceedings (Hobart: Centre for 
Environmental Studies, University of Tasmania, 1987), pp. 342-53 at p. 345. 
15. Claus Offe, "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional 
Politics," Social Research 52 (1985): 817-68 at p. 833. See also Jean Cohen, 
"Strategy or Identity," p. 667. 
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identity and goals of the movements in the way that class background has determined 
the identity and political goals of the labour movement 16 The demands of new 
social movements tend to be highly universalistic (e.g., peace, environmental quality, 
self-determination) or, alternatively, highly particularistic (e.g., save this river or that 
building) rather than sectional in the sense of furthering the class-specific interests of 
a particular socio-economic grouping. 17 New social movements do not tend to claim 
(there are some exceptions, e.g., certain radical feminist groups) that their own class, 
sectional, or gender interests represent those of society at large. In this respect they 
tend to dis-identify with both the Old and the New Left 18 Moreover, there is a 
general disregard of social background or function in the recruitment of members or 
the enlistment of support for most new social movements. 19 
16. Cohen, "Strategy or Identity," p. 667; Elim Papadakis, The Green Movement in  
West Germany, pp. 22-23. 
17. As Rudolf Bahro notes, the Green movement is "not an organ for the particular 
interests of these classes [i.e., the new middle class and "decommodified" groups 
(these terms are explained in the following paragraph in the text)] ... on the contrary, 
this stratum which is being formed is going into battle - or at least to face the water 
canon - for common interests which actually affect the whole of society." See Bahro, 
Building the Green Movement, p. 82. Many Marxists have, of course, disputed this 
claim to universalism and have argued that a class bias can be found in the goals and 
aspirations of new social movements, particularly the environmental movement. For 
a discussion of these charges, see the references in the following note. 
18. Offe, "New Social Movements." These are merely generalizations to which 
exceptions can be found, such as the "not-in-my-back-yard" form of environmental 
protest that is widely criticized for failing to address the wider structural determinants 
of environmental degradation along with the causes of the inequitable distribution of 
environmental "goods" and "bads." For critiques of these and related kinds of 
environmental protest, see James Ridgeway, The Politics of Ecology (New York: 
Dutton, 1971); Irving Louis Horowitz, "The Environmental Cleavage: Social Ecology 
Versus Political Ecology," Social Theory and Practice 2 (1972): 125-34; David 
Eversley, "Conservation for the Minority?" Built Enyiroamgni 3 (1974): 14-16; Hans 
Magnus Enzensberger, "A Critique of Political Ecology," New Left Review 84 
(1974): 3-31; William Tucker, "Environmentalism and the Leisure Class," Ethics and 
Public Policy 7 (1978): 1-40; also by Tucker, Progress and Privilege: America in the  
Age of Environmentalism (Garden City, New York: Anchor/Doubleday, 1982); and 
B. J. Friedan, The Environmental Protection Hustle (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 
1979). Many of these critiques, however, tend to exaggerate the selfishness of the 
motives of environmentalists and treat their universalistic claims as little more than 
ideological smokescreens and tend to ignore or downplay the concrete issues raised 
by environmentalists. For a reply to this genre of critique, see Robyn Eckersley, "The 
Environmental Movement as Middle Class Elitism: A Critical Analysis," Regional 
Journal of Social Issues 18 (1986): 24-36, and Riley E. Dunlap and Denton E. 
Morrison, "Environmentalism and Elitism: A Conceptual and Empirical Analysis," 
Environmental Management 10 (1986): 581-89. 
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(ii) As we have already seen, new social movements tend not to be 
supported by the two "principal" economic classes of capitalist society, that is, the 
industrial working class and those in charge of the disposition of capital (i.e., those 
who own and/or control the means of production). Rather, research has shown that 
most of the core actors in these new conflicts come from the highly educated "New 
Middle Class" (or "New Class"), particularly that sub-group identified by Gouldner as 
the "humanistic intellectuals" (those involved in the teaching, helping, and personal 
service professions).2° However, it is important to emphasize that new social 
movements do not consist exclusively of New Class radicals; they also tend to be 
supported by two other kinds of social strata that have been identified by Offe as the 
"decommodified groups" (i.e., those outside the labour market such as students, 
unemployed, middle class home-keepers, and the retired as well as those who are 
marginally employed) and, to a lesser extent, certain disgruntled sections of the self-
employed middle class or petit-bourgeoisie (e.g., farmers, shop proprietors, and 
craftspeople). 21 Offe has pointed out that two of these social segments supporting 
the new paradigm of politics, namely, the "New Class" and "decommodified groups," 
19.Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller, "From Red to Green," Telos 59 (1984): 35-44, see 
p. 35. 
20. The other component of the New Class, according to Gouldner's classification, is 
the "technical intelligensia" (i.e., bureaucrats and scientists). See Alvin Gouldner, 
The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (London: Macmillan, 1979). 
Stephen Cotgrove has concluded from his empirical survey that the the membership 
of radical environmental associations is "heavily skewed" towards "the personal 
service professions and the creative arts - as teachers, social workers, lecturers, 
doctors ... That is to say, they are employed in occupations outside the market sector 
where goods and services are sold." See Cotgrove, Catastrophe or Cornucopia: The  
Environment. Politics and the Future (Chichester Wiley, 1982), p. 19. See also 
Stephen Cotgrove and Andrew Duff, "Environmentalism, Middle Class Radicalism 
and Politics," ,Sociological Review 28 (1980): 333-51. The category identified by 
Cotgrove corresponds with Gouldner's "humanistic Intellectuals." For a general 
survey of the empirical literature on the composition of the environmental movement, 
see Dunlap and Morrison, "Environmentalism and Elitism." See also F. Parkin, 
Middle Class Radicalism (Manchester Manchester University Press, 1968); B. 
Bruce-Briggs, ed., The New Class? (New Brunswick, N. J.: Transaction Books, 
1979); Seymour Martin Lipset and Richard B. Dobson, "The Intellectual as Critic and 
Rebel," Daedalus 101 (1972): 137-98. For a critical discussion of explanations for the 
predominant New Class involvement in Green politics, see Robyn Eckersley, "Green 
Politics and the New Class: Selfishness or Virtue?" Political Studies 37 (1989): 
205-23. 
21. Offe, "New Social Movements," pp. 832-38. 
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are more likely to grow in number than decline. 22 Offe notes that this development 
constitutes a 
... parallel to the early period of the working class movement, which was 
inspired by its well founded prophecy [at least in the short term] that its 
numbers and strengths were inwased and promoted by the very system against 
which the struggle was waged.' 
(iii) New social movements are concerned less with material goals than with 
symbolic and cultural stakes and the vindication of fundamental values. 24 Their 
critiques are directed as much toward gin" society as the economy or the state, since 
they are not only politicizing neglected areas of domination (e.g., of women, the 
Third World, welfare recipients, ethnic minorities, animals, and ecosystems) but also 
generating new lifestyles and new forms of consciousness. In terms of the issues that 
have been problematized, the emphasis in collective action is generally seen as 
moving away from "materialist" political questions concerning production and 
distribution and towards "post-materialist" issues concerning health and lifestyle, 
sexuality and gender, cultural identity, human survival, and humanity's relationship to 
nature.25  Jurgen Habermas has described these protests as a form of resistance to 
"the colonization of the life-world" (it should be noted, however, that Habermas sees 
this as a defensive, often pathological reaction to modernization rather than as an 
offensive, rational response to the penetration of the state and the market into 
22. Ibid., p. 837. Further support for the increase or at least continuance of the social 
bases for Green politics can be found in Ronald Inglehart's influential "Silent 
Revolution" theory, which predicts that the number of people espousing 
"post-material values" in Western countries will either increase or at least remain 
stable over time. See Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and 
Political Styles Among Western Publics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1977). 
23. Offe, "New Social Movements," p. 838. 
24. See Alberto Melucci, "The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements," 
p. 797. See also Alberto Melucci, "The New Social Movements: A Theoretical 
Approach," Theory and Methods 19 (1980): 199-226 at p. 220, and Jan Pakulsid, 
Social Movements: The Politics of Moral Protest (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 
1990), forthcoming, p. 69 (page citations refer to the pre-publication manuscript). 
25. See Offe, "New Social Movements"; Karl-Werner Brandt, "New Social 
Movements as a Metapolitical Challenge: The Social and Political Impact of a New 
Historical Type of Protest," Thesis Eleven 15 (1986): 60-68, especially p. 61; and 
Melucci, "The New Social Movements: A Theoretical Approach," pp. 220-21. 
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everyday life. Accordingly, he does not look upon new social movements as an 
appropriate vanguard for a new society.) 26 In a similar vein, Melucci has pointed out 
that new social movements are seeking a life-style that is beyond the dictates of 
instrumental reason. 27 Moreover, actors have become reflexive regarding the process 
of social identity formation in that they are aware of their role as actively constructing 
new values and forms of consciousness. 28 As Cohen has observed: 
Contemporary collective actors see ... that the creation of identity involves 
social contestation around the reinterpretation of norms, the creation of new 
meanings, and a challenge to the social construction of tc‘ very boundaries 
between public, private, and political domains of action.hY 
Cohen has also described contemporary social movements as being "willing, to a 
certain extent, to relativize their own values with respect to one another through 
discourse on goals and consequences." 3° 
Yet not all new social movements are overtly political in the sense of 
making claims that are to be binding on the wider community. Many groups, such as 
those concerned with pursuing personal growth, religious awareness, or an alternative 
lifestyle, are simply registering no more than a plea for diversity (their own space) 
rather than hegemony (determining the space for others). There are nonetheless many 
other kinds of groups (e.g., the peace, environmental, women's, Third World, and soft 
technology groups) that are more overtly political in seeking general social and 
economic change. 
(iv) The organizational structures of new social movements are not just 
instrumental for the movement's goals; they also tend to be part of the goal. 
26. Habermas, "New Social Movements," Telos 49 (1981): 33-37. This article is 
extracted from the fmal chapter of Habermas's, The Theory of Communicative 
&sign, vol. 2: Life-world and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason  
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987). The compatibility of Habermas's ideas with 
ecocentric emancipatory ecopolitical thought is examined in detail in Chapter 5. 
27. Melucci, "The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Social Movements," p. 801. 
28. Cohen, "Strategy or Identity," p. 694; See also Melucci, "The New Social 
Movements: A Theoretical Approach." 
29. Cohen, "Strategy or Identity," p. 668. 
30. Ibid., pp. 669-70. 
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Consistency between ends and means is considered essential and considerable 
emphasis is given to striving for the achievement of direct democracy and 
decentralized decision-making structures. However, the patterns are not uniform and, 
in many cases, these "movements" do not always have an enduring organizational 
structure. Rather, they are often discontinuous, with "members" coming together 
from submerged networks through a newsletter or informal contact and coalescing 
around ad hoc issues that have a bearing on new politics themes. 31 
The above general account of the shift in collective action from the "old" 
politics of the 1950s to the "new" politics of the 1960s and beyond captures certain 
broad developments in the political aspirations of protest movements in the West in 
the post-World War II period, yet it also obscures important shifts in the orientation of 
new social movements since the 1960s. These shifts have led some social movement 
observers to date new social movements from the 1970s or, alternatively, subdivide 
the post-1960s period into two more categories with the 1970s being viewed as a 
transitional period. Jean Cohen, for example, distinguishes new social movements 
(from the mid 1970s) from the New Left of the 1960s on the basis of the former's self-
limiting radicalism. According to Cohen, contemporary social movements lack the 
"revolutionary and totalizing character" of the New Left and instead share a 
... self-understanding that abandons revolutionary dreams in favor of the idea of 
-structural reform, along with a defense of civil society that does not seek VI, 
abolish the autonomous functioning of political and economic systems . 
Similarly, Claus Offe sees the 1970s as the transition between the "old paradigm 
politics" of the post-World War era (the "growth-security alliance") and the "new 
paradigm politics" of new social movements. 33 Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller, on 
the other hand, distinguish between new social movements of the 1960s (which they 
describe as primarily "movements for freedom," e.g., civil rights, sexual freedom, 
31. Melucci, "The New Social Movements: A Theoretical Approach," pp. 220-21. 
32. Cohen, "Strategy or Identity," p. 664 (see also p. 668). 
33. Offe, "New Social Movements," p. 820. For a comprehensive overview of 
developments in the 1970s, see Suzanne Berger, "Politics and Antipolitics in Western 
Europe in the Seventies." 
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self-expression through the hippy and drug "scenes") and those of the 1980s (which 
they describe as primarily "movements for life," e.g., peace and environmental 
quality).34 This distinction is one that takes special note of the symbolic change in 
protest colour from red to green during the last three decades. According to these 
authors, "Red was the symbol of blood, both in the sense of revolution and sacrifice, 
and it also represented violence. Green is now the symbol of life and nature." 35 
These differences in political iconography (e.g., red versus green, the clenched fist 
versus the sunflower) were also reflected in the different kinds of political language 
employed during these two periods: 
The "red language" of the 60s was the idiom of alienation and 
antiauthoritarianism; the "green language" of the 84s talks about "pollution" and 
"contamination," the "natural" and the "artificial.". 3° 
Although their characterization of "red" and "green" language is somewhat 
caricatured, Feher and Heller's distinction between freedom and life captures a 
general shift in the preoccupations of new social movements from the 1960s to the 
1980s.37 On the "freedom" side, for example, the major comparative study of mass 
protest in five Western democracies undertaken by Barnes and others in the late 1960s 
has identified the "new political themes" of that period as "classic democratic ideals 
and their realization, such as equality, the rights of minorities, and the unfair 
advantages possessed by the upper middle classes." 38 
34. Feher and Heller, "From Red to Green," pp. 39-40. 
35. Ibid., p. 41. 
36. Ibid., p. 42. 
37. According to this freedom/life schema, the 1970s may be seen as a transitional 
period in the shift in orientation of new social movements from "freedom" to "life." 
This is also broadly consistent with Jean Cohen's and Clause Offe's dating of "new" 
(read "life" oriented) social movements from the mid-1970s. 
38. See Samuel H. Barnes et al., Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western  
Democracies (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979), p. 14. However, not all movement 
participants sought to instantiate these ideals through violent means. For example, the 
principles of nonviolent resistance were popularized during the 1960s by the civil 
rights movement, as were many other themes that are taken up by new social 
movements of the later period. 
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On the "life" side, it is indeed the case that participants in the Green 
movement have embraced "Life" as the central value of the movement, however, it is 
usually used in a more general sense to mean life in general rather than just human  
life. For example, the British Green (formerly Ecology) Party's manifesto is entitled 
"Politics for Life" and its policy on "Land" includes "upholding the basic rights of all 
other species."39 Similarly, Bunyard and Morgan-Grenville's recent introduction to 
Green thinking defines "Green" as "quite simply, concern for life on earth" while 
Porritt, in his popular introduction to Green politics, heads his list of the "minimum 
criteria for being Green" with the principle "reverence for the Earth and all its 
creatures."40  
However, the freedom/life distinction obscures the fact that the movements of 
the 1980s have carried forward and built on many of the concerns of the movements 
of the 1960s, especially the democratic and participatory ideals championed by the 
civil rights movement.41 For example, it is clear from the four pillars of Green 
politics that "life" is not the only principle of Green politics. Indeed, Carl Boggs has 
argued that "the Green vision of democracy - and of politics in general - probably 
owes more to new-left radicalism than to any other ideological current."42 
Moreover, Feher and Heller's freedom/life distinction misleadingly suggests 
that Green concerns are more regressive than emancipatory - a suggestion that reflects 
39. Politics for Life (London: Ecology Party, n.d.), p. 13. 
40. Bunyard and Morgan-Grenville, The Green Alternative, p. x, and Porritt, Seeing 
Green, p. 10. 
41. Indeed, many Green commentators are quick to acknowledge the debt to new 
social movements of the 1960s. For example, Brian Tokar has argued that "the real 
origin of the Green movement is in the great social and political upheavals that swept 
the United States and the entire Western world during the 1960s" (The Green 
Alternative: Creating an Ecological Future, p. 34). Similarly, Carl Boggs observes 
that "what are often described as 'new' social movements have their origins in the 
1960s and owe much of their growth to the translation of their insurgent energy into 
more highly articulated forms of popular revolt in the 1970s" (Social Movements and 
Political Power: Emerging Forms of Radicalism p. 38). 
42. Carl Boggs, Social Movements and Political Power: Emerging Forms of 
Radicalism (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), p. 184. 
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their concern to evaluate the left/right character of new social movements. For 
example, they argue that 
The more a social movement combines the value of freedom and life (under the 
predominance of the former), the more marked is its Leftist character. The 
more emphatic their contrast, the weaker its Leftist character. The abolition of 
freedom through life has fundamentalist consequences, while the dismissal of 
life through freedom has suicidally henic consequences. Both are detrimental 
to the Leftist character of movement'' 
Yet, as I argued in Chapter 1, to approach the Green movement only through the 
prism of the conventional political spectrum is to miss important new themes. Feher 
and Heller's freedom/life distinction suggests that all we have witnessed from the 
1960s to the 1980s is a general swing of the political pendulum from "leftist" 
concerns to "less leftist" concerns. This kind of characterization obscures the 
cumulative development of new social movement concerns - concerns that have been 
given theoretical expression in the dialectical development of ecopolitical thought 
from the 1960s to the 1980s. 
While Feher and Heller's freedom/life distinction is able to capture the 
tension between what I have characterized as the participatory and survivalist themes, 
it misses the most promising and significant theme of emancipation, which is an 
attempt to transcend the tension between participation and survival. I would therefore 
suggest a reformulation of their distinction in terms of the dialectic in ecopolitical 
thought outlined in Chapter 1. That is, we may chart a shift in the emphasis of new 
social movements from participationist (read freedom, with little emphasis on life) to 
a survivalist (read life, with little emphasis on freedom) and finally to an 
emancipatory perspective (representing a creative synthesis of life and freedom in a 
new ecological matrix) which I have further subdivided into an anthropocentric 
stream and an ecocentric stream. Let us now use this new emancipatory ecopolitical 
dimension to explore the nature of the relationship between the Green movement and 
other new social movements and to clarify the ideological debates within, the Green 
movement as to how the concerns of other new social movements are to be integrated 
under the banner of an ecological politics. 
43. Feher and Heller, "From Red to Green," p. 44. 
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The Relationship Between New Social Movements  
And the Green Movement 
Although there now exists a considerable body of literature on Green 
politics and new social movements, there is nonetheless a considerable degree of 
confusion concerning exactly where the Green movement is supposed to fit in the 
"new" and very generalized pattern of politics described above. The problem 
concerns the Green movement's exact identity, in particular, whether it is to be 
understood as (i) essentially the environmental movement (this, of course, is an 
extremely broad and heterogeneous movement containing many different 
philosophical currents, as I showed in Chapter 2); (ii) a broader based new social 
movement that represents an ecumenical and pragmatic alliance between the 
environmental movement and other new social movements with the environmental 
movement having no greater influence than these other new social movement, or 
(iii) a broader based new social movement that seeks to integrate the concerns of 
other new social movements within an ecological matrix, thereby giving primacy to 
ecological concerns. 
The label "Green movement" has been applied by theorists, journalists, and 
general observers to each of these understandings. This confusion concerning the 
identity of the Green movement is partly a reflection of its infancy (i.e., it is still in 
the process of shaping its identity) and partly a reflection of its fiercely grassroots 
democratic nature, which encourages local diversity and experimentation and resists 
uniform organizational models and strategies along with the dogmatic notion of a 
"correct" ideology and identity. Accordingly, the question as to which of these three 
answers is most accurate or relevant will not only turn up different answers in 
different countries but also different answers by different Green activists in these 
countries! Nonetheless, two generalizations can be proffered concerning the identity 
of the Green movement. First, despite the loose equation (most often made by 
journalists) between "Greens" and "environmentalists," most Green movement 
activists and Green political candidates are concerned with both ecological ad social 
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goals. Second, it is generally apparent that the success of Green political parties has 
been dependent on the support not only of the environmental movement but also of 
other new social movements (although these other new social movements do not all 
participate in, or lend their support to, such parties to the same degree). 44 
Notwithstanding these general observations, the matter of the Green 
movement's identity remains a highly contested matter within both movement and 
party circles, and one that bears directly upon the self-understanding, values, and 
collective goals of the movement. One of my principal concerns in this section is to 
provide a classificatory schema that will help to clarify these internal normative 
debates concerning the Green movement's identity. (The different international 
manifestations of the Green movement will be briefly described in the final section of 
this chapter.) 
The main area of normative disagreement concerning the Green movement's 
identity may be analyzed in terms of the different interpretations given to the 5tatua  
and moping of the principle of ecology in Green politics - interpretations which, in 
turn, have a direct bearing on how the principle of ecology is to be integrated with the 
Green movement's social concerns. On the one hand, there are some movement 
participants (this includes many ecosocialists) who conceive of the Green movement 
as a pragmatic "rainbow" alliance of new social movements that ought not to privilege 
(theoretically or practically) the concerns of the environmental movement vis-a-vis 
the concerns of other new social movements.45 This approach may be designated the 
44. In West Germany, for example, Papadakis has found that "over the past decade 
the Green Party has emerged from and been heavily dependent on support from a 
variety of single- and multi-issue social movements. This explains why a majority of 
activists in the new social movements and of voters for the Green party regard the 
party as an extension of the movement. Nonetheless, the party now attracts support 
from a wide range of people, many of whom have only had a loose association with 
the social movements." See Elim Papadalds, "The Greens in West Germany: Social 
Movement, Interest Group or Political Party?," p. 345, and Papadakis, The Green 
Movement in West Germany.  It has also been found in West Germany that while 
most active supporters of the ecology and anti-nuclear movements have voted for the 
Greens, the majority of supporters of the peace movement have voted for the Social 
Democrats. See Muller-Rommel, "Social Movements and the Greens," p. 59. 
45. This is in fact how the West German Greens began, that is, by means of the 
repeated modest electoral success of local and regional coalitions that ran 
"Alternative" or "coloured" lists. See, for example, Werner Hulsberg, "The Greens at 
110 
"rainbow interpretation" (indeed, many proponents of this approach prefer to describe 
their politics as "rainbow politics" rather than Green politics). In terms of the 
meaning (as distinct from the status) accorded to the principle of ecology, adherents 
of the rainbow interpretation invariably adopt an anthropocentric ecological 
perspective (this, of course, is consistent with their special preoccupation with human 
emancipator), struggles). 
The alternative view as to the status of ecological concerns (which also 
generally accords with most of the major introductions to Green politics that have 
been published in English by participating activists and theorists), is that the Green 
movement ought to be seen as a new social movement in its own right that has 
emerged out of concerted efforts to integrate what are seen as the interrelated 
concerns of new social movements within an ecological, holistic framework.' 6 This 
approach may be designated the "ecology first" interpretation. As Karl-Werner 
Brandt has observed, this framework had been spearheaded by the environmental and 
anti-nuclear movements: 
In the wake of these movements, there developed a more or less diffuse 
ecological pattern of criticism, a "new ecological paradigm," which permitted 
the Crossroads," New Left Review 152 (1985): 5-29. A more recent manifestation of 
the rainbow approach is the newly formed Rainbow Coalition in Australia, which is 
intended as an umbrella organization of movements of "various colours," including 
trade unions, ecologists, Aboriginal Australians, feminists, and aid activists (see Boris 
Frankel, "The Rainbow Affiance: A New Political Movement is Born," Habitat 
Australia, June 1988, pp. 33-35). So far, the main concern of this grouping has been 
with the Australian economy - in particular, in developing an alternative socialist 
strategy. According to Caddick and Lynch, it has been less concerned with cultural 
issues and international politics and there has been little input by ecological activists 
and feminists (Alison Caddick and Maryanne Lynch, "Rainbow Politics: A Real 
Alternative?" Arena 83 [1988]: 41-47 at p. 44). Alan Roberts has likewise criticized 
the Rainbow Alliance for what he sees as its lack of "a coherent vision whose 
overarching inclusiveness can be translated into organization terms." See Roberts, 
"Spanning the Difference, Seeking Vision," Arena 83 (1988): 36-40 at p. 40. Other 
defenders of a "rainbow" approach include Senator Michael Macklin, "Green or 
Rainbow? - The Colour for Australia," Paper delivered to the Ecopolitics I 
Conference, Griffith University, Brisbane, Queensland, 30-31 August 1986, and Jim 
Falk, "A Colour-Coded Future? Towards an Alternative Australia," in Moving Left:  
The Future of Socialism in Australia, ed. David McKnight (Sydney: Pluto Press, 
1986), pp. 117-34. 
46. For example, see Capra and Spretnalc, Green Politics; Porritt, Seeing Green; 
Porritt and Winner, The Coming of the Greens: Bahro, Building the Green  
Movement; Bunyard and Morgan-Grenville, eds., The Green Alternative; Tokar, Ll_et 
Green Alternative; Hutton, ed., Green Politics in Australia; Ash, Green Politics; and 
Irvine and Ponton, A Green Manifesto. 
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integration of theA xarious kinds of social protest, or at least gave them an 
ecological tinge.'" 
While those who accept the ecology first interpretation necessarily accept that an 
ecological perspective should provide the overarching framework for Green politics, 
it is clear from the previous chapter that there are different ecological frameworks that 
may be adopted (i.e., Resource Conservation, Human Welfare Ecology, 
Preservationism, Animal Rights, and Ecocentrism). In terms of the meaning (as 
distinct from status) given to this central ecological framework, then, this group can 
be further subdivided into "anthropocentric ecology Greens" and "ecocentric ecology 
Greens." (I shall refer to the latter as simply "ecocentric Greens" since the term 
"ecocentric" is, by definition, one particular kind of ecological perspective.) 
Anthropocentric ecology Greens generally tend to subscribe to a Human Welfare 
Ecology perspective. There is, of course, no logical inconsistency involved with such 
a position. That is, it is possible to argue that ecological concerns should have 
theoretical and political primacy while also arguing that those ecological concerns 
should be defended on purely human-centred grounds (e.g., that healthy ecosystems 
enhance human health, safety, and wellbeing). 
Those who defend a rainbow interpretation generally argue that their 
conceptualization is more ecumenical and nonpartisan than the ecology first 
interpretation insofar as no particular new social movement is regarded as 
theoretically privileged. Ecocentric Greens and anthropocentric ecology Greens, 
however, argue that an ecological perspective should provide the framework or matrix 
47. Brandt, "New Social Movements as a Metapolitical Challenge," p. 62. Similarly, 
Johan Galtung has characterized the Green movement as an umbrella movement for a 
number of partial movements, each of them attacking one or more aspects of modern 
society: "The Green movement is a general reaction to the malfunctioning of the 
Western social formation ... [it] differs from many other social movements in denying 
that basic social problems can be solved by attacking one single factor, a much more 
wholistic approach is needed." See Gaining, "The Green Movement: A 
Socio-Historical Explanation," International Sociology 1 (1986): 75-90, pp. 76 and 
790. Likewise, Jan Pakluski has observed that despite the diversity and fragmentation 
of "ecopax" movements (i.e., his term for Green movements) in advanced Western 
societies, "there are clear signs of coalescence of the ecological, anti-nuclear and 
pacifist initiatives into loosely integrated, national movements ... [a process that] 
increasingly draws into the eco-pax orbit such other more loosely affiliated groups as 
feminists, students, squatters, gays, land-rights supporters, animal liberationists, and a 
host of local political and cultural bodies." (See Pakulsid, Social Movements, p. 166) 
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within which all social problems should be integrated and resolved since the 
continuation of social life is dependent on a healthy biological support system. 
Moreover, ecocentric Greens go further and argue that although an anthropocentric 
ecology first approach is preferable to an anthropocentric rainbow approach, both 
nonetheless ensure that human interests will be privileged vi-a-vis the interests of the 
nonhuman world, albeit in varying degrees. They argue that without being relocated  
within an ecocentric context, human emancipatory struggles will remain wedded to  
the long standing tradition of anthropocentrism  - a tradition that is partly responsible 
for our present environmental problems (as we saw in Chapter 2). 
These normative debates will be discussed in more detail in Part H. In the 
remainder of this section I want to to show how this important 
anthropocentric/ecocentric cleavage within the Green movement has been largely 
overlooked by many observers of new social movements, who regard generalized 
typologies of new social movements as being transposable onto and descriptive of the 
Green movement or, alternatively, do not see Green concerns as anything more than 
an aggregation of new social movement concerns in genera1.48 The result is a 
theoretical understanding that either misses or underplays the significance of the 
contribution of the radical ecocentric stream within the environmental movement, 
which, in turn, has fed into the Green movement. Yet, I argue that it is precisely this 
perspective that is the most novel and distinctive current within the Green movement; 
I also argue that this perspective provides the most encompassing theoretical matrix 
within which the concerns of new social movements may be integrated. 
For example, theorists of new social movements are more likely to focus on 
the continuity in the basic themes and values (as distinct from issues) borne by old 
48. Examples include Offe, "New Social Movements"; Feher and Heller, "From Red 
to Green"; and Papadakis, The Green Movement in West Germany.  Papadakis does 
not even raise the issue of anthropocentrism in his two chapters on "Themes and 
Concepts" in the West German Green movement and instead singles out "survival" 
and our "species interest" [i.e., the interests of humanity] as the central concerns of 
the ecological component of the Green movement (ibid., p. 25). Although the critique 
of anthropocentrism has been much more prominent in Green debates in North 
America and Australasia than in Europe (as I note below), it is certainly not absent in 
Europe, as the above theorists would have us believe. 
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and new social and political movements of the "modern world" (i.e., since the 
Renaissance), particularly those set in train by the Enlightenment, whereas ecocentric 
Green theorists are more likely to stress the differences. An important illustration of 
this concerns the status of the anthropocentric assumptions embedded in the Western 
tradition of humanism, according to which humans are considered to be the measure 
of all things and the centre of value. Most theorists of new social movements tend to 
find no significant discrepancies between the values of new social movements and the 
humanist tradition whereas many Green theorists emphasize the ways in which the 
Green movement is challenging and revising this long standing tradition. 
Accordingly, theorists who apply new social movement typologies to the Green 
movement are more likely to locate the Green movement within the humanist 
tradition and thereby lose sight of its radical ecocentric intent or at least mistake it for 
something else. 
Claus Offe, for example, has identified the issues of concern in the "new 
paradigm" of politics (i.e., the politics of new social movements) as "preservation of 
peace, environment, human rights, and unalienated forms of work" - all of which are 
interpreted as issues to do with "human autonomy and identity" (my emphasis). 
Indeed, Offe argues that these so-called "new" values are not very new at all because 
they are all firmly rooted in modern, political philosophies of the last two centuries; 
that is, "they are inherited from the progressive movements of both the bourgeoisie 
and the working class" and have their foundations "in the modern traditions of 
humanism, historical materialism, and the emancipatory ideas of the 
Enlightenment." 49 In Offe's view, what is at issue today are not the values (which he 
sees as largely uncontroversial) but their mode of implementation and the means by 
which they may be best realized (these values are listed as autonomy, identity, 
authenticity, human rights, peace, and the desirability of balanced physical 
environments). 50 What we are witnessing then, according to Offe, is not a value 
change but 
49 Offe, "New Social Movements," pp. 849-50. 
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... an awareness of the disaggregation and partial incompatibility within the 
universe of modem values. The ties of logical implication between values - 
such as the links between technical progress and the satisfaction of human 
needs, property and autonomy, income and identity, and, most generally, 
between the rationality of processes and the desirability of outcomes - are 
perceived to disintegrate. The cognitive awareness of clashes and 
contradictions within the modem set of values may lead to a selsctive emphasis 
upon some values - which is still different from a value change?' 
Even some sociologists and political scientists who have confined their 
attention to the environmental movement, rather than new social movements in 
general, have (like Feher and Heller) nonetheless continued to miss this new 
ecocentric challenge to anthropocentrism - largely because they have applied 
dimensions (such as left/right or radical/conservative) or asked questions that are 
unable to detect these new values.52 However, theorists (for example, Lester 
Milbrath) who do apply the anthropocentric/nonanthropocentric dimension in their 
empirical research have found 
... that one of the outstanding characteristics of [core] environmentalists is their 
high valuation of nature. Everyone values nature, of course, but 
environmentalists value for its own sake; many of them have an almost 
worshipful love for it 
50. Ibid. 
51. Ibid., p. 850. This argument is endorsed by Elim Papadakis in respect of the West 
German Green movement. See Papadakis, "The Greens in West Germany," p. 350. 
52. See, for example, Grant McConnell, "The Environmental Movement: Ambiguities 
and Meanings," Natural Resources Journal 11(1971): 427-35; David Wells, 
"Radicalism, Conservatism and Environmentalism," Politics 13 (1978): 299-306; 
Frederick H. Buttell and Oscar Larson ifi, "Whither Environmentalism?: The Future 
Political Path of the Environment Movement," Natural Resources Journal 20 (1980): 
323-44; and Cotgrove, Catastrophe or Cornucopia. As Warwick Fox points out in a 
critical discussion of Cotgrove's study, "Cotgrove looks for differences between 
environmentalists and the general public in terms of attitudes toward industrialism, 
science, material values, and economic values (all quite respectable sociological 
variables) and finds them. He does not look for differences between various kinds of 
environmentalists or between environmentalists and the general public with respect to 
the hitherto non-sociological variable of anthropocentrism and, consequently, does 
not find them." See Warwick Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing 
New Foundations for Environmentalism (Boston: Shambhala, 1990), forthcoming, 
pp. 57-8 (page citations refer to the prepublication ms). 
53. Lester Milbrath, Environmentalists: Vanguard for a New Society (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1984), p. 26. Milbrath also found that 
"environmentalists, much more than non-environmentalists, have a generalized sense 
of compassion that extends to other species, to people in remote communities and 
countries, and to future generations" (p. 28). 
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Against Offe's argument that new social movements are symptomatic only 
of value clash and contradiction but not value change, ecocentric Green theorists 
would argue that these clashes and contradictions are partly attributable to our failure 
to re-examine and revise what Offe refers to as "the modern set of values" that we 
have inherited from the Enlightenment. To employ familiar Kulmian language, these 
clashes and contradictions between values are interpreted as anomalies that cannot by 
resolved without a paradigm shift, in this case, from the human-centred universe of 
modern political discourse to the ecological philosophy of interrelatedness that 
underpins the new ecocentric paradigm. Only then, the reply would run, will the links 
between the values mentioned by Offe be re-established, a process made possible by 
revising and "scaling down" some of these values to the point where they are 
compatible with, indeed, take their meaning in the context of, an ecocentric world-
view. 
A different kind of challenge to the claimed "newness" of the values of new 
social movements and the Green movement is that these values are not so much new 
or disaggregated as recurrent. Although Karl-Werner Brandt has pointed to the "new 
ecological paradigm" that has developed in the wake of the environmental and 
anti-nuclear movements, he has suggested that the anti-modern protest engaged in by 
new social movements is not really "new" when viewed from an historical 
perspective: 
Neither the themes, aims nor motives of the new social movements are in fact 
new. The battle about civil rights, about self-determination and autonomy, the 
women's and peace movements, the counter-cultural critics gt civilization, even 
the environment movement can look back to a long history?' 
Brandt has argued that new social movements may be seen as expressing "the patterns 
of a classical critique of modern civilization, which has accompanied the development 
of modernity antithetically since the late 18th century." 55 They are seen as the latest 
in a series of reactions to "far reaching thrusts of modernization," part of the latest 
wave in the cycle of "enlightenment and remythization, rationality and romanticism, 
54. Brandt, "New Social Movements as a Metapolitical Challenge," p. 63. 
55. Ibid. 
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technical instrumentalism and organic living," but a wave that will, like previous 
ones, eventually subside.56 It is certainly true that many of the general values 
defended by new social movements have a long, albeit intermittent, history. They 
were prefigured in part, for example, in the romanticism of the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth century and in the early utopian socialist and anarchist attempts to 
establish communitarian institutions (although these commonalities should not be 
overstated). 57 Even the most distinctive philosophical current in the Green 
movement, namely ecocentrism, has (like most philosophical ideas) numerous 
antecedents and historical resonances - from the life centred theology of St Francis of 
Assisi through to the American literary tradition of naturalism and pastoralism. 58 Yet 
this current is now part of a different (and larger) constellation of ideas that has come 
into being in an entirely new context, namely, in the light of scientific horizons that 
were unknown to previous advocates of what we now recognize, with hindsight, as 
ecocentric philosophies and in the light of social and environmental problems and 
threats the combined scale and magnitude of which have not been experienced 
before.59 Indeed, Brandt himself acknowledges elsewhere in the same article in 
which he asserts the recurrent nature of anti-modern protest that the many different 
56. Ibid., p. 64. 
57. See, for example, Helen Irving, "The Romance of Nature," Arena 84 (1988): 
64-76, and P. R. Hay, "The Contemporary Environment Movement as 
Neo-Romanticism: A Re-Appraisal from Tasmania," Environmental Review 12 
(1988): 39-59. In his wide-ranging, critical discussion of the view that the 
environmental movement is yet another expression of romanticism, Hay criticizes the 
designation of the movement by historians as a lineal descendant of the genteel 
romanticism of the 19th century as "a good instance of the historical enterprise's 
recurrent danger of assuming temporal connections on the basis of apparently similar 
phenomena observed at different points of time" (p. 50). For a discussion of the 
tradition of "Ecological Community" in political thought, see Robert Nisbet, iba 
Social Philosophers: Community and Conflict in Western Thought (London: 
Heinemann, 1974), Chapter 5. I discuss this tradition in detail in Chapter 7. 
58. See Devall and Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered (Layton, 
Utah: Gibbs M. Smith, 1985), Chapter 6. 
59. Carl Boggs has described the Green phenomenon "as a quintessentially 
post-industrial (and therefore post-liberal and post-Marxist) expression - as a new 
paradigm of thought and action that demands a break with the old systems of 
meaning." See Boggs, "The Green Alternative and the Struggle for a Post-Marxist 
Discourse," Theory and Society 15 (1986): 869-99 at p. 871. 
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contemporary currents of anti-modem protest have now been integrated within a nry v 
ecological paradigm. Yet he does not treat this as significant, preferring to view anti-
modernist protest as a cyclical rather than a developmental phenomenon. 60 
The centrality of this ecological context is evident (whether implicitly or 
explicitly) in most of the major Green texts produced by activists and theorists 
(material that is often overlooked as relevant sociological data by new social 
movement theorists). A few more illustrations (i.e., in addition to those provided in 
Chapter 1) will help to give the flavour of this position (critical argument is reserved 
for later chapters). 
In one of the first book length studies of Green politics, Fritjof Capra and 
Charlene Spretnalc have argued that "Green politics, in short, is the political 
manifestation of the cultural shift to the new paradigm." 61 By this they mean a new 
ecological vision of reality (i.e., new vis-a-vis what they call the dominant 
"mechanistic paradigm") that "emphasizes the interconnectedness and 
interdependence of all phenomena, as well as the embeddedness of individuals and 
societies in the cyclical processes of nature." 62 
In the United Kingdom, Peter Bunyard and Fern Morgan-Grenville, who 
have compiled and edited a comprehensive, popular introduction to Green ideas, 
consider the essence of the adjective "Green" to be, "quite simply, concern for life on 
earth."63 They go on to amplify this basic maxim by pointing out that it is 
Not just concern for one's own family or friends, for a community or for the 
whole human race, but concern for the process of life itself and everything that 
60. This is the overall thrust of Brandt's argument despite his observation that 
"whether these recurring waves of movements critical of civilization show a cyclical 
character, connected perhaps to the long waves of accumulated cycles, is an open 
question.". Brandt, "New Social Movements as a Metapolitical Challenge," p. 64. 
Eder, on the other hand, sees the ecology movement's self-conception as crystallizing 
"all aspects of protest into a historically new social movement ... The ecology 
movement is the new social movement displacing the institutionally integrated labour 
movement." Klaus Eder, "A New Social Movement?" Telos 52 (1982): 5-20 at p. 6. 
61. Capra and Spretnak, Green Politics, p. xx. 
62. Ibid., p. xix. 
63. Bunyard and Morgan-Grenville, eds., The Green Alternative, p. x. 
118 
nurtures and pistains that process. One can only care for other people by caring 
for the earth.w+ 
According to Brian Tokar, a U.S. Green activist and author of The Green  
Alternative, 
The science of ecology has inspired a new understanding of humanity as one 
element in an intricate web of relationships that make up the natural world. A 
close study of nature reveals the profound interdependence of all living things. 
The plants, the oceans, the soil, and all living creatures are essential parts of a 
natural living whole. emoving or damaging one piece of the whole makes life 
more difficult for 
And finally, Jonathon Porritt, in his popular introduction to Green politics, 
has headed his list of the "minimum criteria for being Green" with the principle 
"reverence for the Earth and all its creatures." 	to Porritt, "the state of 
the planet ... provides the framework within which we develop our ideas, dream our 
utopias, amend our lifestyles. It provides the earthly reason for all our labours." 67 
As we saw in the previous chapter, much of the inspiration for this new 
recognition of biological and psychological interconnectedness by many Greens has 
been provided by the steadily growing literature on deep or transpersonal ecology. 
While an ecocentric perspective is the most distinctive stream of thought in 
the Green movement it does not, as I have noted, command uniform support. Indeed, 
the conflict between the anthropocentric and ecocentric streams within the Green 
movement remains a major source of debate in grassroots Green circles just as it is in 
emancipatory ecopolitical theory. This conflict that has considerably complicated the 
Green task of integrating ecological concerns with social concerns. As I showed in 
Chapter 1, the attempt to link social and ecological concerns has given rise to a range 
of new theoretical endeavours by emancipatory ecopolitical theorists who have sought 
to synthesize one or more existing egalitarian and communitarian political traditions 
with an ecological perspective of some kind. Not surprisingly, important differences 
64. Ibid. 
65. Tokar, The Green Alternative, p. 4. 
66. Porritt, Seeing Green, p. 10. Drew Hutton draws heavily on both Porritt and 
Capra in outlining a comprehensive Green paradigm in his essay "What is Green 
Politics?" in Hutton, ed., Green Politics in Australia, pp. 1-33. 
67. Porritt, Seeing Green, p. 25. 
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have emerged in the relative emphases given to social and ecological concerns in 
these various theoretical efforts, as we shall see in Part II. For present purposes, I 
intend only to outline some of the major regional and philosophical differences that 
have emerged within Green theory and practice by way of an introduction to the 
theoretical issues that will be explored more fully in the remaining chapters of this 
inquiry. 
Major Debates and Cleavages within the  
Green Movement: An Introduction 
The normative debates in and around the Green movement concerning the 
integration of social and ecological concerns vary in emphasis from country to 
country and region to region depending on a wide range of interrelated factors. 
Foremost among these are the social complexion of the major social movements that 
are active within a given country or region as well as that country's or region's history, 
political framework, contemporary social and ecological problems, and intellectual 
traditions. For example, the stronger intellectual influence of the Left in Europe has 
meant that the theoretical status of socialism (broadly used here to include Marxism) 
has remained a much bigger preoccupation among Greens in European than it has in 
North America, where anarchist (in the decentralist, populist tradition) and feminist 
currents of thought have tended to play a relatively more prominent role in Green 
debates. This is reflected in the fact that the major philosophical differences that have 
emerged within Green circles in North America are between the supporters of deep or 
transpersonal ecology, on the one hand, and the anarchist inspired social ecology of 
Murray Bookchin and ecofeminism, on the other hand. 68 In Europe, however, the 
most publicized movement debates have been between the opposing ecosocialist (i.e., 
anthropocentric rainbow and anthropocentric ecology Green) and ecofundamentalist 
(i.e., ecocentric Green) factions of Pie Grunen, although variations on these tensions 
can be found in Britain (between, say, the Socialist Environment and Resources 
Association [S.E.R.A.] and ecocentric Greens) and Australia (between the Rainbow 
68. See Chapters 7 and 8 for a discussion of these debates. 
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Alliance and ecocentric Green independent groups). 69 These regional differences, 
however, are merely differences of emphasis. The debate concerning the ecological 
merits of Marxism, for example, has by no means been confined to Europe but rather 
has surfaced from time to time - especially in philosophical discussions - in Australia 
and North America. 
A further important point of difference, as I noted in Chapter 2, is that the 
existence of large tracts of relatively "undeveloped" wilderness areas in North 
America, Australasia, and Scandinavia has meant that wilderness preservationist 
conflicts together with debates concerning the importance and moral standing of the 
nonhuman world have tended to be a more significant feature of the Green debates in 
these countries compared to long settled and "domesticated" Europe (excluding 
Scandinavia). For example, in his comparative survey of Green parties in New 
Zealand, Finland, and Sweden, Stephen Rainbow notes that 
The small population and low population densities in all three countries 
contribute to the prominence of the natural environment in their respective 
national psyches, a fact reflected in,gle long tradition of conservation groups, at 
least in Sweden and New Zealand. 'u 
In Britain and Continental Europe, on the other hand, the anti-nuclear, anti-
pollution, and peace movements (which generally proceed from a Human Welfare 
Ecology perspective) have had a greater relative influence on Green politics than 
movements for the preservation of wilderness. 71 This particular difference has 
helped to shape the ways in which ecological problems have been theorized in these 
respective continents. The result has been that much greater critical attention has 
69. This is not meant to be an exhaustive statement of the ideological cleavages 
within the West German Green movement. Werner Hulsberg, for example, identifies 
four factions: the fundamentalists, the ecosocialists, the ecolibertarians, and the 
realpolitilcers (Hulsberg, "The Greens at the Crossroads," p. 22 and following). 
70. Rainbow, "Eco-politics in Practice," p. 32. 
71. See P. R. Hay and M. G. Haward, "Comparative Green Politics: Beyond the 
European Context?" Political Studies 36 (1988): 433-48; Rainbow, "Eco-politics in 
Practice," p. 20. On the other hand, Raymond Dominick has argued that the 
anti-nuclear movement was "probably the most influential antecedent of the Green 
movement" in both the United States and West Germany. However, he also argues 
that debate over nuclear power was more prominent and involved a larger proportion 
of the population in West Germany than in the United States (see Dominick, "The 
Roots of the Green Movement," pp. 16-17). 
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been given to the notion of anthropocentrism by Green theorists and activists in North 
America, Scandinavia, and Australasia compared with the rest of Europe. 
* * * 
Emancipatory ecopolitical theorists have helped to shape, focus, and clarify 
the normative debates within the international Green movement. Indeed, many may 
be seen as "organic intellectuals" in the Gramscian sense insofar as they have helped 
to direct and organize the ideas and aspirations of the movement to which they 
belong.72 The various syntheses of social and ecological concerns discussed in 
Part 11 of this inquiry may therefore be seen as theoretical crystallizations of the 
themes, issues, and controversies sketched above. These may be lined up along a 
major and a minor axis: the first, most fundamental, and distinctive axis concerns the 
human/nonhuman relationship; the second and subsidiary axis concerns social or 
inter-human questions. The most prominent debate along the former axis is between 
ecocentric Green theorists (the most representative group here being deep or 
transpersonal ecology theorists and bioregionalists) and anthropocentric Green 
theorists (this is the general orientation of eco-Marxists, ecosocialists, and social 
ecologists [to some extent]). The most prominent debate along the social axis is 
between ecosocialists and ecoanarchists concerning the role of the State in a Green 
society. Both of these debates are closely interrelated insofar as argument takes place 
not only within but also across these two axes with ecosocialists tending to occupy the 
anthropocentric end and ecoanarchists tending more toward the ecocentric end of the 
ecophilosophical spectrum (although important exceptions will be noted). The 
contribution of ecofeminists has also served to enliven and widen the realm of 
discussion concerning both axes with their central argument than both the domination 
of people and the degradation of the environment can be linked to patriarchal 
consciousness. The dialogue between and across these two spectrums has given rise 
72. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans. and ed. by 
Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1976), 
especially pp. 5-23. Some emancipatory theorists (for example Rudolf Bahro) have 
had a decisive influence on the formation of Green parties (see Papadalds, The Green 
Movement in West Germany, p. 18). 
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to a diverse and growing body of Green literature that has considerably enriched and 
expanded the domain of ecopolitical inquiry. I now intend to examine each of these 
major emancipatory ecopolitical syntheses. 
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Part II 
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An Ecocentric Analysis of Green Political Thought 
Introduction to Part II 
I argued in Part I that emancipatory ecopolitical theorists are united by their 
characterization of the ecological crisis as not just a crisis of participation and 
survival but also a crisis of culture and character. I showed that emancipatory 
ecopolitical theorists are also united by their attempt to integrate the concerns of the 
environmental movement with the concerns of other new social movements in a 
general emancipatory theory that opposes all forms of domination. However, I 
showed that emancipatory ecopolitical thought represents a spectrum of thought 
(rather than an internally coherent political theory) that is divided over what kinds of 
post-liberal political traditions are best suited to ushering in a new phase of cultural 
renewal, social emancipation, and ecological restoration. At a more fundamental 
level I showed that emancipatory ecopolitical theorists are also divided over how far 
the anthropocentric assumptions of our Western political heritage need to be revised. 
In Part III identify, articulate, and critically examine the major strands of 
emancipatory ecopolitical thought that are currently vying for ascendancy. My 
principal concern is to determine the extent to which each particular synthesis of 
ecological and political thought is anthropocentric or ecocentric, to defend an 
ecocentric orientation, and to meet criticisms and misunderstandings of ecocentrism 
that have emerged out of the dialogue between ecocentric and anthropocentric 
emancipatory theorists. I also assess the internal theoretical coherence of each 
synthesis, critically examine theoretical claims on the relationship between social 
domination and ecological degradation, and draw out and assess the political priorities 
that flow from these claims. 
Before commencing my examination of the major strands of emancipatory 
ecopolitical thought, however, it will be helpful to explain and clarify the political 
terminology that I adopt and to say something about the chapter organization that 
follows. In particular, a preliminary discussion and clarification of the term 
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"socialism" is needed given that there exists a wide range of potential syntheses of 
ecological and socialist thought, not all of which go by the name of "ecosocialism" 
and not all of which properly belong within the spectrum of emancipatory ecopolitical 
thought. Of course, characterizing socialism (which is sometimes appropriately 
referred to as "a mansion with many rooms") is a hazardous undertaking given that 
the ideals, boundaries, intended agents, and institutional forms of socialism are all 
highly contested matters. As a very general first approximation, socialism may be 
characterized negatively by virtue of its critique of, though not always total 
opposition to, the social and economic order spawned by capitalism together with its 
indictment of possessive individualism, the ideology of capitalism. Socialists 
therefore usually seek either alternatives to, or at least the systematic amelioration of, 
what they see as the impersonal and socially unjust operations of the market. Beyond 
general characterizations of this kind, it is impossible to formulate a succinct, positive 
definition of socialism that is able to encompass and reconcile the many varieties of 
socialist thought. This is because socialism contains deep divisions as to whether it is 
essentially a scientific doctrine or an egalitarian ethical impulse. It is equally divided 
as to whether it represents the antithesis of liberalism, and hence a rupture with that 
tradition, or its democratic fulfilment, and hence part of the same cultural universe as 
liberalism. (Accordingly, it is possible to discern modern, anti-modern, and 
post-modern tendencies within socialist thought.) It is also divided as to whether it is 
a rational, organized response to the disorder of capitalism, and hence the triumph of 
Reason in the form of "rational planning," or a libertarian movement that is concerned 
with self-directedness within a decentralized community setting, and hence simply the 
triumph of politically and economically dispossessed peoples. This latter current of 
socialist thought merges with the anarchist critique of capitalism and the state 
(particularly on the theme of producer democracy). Finally, while many socialist 
theorists advocate state or communal ownership of the means of production, others 
are content to focus on developing (usually centralized) mechanisms of wealth 
redistribution, thereby leaving wealth generation to private enterprise. In short, 
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"socialism is not a simple thing, but a range, an arena, an open texture, a 
self-contradiction." 1 
Many of the tensions and contradictions to be found in socialist thought in 
general are also to be found in the various syntheses of socialism and ecology 
discussed in this inquiry, an inheritance that has made the task of elaborating a 
concise definition of ecosocialism an equally hazardous undertaking. For example, 
while most emancipatory ecopolitical theorists who call themselves ecosocialists 
share the Green critique of the growth consensus of existing communist regimes, their 
relationship to the theoretical traditions of orthodox Marxism, neo-Marxism, 
non-Marxist socialist theory, the Western trade union movement, the conventional 
social democratic political parties of the West, the New Left, and new social 
movements is more complex and cannot be generalized. Similarly, while most 
ecosocialists are critical of social democratic parties and trade unions in the West, 
they differ in the extent to which they argue for the retention of some kind of link 
with these organizations, whether by establishing a new political alliance or simply 
opening up a critical dialogue within party or union circles. Such links (whatever 
their nature and extent) are considered to be important by ecosocialists not simply 
from a strategic point of view; they also reflect a general philosophical commitment 
to extend the project of social and economic democracy. As we shall see, where most 
ecosocialists differ from conventional social democratic parties and trade union 
organizations is in their recognition of "ecological constraints" and their concern to 
bring resource consumption down to a level that is compatible with global justice. 
In view of the impossibility of elaborating a positive, exhaustive, and 
concise definition of socialism, and hence of ecosocialism, I have chosen to proceed 
instead on the basis of a convenient relational classification of three loose, "extended 
families" of socialism that are characterized simply by their relationship to Marxism. 
(I use the analogy of extended families because it allows for some degree of 
intermarriage with other currents of social and political thought.) I have adopted this 
1. R. N. Berlci, Socialism (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1975), p. 16. 
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approach not in order to pay tribute to Marx's towering influence on socialist thought 
(indeed, as Wright notes, his attempts to eradicate socialist pluralism by securing for 
Marxism an "organizational and theoretical monopoly" have done much to restrain 
the progressive evolution of socialist ideas) but rather to emphasize the degree of 
unlearning of orthodox Marxist premises that is needed for the re-assertion of an 
ecologically enlightened emancipatory socialism. 2 Such an approach will, of course, 
require a brief elaboration of orthodox Marxist tenets as a general benchmark for 
comparison (although no emancipatory ecopolitical theorist in fact unreservedly 
subscribes to these tenets). In line with this general trajectory away from orthodox 
Marxism, then, I have organized the relevant strands of ecosocialism that will be 
discussed into the following three family groupings: orthodox Marxism, 
neo-Marxism, and democratic socialism (which is largely, though not exclusively, 
post-Marxist). 
The first socialist grouping, which corresponds to the scientific socialism of 
the "mature Marx" and Engels (as well as Bolshevism), is discussed in Chapter 4. 
Basic to this orthodox doctrine is the view that the urban proletariat is the historically 
destined agent of the revolutionary transformation of the capitalist relations of 
production, which will lead to the abolition of private property and its replacement 
with common ownership of the means of production. The historical materialism of 
this strand of Marxism gives it its "scientific" flavour, since it is seen to be based on a 
rigorous analysis of the "laws of development" of capitalism (hence its rejection of 
nonscientific forms of socialism as utopian, ahistorical, and idealist). Ecopolitical 
theorists who defend this perspective argue that the development of the capitalist 
forces of production should be actively encouraged so as to provide the technological 
means for the "rational mastery of nature," which would thereby see an end to the 
ecological crisis. Followers of this approach will be called "orthodox eco-Marxists." 
It must be emphasized that orthodox eco-Marxism does not properly belong to the 
emancipatory ecopolitical spectrum since it remains wedded to the same cornucopian 
2. Anthony Wright, Socialisms: Why Socialists Disagree - and What They Disagree 
About (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), P.  ix. 
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assumptions as liberalism (as I showed in Chapter 1). My discussion of orthodox 
eco-Marxism in Chapter 4 is presented merely as a benchmark by which we may 
compare how far emancipatory ecopolitical theorists who draw on socialism have 
moved away from the ecologically problematic assumptions of the mature Marx. 
The second (and, in this context, more relevant) family of socialism is a 
significant sub-set of the Western Marxist (or Neo-Marxist) heritage, which 
encompasses that body of Marxist thought borne in the 1920s as a doctrinal challenge 
to Soviet Marxism, particularly the deterministic historical materialism of Bolshevik 
philosophy. 3 According to Merquior, what unites the diverse writers under this broad 
rubric is not so much their political allegiances as the shift in their theoretical 
attention from economic history and the politics of class struggle (the "base") to 
culture and ideology (the "superstructure"). In short, "they preferred to regard 
Marxism not as a science but as critique." 4 They also generally adopt a humanist 
view of knowledge (with many looking to the more philosophical writings of the 
young Marx in The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844), a theoretical 
eclecticism (often including a "return to Hegel"), and are highly critical of capitalist 
modernity. Although they range from pragmatism to idealism, empiricism, 
experientialism, and pure critique, they share, as Gorman has put it, certain "blood 
traits that are the irreplaceable core of Marxism" - they are dialectical (i.e., they 
examine the dynamic connections binding particulars to a totality), anti-capitalist, 
advocate socialism (i.e., public ownership and rational control of the productive 
apparatus), and trace their theory to relevant parts of Marx's original texts. 5 
3. J. G. Merquior, Western Marxism (London: Paladin, 1986), p. 2. Robert Gorman 
adopts a similar classification under the rubric "neo-Marxism," noting that it is a 
heterogeneous body of thought "born in Marx's ambiguous legacy and nurtured by 
practical exigencies" and containing many internal fissures. What unites 
neo-Marxists, however, is their "nonmaterialism" and their departure from Soviet 
style orthodox Marxism. (See Robert A. Gorman, ed., Biographical Dictionary of 
Neo-Marxism [Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985]) p. 21.) 
4. Merquior, Western Marxism, p. 5. 
5. Gorman, Dictionary of Neo-Marxism, pp. 21-22. 
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In addition to the discussion of orthodox eco-Marxism in Chapter 4,! also 
discuss in that chapter those emancipatory ecopolitical theorists who have sought 
theoretical inspiration from Marx's early humanist writings. These theorists will 
accordingly be referred to as "humanist eco-Marxists" (to distinguish them from their 
orthodox cousins, who seek illumination from the writings of the mature Marx). 
While the influential Critical Theory of the Frankfurt school also forms an important 
tributary of the humanist current in Western Marxism, it is treated separately in 
Chapter 5 by virtue of its innovative critique of instrumental reason and the 
domination of nature (I do, however, include a preliminary discussion of Marcuse's 
reading of the young Marx in Chapter 4). 
The third family of ecologically informed socialist theory, which is the most 
influential family of ecosocialism in Green circles, draws on the broad democratic 
socialist (or "ethical socialist") tradition and will therefore be referred to as 
"democratic ecosocialism." 6 This broad family may be variously described as 
post-Marxist or non-Marxist insofar as it is highly critical of orthodox Marxism (and 
much Western Marxism) but is not And-Marxist. That is, many theorists within this 
tradition occasionally draw on Western Marxist insights (without accepting Marxism 
as a whole) alongside other older traditions and contemporary strands of socialist 
6. There is considerable confusion among political theorists as to what distinguishes a 
democratic socialist from a social democrat, although it is generally agreed that the 
former is "more leftist" than the latter. Roger Scruton, for example, defines 
democratic socialism as "Socialism pursued by democratic means - e.g., through 
persuasion of the electorate in a state ruled by representative institutions" (Roger 
Scruton, A Dictionary of Political Thought [London: Pan Books, 1983], p. 118). 
Although Scruton goes on to state that democratic socialism should not be confused 
with social democracy, his definition of social democracy is substantially similar to 
that of democratic socialism: "Now [i.e., nowadays], social democrat denotes, 
roughly, any view, with some elements of socialist belief, which seeks reform rather 
than revolution ... and which adheres to the principles of democratic election" 
(p. 432). To the extent that democratic socialism is distinguishable from social 
democracy, according to Scruton, it is that the former is somehow "more socialist" 
than social democracy. Similarly, Anthony Wright has described democratic 
socialists as "social democrats who really mean it" (Wright, Socialisms, p. 4). 
According to Wright, whereas social democrats merely seek to reform (in the sense of 
ameliorate the effects of) capitalism, democratic socialists seek to re-organize 
capitalism along more democratic and participatory lines. I will adopt Wrighf s 
clearer delineation for the purposes of this inquiry, although it must be noted that the 
differences between democratic socialism and social democracy, especially in 
practice, are mainly differences of degree rather than kind. 
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thought, including utopian socialism, the self-management ideas of the New Left, and 
socialist feminism. (This family is distinguishable from anarchism, however, in its 
argument for the retention of a democratically accountable state.) Democratic 
socialists are critical of both Western social democracy (which has not managed to 
transcend "welfare capitalism") and Second and Third world communism (which they 
reject as authoritarian and undemocratic) and assert instead a socialism that aspires 
toward production for genuine human need, self-management, and participatory 
democracy.7 Democratic socialists thus recognize and seek to carry forward the 
substantial achievements of the liberal parliamentary democratic tradition (and are 
therefore not prepared to sacrifice democratic values in order to hasten the reform 
process). Nonetheless, they are critical of the strategy of most Western labour and 
social democratic parties for merely seeking to "milk the capitalist cow." 8 They 
argue that such a strategy has meant that most labour and social democratic parties 
have become dependent on private capitalist growth to fund their social welfare 
programmes.9 This has meant that there is a real limit to the extent to which such 
parties are prepared to intervene in, or otherwise seek control of, private investment 
decisions in order to fulfil their social reform aspirations. Yet democratic socialists 
are concerned not only to reduce the dependency of the State on the market but also 
the personal dependency of welfare recipients on the State by seeking ways of moving 
beyond the corporatist welfare state to a decentralized participatory democracy where 
producers and citizens have a more direct say in the organization of their work and 
community life. Democratic socialists accept liberal political freedoms but argue that 
7. It should also be noted that even those theorists (discussed in Chapter 4) who draw 
on orthodox Marxist theory also distance themselves from "actually existing 
socialism." 
8. Wright, Socialisms, p. 120. 
9. This kind of social democracy is considered by democratic socialists to be little 
different from the ameliorative reformism of "welfare capitalism." Welfare 
capitalism, according to Cunningham, is "a society with nonnegligible and persistent 
constraints on capitalists, most of which are capitalist serving in the long run (for 
example by providing purchasing power or by dampening social unrest), even if there 
are a few truly countercapitalist constraints." See Frank Cunningham, Democratic  
Theory and Socialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 84. 
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they are illusory without economic democracy and relative material equality. This 
kind of socialism may thus be seen as the radical democratic fulfilment of the liberal 
tradition rather than its antithesis; it seeks not only to call liberalism to account, by 
showing that its ideals cannot be realized under "late" capitalism, but also to outbid its 
promise, by suggesting alternative allocative arrangements that are better able to 
realize these ideals. Most of the emancipatory ecopolitical theorists who call 
themselves, or who I identify as, "ecosocialists" (chief among whom are Boris 
Frankel, Martin Ryle, and Raymond Williams) have emerged from, and have 
considerably revised, this broader tradition of democratic socialism. In Chapter 61 
will be arguing that "democratic ecosocialism" is the most promising body of 
ecologically inspired socialist thought in the emancipatory debates, although it falls 
short of an ecocentric perspective and, accordingly, a considerable broadening of its 
basic premises is required. 
It must be emphasized that the above loose family divisions are merely a 
convenient means of organizing and discussing the various ecological/socialist 
syntheses that feed into emancipatory ecopolitical thought. For example, many of the 
concepts elaborated by humanist eco-Marxists reappear in the ecosocialist ideas 
discussed in Chapter 6. In this respect, neo-Marxism and democratic socialism may 
be seen as close theoretical relatives (having much more in common with each other 
than with orthodox Marxism). The major difference between them is that the 
contribution of those who take a more explicitly humanist eco-Marxist perspective 
has tended to be by way of philosophical reflection and critique (drawing, inter alia, 
on the young Marx's theory of alienation) whereas those ecosocialists who draw on 
the general democratic socialist tradition have tended to be more directly concerned 
with developing concrete and feasible alternatives to capitalism that will further the 
goal of human emancipation and ecological reconstruction. One significant exception 
to this generalization is Andre Gorz, who draws directly on the writings of the young 
Marx but also outlines a detailed dual economy for an ecosocialist society. Gorz's 
ideas are discussed in both Chapters 4 and 6. 
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For the purposes of this inquiry, I treat anarchism as standing outside the 
general socialist tradition rather than as a sub-set of that tradition (despite their shared 
anti-capitalist leanings) and I categorize as anarchist all those emancipatory 
ecopolitical theorists who seek to abolish and/or by-pass the nation state and confer 
maximum political and economic autonomy on decentralized local communities. 
Emancipatory ecopolitical theorists who adopt an anarchist perspective are discussed 
in Chapter 7. It is noteworthy, however, that some of the more influential 
ecoanarchist theorists that I discuss in Chapter 7 (most notably Murray Bookchin and 
Rudolf Bahro) have generally been schooled in the Marxist tradition, are intimately 
familiar with its categories and arguments, yet have, for various reasons, rejected 
Marxism. To the extent that Marxism is discussed by these theorists, it is usually as a 
foil by which they contrast their own theoretical position, which they argue is more 
attuned to ecological reality and the concerns of new social movements than 
Marxist-based approaches. (Indeed, Bookchin and Bahro have become two of 
Marxism's harshest critics.) By definition, ecoanarchists differ from ecosocialists on 
the question of the role to be played by the State in an ecological society. 
Significantly, too, they adopt a much more radical ecological posture than 
ecosocialists. 
The feminist contribution to emancipatory ecopolitical thought is largely 
concerned to explore the connections between the domination of women and the 
domination of nonhuman nature and it generally proceeds by way of a philosophical, 
psychological, and ecological critique of patriarchy. Although it does not directly 
address the question of political forms, its strong anti-hierarchical perspective means 
that it has much more theoretical sympathy with ecoanarchism than ecosocialism. 
Chapters 5 through to 8 represent a general movement away from orthodox 
Marxism and state socialism and toward decentralized communitarian and anarchist 
political solutions; this progression of chapters also happens to correspond loosely 
with a general movement away from anthropocentrism and toward ecocentrism, 
although in both cases there is some unevenness and overlap. This parallel movement 
of ideas toward ecocentrism gad anarchism is, of course, a highly significant one in 
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terms of the key question posed in this inquiry (i.e., what political tradition is most 
compatible with an ecocentric emancipatory perspective?). However, I also argue 
that the two termini of this parallel movement of ideas - ecoanarchism and 
ecofeminism - do not represent the only or most appropriate solutions to this key 
question. It will be shown that although ecoanarchism and a revised ecofeminism 
provide the most appropriate cultural perspective for an ecocentric society, 
ecoanarchism does not provide (and ecofeminism does not address the matter of) the 
most appropriate decision-making framework for an ecocentric society. 
Chapter 4 
The Impossibility of an Ecocentric Marxism 
Introduction 
The pressing nature of the environmental crisis and the growing political 
prominence of the environmental movement and, more recently, the broader Green 
movement has prompted a number of Marxist theorists to turn their attention to the 
relationship between environmental degradation, capitalism, and social justice. 1 This 
somewhat belated entry into the ecopolitical debate marks the beginning of an 
important new chapter in the development of Marxist thought, the outcome of which 
may well determine the extent to which it is able to exert a continuing influence on 
political movements in the closing decade of this century and beyond. I say "new 
chapter" here because environmental degradation has not been a traditional concern of 
Marxism. Indeed, it has generally been considered a mere epiphenomenon of 
capitalism rather than important in its own right - something that, in any event, will be 
brought under rational social control in a socialist society. 2 This has been reflected in 
the widespread tendency among Western Marxists, especially in the "early" days of 
modem environmental concern (i.e., the late 1960s and early 1970s), to dismiss 
environmentalism as an elitist preoccupation of the middle class who can "afford" to 
worry about such matters. In particular, calls by radical environmentalists and Green 
parties for the curbing of economic growth have been met with suspicion, and in 
many cases, open hostility on the grounds of a rejection by Marxists of the idea that 
there are =algid limits to growth along with a concern for the inequitable social 
consequences that were presumed to flow from a scaling down of production. 
1. See, for example, the new U. S. journal Capitalism. Nature. Socialism: A Journal of 
Socialist Ecology, which began in 1988. 
2. K. J. Walker, "Ecological Limits and Mandan Thought," Politics 14 (1979): 29-46 
at p. 29. Walker has argued that the neglect of ecological problems by Marxist 
scholars may be largely attributed to their acceptance of Marx's rejection of the limits 
to growth arguments of Malthus. 
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Recent attempts to address Marxism's traditional neglect of environmental 
issues have been conducted on three major levels: first, somewhat defensively, by 
way of an ideological critique of the allegedly elitist campaigns of "bourgeois 
environmentalists"; 3 second, a re-reading of the writings of Marx and Engels in order 
to discern their attitude toward nature and technology and find out how and to what 
extent they addressed the environmental problems of their day; 4 and, third, an inquiry 
into the question as to whether Marxism can be developed in such a way as to address 
constructively the environmental crisis in terms that are relevant to the conditions of 
the late twentieth century. 5 This last endeavour has been considered important by 
such scholars from the point of view of opening up a constructive dialogue on 
environmental problems with communist countries (where over one third of the 
3. The classic illustration of this kind of critique is provided by Hans Magnus 
Enzensberger, "A Critique of Political Ecology," New Left Review 84 (1974): 3-31. 
Enzensberger's critique has been either adopted or quoted with approval by many 
Marxist critics of the environmental movement as well as by "Red/Green" theorists 
who are broadly sympathetic with Marxism and/or the labour movement. See, for 
example, Melanie Beresford, "Doomsayers and Eco-nuts: A Critique of the Ecology 
Movement," Politics 12 (1971): 98-106; David Pepper, The Roots of Modern  
Environmentalism (London: Croom Helm, 1984); Michael Redclift, „Sustainable  
Development: Exploring the Contradictions (London: Methuen, 1987), especially 
pp. 45-51 (indeed, both Pepper [p. 175] and Redclift [p. 45] describe Enzensberger's 
critique as "seminal" and both quote from it extensively); Robert D. Holsworth, 
"Recycling Hobbes: The Limits to Political Ecology," Massachusetts Review 20 
(1979): 9-40; David Sills, "The Environmental Movement and its Critics," Human 
Ecology 3 (1975): 1-41; and Janna Thompson, "The Death of a Contradiction: 
Marxism, the Environment and Social Change," Intervention 17 (1983): 7-26. 
4. For example, Howard Parsons, Marx and Engels on Ecology (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978); Donald Lee, "On the Mandan View of the 
Relationship between Man and Nature," Environmental Ethics 2(1980): 3-16; and 
Michael Clow, "Alienation from Nature: Marx and Environmental Politics," 
Alternatives 10 (1982): 36-40. 
5. For example, Parsons, Marx and Engels on Ecology; Lee, "On the Marxian View"; 
Charles Tolman, "Karl Marx, Alienation, and the Mastery of Nature," Environmental  
Ethics 3 (1981): 63-74; Raymond Williams, Socialism and Ecology (London: 
Socialist Environment and Resources Association, n.d.); Thompson, "The Death of a 
Contradiction"; Adrienne Farago, "Environmentalism and the Left," Urban Policy and 
Research 3 (1985): 11-15; Neil Smith, Uneven Development: Nature. Capital and the  
Production of Space (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984); Clow, "Alienation from 
Nature"; Redclift, Sustainable Development, especially at pp. 45-51 and 173-80; 
James O'Connor, "Capitalism, Nature, Socialism: A Theoretical Introduction," 
Capitalism. Nature. Socialism 1 (1988): 11-38; and James O'Connor, "Introduction to 
Issue Number Two: Socialism and Ecology," Capitalism. Nature. Socialism 2 (1989): 
5-11. 
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world's population resides) as well as with the labour movement within the liberal 
democracies of the West. Significantly, some of the Marxist scholars who embarked 
on this new area of inquiry became increasingly critical of Marxism and found 
themselves rapidly discarding central planks of classical Marxist theory (such as the 
revolutionary potential of the working class and the importance of technological 
development in facilitating social emancipation). In some cases this has occurred to 
the point where these theorists have either taken on a new ecosocialist label (Andre 
Gorz) or become recognized as post-Marxists (Rudolf Bahro). 6 This theoretical shift 
has been sharpest among those former Marxist scholars who are now actively 
involved in the Green movement as ecoanarchists, such as Rudolf Bahro and Murray 
Bookchin, both of whom have become two of Marxism's staunchest critics. 7 These 
more radical revisions and departures will, however, be explored in Chapters 7 and 8. 
My concern in this chapter is with the theoretical contributions of those scholars who 
have found sufficient illumination in the original writings of Marx (whether "early" or 
"late") to enable them to develop a Marxist explanation of, and response to, the 
contemporary ecological crisis. 
The initial Marxist entry into the environmental debate may be seen just as 
much as an attempt to come to terms with the popularity and growing political 
influence of the environmental movement as an attempt to come to terms with the real 
problems associated with environmental degradation. Yet the injection of various 
Marxist perspectives into ecopolitical debates has also led to a fruitful political 
dialogue between the labour and environmental movements, which has, in turn, 
served to challenge and widen both perspectives. Moreover, the increasing public 
prominence of the science of ecology alongside new developments in the growing 
6. Andre Gorz, Ecology as Politics, trans. Patsy Vigderman and Jonathon Cloud 
(London: Pluto Press, 1980); Gorz, Farewell to the Working Class: An Essay in  
Post-Industrial Socialism (London: Pluto Press, 1982); Rudolf Bahro, Socialism and 
aundy_al. (London: Heretic Books, 1982); and Bahro, Building the Green Movement  
(London: Heretic/GMP, 1986). 
7. See, for example, Rudolf Bahro, 5ocialism and Survival; Murray Bookchin, 
"Marxism as Bourgeois Sociology," and "On Neo-Marxism, Bureaucracy and the 
Body Politic," in Toward an Ecological Society (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1980), 
pp. 193-210 and 213-48. 
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field of environmental philosophy, both of which underscore the importance of 
preserving wilderness and ecological diversity, have thrown down significant new 
challenges to Marxist theory. Indeed, I intend to show that it has been the ecocentric 
arguments for wilderness preservation that Marxist scholars have found to be the 
furthest removed from their traditional concerns and consequently the hardest to 
assimilate into their theoretical framework. Such arguments directly challenge the 
essentially human-centred philosophical roots of Marxism in arguing for the 
preservation of the nonhuman world for its omai sake. 
Although the Marxist critique of the class character of environmentalism has 
formed an important part of ecopolitical debates in the West, I have addressed these 
charges elsewhere and do not intend to evaluate them again here. 8 My main purpose 
in referring to these debates is simply to draw attention to the essentially reactive and 
defensive character and tone of the Left's initial entry into the environmental debates. 
To many Marxists and working class sympathizers, the environmental movement was 
initially perceived more as a threat to the political and theoretical terrain staked out by 
the Left - as a backsliding toward conservatism - than a harbinger of novel and 
progressive political ideas. One of the concerns in this early project of ideological 
"unmasking" was to denigrate and dismiss the new preoccupation with environmental 
issues that surfaced from the early 1960s in an attempt to reassert the basic political 
goals of the Left - the social control of the means of production and the creation of a 
classless society. To the extent that the gravity of the environmental crisis was 
acknowledged, it was generally treated as secondary to the questions of distributional 
impact. 
8. It will suffice to point out that many of these Marxist critiques proceed on the basis 
of (i) an ill-informed understanding of the social composition of the environmental 
movement, (ii) a crude class model of society (i.e., middle class capitalists versus the 
working class) that ignores many significant cleavages within the middle class 
between say, the New Class and the "business class," and (iii) a characterization of 
environmentalism that either ignores or fails to grasp the radical implications of much 
environmental protest. See Robyn Eckersley, "The Environment Movement as 
Middle-Class Elitism: A Critical Analysis," Regional Journal of Social Issues 18 
(1986): 24-36, and Eckersley, "Green Politics and the New Class: Selfishness or 
Virtue?" Political Studies 37 (1989): 205-23. 
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However, it should also be acknowledged that many of the Marxists who 
engaged in these early critiques have acknowledged the limitations of the Left's initial 
intervention in the environmental debate and its failure to address constructively the 
concrete problems of environmental degradation. As Enzensberger expressed it, the 
Left's "characteristic gesture of 'unmasking' can turn into a smug ritual, if attention 
remains fixed on the mask instead of what is revealed beneath it" 9 It is now 
essential, he argues, that Western Marxist scholars turn their attention to the 
ecological contradictions wrought by industrialization, including uncontrolled 
population growth, depletion of nonrenewable energy resources and metals, growing 
disturbances to the water cycle, the increasing scarcity of arable land, and the many 
forms of pollution (e.g., air, water, thermal, and "psychic"). Despite the disagreement 
concerning the projected trends in these ecological disturbances, Enzensberger has 
cautioned that if the ecologists' prophecy of impending catastrophe cannot be refuted, 
then, as a kind of Pascal's wager, "it will be heuristically necessary to base any 
thinking about the future on what it has to say.',10 
This chapter, then, will seek to evaluate the more positive task undertaken 
by a growing number of Marxist scholars of developing a specifically Marxist 
response to the environmental crisis. Such an evaluation is necessary since Marxism 
now stands not simply as a source of external criticism of the Green movement; there 
are many who argue, for a variety of reasons, that the Green movement ought to 
embrace a Marxist perspective as an alternative to what is seen as the utopianism, 
idealism, and "voluntarism" of much Green theorizing. What is needed, these critics 
argue, is a more materialist approach that is cognizant of the relationship between 
class and the inequitable impact of environmental degradation and is prepared to 
directly challenge institutionalized power relations in society. 11 Indeed, for some 
9. Enzensberger, "A Critique of Political Ecology," p. 18. 
10. Ibid., p. 28. 
11.This general kind of argument abounds in the work of "Red Green" theorists who 
remain sympathetic to Marxism. See, for example, Joe Weston, ed., Red and Green:  
The New Politics of the Environment (London: Pluto Press, 1986); Pepper, The Roots 
of Modern Environmentalism; Franlde Ashton, Green Dreams. Red Realities, 
140 
Green theorists, particularly in Europe, Western Marxism has served as the theoretical 
starling point for their analysis of the ecological crisis. 12 Yet it is also the case that 
most of the more ecologically oriented emancipatory ecopolitical theorists (e.g., 
Bahro, Bookchin, Capra, Porritt, Sale, Spretnak, and Tokar) have not found it 
necessary to endorse Marxist theory (revised or otherwise) in order to acknowledge, 
say, the importance of an equitable sharing of the costs of environmental reforms or 
the many ways in which the profit motive and the dynamics of capital accumulation 
have contributed to our current environmental ills. Indeed, I will be arguing that such 
an endorsement is entirely inappropriate since it involves inheriting an intellectual 
legacy that is entirely out of keeping with the ecocentric perspective that is defended 
in this inquiry. 13 
As a background to the general trajectory away from Marxism that I 
foreshadowed in the introduction to Part II of this inquiry, this chapter will explore 
the re-reading of Marx and Engels' writings that has been undertaken in the wake of 
the ecological crisis. It will begin by clarifying the general position of the early and 
N.A.T.T.A. Discussion Paper no. 2, Alternative Technology Group (Milton Keynes, 
Bucks. U.K.: The Open University, 1985); Beresford, 'Doomsayers and Eco-nuts"; 
Farago, "Environmentalism and the Left"; and Boris Frankel, "Beyond Abstract 
Environmentalism," Island Magazine, Autumn 1989, pp. 22-25. 
12.Two prominent examples in West Germany are Thomas Ebennann and Rainer 
Trampert. For a discussion of the relationship between Marxism and Die Gninen see 
John Ely, "Marxism and Green Politics in West Germany," Thesis Eleven 13 (1986): 
22-38, and Werner Hulsberg, The German Greens: A Social and Political Profile 
(London: Verso, 1988). 
13. Major ecopolitical critiques of Marxism include Colin Fry, "Marxism Versus 
Ecology," The Ecologist 6(1976): 328-32; Michael Zimmerman, "Marx and 
Heidegger on the Technological Domination of Nature," Philosophy Today 23 
(1979): 99-112; Val Routley, "On Karl Marx as an Environmental Hero," 
Environmental Ethics 3 (1981): 237-44; Brian Easlea, Science and Sexual, 
Oppression: Patriarchy's Confrontation with Woman and Nature (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1981); Isaac D. Balbus, Marxism and Domination: A  
Neo-Hegelian. Feminist. Psychoanalytical Theory of Sexual. Political. and 
Technological Liberation (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982); 
Rudolf Bahro, Socialism and Survival (London: Heretic Books, 1982); Hwa Yol 
Jung, "Marxism, Ecology, and Technology," Environmental Ethics 5 (1983): 169-71; 
M. R. Redolift, "Marxism and the Environment: A View from the Periphery," in 
Political Action and Social Identity: Class. Locality and Ideology, eds. Gareth Rees, 
Janet Bujra, Paul Littlewood, Howard Newby, and Teresa L. Rees (London: 
Macmillan, 1985), pp. 191-211; Ted Benton, "Humanism = Speciesism: Marx on 
Humans and Animals," Radical Philosophy (Autumn 1988): 4-18; and John Clark, 
"Marx's Inorganic Body," Environmental Ethics 11(1989): 243-58. 
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mature Marx and will then explore attempts by what I have called "orthodox eco-
Marxists" and "humanist eco-Marxists" to develop a contemporary understanding of, 
and response to, the environmental crisis on the basis of this re-reading. 14 It is 
important to remember that my discussion of orthodox Marxism (and orthodox 
eco-Marxism) is presented as a foil or point of departure for, rather than as an 
example of, emancipatory ecopolitical theory. 
The Theoretical Roots  
Although Marx was only marginally concerned with environmental 
degradation in his day and although he did not present a systematic theory of 
humanity's relationship to nature, there exist numerous passages in his wide-ranging 
oeuvre that enable his position on both of these matters to be easily discemed. 15 It 
must also be remembered that Marx formed his ideas at a time when he could not 
have been expected to anticipate the extent of global ecological degradation that we 
now face. It is indeed testimony to the stature of Marx and the hold of his ideas that 
scholars should still be seeking illumination and direction from his writings in respect 
of problems that he regarded in his day as epiphenomenal (i.e., ecological degradation 
was seen as a mere by-product of capitalism and as not worthy of special attention in 
the scheme of things). Of course, many Green theorists consider this latter point to be 
a good reason in itself to abandon Marxism as being ill-equipped to tackle 
contemporary environmental problems. 
The overriding sense in which Marx characterized nature was as a medium 
for human labour, as the means by which the power of the human labourer could be 
14. Michael Lowy has referred to these two groupings as representing the "cold" and 
"warm" streams of Marxism. See Michael Lowy, "The Romantic and the Marxist 
Critique of Modern Civilization," Theory and Society 16(1987): 891-904. 
15. See Alfred Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx (London: New Left Books, 
1971), p. 17. Schmidt, in seeking to clarify the concept of nature in dialectical 
materialism, has noted that there "is no systematic Marxist theory of nature of such a 
kind as to be conscious of its own speculative implications" (ibid). However, he has 
sought to articulate Marx's position by bringing together the disparate themes 
concerning the concept of nature from the major phases of development of Marx's 
thought. Schmidt's book is very helpful in this respect, although it does not directly  
address the question of the relationship between Marx's concept of nature and the 
problem of ecological degradation. 
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revealed, or as Alfred Schmidt has summarized it, "as the means and the material of 
man's self-realization in history." 16  The nonhuman world, which Marx often referred 
to as "external nature," was first and foremost "the primary source of all instruments 
and objects of labour" and is variously described by him as a "laboratory," "the 
original tool house," or the "original larder." 17 Like Locke before him, Marx 
accepted the view that the mixing of human labour with external nature was an act of 
appropriation, that the product belonged to the labourer, indeed, revealed the power of 
the labourer since labour and its extension - technology - brought about what nature 
could not accomplish alone. 18 Although Marx saw humans as a part of (rather than 
separate from) nature, human labour was nonetheless seen as playing a pivotal and 
determinative role in nature's unfolding. Drawing on Hegel, Marx portrayed the 
labour process as a "metabolism" between humans and external nature with humans 
as Subject confronting external nature as Object in a dialectical movement that led to 
• the transformation of both humans and the nonhuman world. Humanity and external 
nature were characterized as two indivisible "moments" in nature's self 
development. 19 
In tracing the development of Marx's theoretical perspective vis-a-vis nature, 
it is possible to find both continuities and discontinuities between the writings of the 
young (i.e., pre-1845) Marx and the mature and more economically preoccupied Marx 
of Capita1.2° In the so-called "Paris Manuscripts" (i.e., ExIssznonicand 
16. Ibid., p. 154. 
17. Ibid., pp. 15 and 81. 
18. This, observes Castoriadis, was also an idea developed by Aristotle: "If 'the 
origination of being or becoming resides in the maker and not in the thing made,' as 
Aristotle says about techne, then the only 'revelation' which can be involved is the 
revelation of the producer as this origin of the principle of being or becoming. This 
is, more or less, what Marx was to say twenty-three centuries later." Cornelius 
Castoriadis, Crossroads in the Labyrinth, trans. Kate Soper and Martin H. Ryle 
(Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978), p. 233. 
19. Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, p. 79. 
20. David McLellan in his introduction to The Grundrisse (see Karl Marx, Th_g 
Grundrisse, ed. and trans. by David McLellan [New York: Harper & Row, 1971], 
p. 14) has stressed the continuity in Marx's work and has rejected the idea that there is 
a radical break between the young and the old Marx on the basis of Marx's 
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Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844), Marx referred to the labour process as effecting 
the progressive "humanization" of nature and "naturalization" of humanity. Nature 
was described as "the inorganic body" of humanity that had been increasingly 
assimilated, through work, into an "organic" part of humanity. 21 In his essay on 
"Estranged Labour," Marx described humanity's transformation of the external world 
through labour as the means by which humanity realized its "species being" (or 
human essence) - a notion that Marx took from Ludwig Feuerbach. Feuerbach had 
argued in his famous "inversion" of Hegers idealism that the "subject" of history was 
neither the Absolute Idea nor the individual self but rather nature rendered self-
conscious in humanity taken as a whole. 22 Feuerbach was both an atheist and a 
materialist who regarded God as an alien and fictitious being to whom humans had 
attributed their essential powers, thereby impoverishing themselves. Religion and 
Hegel's idealist metaphysics were therefore both regarded as stages to be overcome in 
humanity's emergence out of nature since Feuerbach regarded humanity, not God, as 
the appropriate object of worship. According to Feuerbach, we realize our species 
being or human essence as our consciousness of ourselves expands, culminating in the 
overcoming of our alienation from ourselves and the realization of the unity of subject 
and object - humanity and nature. Marx, who considered Feuerbach's conception of 
humanity's relationship to nature to be too passive, considerably reworked 
Feuerbach's notion of self-estrangement on the basis of a different conception of 
abandonment of the idea of alienation. Rather, McLellan argues that "Marx's thought 
is best viewed as a continuing meditation on central themes broached in 1844, the 
high point of which meditation occurred in 1857-8" with the publication of lbg 
Grundrisse (ibid., p. 12). McLellan argues that this work, which was written after the 
Paris Manuscripts and before Capital, is the most fundamental of all Marx's writings 
since it synthesizes all of the major strands of Marx's thought. In particular, it 
maintains continuity with the themes of alienation and humanity's dialectical 
relationship to nature from the Paris Manuscripts while also containing the first 
elaboration of Marx's mature economic theory. See also David McLellan, lha 
Thought of Karl Marx: An Introduction (London: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 70-71. 
21. Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, trans. Martin 
Milligan and ed. Dirk J. Struik (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 112. 
This work was not published in full in Europe until the 1930s and did not become 
generally available in the United States until the 1960s. 
22. For a general discussion of Feurbach's ideas and their influence on the young 
Marx, see Dirk J. Struik's "Introduction" to The Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844, p. 15 and following. 
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human essence that was based on the dynamics of the labour process. Hegel's Geist 
or spirit was thus replaced by the concrete activity of homo faber. Marx argued that 
the relationship between humanity and external nature is a transformative one 
whereby both humans (and their needs) and external nature are changed as the labour 
process expands humanity's productive powers. As Alex Callinicos has put it, for 
Marx "man's species being consists, not in his self-consciousness, but in his objective 
relation to the labour-process which provides the framework of man's interaction with 
his envirotunent." 23 
According to Marx, whereas (nonhuman) animals produce one-sidedly, that 
is, only for their immediate needs, humans produces universally, that is, even when 
free from physical need "and only truly [produce] in freedom thereof." 24 Marx thus 
saw the transformation of nature through unalienated labour as the means toward 
human self-realization: 
It is just in his work upon the objective world, therefore, that man first really 
proves himself to be a species being. This production is his active species life. 
Through and because of this production, nature appears as hi a work and his 
reality. The object of labour is, therefore, the objectification of man's species  
lift: for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but 
also actively, in reality, and therefore he contemplates himself in a world that he 
has created. In tearing away from man the object of his production, therefore, 
estranged labour tears from him his species life, his real objectivity as a member 
of the species and transforms his advantage over animal4into the disadvantage 
that his inorganic body, nature, is taken away from him.h° 
Marx argued that alienated labour degrades to a mere means of physical existence 
what might otherwise have been spontaneous, free human activity. As a result, 
humans become estranged from their labour and its product, which confronts them as 
an alien other at the behest of the masters of labour - the owners and controllers of 
capital. Marx saw this as also leading to the estrangement of humans from 
23. Alex Callinicos, Marxism and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 38. 
Both Feuerbach and Marx were to retain, however, Hegel's conception of history as a 
dialectical process whereby progress can only be achieved via the resolution of the 
tension between opposites, i.e., the subject can only develop by first experiencing a 
state of alienation or self-estrangement after which the subject is able to return to 
itself via the recognition that the alien objects that it has created are its own. 
24. Marx, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, p. 113. 
25. Ibid, p. 114. 
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themselves, from their fellow humans, from nature, and from their species being. 26 
Marx's solution to the problem of alienated labour was the revolutionary 
transformation of the institutions of wage labour and private property via the 
expropriation by the proletariat of the capitalist means of production - a 
transformation that Marx envisaged as paving the way for a fully social mastery of 
nature. 
Marx's treatment of humans as homo_falla is a central feature of the 
antagonistic dialectic between humanity and nature set out in these early writings. 
Labour and its extension - technology - were seen not only as a means to survival but 
also as th.t road to human self-realization. History was seen as the progressive 
humanization of nature and naturalization of humanity resulting in an ever greater 
equivalence between humanity and nature (i.e., where nature appeared as increasingly 
made rather than given, domesticated rather than wild). Communism was to be that 
stage where individuals would live in a classless society and be free to engage in self-
determining activity since they would no longer be dominated by the functional 
economic imperatives of capitalism, the commands of a dominant class, or external 
nature. It would also be that stage where the human/external nature dialectic would 
be reconciled via the complete "humanization" of nature. Through technological 
innovation and automation, and the subordination of economic and natural processes, 
humans would thus recover time in which to enjoy freedom beyond the dull 
compulsion of labour. 27 In short, the young Marx believed that the "realm of 
necessity" would give way completely to the "realm of freedom" in a communist 
society. 
While the notion of humans as homo faber remained a central theme in the 
writings of the mature Marx, he later came to the view "that the struggle of man with 
nature could be transformed but not abolished." 28 That is, the complete 
26. Ibid. 
27. See William James Booth, "Gone Fishing: Making Sense of Marx's Concept of 
Communism," Political Theory 17 (1989): 205-22. 
28. Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, p. 76. 
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"reconciliation" with, or "humanization" of, nature was no longer considered possible 
because, although labour could be reduced to a minimum, Marx took the view that it 
could never be totally dispensed with. Although more and more areas of nature 
would come under human control through technological development, the 
antagonistic dialectic between humanity and nature would thus never be entirely 
resolved.29 
Another significant change in emphasis in Marx's writings concerned the 
theme of alienation. In particular, from the time of Marx's first systematic 
presentation of historical materialism (namely, the critique, jointly authored with 
Engels, of German idealism and the Young Hegelians in The German Ideology  
[1986]) he no longer emphasized concepts such as "alienation" or "realization of the 
human essence." 3° Instead of explaining historical change in accordance with a 
philosophical concept of "species being," Marx became increasingly preoccupied with 
analysing the dynamics of the capitalist mode of production - an analysis that he 
referred to as an "objective" and "scientific" study of the unfolding of history. By the 
time of the publication of Capital, Marx had consolidated the now familiar distinction 
(which was frequently conflated in his earlier work) between the forces and relations  
of production. The forces (or means) of production were understood as the 
technological means with which humans control external nature in order to satisfy 
their needs, including tangible means such as machines as well as the more intangible 
means such as scientific knowledge, skills, and organizational layout. The relations 
of production referred to that ensemble of property, class, and legal arrangements that 
regulated the control and ownership of the production process and the distribution of 
its fruits. In capitalist societies, these relations of production were seen as relations of 
29. According to Schmidt, this is the fundamental distinction between a materialist 
and idealist dialectic: "In the Marxist dialectic, as in the Hegelian, what is 
non-identical with the Subject is overcome stage by stage. Greater and greater areas 
of nature come under human control. In Marx, however, and this distinguishes him 
from Hegel's ultimate idealism, the material of nature is never totally incorporated in 
the modes of its theoretical-practical appropriation" (ibid., p. 136). 
30. Ibid., p. 129. As I noted above, an important exception to this generalization is 
The Grpndrisse. 
147 
exploitation where unpaid surplus-labour was siphoned off to the capitalist class. 
Together, the forces and relations of production formed an articulated unity - the 
milk of production - that corresponded respectively to the technical and social 
determinants of humanity's interaction with external nature. According to Marx, the 
exploitation embodied in the capitalist relations of production could only he 
overcome by their overthrow. However, Marx's contempt for the relations of 
production did not extend to the rapidly expanding forces of production of his time. 
Quite the contrary, he extolled the new techniques of industrial society as the 
harbinger of freedom in creating the material and social preconditions for a socialist 
society. Total automation (considered a definite advance over handicrafts) would, 
under revolutionized relations of production, free the labourer to enter a qualitatively 
different relationship to the production process as overseer and regulator. Marx 
believed this process would lead to the development of more rounded individuals 
rather than specialized ones. As Schmidt puts it, the new society envisaged by the 
mature Marx 
... is to benefit man alone, and there is no doubt that this is to be at the expense 
of external nature. Nature is to be mastered with gigantic technological aids, 
and the smallest possible expenditure of time and labour. It is to sg-ve all men 
as the material substratum for all conceivable consumption goods.' 
Marx also welcomed what he saw as the civilizing influence of technology 
and rejected nature romanticism and primitive cultures alike as "childish," 
"backward," and "reactionary" in opposing or otherwise showing no inclination 
toward technical progress. For example, he wrote: 
Hence the great civilizing influence of capital; its production of a stage of 
society in comparison to which all earlier ones appear as mere 1=1 
developments of humanity and as nature-idolatry. For the first time, nature 
becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of utility [i.e., 
instrumental value]; ceases to be recognized as a power for itself [i.e., as having 
intrinsic value]; and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears 
merely as a ruse so as to subjugate it under himan needs, whether as an object 
of consumption or as a means of production?' 
31. Ibid., p. 155. 
32. Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy,  trans. 
by Martin Nicholas (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), pp. 409-10. 
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Although Marx was alive to the contradictions in, and the destructive impact of, these 
developments he nonetheless fully endorsed the civilizing and technical 
accomplishments of the capitalist forces of production and had thoroughly absorbed 
the Victorian faith in scientific and technological progress as the means by which 
humans could outsmart and conquer nature. Indeed, Marx welcomed the challenge 
thrown down to humans by a "stingy" nature: 
This mode [i.e., capitalism] is based on the dominion of man over Nature. 
Where nature is too lavish, she "keeps him in hand, like a child in leading-
strings." She does not impose upon him any necessity to develop himself. 33 
As Balbus has observed, Marx saw the development of science as the means 
by which humanity would seek to "discover nature's 'independent laws' not in order to 
respect, but rather in order to undermine, its independence from our wdstence." 34 
Conquering nature in this way was welcomed as the means of human self-
aggrandisement, for Marx considered that, once outsmarted by "man," external nature 
"becomes one of the organs of his activity, one that he annexes to his own bodily 
organs, adding stature to himself in spite of the Bible." 35 
Although Marx changed his view concerning the extent to which humanity 
would be able to master necessity, he consistently saw human freedom as inversely 
related to humanity's dependence on nature. Moreover, he argued that human 
freedom only properly began when mundane, necessary labour ceased: 
Freedom ... can only consist in socialised man, the associated producers, 
rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their 
common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; 
and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions 
most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless still 
remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human 
energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, ich, however, can 
blossom forth only with this realm of necessity at its basis. 
33. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, ed. Friedrich Engels, trans. 
Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, vol. 1: Capitalist Production (London: Lawrence 
& Wishart, 1970), p. 513. 
34. Isaac Balbus, Marxism and Domination, p. 272. 
35. Marx, Capital, vol. 1. p. 179. 
36. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, ed. Friedrich Engels, trans. 
Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, vol. 3: The Process of Capitalist Production as a 
Whole (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1970), p. 820. 
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Engels also endorsed this understanding of the free communist human being. Once 
the capitalist relations of production had been overthrown, Engels believed that 
... for the first time man, in a certain sense, is finally marked off from the rest of 
the animal kingdom, and emerges from mere animal conditions of existence 
into really human ones. The whole sphere of the conditions of life which 
environ man, and which have hitherto ruled man, now comes under the 
dominion and control of man, who for the first time becomes the real, conscious 
lord of Nature, because he has now become master of his own social 
organization ... It is the ascent of maq from the kingdom of necessity to the  
kingdom of freedom [my emphasis]." 1 
In the Dialectics of Nature, Engels considered the essential distinction between 
humans and nonhumans to rest on humanity's ability not simply to use and change 
nature (something all animals do) but also to master it by making it serve humans 
ends.38 
Yet Engels also shrewdly noted that we ought not "flatter ourselves 
overmuch on account of our human victories over nature. For each such victory takes 
its revenge on us."39  In tracing the development of the forces of production, Engels 
showed a keen awareness of the many unintended ecological dislocations brought 
about by the labouring activities of humans in both industrial and pre-industrial times. 
Moreover, he observed that 
... at every step we are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like a 
conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature - but that 
we, with flesh, blood and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and that 
all our mastery of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage overAll 
other creatures of being able to learn its laws and apply them correctly. 4u 
Similarly, there are frequent passages in Capital where Marx also observes how the 
dynamics of capital accumulation led to the exploitation of the labourer and soil 
alike.41 Yet both Marx and Engels continued to welcome the powerful forces of 
37. Friedrich Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific" in The Marx-Engels Reader, 
ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), pp. 637-38. 
38. Friedrich Engels, pialectics of Nature, trans. Clemens Dutt, in Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, vol. 25 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1987), p. 
460. 
39. Ibid., pp. 460-61. 
40. Ibid., p. 461. 
41. Capital, vol. 1, pp. 264-65 and 506 and Capital, vol. 3, p. 812-13. 
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production unleashed by capitalism for creating the "material conditions for a higher 
synthesis in the future" where further advances in the natural sciences would enable 
humans to predict and control the more remote consequences of their increasing 
incursions into nature.42 In Marx's lexicon, emancipation meant being freed from 
both social and "natural" oppression (the latter made possible by the mastery of 
nature's laws, which included the control and containment of the unwanted ecological 
"side-effects" of human productive activity). 
As we shall see, Marx's juxtaposition of freedom and necessity, the former 
corresponding to the mastery of social and natural constraints and the latter 
corresponding to subservience to social and natural constraints, has remained an 
enduring theme in eco-Mandst/ecosocialist thought, particularly in the work of 
Herbert Marcuse and Andre Gorz. 
Although our concern here is with the writings of Marx and Engels, it is of 
interest to note how Marx's technological optimism and desire to master nature has 
been carried forward in the programmes and goals of twentieth century Marxist 
revolutionaries. Leon Trotsky, for example, in an extraordinary song of praise to 
humanity's technological capabilities, has argued: 
The present distribution of mountains and rivers, of fields, of meadows, of 
steppes, of forests, and of seashores, cannot be considered final. Man has 
already made changes in the map of nature that are not few or insignificant. But 
they are mere pupils' practice in comparison with what is coming. Faith merely 
promises to move mountains; but technology, which takes nothing "on faith," is 
actually able to cut down mountains and move them ... Througll.the machine, 
man in Socialist society will command nature in its entirety ... 
And on the population question, Fidel Castro has warned: 
In certain countries they are saying that only birth control provides a solution to 
the problem [of human population growth]. Only capitalists, the exploiters can 
speak like that; for no-one who is conscious of what man can achieve with the 
42. Capital, vol. 1, pp. 505-7. 
43. Leon Trotsky, Literature and Revolution (Chicago: University of Michigan Press, 
1960), pp. 251-52. For a more recent Soviet view, see Society and the Environment:  
A Soviet View (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), especially the essay by 
Yevgeny Fyodorov and Ilya Novik entitled "Ecological Aspects of Social Progress," 
pp. 37-55. Although these authors acknowledge the seriousness of ecological 
degradation, they continue to characterize it as a technical problem to be solved by 
further advances in science. 
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help of technology and science will wish to set a limit to the number of human 
beings who can live on the earth ... We shall never be too numerous however 
many of us there are, if only we all together place our efforts and our 
intelligence at the service of nankind, a mankind which will be freed from the 
exploitation of man by man." 
In the following two sections we shall see that, despite the increased 
awareness by Western Marxists of world wide ecological degradation, population 
pressures, and the increasingly rapid extinction of species, the optimistic and 
anthropocentric belief in humanity's ability to master nature has remained 
unchallenged, indeed, has been heralded as the cornerstone of the Marxist solution to 
environmental degradation. 
The recent efforts to develop a Marxist solution to the environmental crisis 
have been divided into two streams in accordance with the convenient distinction 
between "humanist" and "orthodox" Marxism (which corresponds generally to the 
work of the "young" and "mature" Marx respectively). The humanist eco-Marxists 
have sought to develop a more ecologically sensitive Marxist response to the 
environmental crisis that seeks to harmonize relations between the human and 
nonhuman realms; orthodox eco-Marxists, on the other hand, make no apologies for 
being anthropocentric and are critical of humanist eco-Marxists for being idealist, 
voluntarist, and decidedly "un-Marxist." From an ecocentric perspective, however, it 
will be shown that hob, streams of eco-Marxism uncritically accept Marx's view of 
history and his notion of humanity as homo faber and thereby perpetuate an 
instrumentalist and anthropocentric orientation toward the nonhuman world. 
SktbSdigiagalanciiM 
Orthodox eco-Marxists have strayed very little from the basic position of the 
"mature" Marx set out in the preceding section. 45 That is, environmental problems, 
like social problems, are traced directly to the exploitative dynamics of capitalism. 
The solution to these problems is seen to require the revolutionary transformation of 
44. "Primera Conferencia de Solidaridad de los Pueblos de America Latina," in 
America Latina: Demographia. Poblacion indigena y Salud, vol 2, (Havana: n.p., 
1968), pp. 15f. Quoted by Enzensberger, "A Critique of Political Ecology," p. 14. 
45. See Tolman, "Karl Marx, Alienation, and the Mastery of Nature"; Parsons, Marx 
and Engels on Ecology; and Beresford, "Doomsayers and Eco-nuts." 
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the relations of production combined with the development of a better theoretical 
understanding of nature and further advances in technology and so that a complete 
social mastery of nature can be attained for the benefit of all rather than the privileged 
capitalist class. This orthodox eco-Marxist interpretation thus retains Marx's view of 
history as a progressive dialectical struggle from the primitive to the advanced, 
resulting in the increasing domestication of the nonhuman world through the activity 
of labour and its extension, technology. In view of this, as Tolman points out, 
... it should be clear why Marxists should continue to support the development 
of science and technology, and why they should assert the ultimate unity of 
science, technology, the mastery of nature, and humanism. Taking human 
history as a dialectical whole, these can all be seen as essential components of 
human nature itself. If understood in t dialectical sense, the Marxist gladly 
accepts the charge of "homocentrism." 
It clearly follows from such a view that the setting aside of areas of wilderness for the 
protection of endangered species and the preservation of biotic diversity will be seen 
as an unnecessary constraint on human self-realization, unless it can be shown to be 
of some instrumental value to humans, by providing, say, a place of recreation or 
acting as a store of potential raw materials for humanity's future productive labour. 
According to orthodox eco-Marxists, it simply makes no sense to say that the 
nonhuman world ought to be valued and protected for its own sake. For example, 
Howard Parsons, in his exhaustive review (and endorsement) of Marx and Engels' 
position on nature and technology, has trouble in grasping what the case against 
anthropocentrism is all about: "It is hard to know," he confesses, "what could be 
meant by nature 'in itself,' either in a Kantian sense or in the sense of a discrete reality 
entirely independent of our cognition and action?" 47 On the basis of this 
epistemological point - that nature cannot exist independently from our values and 
actions - Parsons concludes that humans cannot value the nonhuman world for its own 
sake. 
Yet Parsons' answer to the critique of anthropocentrism misses entirely the 
normative point of the ecocentric critique. First, he commits what Fox refers to as 
46. Tolman, "Karl Marx, Alienation, and the Mastery of Nature," p. 72. 
47. Parsons, Marx and Engels on Ecology, p. 44. 
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"the anthropocentric fallacy" in that he conflates the weak, trivial, and tautological 
sense of the term anthropocentric (i.e., that all our views are, necesssarily, human 
views) with the strong, substantive, informative sense of the term anthropocentric (the 
unwarranted, differential treatment of other beings on the basis that they do not 
belong to our awn species). Second, and in any event, the ecocentric argument is not 
that we should value the nonhuman world because it exists completely independently 
from human values and actions. Ecocentric theorists would be the first to agree that 
we are intimately connected with the nonhuman world and vice versa. However, 
despite these interconnections, the model of internal relations that informs 
ecocentrism also recognizes the relative autonomy of all entities. On the basis of this 
recognition, ecocentric theorists are concerned to cultivate a prima facie orientation of 
nonfavouritism that allows both human and nonhuman entities to unfold in their own 
ways. And it is precisely because we are part of an interconnected, larger whole that 
ecocentric theorists argue that we should exercise our own freedom with care and 
compassion. 
However, it is clear from Parsons' discussion that even if he properly 
grasped the ecocentric argument he would still reject the normative and practical 
claims it makes upon us. For example, Parsons rejects as "unrealistic" the radical 
ecological argument that we should simplify human needs, reduce human population 
and consumption, respect nature, and lead a more agrarian lifestyle. (All but the last 
of these points more or less reflect the kinds of changes defended by many ecocentric 
theorists; I argue in Chapter 7, however, that it is neither necessary nor desirable that 
everyone live in decentralized, rural settlements and there is a strong case for urban 
settlements in an ecocentric society.) According to Parsons, human survival and well-
being depend on a "knowledge and control of nature's substances and processes." 48 
The kind of knowledge Parsons and other orthodox eco-Marxists have in mind, 
however, is not the kind that sees nature as a pattern or set of interrelationships to 
respect and follow or a design from which to draw guidance and inspiration. Rather, 
48. Ibid., p. 45. 
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it is knowledge that will enable humans to overcome and redirect any resistance to 
their struggle for total mastery of nature. As Tolman explains, 
Marxism rejects this [ecocentric] =realism, and in its view of the man-nature 
relation, is inclined to emphasize man rather than the plants and the animals. If 
the assumption of the criticism is that Marxism has this emphasis, the 
assumption is correct. And like many modern hummisms, Marxism has 
sometimes overemphasized man's place in nature."" 
Clearly, orthodox eco-Marxists regard ecocentrism as putting an 
unnecessary restraint on human development, which they regard as dependent upon 
an expanding science and technology that will increase our ability to control and 
manipulate the "secrets of nature." However, in an effort to downplay the 
"domination of nature" theme in Marx's writings, Parson's reminds his ecological 
critics that the early Marx discussed the aesthetic needs of humans in relation to 
plants and animals (e.g., in The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844) 
and that although he may not have been as explicit on this score in his later writings 
on political economy he nonetheless "had those needs and others in mind when he 
recurrently called for the 'all-round development' of all persons as the goal of history 
and class struggle." 5° Yet this supposed counterweight to the mature Marx's undue 
emphasis on technological advancement and economic values is revealing, for the 
concern here is again restricted to the aesthetic needs of humans, not the needs or 
interests of nonhumans. This, of course, is entirely consistent with Marx's exclusive 
preoccupation with human affairs. Marx showed no interest in natural history and he 
did not address the cause of nonhuman suffering. Indeed, Parsons defends Marx's 
lack of interest in the emerging "humane societies" for the prevention of cruelty to 
animals in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, arguing that the concern for the 
welfare of nonhuman animals was "a displacement of human concern" that was 
restricted by the privileged class position of its advocates. 51 In any event, Parsons 
49. Ibid. 
50. Ibid., p. 45. 
51. Ibid. 
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suggests that in the long run nonhuman animals, like human animals, might also be 
liberated by technology: 
Presumably when animals are displaced entirely by machines as instruments of 
production, and when food is synthesized chemically, animaLs will enjoy a 
freedom not enjoyed since their domestication for food and labour in Neolithic 
times, an0 	's attitude toward them will likewise change with man's new 
freedom.J 
However, far from being displaced by machines, many domestic animals (most 
notably cattle and hens) have been effectively turned into machines as a result of the 
application of "advanced" production techniques in agriculture. Moreover, ecological 
reality suggests that unless human population growth and the loss of genetic diversity 
and wild habitat is drastically curbed, there will be a very narrow range of nonhuman 
animals left to enjoy the distant "freedom" that Parsons believes will be wrought by 
advanced technology! 
As we have seen, to the extent that environmental problems were 
acknowledged by Marx and Engels, they were attributed to the capitalist relations of 
production, not the forces of production. Orthodox eco-Marxists have fully endorsed 
this analysis of the problem: the capitalist classes, while initially facilitating the 
development of the productive forces, are ultimately seen as acting as a fetter to their 
full development by standing in the way of a full social appropriation of the power of 
nature and the control of any unwanted side-effects. According to Parsons: 
An economic system [such as the capitalist one] that breaches the laws of nature 
by which wealth is produced will bring on inevitable reactions: impairment of 
nature's "metabolism" of ecological cycles, depletion of nature's resources, 
impoverishment human society, and a relapse of nature into the slumber of 
undevelopment. 
The Marxist explanation for ecological degradation lies in the fact that 
capital works only for the benefit of the owners and controllers of capital rather than 
for the benefit of the complete society of producers (it is assumed that the complete 
society of producers would act as a collective and would therefore be concerned to 
protect public environmental goods such as air, water, and soil). It is thus the 
52. Ibid., p. 45. 
53. Ibid., p. 16. 
156 
dynamic of private capital accumulation that has given rise to resource depletion, 
pollution, untrammelled urbanization, and the occupational and residential hazards 
suffered by workers and their families. 54 In this respect, Marx frequently drew 
analogies between the exploitation of human labour and the exploitation of the soil. 
Yet as John Clark observes, although Parsons tries to establish Marx's ecological 
credentials by arguing that Marx recognized an "essential incompatibility" between 
capitalism and "the system of nature," Parsons in fact misses Marx's anti-ecological 
point: 
Marx's point is not that this expansionism is in conflict with nature, but rather 
that capital's quest for surplus value contradicts and limits this development in 
some ways, to the detriment of humanity. In contrast, an ecological critique 
would question this very expansiopjsm as being in contradiction with "the 
system of nature" [my emphasis]."' 
Orthodox eco-Marxists simply seek to replace the private and socially inequitable 
mastery of nature under capitalism with the public and socially equitable mastery of 
nature under communism. Ecological degradation under capitalism is seen by 
orthodox eco-Marxists as a measure of its inefficiency, of its failure to utilize 
resources wisely. As such, orthodox eco-Marxists are predominantly Resource 
Conservationists; they are at home with Gifford Pinchot (with his "wise-use" of 
natural resources argument), but are fundamentally at odds with John Muir's vision of 
large tracts of wilderness being protected in their "state of natural grace." 56 (As I 
noted above, to the extent that orthodox eco-Marxists would be prepared to defend 
Preservationism, it would be on purely human-centred, instrumental grounds.) Of 
course, Marx and Engels were also early pioneers of what I have called the Human 
Welfare Ecology stream of environmentalism - indeed, as I noted in Chapter 2, 
Engels' classic critique of the working and living conditions of the Victorian working 
54. Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
55. Clark, "Marx's Inorganic Body," p. 245. 
56. For a critical juxtaposition of the respective concerns and philosophies of Marx 
and Muir, see Robyn Eckersley, "The Road to Ecotopia?: Socialism Versus 
Environmentalism," Island Magazine, Spring 1987, pp. 18-25 (reprinted in Thg 
Ecologist 18 [1988]: 142-47; The Trumpeter 5 [1988]: 60-64; and Andrew Sant and 
Michael Denholm, eds., First Rights: A Decade of Island Magazine [Elwood, 
Victoria: Greenhouse Publications, 1989], pp. 50-60). 
157 
class is a major milestone in the development of this stream of environmentalism. 57 
However, while their critique challenged capitalism and exposed the misery of the 
working class, it did not challenge the hegemony of instruinental reason. As Alfred 
Schmidt concludes from his reading of Marx's later politico-economic writings: 
[Marx] ... was not solely concerned to secure a quantitative increase in the 
existing forms of mastery over nature. On the contrary, Marx wanted to 
achieve something qualitatively new: mastery by the whole of society of 
society's mastery over nature. This mastery would still depend on the functions 
of instrumental reason. But since it would "finalize" these functions, and 
subject them to truly human aims, the mastery of society would undertake its 
own correction; society's mastery over nature would thereby be freed from the 
curse of being simultaneously mastery over men, and of thus perpetuating the 
reign of blind natural history. 5° 
From an ecocentric perspective, the "true freedom" promised by scientific 
socialism is ultimately illusory. As Bookchin puts it, "at its best, Marx's work is an 
inherent self-deception that inadvertently absorbs the most questionable tenets of 
Enlightenment thought into its very sensibility."59 It legitimates not only the 
conquest of nature but also new forms of bureaucratic domination and a highly 
rationalized capitalism. The result is that both people and nature are cast as mere 
instruments of production as we aspire toward a post-scarcity utopia. (This ecological 
critique of instrumental reason is discussed in detail in the following chapter.) 
Moreover, ecofeminists have drawn attention to the "masculine" character of 
the mastery sought by the mature Marx, who rejected as regressive the idolization of 
nature as a "nurturing mother." According to Marx, modern "man" must sever his 
umbilical cord with nature and become a self-determining being in order to achieve 
his "manhood." As John Clark has observed, 
Marx's Promethean and Oedipal "man" is a being who is not at home in nature, 
who does not see the Earth as the "household" of ecology. He is an 
indominable spirit who must subjugate nature in his quest for self-realization... 
For such a being, the forces of nature, whether in the form of his own 
unmasterg4 internal nature or the menacing powers of external nature, must be 
subdued.' 
57. Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England, trans. and ed. 
W. 0. Henderson and W. H. Chaloner, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971). 
58. Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, pp. 12-13. 
59. Bookchin, "Marxism as Bourgeois Sociology," p. 195. 
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Finally, as a result of the emphasis given to the relations of production, 
orthodox eco-Marxists continue to place faith in the working class as the agents of 
revolutionary change, both social and environmental. According to Parsons, the 
proletariat still remain the class best situated for "assuming ultimate power and 
responsibility over the whole transformed system" - including control of the unwanted 
side-effects of the manipulation of nature. 61 Post-Marxist Green theorists, on the 
other hand, have challenged what they call the "productivist ideology" and inherent 
conservatism of the Western labour movement and pointed instead to the radical 
potential of new social movements, particularly those concerned with ecology, 
feminism, and community contro1. 62 
To conclude this section, then, the eco-Marxist critique of capitalism still 
has relevance today in terms of highlighting the ways in which capitalism can exploit 
labourer and land alike, particularly in third world countries where ecological 
considerations are displaced almost entirely in the drive to develop massive power 
schemes and large scale export industries (often merely to service the large debts 
owed to first world countries). 63 From an ecocentric perspective, however, the eco-
Marxist critique simply does not go far enough: it is fundamentally limited by its 
anthropocentrism, its focus on the relations of production at the expense of the forces 
of production, and its uncritical acceptance of industrial technology and instrumental 
reason. 
Not surprisingly, the above shortcomings of orthodox Marxism have 
attracted the critical attention of a number of ecologically concerned Western 
Marxists of a "humanist" persuasion who are critical of "scientific socialism" yet still 
60. Clark, "Marx's Inorganic Body," p. 26. 
61. Parsons, Marx and Engels on Ecology, p. 14. 
62. See, for example, Bookchin, Toward an Ecological Society; Bahro, Socialism and 
Survival; John Clark, The Anarchist Moment: Reflections on Culture. Nature and 
Power (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1984); and Carl Boggs, Social Movements and 
Political Power: Emerging Forms of Radicalism (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1986). 
63. See Michael Redclift, Development and the Environmental Crisis: Red or Green 
Alternatives? (London: Methuen, 1984) and Redolift, Sustainable Development. 
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attracted to Marxism as a philosophy and form of critique. I will now turn to this 
humanist eco-Marxist alternative. 
Humanist Eco-Marxism 
Unlike orthodox eco-Marxists, humanist eco-Marxists argue that it is 
necessary to reassess Marx's technological optimism and 19th century belief in 
material progress. According to Andre Gorz, the collective appropriation by the 
proletariat of the capitalist forces of production would not solve the ecological crisis: 
it would simply mean that the proletariat would take over the machinery of 
domination. 64 He argues that the development of the productive forces, hitherto 
welcomed by most Marxists, must be re-examined on the grounds that they now 
threaten "the very existence of society." 65 Similarly, Enzensberger has argued that 
the ecological crisis can be dealt with in Marxist terms if we remember that capitalism 
is not just a property relation but also a mode of production in which the forces and 
relations of production are inextricably linked; this capitalist mode of production is 
something that the socialist countries, which he considers to be "still in transition," 
have yet to abandon. 66 
In asking how we might resolve the ecological contradictions of 
industrialism and what kind of human being will inhabit the society that lies beyond 
the realm of domination, humanist eco-Marxists have sought inspiration from the 
philosophical writings of the young Marx.° Indeed, John Ely has shown that certain 
aspects of the young Marx's utopianism concerning the reconciliation of humanity 
64. Gorz, Farewell to the Working Class, p. 100. 
65. Ibid. 
66. Enzensberger, "A Critique of Political Ecology," p. 21. Enzensberger's call has 
also been endorsed by Adrienne Farago, "Environmentalism and the Left," p. 13 
67. Enzensberger, "A Critique of Political Ecology," p. 31; Lee, "On the Mandan 
View"; Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964); 
Marcuse, Counter Revolution and Revolt (London: Allen Lane, 1972) - see in 
particular the chapter "Nature and Revolution," pp. 60-128, especially pp. 63-64; K. 
D. Shifferd, "Karl Marx and the Environment," The Journal of Environmental 
Education 3 (1972): 39-42; Gorz, Ecology as Politics; Gorz, Farewell to the Working 
Class; Thompson, "The Death of a Contradiction," p. 20; and Lowy, "The Romantic 
and the Marxist Critique of Modern Civilization." 
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and nonhuman nature have been taken up directly in the West German Greens' first 
economic programme, although the usage of these concepts by the Greens is selective 
rather than systematic.68 
The most ecologically sensitive case for a return to the ideas of the young 
Marx is that provided by Donald Lee in his essay entitled "On the Mandan View of 
the Relationship between Man and Nature." 69 However, I intend to argue in this 
section that while Lee's particular vision of humanist eco-Marxism is, for the most 
part, no longer vulnerable to the criticisms that I have levelled against orthodox 
eco-Marxism, it is also no longer Marxist. That is, Lee has developed a particular 
version of humanist eco-Marxism that downplays, and in some cases ignores, key 
distinctions and themes in the writings of the young Marx. I intend to show that these 
particular distinctions and themes are, when closely examined, such as to make 
humanist Marxism irredeemable from an ecocentric perspective. The most important 
of these is Marx's distinction between "freedom" and "necessity." I argue that this 
key distinction serves to make the domination of the nonhuman world a requirement 
of human self-realization. By drawing on examples of other versions of humanist 
eco-Marxism that Actively endorse this particular distinction, I conclude that humanist 
eco-Marxism - while a definite improvement on orthodox eco-Marxism - is 
fundamentally incompatible with an ecocentric perspective. 
The basic goal of Lee's approach is to overcome alienation in a very broad 
sense, with the ecology crisis taken as evidence of our alienation from nature and as 
one more obstacle in the path to human emancipation. According to Lee's reading of 
Marx's early writings on alienation, there is no human/nature (or Subject/Object) 
dichotomy in Marx's thinking, as is often claimed. Rather, Lee argues that Marx was 
concerned to overcome alienation between humans and themselves and their work 
68. Ely, "Marxism and Green Politics in West Germany," p. 26. 
69. It should be noted that Lee's case had already been advanced as early as 1972 by 
K. D. Shifferd in "Karl Marx and the Environment" and by Herbert Marcuse in his 
essay "Nature and Revolution" in Counterrevolution and Revolt (1972). However, 
Lee's argument in "On the Mancian View" is a more suitable focus for present 
purposes since it is both more recent and more developed. 
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and between humans and external nature. Under capitalism, both worker 
nonhuman nature are considered by the capitalist class as instruments to be exploited 
for private profit. According to Lee, "capitalism was a necessary stage in man's 
development of the mastery of nature: but a further development is now necessary, 
namely, the overcoming of the dichotomy between man as subject over and against 
nature as object."7° 
In Lee's view, Marx's ideas were not anthropocentric because he conceived 
of nature as humanity's inorganic body: "The recognition of nature as our body will 
constitute the overcoming of the alienation of ourselves from nature, manifested in 
subject-object dualism."71 On the basis of this insight, Lee has sought to outline an 
ecologically benign form of socialist stewardship of nature that will emancipate 
humans and nonhumans alike from the tyranny of capitalism so that humankind can 
become the caretakers of its own "body." This socialist notion of nonhuman nature as 
Qur inorganic body, toward which we have a responsibility of care, is juxtaposed to 
the capitalist conception of nature as an alien "other" to be exploited for private profit. 
According to Lee, an ecological ethic must become part of the Marxist programme of 
liberation; socialism must be developed to what Lee sees as its logical end, that is, 
beyond homocentrism (i.e., anthropocentrism).72 
From a political viewpoint, Lee argues that the present dichotomy between 
humanity and nature may only be overcome through the overthrow of the wasteful 
capitalist system (read mode of production) and its replacement by "a rational, 
humane, environmentally unalienated social order." 73 The major characteristics of 
this new order would be socially useful production, the reduction of labour time, 
maximum creative leisure, wise use of resources, rational population control, and 
solidarity between all living things, not just humans. Lee's post-scarcity utopia is thus 
70. Lee, "On the Mandan View," p. 11. 
71. Ibid., p. 8. 
72. Ibid., p. 15. 
73. Ibid., p. 11. 
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one in which everyone will be able to realize what Marx referred to as our "species 
being" - a situation of genuine freedom from need - whereby we can create according 
to the "laws of beauty" and become responsible stewards of the ecosystem. 
According to Lee, this form of socialist stewardship is based on a a sense of 
enlightened self-interest because: 
Man is the universal being who can understand what is good for each species 
intrinsically, and thus, just as socialist man transcends the selfish greed of the 
capitalist and acts for the good of all men (which is ultimately his own good) so 
must ecologically aware socialist man transcend the selfish greed of 
homocentrism Arid act for the good of the whole ecosystem (which ultimately is 
his own good). 
Lee's socialist post-scarcity utopia represents a considerable departure from 
the orthodox eco-Marxists' Promethean vision of "conquering" nature. That is, Lee's 
socialist society does not seek to dominate nonhuman nature as an alien "other" 
through the development of technology. Rather, it is to be a society of self-
determining individuals who realize themselves through free, conscious activity and 
recognize nonhuman nature as but an extension of themselves, as part of their 
inorganic body. 
However, what is um apparent in Lee's ecological interpretation of the ideas 
of the young Marx, and what is apparent in the writings of the young Marx and in 
other versions of humanist eco-Marxism, is a notion of human freedom that is 
irredeemably anthropocentric. This notion of human freedom takes its meaning from 
Marx's distinction between freedom and necessity. 
It will be recalled that the young Marx maintained that humans realize their 
"essence" through unalienated labour and that the distinctive characteristic of humans 
was that "they produce universally, i.e., produce even when free from physical need 
and only truly produce in freedom thereof."75 This same distinction also runs 
through the writings of the mature Marx. For example, in Capital Marx wrote: 
74. Ibid., p. 16. 
75. Marx, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, p. 113. 
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The realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by 
necessity and mundane considerations ceases; tho in the nature of things it lies 
beyond the sphere of actual material production. '° 
As Andre Gorz points out in commenting upon this passage, 
... contrary to a widespread misconception, Marx does not equate the reign of 
liberty with self-management of material production by the associated 
producers ... [Rather] at /he level of material production, freedom consists 
merely of being able to work with as much dignity and efficiency as possible 
for as brief a time as possible. This is the direction in which self management 
should point. As for the realm of freedom, it will flourish through the red *o 
of working time and of the effort involved in producing what is necessary. 
According to Marcuse and Gorz (both of whom develop this freedom/necessity 
theme), the more we have mastered necessity, the more we can become truly free and 
realize our individuality through creative leisure, through the sciences and the arts, 
through convivial activity, and the like. According to Marcuse (who also drew on 
Freud's theory of human instincts), freedom lies in Eros and play, not labour, for 
labour presupposes the suppression of instincts and the conquering of desire. In other 
words, the problem lies in the fact that social necessity demands that humans must 
always labour. Unlike Freud, however, Marcuse argued that in today's society 
scarcity (which gave rise to "basic repression") is not so much a brute fact as a 
consequence of a specific social organization that is sustained to secure the privileged 
position of powerful groups and individuals - a state of affairs that has led to "surplus 
repression."78 Marcuse observed that, paradoxically, the very technological 
achievements of "repressive civilization" (which he considered to be dominated by 
76. Marx, Capital, vol. 3, p. 820. 
77. Gorz, Farewell to the Working Class, pp. 96-97. Against Gorz's interpretation, 
Schmidt has noted passages from the Grundrisse (which represents an important 
bridge between the young and mature Marx) that suggest that Marx believed that a 
humanized realm of necessity can also become a sphere of human self-realization 
(The Concept of Nature in Marx, p. 143). This does not, however, detract from 
Marx's overriding concern to rationalize and reduce necessary labour. As Schmidt 
himself argues, "the problem of human freedom is reduced by Marx to the problem of 
free time" (p. 142). This was also a concern of the young Marx (see Booth, "Gone 
Fishing") and certainly represents the direction in which Gorz and Marcuse have 
developed Marx's ideas. 
78. According to Marcuse, Freud had theorized that "behind the reality principle lies 
the fundamental fact of Ananke or scarcity (Lebensno0, which means that the 
struggle for existence takes place in a world too poor for the satisfaction of human 
needs without constant restraint, renunciation, delay." See Herbert Marcuse, Eros and 
Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1956), p. 35. 
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the "performance principle" - the prevailing historical form of the "reality principle") 
have created the preconditions for the gradual abolition of repression. That is, 
breaking down these social relations of domination would enable the forces of 
production to be pressed into the service of "genuine need" by liberating humans from 
toil, thereby creating a post-scarcity and hence "nonrepressive civilization." Like the 
young Marx (and contra the mature Marx), Marcuse believed that both labour and 
scarcity could be abolished in this way rather than simply diminished. 
The problem with this humanist eco-Marxist project of overcoming human 
alienation is that "true" human freedom and embeddedness in nature are posited as 
inversely related.79 That is, the kind of freedom pursued by humanist eco-Marxists 
necessarily requires the subjugation of external nature (through labour's extension, 
technology) so that humans may ultimately become fully sovereign and answerable 
only to themselves as opposed to being dependent on, and "held down" by, the 
limitations and inconveniences of nonhuman nature. Nonhuman nature remains, as 
Benton observes, "an external, threatening and constraining power ... to be overcome 
in the course of a long-drawn-out historical process of collective transformation." 8° 
The ultimate purport, then, of Marx's notion of "the resurrection of nature" 
in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts 1844 is not a nonanthropocentric 
socialist stewardship of "our inorganic body," as Lee would have us believe, but 
rather the further subjugation of the nonhuman world. 81 If Lee's humanist 
eco-Marxism is to remain recognizable as Marxism, then it must accept the 
anthropocentric implications of Marx's particular notion of freedom, which takes its 
meaning from the freedom/necessity distinction discussed above. 
In any event, some ecocentric critics have argued that even Lee's apparently 
benign ecological interpretation of the ideas of the young Marx - an interpretation that 
focuses on the theme of alienation - nonetheless serves to legitimin (albeit 
79. Balbus, Marxism and Domination, p. 274. 
80. Benton, "Humanism = Speciesism," p. 7. 
81. Balbus, Marxism and Domination, p. 274. 
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unwittingly) the domination of the nonhuman world. According to Lee, the 
overcoming of our alienation from nature is understood as the outcome of a 
dialectical struggle (sometimes referred to as a "metabolic interaction") between 
Subject (the labourer) and Object (external nature, the material to be transformed). 
According to this view, for nature to be recognized as our "body," a familiar and 
extended part of us rather than something "other," there must be a mutual 
interpenetration of both spheres through the activity of labour resulting in the mutual 
transformation of both - thus arriving at the much heralded "humanization of nature" 
and "naturalization of humanity." Ecocentric critics have been quick to point out that 
this superficially attractive version of overcoming the human/nature dichotomy is yet 
another form of domination couched in the language of human self-realization.d 82 
According to Val Routley, Marx's early view of nature as our body, our creation and 
our expression 
... can usefully be seen as the product of Marx's well-known transposition of 
God's features and role in the Hegelian system of thought onto man ... Thus, 
Marx's theory represents an extreme form of the placing of man in the role 
previous x attributed to God, a transposition so characteristic of Enlightenment 
thought.°.3 
The upshot of humanist eco-Marxism (Lee's version included) is that the unity of 
humans with nature is achieved by making it our artifact. by totally domesticating it. 
We have thus returned full circle to the orthodox solution to the environmental crisis 
(albeit couched in different language), to that stage of human development where 
nature is totally mastered through the power of associated individuals. In Lee's own 
words, this "unity" would enable us to live "in consciousness that each of us is 
identical with each other and with nature, and exploitation of men and nature would 
cease. 1184 
From an ecocentric perspective, however, harmonizing our relationship with 
the rest of nature does not mean obliterating what is "other" or not-human in nature. 
82. Routley, "On Karl Marx as an Environmental Hero," p. 239. 
83. Ibid., pp. 239-40. 
84. Lee, "On the Marxian View," p. 9. 
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Rather, it means identifying with it in a way that involves the recognition of the 
relative autonomy and unique modes of being of the myriad life-forms that make up 
the nonhuman world. This is because freedom or self-determination is recognized as 
a legitimate entitlement of both human and nonhuman life-forms. As we saw in 
Chapter 2, the goal of an ecocentric political theory is "emancipation writ large" - the 
maximisation of the freedom of all entities to unfold or develop in their own ways. 
Moreover, such freedom or self-determination is understood in relational terms (both 
socially and ecologically) insofar as the development of any relatively autonomous 
parts of a larger system (e.g., an ecosystem or the ecosphere) is inextricably tied to its 
relationship with the development of other relatively autonomous parts of that system 
as well as the development of the system itself (i.e., the whole). Ecocentric theorists 
argue that whereas the flourishing of human life and culture is quite compatible with a 
lifestyle based on low material and energy throughput, the flourishing of nonhuman 
life requires such a lifestyle. In order to meet this requirement we need to live and 
experience ourselves as part of, and more or less keep pace with, the basic cycles and 
processes of nature rather than seek to totally transcend the nonhuman world by 
removing all of its inconveniences and thereby obliterating its "otherness." 
To be sure, Lee's reinterpretation of the "mastery" of nature to mean 
"rational harmony with nature," which is cognizant of the need for population control 
and of the need to respect the carrying capacity of the land, is more ecologically 
grounded than that of orthodox eco-Marxists, who would openly encourage the 
development of all manner of synthetic substitutes for "nature's bounty" so as to avoid 
remaining "tethered" to the cycles of nature. Yet this latter kind of outcome is 
logically entailed in the quest for freedom according to the young Marx. As we have 
seen, if true freedom is understood to be inversely related to our embeddedness in 
nature, then the realization of that freedom necessarily requires that we seek to 
increase our control over, and reduce our dependence on, ecological cycles. The 
upshot is that nature, although redefined as "our body," must be thoroughly tamed and 
made subservient to human ends. 
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Of course, the kind of "true human freedom" promised by humanist eco-
Marxists is an attractive and familiar interpretation of "freedom," made all the more 
so in the light of our general bifurcation between work and leisure in modern society. 
Yet, from an ecocentric perspective, this eco-Marxist coupling of necessity/freedom 
and work/leisure is objectionable in two important respects. First, it is based on the 
anthropocentric Marxian "differential imperative" of bomo faber. It will be recalled 
from our discussion in Chapter 2 that the "differential imperative" refers to the 
selection of characteristics that are special to humans vis-a-vis other species as the 
measure of both human virtue and human superiority over other species. According 
to Marx, to be fully human and truly free, humans must maximise what he believed 
made us different from the rest of nature, namely, our ability to self-consciously act 
upon and transform the external world and thereby augment our own powers. 85 Yet, 
like so many anthropocentric assumptions, Marx's putative human/nonhuman 
opposition is based on an erroneous understanding of ecological reality. As Benton 
puts it in an extended critique of this opposition: 
For his intellectual purposes, Marx exaggerates both the fixity and limitedness 
of scope in the activity of other animals, and thgfilexibility and universality of 
scope of human activity upon the environment.°° 
Second, the eco-Marxist distinction between freedom and necessity reifies non-
essential activities as the means to true individual fulfilment while downgrading as 
lowly or "animal-like" many life-sustaining activities that can be potentially more 
fulfilling if approached and organized differently. (By life-sustaining activities, I am 
referring to those fundamental human activities necessary for survival and physical 
and psychological health such as growing and preparing food, constructing and 
maintaining shelter, nurturing and teaching the young, and caring for the infirm and 
the elderly.) The result is that culture and self-expression are made the complete 
antithesis of necessary material labour. This is because the general reduction of 
necessary labour time is seen to provide the foundation for the "true freedom" to be 
85. Benton, "Humanism = Speciesism," p. 8. 
86. Ibid., p. 9. 
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experienced by all humans, a freedom to be "purchased" via ongoing technological 
developments designed to "relieve" humans from concerning themselves with those 
burdensome tasks that have limited the development of present and prior generations 
of humans and which are seen to remain forever the lot of the rest of the animal 
world.87 Marx's distinction between freedom and necessity thus creates a dualism 
not only between humans and nonhuman nature but also within human nature 
between common, lowly animal functions, powers, and needs and sui generis, higher 
human functions, powers, and needs. 88 (As I show in Chapter 8, Simone de Beauvoir 
has drawn attention to a similar kind of contrasting valuation between nature and 
culture and between the self-limiting work of women and the self-transcending work 
of men. The former is treated as private, mundane, and concerned with the . 
regeneration and repetition of life while the latter is regarded as public, worthy, and 
concerned with transcending life by reshaping the future through technology and 
symbols.) 
The ecocentric objection to the post-scarcity utopia of humanist 
eco-Marxism is that it would cultivate a type of human who, as Val Routley has 
observed, through science and technology, is thoroughly insulated from, and in 
control of, the cycles of nature and the myriad of other nonhuman life-forms. Indeed, 
it is hard to see how the overcoming of human alienation from nature is to be 
achieved in such a utopia when humans are to be so thoroughly insulated and 
removed from their biological roots. In effect, the price of overcoming alienation in 
the workplace is alienation from nonhuman nature. Moreover, as Bookchin has 
argued, according to the Marxist view of freedom, class society and authoritarian 
social relations will remain unavoidable for so long as the mode of production fails to 
provide a sufficient material abundance for everybody to enjoy the realm of "true 
87. As I pointed out in footnote 77, there are passages in the Grundrisse that run 
contrary to this interpretation in that they suggest that human freedom or 
self-realization can be attained through democratic self-management in the 
workplace. This is a much more defensible interpretation from an ecocentric 
perspective. However, I argue that this interpretation does not hold up against Marx's 
freedom/necessity distinction, which appears in both his early and mature writings. 
88. Benton, "Humanism = Speciesism," p. 12. 
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freedom." Until that time, the "realm of necessity" will become "a realm of command 
and obedience, of ruler and ruled." That is, domination of people and nature under a 
rationalized capitalism remains the precondition for the achievement of a distant and 
continually postponed socialist freedom. 89 
It is clear that Marcuse's version of htimanist eco-Marxism is more firmly 
grounded in the philosophical ideas of the young Marx than Lee's version. Indeed, it 
is noteworthy that Tolman has rejected Lee's selective reading of Marx's early 
writings for being decidedly un-Marxist. According to Tolman, Lee's basic argument 
that we ought to see ourselves as stewards of the environment, which is to be seen as 
part of our "inorganic" body, is a serious distortion of Marx's true position, since 
Marx ultimately rejected the ideas drawn upon by Lee as abstract and idealist. 90 We 
have seen in section one that the mature Marx, as Schmidt has pointed out, had come 
to the view that the antagonistic struggle between humanity and nature would never 
be completely resolved, that is, nature would never be fully "resurrected" since labour 
could never be totally abolished and, accordingly, there would always be some parts 
of nature that remained untransformed and alien. For his part, Tolman makes no 
apologies in declaring the incompatibility between Marxism and ecocentrism. On this 
score, Tolman seems to have a clearer perception than Lee of the long term 
technological and ecological implications of Marxism. 
From an ecocentric perspective, then, the Mandan dichotomy between 
freedom and necessity must be transcended if we are to allow the mutual unfolding of 
both human and nonhuman life. In particular, the view (strongly endorsed by Gorz in 
particular) that even unalienated, self-managed material labour is a "lower" form of 
freedom than unnecessary labour and/or leisure activity must be rejected. Rather, the 
emphasis must turn to exploring the many ways in which basic needs may be met and 
necessary and life-sustaining work performed in a manner that is personally, 
89. Bookchin, "Marxism as Bourgeois Sociology," pp. 204-6. See also Routley, "On 
Karl Marx as an Environmental Hero," p. 241. 
90. Tolman, "Karl Marx, Alienation, and the Mastery of Nature," p. 72. 
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aesthetically, and intellectually satisfying and Lot environmentally damaging. 91 
Individuality, self-expression, and rounded human development will then be able to 
be realised through socially useful work as well as through other kinds of activity. 
(As I show in my discussion of ecoanarchism is Chapter 7, one kind of setting in 
which rounded human development is possible is a self-managed, co-operative 
community.) Moreover, contrary to Gorz's presumption, the enjoyment of "true 
freedom" as leisure need not be dependent on high technology or a high energy and 
material throughput. As Marshall Sahlins has argued in Stone Age Economics, the 
enjoyment of affluence (i.e., interpreted here as ample creative leisure rather than an 
abundance of material goods) by the members of a particular society is not 
necessarily dependent on that society "mastering necessity" by conquering nature 
through advanced technology and a high energy droughput. 92 Quite the contrary, his 
book is an important illustration of the maxim "want not, lack not" and a challenge to 
what he calls modern culture's "shrine to the Unattainable: Infinite Needs." 93 From 
an ecocentric perspective, such creative leisure is best procured through the critical 
revision and simplification of human needs and the development of tools and goods 
appropriate to those revised needs rather than through the systematic replacement of 
human labour by energy intensive machines. 
Conclusion. 
The above discussion is intended to demonstrate that an ecocentric 
perspective cannot be wrested out of Marxism, whether orthodox or humanist, 
without seriously distorting Marx's own philosophical concepts. As John Clark has 
put it, "to develop the submerged ecological dimension of Marx would mean the 
negation of key aspects of his philosophy of history, his theory of human nature, and 
91. See also Benton, "Humanism = Speciesism," p. 14, and Routley, "On Karl Marx 
as an Environmental Hero," p. 242. 
92. Marshal Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (London: Tavistock, 1974) - see 
especially chapter one "The Original Affluent Society," pp. 1-39. 
93. Ibid., p. 39. 
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his view of social transformation." 94 This explains why nonanthropocentric Greens 
theorists have chosen not to develop their ideas within a Marxist matrix and instead 
have sought guidance from other traditions of political thought such as utopian or 
"ethical" socialism, communal anarchism, and feminism. Far from providing a 
theoretical touchstone, then, many radical Green theorists have argued that the time 
has come for ecologically oriented political theorists to do to the ideas of Marx what 
he did to the ideas of the bourgeois thinkers he contested, namely, explain their 
origins in order to reveal their historical limits. 95 In this respect, Hwa Yol Jung has 
provided three succinct reasons why ecologically oriented theorists should abandon 
the ideas of Marx: 
First, he was too Hegelian to realize that the gain of "History" (or Humanity) is 
the loss of "Nature"; second, he was influenced by the English classical labour 
theory of value which undergirds his conception of man as homo faber, and 
third, he was a victim of the„iintamed optimism of the Enlightenment for 
Humanity's future progress.Y° 
To be sure, Marx's conception of freedom was more comprehensive than the liberal 
concept of freedom that he called to account. As Booth has neatly put it, whereas 
"liberalism had grasped one form of unfreedom, coercion, or the arbitrary rule of one 
will over another, which was the dominant form in precapitalist societies," Marxism 
recognized another form, namely, the silent and "objective compulsion" of the 
economic laws of capitalism. 97 As ecocentric theorists have shown, however, neither 
liberalism nor Marxism have acknowledged the unfreedom of the nonhuman world 
under jollity:AU/n. 98 To acknowledge the particular kinds of unfreedom exposed by 
Marx, as ecocentric theorists do (given their general concern for "emancipation writ 
large"), does not also require an acceptance of Marx's notion of freedom. Quite the 
94. Clark, "Marx's Inorganic Body," p. 250. 
95. Balbus, "A Neo-Hegelian Perspective," see p. 110. 
96. Jung, "Marxism, Ecology, and Technology," p. 170. 
97. Booth, "Gone Fishing," pp. 220-21. 
98. As I pointed out in Chapter 1, Mill and Bentham constitute two important 
exceptions within the liberal tradition insofar as they were concerned to alleviate the 
suffering of animals. 
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contrary. I have tried to show that Marx's notion of freedom as mastery achieved 
through struggle, as the subjugation of the external world through labour and its 
extension - technology, as the conquering of mysterious or hostile forces and the 
overcoming of all constraints, can only be achieved at the expense of the nonhuman 
world. 
In this chapter, my discussion has generally been confined to those strands 
of eco-Marxism that have sought inspiration from Marx's own texts. However, there 
is one more relatively distinct sub-set of humanist Marxist thought, namely, the 
Critical Theory of the Frankfurt school, that warrants the special attention of 
ecocentric theorists on account of its innovative critique of instrumental reason - a 
subject largely left unexplored by the theorists discussed in this chapter (with the 
exception, of course, of Marcuse, who is himself a Critical Theorist). In the following 
chapter I shall critically explore the insights of the Frankfurt School on the 
relationship between the domination of people and the domination of nonhuman 
nature in order to determine whether this particular school of Neo-Marxism can 
provide new conceptual tools that are relevant to the ecocentric emancipatory project. 
Chapter 5 
The Failed Promise of Critical Theory 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I argued that the orthodox and humanist strands of 
eco-Marxism have not been able to offer an emancipatory ecopolitical theory of 
sufficient scope to satisfy the concerns of ecocentric theorists (although Marx's 
analysis of capitalism goes some way toward explaining the economic dynamics that 
lie behind ecological degradation). Although forming part of the humanist Marxist 
heritage, the Critical Theory developed by the members of the Frankfurt Institute of 
Social Research ("the Frankfurt School") warrants separate treatment because it has 
revised this heritage in ways that do directly address the wider emancipatory concerns 
of ecocentric theorists. 1 In particular, Critical Theorists have laid down a direct 
challenge to the Marxist idea that "true freedom" lies beyond socially necessary 
labour. They have argued that the more we try to "master necessity" through the 
increasing application of instrumental reason to all spheres of life, the lcsi free we 
will become. In this chapter, I evaluate the special contribution of certain key 
members of the first and second generation of Critical Theorists in order to determine 
the extent to which their innovative critique of instrumental reason is compatible with 
an ecocentric perspective. I show that Critical Theory had the potential to develop in 
a thoroughgoing ecocentric direction but that this potential was not realized. Indeed, I 
show that Critical Theory, after a promising start, ultimately returned to the 
anthropocentric fold of Marxism. 
Critical Theory represents an important break with orthodox Marxism - a 
break that was undertaken in order to understand, among other things, why Marx's 
1. The Frankfurt School was founded in 1923 as an independently endowed institute 
for the exploration of social phenomenon. For an historical overview, see Martin Jay, 
The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of 
,Social Research 1923-1970 (Boston: Little Brown, 1973). 
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original emancipatory promise had not been fulfilled. Like most other strands of 
Western Marxism, Critical Theory turned away from the scientism and historical 
materialism of orthodox Marxism that dominated the Second International. 2 In the 
case of the Frankfurt School, however, it was not through a critique of political 
economy but rather through a critique of culture, scientism, and instrumental reason 
that Marxist debates were entered. One of the enduring contributions of the first 
generation of Frankfurt School theorists (notably, Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, 
and Herbert Marcuse) was to show that there are different levels and dimensions of 
domination and exploitation beyond the economic sphere and that the former are no 
less important than the latter. The most radical thematic innovation concerning this 
broader understanding of domination came from the early Frankfurt School theorists' 
critical examination of the relationship between humanity and nature. This resulted in 
a fundamental challenge to the orthodox Mandan view concerning the progressive 
march of history, which had emphasized the liberatory potential of the increasing 
mastery of nature through the development of the productive forces. Far from 
welcoming these developments as marking the "ascent of man from the kingdom of 
necessity to the kingdom of freedom" (to borrow Engels' phrase), Horkheimer, 
Adorno, and Marcuse saw them in essentially negative terms as giving rise to the 
domination of both "outer" and "inner" nature. 3 (For this reason, the early Frankfurt 
School theorists regarded the rationalization process set in train by the Enlightenment 
as a "negative dialectics.") This was reflected, on the one hand, in the apprehension 
and conversion of nonhuman nature into resources for production or objects of 
scientific inquiry (including animal experimentation) and, on the other hand, in the 
repression of humanity's joyful and spontaneous instincts brought about through a 
repressive social division of labour and a repressive division of the human psyche. 
2. The First and Second Internationals refer to the successive international federations 
of socialist parties and organizations, the first of which was the international 
"Working Men's Association" formed in 1864 in London. The Second International 
was formed in Paris in 1889, but disintegrated with the outbreak of World War Tin 
1914 owing to divided nationalist and socialist loyalties. 
3. Friedrich Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific" in The Marx-Engels Reader, 
ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), p. 638. 
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Hence their quest for a human "reconciliation" with nature. Instrumental or 
"purposive" rationality - that branch of human reason that is concerned with 
determining the most effective or efficient means of realizing pregiven goals and 
which accordingly apprehends only the instrumental (i.e., use) value of phenomena - 
should not, they argued, become the exemplar of rationality for society. Human 
happiness would not come about simply by improving our techniques of social 
administration, by treating society and nature as subject to blind, immutable laws that 
could be manipulated by a technocratic elite. 
The early Frankfurt School's critique of instrumental rationality (or 
"technocratic rationality") has been carried forward and extensively revised by Jurgen 
Habermas, who has sought to show, among other things, how political decision 
making has been increasingly reduced to pragmatic instrumentality, which serves the 
capitalist and bureaucratic system while "colonizing the life-world." 4 According to 
Habermas, the "scientization of politics" has resulted in the lay public ceding ever 
greater areas of system-steering decision making to technocratic elites. 
All of these themes have a significant bearing on the Green critique of 
industrialism, modern technology and bureaucracy, and the Green commitment to 
grassroots democracy. Yet Critical Theory has not had a major direct influence in 
shaping the theory and practice of the Green movement in the 1980s, whether in West 
Germany or elsewhere.5 I have noted in Chapter 1, however, that the ideas of 
Marcuse and Habermas did have a significant impact on the thinking of the New Left 
in the 1960s and early 1970s and that the general "participatory" theme that 
4. By "life-world" Habermas means "the taken-for-granted universe of daily social 
activity." Anthony Giddens, "Reason Without Revolution? Habermas's Theories des  
kommunikativen Handelns," in Richard J. Bernstein, ed., Habermas and Modernity  
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), pp. 95-123 at p. 101. 
5. See, for example, Werner Hulsberg, The German Greens: A Social And Political  
Profile (London: Verso, 1988), pp. 8-9; John Ely, "Marxism and Green Politics in 
West Germany," Thesis Eleven 13 (1986): 22-38 at p. 27 and footnote 11. It should 
be noted, however, that the themes of the early , Frankfurt School theorists (Adorno, 
Horkheimer, and Marcuse) have had an important influence on the emancipatory 
ecopolitical writings of Murray Bookchin, who has been an influential figure in the 
Green movement in North America. As I show in Chapter 7, however, Bookchin was 
to invert the early Frankfurt School's thesis concerning the domination of human and 
nonhuman nature. 
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characterized that era has remained an enduring thread in the emancipatory stream of 
ecopolitical thought. Yet this legacy is largely an indirect one. Of course, there are 
some emancipatory ecopolitical theorists who have drawn upon Habermas's social 
and political theory in articulating and explaining some aspects of the Green critique 
of advanced industrial society. 6 However, this can be contrasted with the much 
greater general influence of post-Marxist Green theorists such as Murray Bookchin, 
Theodore Roszak, and Rudolf Bahro and non-Marxist Green theories such as 
bioregionalism, deep/transpersonal ecology, and ecofeminism - a comparison that 
further underscores the distance Green theory has had to travel away from the basic 
corpus of Marxism and neo-Marxism in order to find a comfortable theoretical 
"home." 
It is important to understand why Critical Theory has not had a greater direct 
impact on Green political theory and practice given that two of its central 
problematics - the triumph of instrumental reason and the domination of nature - 
might have served as a useful theoretical starting point for the Green critique of 
industrial society. This possibility was indeed a likely one when it is remembered 
that both the Frankfurt School and Green theorists acknowledge the dwindling 
revolutionary potential of the working class (owing to its integration into the capitalist 
order); that both are critical of totalitarianism, technocratic rationality, mass culture, 
and consumerism; and that both have strong German connections. Why did these two 
currents of thought not come together? 
There are many possible explanations as to why Critical Theory has not been 
more influential. One might note, for example, the early Frankfurt School's 
pessimistic outlook (particularly that of Adomo and Horkheimer), its ambivalence 
toward nature romanticism (acquired in part from its critical inquiry into Nazism), its 
rarefied language, its distance from the imperfect world of day-to-day political 
6. For example, William Leiss, The Domination of Nature (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1974); Timothy W. Luke and Stephen K. White, "Critical Theory, the Informational 
Revolution, and an Ecological Path to Modernity," in Critical Theory and Public Life, 
ed. John Forester (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1985), pp. 22-53; and John 
Dryzek, Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1987). 
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struggles (Marcuse being an important exception here), and its increasing 
preoccupation with theory rather than praxis (despite its original project of uniting the 
two). Yet I intend to argue that the more fundamental explanation lies in the direction 
in which Critical Theory has developed since the 1960s, particularly in the hands of 
Jurgen Habermas who has, by and large, remained preoccupied with and allied to the 
fortunes of democratic socialism (represented by the Social Democratic Party in West 
Germany) rather than the fledgling Green movement and its parliamentary 
representatives. 7 Of course, the Green movement has not escaped Habermas's 
attention. However, he has tended to approach the movement more as an indicator of 
the motivational and legitimacy problems in advanced capitalist societies rather than 
as the historic bearer of emancipatory ideas (this is to be contrasted with Marcuse, 
who embraced the activities of new social movements). 8 Habermas has analysed the 
emergence of new social movements and "Green" concerns as a grassroots "resistance 
to tendencies to colonize the life-world." 9 With the exception of the women's 
movement (which Habermas does consider to be emancipatory), these new social 
movements (e.g., ecology, anti-nuclear) are seen as essentially defensive in 
7. In a recent collection of interviews published in 1986, Habermas declared: "I vote 
for the S.P.D., and have always done so. Naturally, I would like to see an alliance 
between the S.P.D. and the Greens, what is left of the labour movement and the new 
social movements. But this is not a =gal alliance. How can unity be achieved 
among such heterogeneous groups - anti-productivist, old-productivist, new-middle 
class? Above all, what kind of political vision can be developed beyond the impasse 
of the welfare state?" See Peter Dews, ed., Habermas: Autonomy and Solidarity  
(London: Verso, 1986), p. 210. 
8. Marcuse saw the ecology and feminist movements in particular as the most 
promising political movements and foreshadowed many of the insights of 
ecofeminism (discussed in Chapter 8). For example, in Counterrevolution and Revolt 
(London: Allen Lane, 1972), he argued for the elevation of the "female principle," 
describing the women's movement as a radical force that was undermining the sphere 
of aggressive needs, the performance principle, and the social institutions by which 
these are fostered (p. 75). See also Herbert Marcuse, "Protosocialism and Late 
Capitalism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis Based on Bahro's Analysis," in Ulf 
Wolter, ed., Rudolf Bahro: Critical Responses, original trans. Michael Vale and 
Annemarie Feenberg with the assistance of Andree Feenberg; revised trans. Erica 
Sherover Marcuse (White Plains, New York: M. E. Sharp, 1980), pp. 25-48 at p. 43. 
9. "New Social Movements," Telos 49 (1981): 33-37 at p. 35. This article is extracted 
from the final chapter of Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 
vol 2: Life-world and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1987), p. 393. 
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character. 1° While acknowledging the ecological and bureaucratic problems 
identified by these movements, Habermas regards their proposals to develop 
counterinstitutions and "liberated areas" from within the life-world as essentially 
unrealistic. What is required, he has argued, are "technical and economic solutions 
that must be planned globally and implemented by administrative m." 11 In 
defending the revolutionary potential of new social movements, Murray Bookchin has 
accused Habermas of intellectualizing new social movements "to a point where they 
are simply incoherent, indeed, atavistic." 12 According to Bookchin, Habermas has 
no sense of the potentiality of new social movements. 
Yet Habermas's general aloofness from the Green movement (most notably, 
its radical ecocentric stream) goes much deeper than this. It may be traced to 
Habermas's theoretical break with the "negative dialectics" of the early Frankfurt 
School theorists and with their utopian goal of a "reconciliation with nature." 
Habermas has argued that such a utopian goal is neither necessary nor desirable for 
human emancipation. Instead, he has welcomed the rationalization process set in 
train by the Enlightenment as a positive rather than negative development. This 
chapter will therefore be concerned to locate this theoretical break and outline the 
broad contours of the subsequent development of Habermas's social and political 
theory in order to identify what I take to be the major theoretical stumbling blocks in 
Habermas's oeuvre - from an ecocentric perspective. (This is not intended to be an 
10.Habermas, "New Social Movements," p. 34. 
11. Ibid., pp. 37 and 35. Habermas's preferred solution arises from his delineation of 
two forms of rationality - a systems rationality, which corresponds to purposive 
rationality, and a life-world rationality, which corresponds to communicative 
rationality (these distinctions are discussed in greater detail below). While he 
observes the distorting effects resulting from the colonization of the life-world by 
systems rationality, he insists that only the latter can deal with the pathologies of 
advanced capitalism. Yet, as Giddens observes, if these pathologies are the result of 
the triumph of purposive rationality, how can the life-world be defended against the 
encroachments of bureaucratic and economic steering mechanisms without 
transforming those very mechanisms? See Giddens, "Reason Without Revolution?" 
p. 121. Habermas argues for a new balance between system and life-world, but he 
provides no suggestion as to how this might be achieved. 
12. Murray Bookchin, "Finding the Subject: Notes on Whitebook and Habermas 
Ltd.," Telos 52 (1982): 78-98 at p. 83. 
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exhaustive overview of contemporary Critical Theory; my main concern is simply to 
identify and examine those themes and categories that are relevant to ecocentric 
emancipatory concerns.) This will help to explain, on the one hand, why Habermas 
regards the radical ecology movement as defensive and "neo-romantic" and, on the 
other hand, why ecocentric theorists would regard many of Habermas's theoretical 
categories as unnecessarily rigid and anthropocentric. 
However, I also argue that Habermas' social and political theory has 
produced some important theoretical insights that do enrich emancipatory ecopolitical 
thought. In particular, his communicative ethics provide an elaborate theoretical 
defence and extension of the Green commitment to grassroots democracy and the 
expansion of moral and aesthetic discourse vis-a-vis technical discourse. Ultimately, 
however, I argue that Habermasian Critical Theory merely extends the human 
emancipatory theme but does nothing to further the emancipation of the nonhuman 
world - indeed, he counsels against the latter. 
On the other hand, a central theme of the early Frankfurt School theorists, 
namely, the hope for a reconciliation of the negative dialectics of Enlightenment that 
would liberate both human and nonhuman nature, speaks directly to ecocentric 
concerns. While Adorno and Horkheimer were pessimistic as to the prospect of such 
a reconciliation ever occurring, Marcuse remained hopeful of the possibility that a 
"new science" might be developed, based on a more expressive and empathic 
relationship to the nonhuman world. This stands in stark contrast to Habermas's 
position - that science and technology can only know nature in instrumental terms 
since that is the only way in which it can be effective in terms of securing our survival 
as a species. Unlike Habermas, who saw work, science, and technology as rooted in 
our species' "quasi-transcendental" interest in survival (which shaped and limited how 
humans may "know" nature, namely, instrumentally), Marcuse saw science as a 
historically relative project. That is, he believed that a qualitatively different society 
might produce a qualitatively different science and technology. Ultimately, however, 
I show that Marcuse's notion of a "new science" remained vague and undeveloped 
and, in any event, was finally overshadowed - indeed contradicted - by his overriding 
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concern for the emancipation of the human senses and the freeing up of the instinctual 
drives of the individual. As we saw in the previous chapter, this required nothing 
short of the total abolition of necessary labour and the rational mastery of nature, a 
feat that could oay be achieved by advanced technology and widespread automation. 
I conclude that neither the early Frankfurt School theorists (including 
Marcuse) nor Habermas offer a satisfactory resolution of the ecological crisis from an 
ecocentric perspective, although they both make important (and quite different) 
contributions to the anthropocentric emancipatory stream of ecopolitical thought. 
Both proceed on the basis of an abstract idea of science and a simplistic equation 
between science, technology, and instrumental reason. Such an understanding 
overlooks the cosmological aspect of science, namely, the many ways in 'which 
science enhances our understanding of our origins and our place in the larger scheme 
of things. Such an understanding also overlooks how science itself has pointed to the 
limits of instrumental reason in our dealings with nature. 
The Legacy of Horkheimer. Adorno, 
and Marcuse 
While the primary focus of this chapter will be on Habermas's contribution, 
it will be helpful to begin with an examination of the major innovations of the 
Frankfurt School's intellectual pioneers, in whose footsteps Leiss, Habermas; and 
others have followed. In particular, the contributions of Horkheimer and Adomo in 
the 1940s, and Marcuse in the 1950s and 1960s, contain a number of theoretical 
insights that foreshadowed the ecological critique of industrial society that was to 
develop from the late 1960s. 13 Indeed, these insights might have provided a useful 
theoretical starting point for ecocentric emancipatory theorists by providing a 
potential theoretical linkage between the domination of the human and nonhuman 
13. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John 
Cummings (London: Verso, 1979) - this work was written during the second World 
War and first published in 1944. As Albrecht Wellmer has argued, it is this work that 
has had the greatest impact on post-war Critical Theory in Germany. See Albrecht 
Wellmer, "Reason, Utopia, and the Dialectic of Enlightenment," Praxis International  
3(1983): 83-108 at p. 91. 
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worlds. By drawing back from the preoccupation with class conflict as the "motor of 
history" and examining instead the conflict between humans and the rest of nature, 
Horkheimer and Adorno developed a critique that sought to transcend the socialist 
preoccupation with questions concerning the control and distribution of the fruits of 
the industrial order. In short, they replaced the critique of political economy with a 
critique of technological civilization. As Martin Jay has observed, they found a 
conflict whose origins pre-dated capitalism and whose continuation (and probable 
intensification) appeared likely to survive the demise of capitalism. 14 Domination 
was recognized as increasingly assuming a range of noneconomic guises, including 
the subjugation of women and cruelty to animals - matters that had been largely 
overlooked by Marxists. 15 The Frankfurt School also criticized Marxism for reifying 
nature as little more than raw material for exploitation, thereby foreshadowing aspects 
of the more recent ecocentric emancipatory critique of Marxism (discussed in the 
previous chapter). Horkheimer and Adorno argued that this stemmed from the 
uncritical way in which Marxism had inherited and perpetuated the paradoxes of the 
Enlightenment tradition - their central target. In this respect, Marxism was regarded 
as no different from liberal capitalism. 
Horkheimer and Adorno's contribution was essentially conducted in the 
form of a critique of reason. Their goal was to rescue reason in such a way as to bring 
instrumental reason under the control of "objective" or critical reason. By "objective 
reason" Adorno and Horkheimer meant that synthetic faculty of mind that engages in 
critical reflection and goes beyond mere appearances to a deeper reality in order to 
reconcile the contradictions between reality and appearance. This was to be 
contrasted with "instrumental reason," that one-sided faculty of mind that structures 
the phenomenal world in a commonsensical, functional way and is concerned with 
efficient and effective adaptation, with means not ends. The Institute sought to 
14. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, p. 256. 
15. Ibid., p. 257 (see Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 84 and pp. 245-55). Friedrich 
Engels' discussion of the subjugation of women in The Origin of the Family. Private 
Property and the State (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1940) is, of course, an 
important exception. 
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defend reason from attacks on both sides, that is, from those who reacted against the 
rigidity of abstract rationalism (e.g., the romantics) and from those who asserted the 
epistemological supremacy of the methods of the natural sciences (i.e., "the 
positivists"). The task of Critical Theory was to foster a mutual critique and 
reconciliation of these two forms of reason. In particular, reason was hailed by 
Marcuse as an essential "critical tribunal" that was the core of any progressive social 
theory; it lay at the root of Critical Theory's utopian impulse. 16 
According to Horkheimer and Adomo, the Age of Enlightenment had 
ushered in the progressive replacement of tradition, myth, and superstition with 
reason, but it did so at a price. The high ideals of that period had become grossly 
distorted as a result of the ascendancy of instrumental reason over critical reason, a 
process that Max Weber had decried as simultaneously leading to the rationalization 
Bad disenchantment of the world. The result, as Martin Jay has observed, was an 
inflated sense of human self-importance and a quest to dominate nature: 
At the root of the Enlightenment's project of domination, Horkheimer and 
Adomo charged, was a secularized version of the religious belief that God 
controlled the world. As a result, the human subject confronted the natural 
object as an inferior, external other. At least primitive animism, for all its lack 
of self-consciousness, had expressed an awareness of the interpenetration of the 
two spheres. This was totally lost in Enlightenment thought, where the world 
was seen as composed of lifeless, fimgib1e41toms: "Animism had spiritualized 
objects; industrialism objectified spirits." 
Horkheimer and Adomo argued that this overemphasis on human autonomy and 
sovereignty led, paradoxically, to a loss of freedom. This was because the 
instrumental manipulation of nature that flowed from the anthropocentric view that 
humans were the measure of all things and the masters of nature inevitably gave rise 
to the objectification and manipulation of humans: 
Men pay for the increase in their power with alienation from that over which 
they exercise their power. Enlightenment behaves towards things as a dictator 
towards men. He knows them insofar as he can manipulate them. The man of 
science knows things insofar as he can make them. In this way their 
potentiality is turned towards his ends. In the metamorphosis the nature of 
16. See Martin Jay, "The Frankfurt School and the Genesis of Critical Theory," in Tim 
Unknown Dimension: European Marxism Since Lenin, eds. Dick Howard and Karl E. 
Klare (New York: Basic Books, 1972), pp. 224-48, especially pp. 240-41. 
17.Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, p. 260. 
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things, as the substratum of dominatioq,s revealed as always the same. This 
identity constitutes the unity of nature. 
The first generation of Critical Theorists also argued that the "rational" 
domination of outer nature necessitated a similar domination of inner nature by means 
of the repression and renunciation of the instinctual, aesthetic, and expressive aspects 
of our being. This was the paradox that lay at the heart of the growth of reason. The 
attempt to create a free society of autonomous individuals was self-vitiating because it 
distorted the subjective conditions necessary for the realization of that freedom. 19 
The more we seek material expansion in our quest for freedom from traditional and 
natural constraints, the more we become distorted psychologically as we deny those 
aspects of our own nature that are incompatible with instrumental reason. (Recall 
here, from Chapter 1, Bahro's ironic welcoming of the ecological crisis for forcing us 
to re-examine the belief that the road to human freedom lay in material expansion). 
As Alford has observed, Horkheimer and Adorno condemned "not merely science but 
the Western intellectual tradition that understands reason as effective adaptation." 2° 
Whereas Weber had described the process of rationalization as resulting in the 
disenchantment of the world, Horkheimer and Adorno described it as resulting in the 
"revenge of nature." As we saw above, this was reflected in the gradual undermining 
of our biological support system and in a new kind of repression of the human psyche. 
Such "psychic repression" was offered as an explanation for the modern individual's 
blind susceptibility, during times of social and economic crisis, to follow a 
demagogue such as Hitler who is able to offer the alienated individual a sense of 
meaning and belonging. From a Critical Theory perspective, then, just as the 
totalitarianism of Nazism was premised on the will to engineer social problems out of 
existence, the bureaucratic state and corporate capitalism may be seen as seeking to 
engineer ecological problems out of existence. 
18.Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 9. 
19.This theme has also been pursued by Eric Fromm in Escape from Freedom (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1969). 
20. C. Fred Alford, Science and the Revenge of Nature: Marcuse and Habermas  
(Tampa/Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1985), p. 16. 
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Adorn°, Horkheimer, and Marcuse longed for "the resurrection of nature" - a 
new kind of mediation between society and the natural world. Whitebook has 
described this resurrection as referring to "the transformation of our relation to and 
knowledge of nature such that nature would once again be taken as purposeful, 
meaningful or as possessing value." 21 This did not mean a nostalgic regress into 
primitive animism or pre-Enlightenment mythologies that sacrificed critical reason - 
the phenomenon of Nazism demonstrated the dangers of such a simplistic solution. 
Rather, their utopia required the integrated recapture of the past. This involved 
remembering rather than forgetting the experiences and ways of being of earlier 
human cultures and realizing that the modem rationalization process and the 
increasing differentiation of knowledge (particularly the factual, the normative, and 
the expressive) has been both a learning And unlearning process. As Albrecht 
Wellmer has explained it: 
Critical Theory could be said to be based on an idea of reason which comprises 
the image of a harmonious unity of the collective life-process, a situation in 
which the opposition between volonte generale [the general will] and the 
individual's will and needs, as well as the opposition,hetween our rational 
faculties and our sensuous nature will be overcome."' 
Yet Adorn° and Horkheimer recognized that their utopia was very much against the 
grain of history. Unlike Marx, they stressed the radical discontinuity between the 
march of history and the liberated society they would like to see. As we saw, this 
sprang from the lack of a revolutionary subject that would be able to usher in the 
reconciliation of humanity with inner and outer nature. After all, how could there be 
a revolutionary subject when the individual in mass society had undergone such 
psychological distortion and was no longer autonomous? Accordingly, they were 
unable to develop a revolutionary praxis to further their somewhat vague utopian 
dream. However they insisted that the utopian impulse that fuelled that dream, 
although never fully realizable, must be maintained as providing an essential source 
of critical distance that guarded against any passive surrender to the status quo. 
21. Joel Whitebook, "The Problem of Nature in Habermas," Telos 40(1979): 41-69 at 
p. 55. 
22. Wellmer, "Reason, Utopia, and the Dialectic of Enlightenment," p. 91. 
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Although Herbert Marcuse explored the same negative dialectics as Adomo 
and Horkheimer, he reached a marginally more optimistic conclusion concerning the 
likelihood of a revolutionary praxis developing. In particular, he saw the 
counterculture and student movements of the 1960s and early 1970s as developing a 
more expressive relationship to nature that was co-operative, aesthetic - even erotic. 
Here, he suggested, were the seeds of a new movement that could expose the 
ideological functions of technocratic rationality and mount a far-reaching challenge to 
the "false" needs generated by modem consumer society that had dulled the 
individual's capacity for critical reflection. 23 Marcuse saw aesthetic needs as a 
subversive force since they enabled things to be seen and appreciated in_thlk_oan 
light.24 Indeed, he argued that the emancipation of the senses and the release of 
instinctual needs was a prerequisite to the liberation of nature (both internal and 
external). In the case of the former, this meant the liberation of our primary impulses 
and aesthetic senses. In the case of the latter, it meant the overcoming of our 
incessant struggle with our environment and the recovery of the "life-enhancing 
forces in nature, the sensuous aesthetic qualities which are foreign to a life wasted in 
unending competitive performance."25 
Marcuse also suggested that sensuous perception might form the 
epistemological basis of a new science that would overcome the one-dimensionality 
of instrumental reason that underpinned modem science. Under a new science, 
Marcuse envisaged that knowledge might become a source of pleasure rather than the 
means of extending human control. The natural world would be perceived and 
responded to in an open, more passive and receptive way and be guided by the object 
of study (rather than by human purposes). Such a new science would also reveal 
previously undisclosed aspects of nature that could inspire and guide human 
23. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (London: Abacus, 1972). For a critique of 
Marcuse's distinction between true and false needs, see Robert Hoffman, "Marcuse's 
One-Dimensional Vision," Philosophy of the Social Sciences 2 (1972): 43-59. 
24. Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt (London: Allen Lane, 1972), p. 74. 
25. Ibid., pp. 72 and 60. 
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conduct.26 This was to be contrasted with modern "Galilean" science, which 
Marcuse saw as "the 'methodology' of a pre-given historical reality within whose 
universe it moves" - it reflects an interest in experiencing, comprehending, and 
shaping the world "in terms of calculable, predictable relationships among exactly 
identifiable units. In this project, universal quantifiability is a prerequisite for the 
domination of nature."27 
Habermas has taken issue with Marcuse, claiming that it is logically 
impossible to imagine that a new science could be developed that would overcome 
the manipulative and domineering attitude towards nature characteristic of modern 
science.28 There are certainly passages in Marcuse's One Dimensional Man that 
suggest that it is the scientific method itself that has ultimately led to the domination 
of humans and that therefore a change in the very method of scientific inquiry is 
necessary to usher in a liberated society. 29 Against Habermas's interpretation, 
however, William Leiss has argued that these are isolated, inconsistent passages that 
run contrary to the main line of Marcuse's argument, which is that the problem is not 
with science or technocratic rationality per se but "with the repressive social 
26. Ibid., p. 60. Marcuse argued that instead of seeing nature as mere utility, "the 
emancipated senses, in conjunction with a natural science proceeding on their basis, 
would guide the 'human appropriation' of nature." 
27. One Dimensional Man, pp. 133-34. 
28. Jurgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest. Science. and 
Politics, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1971), 
pp. 85-87. 
29. For example, Marcuse has stated: "The principles of modern science were a priori  
structured in such a way that they could serve as conceptual instruments for a 
universe of self-propelling, productive control; theoretical operationalism came to 
correspond to practical operationalism. The scientific method [which] led to the 
ever-more-effective domination of nature thus came to provide the pure concepts as 
well as the instrumentalities for the ever-more-effective domination of man by man 
through the domination of nature" (One Dimensional Man, p. 130). And later: "The 
point which I am trying to make is that science, by virtue of its own method and 
concepts, has projected and promoted a universe in which the domination of nature 
has remained linked to the domination of man - a link which tends to be fatal to the 
universe as a whole" (ibid., p. 136). 
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institutions which exploit the achievements of that rationality to preserve unjust 
relationships among men."3° 
Yet these inconsistencies in Marcuse's discussion of the relationship 
between science and liberation do not appear to be resolvable either way. Indeed, it is 
possible to discern a third position that lies somewhere between Habermas's and 
Leiss's interpretations (although it is closer to Leiss's): that the fault lies neither with 
science nor technocratic rationality per se nor repressive social institutions per se but 
rather with the instrumental and anthropocentric character of the modern world-view. 
In One Dimensional Man, Marcuse was concerned to highlight the inextricable 
interrelationship between science and society. He conceded that pure as distinct from 
applied science "does not project particular practical goals nor particular forms of 
domination," but it does proceed in a certain universe of discourse and cannot 
transcend that discourse. 31 According to Marcuse, 
... scientific rationality was in itself, in its very abstractness and purity, 
operational in as much as it developed under an instrumental horizon ... This 
interpretation would tie the scientific project (method and theory), prior to all 
application and utilization, to a specific societal project, and would see the tie 
precisely in the inner form of scientific rationality, i.e., the functional character 
of its concepts [my emphasis]../4 
It is clear that Marcuse regarded the scientific method as being dependent on a 
pre-established universe of ends, in which and fa which it has developed. 33 It 
follows, as he points out in Counterrevolution and Revolt, that: 
A free society may well have a very different a priori and a very different 
object; the development of the scientific concepts may be grounded in an 
experience of nature as a totality of life to be protected and "cultivated," and 
techinlogy would apply this science to the reconstruction of the environment of 
life?' 
30. William Leiss, "Technological Rationality: Marcuse and His Critics," Philosophy 
of the Social Sciences 2(1972): 31-42 at pp. 34-35. This essay also appears as an 
appendix to Leiss, The Domination of Nature, pp. 199-212. 
31. One Dimensional Man, p. 129. 
32. Ibid., pp. 129 and 131. 
33. Ibid., p. 137. 
34. Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt, p. 61. 
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Marcuse's point is a very general one: that a new or liberatory science can only be 
inaugurated by a liberatory society. It would be a "new" science because it would 
serve a new pre-established universe of ends, including a qualitatively new 
relationship between humans and the rest of nature. This third interpretation is much 
closer to Leiss's interpretation than Habermas's since it argues that we must re-order 
social relations before we re-order science if we wish to "resurrect" nature. Only then 
would we be able to cultivate a liberatory rather than a repressive mastery of nature. 
Yet it is important to clarify what Marcuse meant by a "liberatory mastery of 
nature." As Alford has convincingly shown, Marcuse's new science appears as mere 
rhetoric when judged against the overall thrust of his writings. 35 As I pointed out in 
the previous chapter, Marcuse's principal Marxian reference was the Paris 
Manuscripts, which Marcuse saw as providing the philosophical grounding for the 
realization of the emancipation of the senses and the reconciliation of nature. 
Moreover, his particular Marx/Freud synthesis was concerned to overcome repressive 
dominance, that is, the repression of the pleasure principle (the gratification of the 
instincts) by the reality principle (the latter being the need to transform and modify 
nature in order to survive, which is reflected in the work ethic and the growth of 
instrumental reason). Marcuse saw the reality principle as being culturally specific to 
an economy of scarcity. In capitalist society, the forces of production had developed 
to the point where scarcity (which gave rise to the "reality principle") need no longer 
be a permanent feature of human civilization. That is, the technical and productive 
apparatus was seen to be capable of meeting basic necessities with minimum toil so 
that there was no longer any basis for the repression of the instincts via the dominance 
of the work ethic. The continuance of this ethic must be seen as "surplus repression," 
which Marcuse maintained was secured, inter alia, by the manipulation of false 
consumer needs.36 Marcuse ultimately wished to reap the full benefits promised by 
35. Alford, Science and the Revenge of Nature, pp. 49-68. 
36. Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956), especially pp. 35, 37, and 87-88. 
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mainstream science, namely, a world where humans were spared the drudgery of 
labour and are free to experience "eros and peace." 
However, the necessary quid pro quo for the reassertion of the pleasure 
principle over the reality principle was that the nonhuman world would continue to be 
sacrificed in the name of human liberation. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
Marcuse shared Marx's notion of two mutually exclusive realms of freedom and 
necessity and, like Marx, he believed that "true freedom" lay beyond the realm of 
labour. Accordingly, total automation, made possible by scientific and technological 
progress, was essential on the ground that labour was regarded as inherently unfree 
and burdensome in that it demanded that humans subordinate their desires and 
expressive instincts to the requirements of the "objective situation" (i.e., economic 
laws, the market, and the need to make a livelihood). I have already discussed the 
limitations of humanist eco-Marxism in the previous chapter and need not repeat all 
of those criticisms here. It will suffice simply to emphasize that socialist stewardship 
under humanist eco-Marxism would usher in a "reconciliation with nature" of a kind 
that would see to the total domestication of the nonhuman world. As Malinovich has 
observed, "for Marcuse the concept of the 'development of human potentiality for its 
own sake' became ibg ultimate socialist value." 37 In Marcuse's own words, the 
emancipation of the human senses under a humanistic socialism would enable 
... "the human appropriation of nature," i.e., through the transformation of 
nature into an environment (medium) for the human being as "species being"; 
free to de,yglop the specifically human faculties: the creative, aesthetic 
faculties.'° 
Despite his intriguing discussion of the notion of a new, nondomineering 
science, then, Marcuse's major pre-occupation with human self-expression, 
gratification, and the free play of the senses ultimately overshadowed his concern for 
the liberation of nonhuman nature. Any nonanthropocentric gloss that Marcuse may 
have placed on Marx's Paris Manuscripts must be read down in this context. 
37. Myriam Miedzian Malinovich, "On Herbert Marcuse and the Concept of 
Psychological Freedom," Social Research 49 (1982): 158-80 at p. 164. 
38. Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt, p. 64. 
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Nonetheless, I show below that Marcuse's "ecocentric moments" (i.e., his discussion 
of a qualitatively different science and society that approach the nonhuman world as a 
partner rather than as an object of manipulation) serve as a useful foil to Habermas's 
more limited conceptualization of the scientific project. I will return to this issue in 
my discussion of Habermas's social and political theory. 
Habermasian Revisions 
Habermas has carried forward but extensively revised the early Frankfurt 
School's critique of instrumental reason in advanced industrial society. He has argued 
that the advance of instrumental reason has led to the "scientization of politics," that 
process whereby social and environmental problems are increasingly posed as 
technical problems requiring technical solutions by experts rather than as political 
problems that need to be addressed, first and foremost, by an informed citizenry. 39 
According to Habermas, this is part of a larger process that has been taking place over 
the last two hundred years - beginning with Hobbes - involving the gradual demise of 
the classical doctrine of politics (which had entailed the cultivation of practical 
wisdom) and the emergence of specialized social sciences that emulate the 
methodology of the natural sciences.4° The result is that the achievement of a 
rational, democratic consensus by an informed citizenry concerning societal goals is 
being increasingly subverted by a technical discussion by a minority of experts 
concerning means (based on presupposed ends, namely, economic growth, the 
expansion of the bureaucratic-technical apparatus, and the domination of human and 
nonhuman nature). This has led to the depoliticization, manipulation, and 
unacknowledged domination of the majority of the population by a technical and 
bureaucratic elite and the concomitant withering of the "public sphere" (culminating 
in the decline of parliament as a meaningful forum for debate). According to 
39. See Jurgen Habermas, "The Scientization of Politics and Public Opinion," in 
Toward a Rational Society, pp. 62-80. 
40. See, for example, Jurgen Habermas, "The Classical Doctrine of Politics in 
Relation to Social Philosophy," in Theory and Practice, trans. John Viertel (London: 
Heinemann, 1977), pp. 41-81. 
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Habermas, reason has lost the critical force it once had. It is now degraded to mean 
only instrumental reason with the result that "the industrially most advanced societies 
seem to approximate the model of behavioural control steered by external stimuli 
rather than guided by norms.,,41 
Unlike his Frankfurt School predecessors, however, Habermas does not 
argue for the "resurrection of a fallen nature," that is, a healing of the rift between 
humanity and nonhuman nature that has been brought about by the rationalization 
process. Nor does he accept the need for a "new science." Instead, Habennas has 
taken a different path by locating instrumental reason within a larger and more 
comprehensive theory of rationality. He has criticized Adorno, Horkheimer, and 
Marcuse's central thesis - that the domination of "external" nature leads inexorably to 
the domination of "internal" (i.e., human) nature - and has argued that the proper 
mastery of "external" and "internal" nature does not follow the same logic of 
instrumental rationality. Habermas has posited instead a dualistic framework 
whereby the logic of instrumental rationality governs our dealings with the nonhuman 
world and the logic of communicative rationality governs interaction between human 
subjects. According to Habermas, the former necessarily aims at reification (in order 
to be effective) whereas in the case of the latter reification is a possible but a 
pathological outcome (the proper telos is autonomy, individuation, and 
socialization).42 
According to Habermas, Marcuse's new science, which seeks to approach 
nature as a partner rather than as an object of technical control, confuses two different 
structures of action, namely, symbolic interaction/communication (the project of 
.language) and purposive-rational action (the project of labour). 43 Labour and its 
extension - technology - are seen as forming an indispensable part of the survival 
project of the human species as a whole. Science and technology, according to 
41. Jurgen Habermas, "Technology and Science as 'Ideology," in Toward a Rational 
Society, pp. 81-122 at p. 107. 
42. See Joel Whitebook, "The Problem of Nature in Habermas," p. 43. 
43. Ibid. 
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Habermas, are determined by the objective character of human labour, which is to 
wrestle with nonhuman nature (the bounty of which is all too scarce) in order to 
extract a livelihood. This relationship of labour (and technology) to nature is 
presented as having a "quasi-transcendental" status; it is not historically relative but 
rather is a kind of biological drive that is rooted in the species. It is on this ground 
that Habermas maintains that we can only know nature (through our work and 
technology) as an object of instrumental control. 
In Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas identified three basic 
cognitive interests that guide the production of knowledge: the technical, the 
practical, and the emancipatory. The mode of inquiry of the technical interest is the 
empirical-analytic sciences, which are based on the requirements of labour and are 
concerned with producing nomological knowledge (i.e., law-like generalizations 
concerning the behaviour of natural and social phenomena) that enables the prediction 
and control of events. In contrast, the practical cognitive interest, the concern of the 
historical-hermeneutic sciences, is based on interaction and is directed toward 
interpretive understanding, that is, "securing and expanding the possibilities of mutual 
and self understanding in the conduct of life." 44 The emancipatory interest, whose 
mode of inquiry is critical reflection and whose exemplars are the Marxian critique of 
ideology and Freudian psychoanalysis, is based on power and is concerned to secure 
the autonomy of the individual via the recognition of unnecessary constraints (e.g., 
alienated work, distorted communication). The last mentioned interest is the guiding 
inspiration for Critical Theory. 
By separating labour and communication and grounding them in different 
cognitive interests (i.e., technical control and understanding), Habermas was able to 
reject the early Frankfurt School's pessimistic thesis that technical progress 
necessarily entailed moral regression and the distortion of the psychological 
conditions of emancipation. His proposed reforms are intended to circumscribe the 
44. Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 56. 
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application of instrumental reason so that it remains subservient to the sphere of 
interaction between human beings. As Alford has put it, "the goal of Habermas's 
project can be expressed in one sentence: to prevent social relations from becoming 
like our relations with the natural world."45 The upshot is that the domination of 
nonhuman nature would continue as a legitimate project of the human species but that 
it would no longer entail the domination of humans in the way that the earlier 
Frankfurt School theorists had believed. Indeed, Habermas has hailed the progressive 
features of modernity and rejected what he regards as the "utopian excesses" of the 
early Frankfurt School theorists (such as their hope for the "reconciliation of nature"). 
The disenchantment of nature is accepted as the necessary price of modernity. 
According to Habermas, the problems of advanced industrial societies do 
not stem from instrumental rationality per se but rather from the fact that instrumental 
rationality has not been accompanied or matched by a concomitant rationalization of 
social norms in the sphere of communication. By rationalization of social norms, 
Habermas means the establishment of a participatory democracy that provides the 
opportunity for undistorted communication and the achievement of a rational and 
universalistic normative consensus. These norms are to be found in what Habermas 
refers to as "the ideal speech situation." Instrumental reason is presented as a 
specialized language abstracted out of ordinary communication, which, in turn, 
presupposes certain basic norms against which we may locate distortions in any given 
communication. As Habermas explains: 
What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know: 
language. Through its structure, autonomy and responsibility are posited for us. 
Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and 
unconstrained consensus. Taken together, autonomy and responsibility 
constituteshe only Idea that we possess a priori in the sense of the philosophical 
tradition.'4° 
The norms that Habermas argues are implicit in every act of consensual 
communication are (i) that what each speaker says is intelligible or meaningful; (ii) 
that what each speaker says is true in terms of the propositional content of the 
45. Alford, Science and the Revenge of Nature, p. 77. 
46. Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy Shapiro 
(London: Heinemann, 1972), P.  314. 
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statements; (iii) that each speaker communicates truthfully, with genuineness of intent 
(i.e., without guile or dishonesty); and (iv) that what each speaker says is rationally 
justifiable. Habermas's solution to the problem of the "scientization of politics," then, 
is not the reform of the logic of instrumental rationality per se but rather the 
reinvigoration of the public sphere (of "interaction") so that society can direct 
instrumental reason toward rationally justified ends. 
Habermas's ideas and concerns have evolved considerably since he first took 
issue with the ideas of the early Frankfurt School. For example, instead of labour and 
interaction, he is now more likely to speak of "system" and "life-world," 
corresponding to purposive and communicative rationality respectively!" And in 
The Theory of Communicative Action he has moved away from a discussion of 
"quasi-transcendental" cognitive interests, preferring to ground Critical Theory in 
language or, more precisely, caDnillicatipil as distinct from epistemology.48 in this 
recent project Habermas has outlined a theory of communication that is concerned to 
identify and clarify the conditions for human communication. A central purpose of 
this project has been to show that "the emancipatory critique does not rest on arbitrary 
norms that we 'choose'; rather it is grounded in the very structure of intersubjective 
communicative competence s."49 None of these new theoretical endeavours, 
however, have altered his basic division between labour and interaction and between 
instrumental and practical reason. They simply represent an elaboration of the 
conceptual foundations of the practical and emancipatory cognitive interests, that is, a 
continuation of certain themes developed in his earlier work. Moreover, as I show in 
the following discussion, Habermas has stood by the fundamentally anthropocentric 
47. Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, trans. Thomas McCarthy (London: 
Heinemann, 1976); Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol 1: 
Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984); and 31g 
Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2: Life-world and System: A Critique of 
Functionalist Reason (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987). 
48. For an overview of this general shift (in relation to vol. 1 of The Theory of 
Communicative Action) see Richard J. Bernstein's "Introduction" in Bernstein, ed., 
Habermas and Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985). 
49. Bernstein, Habermas and Modernity, p. 17. 
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framework of his communication theory in his major reply to ecologically oriented 
criticisms of his theory of cognitive interests. 50 A critical discussion of these earlier 
ideas and categories (along with Habermas's response to his ecological critics) is 
therefore essential to understanding the anthropocentric framework of Critical Theory 
and assessing its relevance to ecocentric emancipatory political theory. 
The Ecocentric Critique  
There are two interrelated levels at which Habermas's Critical Theory 
conflicts with a comprehensive ecocentric political theory. The first level relates to 
the kinds of dealings humans can have with the nonhuman world. The second relates 
to the kinds of inter-human communications prescribed by Habermas's ideal speech 
situation. In the following critique I address both levels in the course of challenging 
Habermas's separation and privileging of human emancipation vis-a-vis the 
emancipation of nonhuman nature. In particular, I take issue with Habermas's 
unnecessarily limited and rigid categorization of cognitive interests and his associated 
claim that we can only know nature (through science and technology) insofar as we 
can control it. My central claim is that the rigid character of these distinctions 
effectively serves to legitimate the continued exploitation of nonhuman nature, 
endorsing rather than challenging dominant anthropocentric prejudices toward the 
nonhuman world. I begin with a critique of Habermas's claim that instrumental 
reason is always the most "efficacious" form of reason to apply in our dealings with 
the nonhuman world. I then proceed to a critical discussion of the likely character 
and limits of "ecological reason" in a communicatively rationalized society. Finally, I 
outline what an ecocentric science might look like and distinguish it from both 
Marcuse's utopian "new science" and Habermas's unduly narrow and instrumental 
science, which, by definition, can only "know" nature insofar as it can control it. 
Although Habermas has made only occasional reference to the ecology crisis 
in his extensive writings, the general outlines of a Habermasian solution to the crisis 
50. Jurgen Habermas, "A Reply to My Critics," in Iiabermas: Critical Debates, eds. 
John B. Thompson and David Held (London: Macmillan Press, 1982), see pp. 219-83, 
especially pp. 238-50. 
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are clearly discernible. 51 Although he has argued that, in a rational society, 
instrumental reason would be made subservient to the norms established by practical 
reason as a result of free discussion, he also insists that (whatever these norms) a 
rational society would continue to apply, and would only apply, instrumental reason 
to our dealings with the nonhuman world through our work and technology. Indeed, 
our environmental problems must necessarily be solved by the application of 
instrumental reason according to Habermas because that is the only kind of reason 
that Habermas considers to be efficacious in our dealings with nature from the point 
of view of our species' cognitive interest in survival. 
Habermas's insistence that we can only know nature in instrumental terms 
has attracted strong criticism from those who see his categories of thought as unduly 
limited and/or part of the cause of the environmental crisis rather than its solution. 52 
According to Vincent Di Norcia, 
... it is risky to deduce the human interest in nature from a technologically 
advanced culture's break with nature ... [although] one can see how the 
technical intere§t, in control can take on the appearance of a species' interest for 
those within it.°-3 
The fact that hunter gatherer societies and many agricultural civilizations do not 
appear to have proceeded from a "will to control" but have nonetheless managed to 
secure a livelihood points to the historical specificity of the modem drive to control 
and challenges the objective status of Habermas's technical interest. 54 As Henning 
51. In Legitimation Crisis, for example, Habermas includes the ecology crisis as one 
of the many pathologies of modernity (see pp. 41-43). 
52. See, for example, Henning Ottmann, "Cognitive Interests and Self-reflection," in 
Habennas: Critical Debates, eds. John B. Thompson and David Held (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1982), pp. 78-97; McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen 
llabittmgs, p. 67; Alford, Science and the Revenge of Nature, Chapter 9; Vincent Di 
Norcia, "From Critical Theory to Critical Ecology," Telos 22 (1974-75): 86-95; 
Whitebook, "The Problem of Nature in Habermas"; and Bookchin, "Finding the 
Subject: Notes on Whitebook and Habermas Ltd.." 
53. Di Norcia, "From Critical Theory to Critical Ecology," p. 90. 
54. The lack of an apparent "will to control" in many traditional societies cannot be 
accounted for by the fact that such societies simply lacked the technological means to 
exploit nature. Other factors, such as cultural or religious values, must also be 
acknowledged. China's native religion of Taoism, for example, positively encouraged 
the Chinese peasantry (and more particularly, its rulers) to align themselves with, 
rather than seek to dominate, the "Way" of nature. 
.:711 
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Ottmarm has pointed out, it is only in modern times that we have assumed the 
Cartesian mantle of "masters and possessors of nature." Moreover, as Ottmann argues 
in pointing to the irony in this instrumental approach to nature, 
... even if, in the name of the survival of the masses of contemporary humanity, 
we did not want to dispute the legitimacy of the modem type of mastery over 
nature entirely, nevertheless this does not mean that we should accept carte  
blanche the will to control and its modem form. A will to control, whose 
legitimacy is based on our need to survive and which is itself a threat to our 
survival, becomes dialectical. The technical interest in mastery over nature 
encountgps a nature taking revenge upon the boundlessness of the will to 
control?' 
Similarly, from an ecocentric perspective, environmental problems are likely to 
remain intractable in a Habermasian society owing to Habermas's insistence that the 
technical cognitive interest in control must remain untrammelled by an alternative 
sensibility if it is to be successful in the terms in which it has been defined. 
Ecocentric theorists argue that the mere refmement of our ability to manipulate and 
control nonhuman nature will simply give rise to more "technological fix" solutions 
that will perpetuate, or at best contain rather than solve, environmental problems since 
we can never be fully cognizant of all the interrelationships between the human and 
nonhuman worlds.56 The Green revolution, for example, once widely hailed as an 
example of how instrumental reason - applied to agriculture - could alleviate world 
hunger, is now increasingly seen as creating ecological problems that ultimately have 
served to accentuate world hunger. Indeed, the ecology crisis may be seen as partly 
stemming from the extensive and over-confident application of instrumental reason to 
ecosystems and as therefore a reflection of some of its inherent limitations 
(particularly when applied on a grand scale) and of the need to cultivate an alternative 
human interest in nature. 
The ecocentric critique of instrumental reason should not, however, be 
construed as an anti-science or anti-technology posture. Ecocentrism is simply 
against 5cientism (i.e., the conviction that empiric-analytic inquiry is the only valid 
55. Ottmann, "Cognitive Interests and Self-reflection," p. 89. 
56. Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (Frogmore, St. Albans: Paladin, 
1973), especially pp. 436-37. 
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way of knowing nature) and umbnocom aimi 	(i.e., anthropocentric technological 
optimism). Indeed, as we saw in Chapter 2, ecocentric theorists are quick to point to 
the many ways in which science has served to undermine anthropocentric 
assumptions concerning our place in nature (points that seem to have escaped 
Habermas's attention). Moreover, as I argue below in discussing the question of a 
"new science," it is a caricature of science to regard it as concerned only with 
manipulation, prediction, and control - as Critical Theorists are want to do. Science 
also provides us with an understanding of our place in the rest of nature. 
A new ecocentric "interest" in nature, then, need not and ought not be 
circumscribed by the objectified image of nature that is called forth by instrumental 
reason.57 According to Di Norcia, an alternative human interest in nature 
... must clearly ground and reinforce the emancipatory interest. An instrumental 
or utilitarian external attitude toward systems of which we are a part to the core 
of our being is mystifying and ideological. That is why the liberating form of 
interaction of ... [people] with nature should not be seen as instrumental or 
purposive-rational but as cp-operative... social and natural emancipation 
co-determine each other.° 
Yet even if we were to assume that further technical refinements would  
succeed in protecting human welfare (after all, this technical interest in nature is 
rooted in the survival needs of the human species and our technical interventions in 
ecosystems would therefore have to be adjusted in response to threats to those 
survival needs), the consequences would be disastrous from the point view of those 
species that are not presently or potentially useful to humankind. This is because 
Habermas's technical interest in control approaches the nonhuman world in purely 
instrumental terms and leaves no room for the recognition of the intrinsic value of the 
nonhuman world. While Habermas accepts that an empathic orientation toward 
nonhuman nature might infuse art and recreation, he denies the need for a conceptual 
shift from anthropocentrism to ecocentrism in relation to our most significant dealings 
with nature (i.e., work, science, and technology). 
57. For a pertinent discussion, see Andrew McLaughlin, "Is Science Successful? An 
Ecological View," Philosophical Inquiry 6 (1984): 39-46. 
58. Di Norcia, "From Critical Theory to Critical Ecology," pp. 92 and 95. 
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To the above criticisms, Habermas has replied that he is simply making an 
epistemological as distinct from an ethical statement as to the type of reason that is 
capable of giving rise to theoretically fruitful knowledge, that is, knowledge that 
produces "efficacious results" from the perspective of our species' interest in material 
reproduction and survival. 59 We may, he argues, have noninstrumental encounters 
with nature (e.g., aesthetic experiences) but these encounters do not produce 
efficacious results in the way that instrumental reason does through its systematic 
observation, objectification, manipulation, and control of natural phenomena. 
Habermas agrees that "the moralization of our dealings with external nature" would 
indeed lead to the "reenchantment of the world" but disapproves of such a step on the 
ground that it would involve a regression, an undoing of the differentiation of 
knowledge that Habermas has categorized in his theory of cognitive interests as being 
the progressive outcome of the Enlightenment. As Habermas explains: 
We cannot expect to be able to use the experiential potential gathered in 
non-objectivating dealings with external nature for purposes of knowledge and 
to make them theoretically fruitful... Such attempts would have to lead back to 
metaphysics, and thus belligd the levels of learning reached in the modern age 
into a reenchanted world.w 
There are two counter-replies to Habermas's reply. First, Habermas has not 
shown that pure instrumental reason is always the most efficacious form of reason 
from the stand-point of human well-being and survival. The Green revolution 
example referred to above attests to that. Moreover, Alford has argued that 
Habermas's claim that only an instrumental attitude is compatible with theoretically 
fruitful knowledge of nature (which includes "external" nature as well as our bodies 
and our "internal" [i.e., psychological] nature) does not hold up. He points out that 
medical anthropology is replete with examples of so-called primitive techniques of 
healing that are mediated by a "communicative attitude" towards nature and which are 
nonetheless efficacious in terms of achieving the intended results. 61 Similarly, the 
59. Jurgen Habermas, "A Reply to my Critics," p. 241. 
60. Ibid., p. 245. 
61. Alford, Science and the Revenge of Nature, pp. 152-56. 
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farming and fishing techniques of many traditional cultures are often more 
"efficacious" from a long term point of view than the modern agricultural, forestry, 
and fishing techniques that have so often replaced such traditional techniques. A 
more modern example can be found in the practice of biodynamic farming, which is 
mediated by a symbiotic and communicative relationship with the land. Although 
this practice cannot be fully explained by modern science, it is demonstrably 
efficacious from the point of view of results. Of course, many of these traditional 
techniques contain elements of instrumental reason; the point, however, is that they 
are also infused with other forms of reason that mediate and guide the technique and 
which, from the practitioners' point of view, are part and parcel of the technique's 
particular kind of efficacy. 
Second, and in any event, ecocentric theorists ask how "efficacious" do we 
want our dealings with the rest of nature to be (i.e., at what cost and from whose 
perspective)? Habermas's epistemological separation of the communication and 
technical spheres is intended to ensure that the latter is untrammelled by the former, 
that it operates without cultural, aesthetic, ethical, or religious restraint in order that it 
be successful in furthering its supposed quasi-transcendental interest in control. This 
raises the question as to how instrumental reason could possibly be tamed in its 
application in the way that Habermas proposes, that is, made subservient to 
discursively adjudicated norms. It would seem that ecologically benign interventions 
in ecosystems can only be guaranteed if instrumental reason is allowed to be infused  
with and tempered by - rather than simply instructed by - normative considerations 
concerning human well-being and respect for other life-forms. As we shall see in the 
following section, Habermas's ethics of communications can provide no guarantee 
that a rational eco-technics will emerge from a rationalized sphere of communication. 
The Character and Limits of Ecological Reason 
in Critical Theory  
According to Habennas's schema, a norm is considered "right" if it is 
achieved via a consensus reached between truthful, uncoerced, and rational agents. It 
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follows that if a "speech community" agrees, after free and rational discussion, to 
direct technology in such a way as to continue to manipulate and subjugate "external 
nature," then Critical Theory can raise no objection since its concept of emancipation 
has been exhausted (its exclusive concern being with human self-determination). 
John Dryzek, in an otherwise persuasive application of Habermas's 
communicative ethics to the ecology crisis, openly concedes that there is no guarantee 
that individuals in a communicatively rationalized society would necessarily agree to 
give any primacy to ecological values.62 (And it should be noted here that the kind 
of "ecological rationality" defended by Dryzek is essentially limited to the Resource 
Conservation and Human Welfare Ecology perspectives that I outlined in Chapter 2; 
that is, ecological rationality is defined as "the capability of ecosystems consistently 
and effectively to provide the good of human life support." 63) However, Dryzek 
does argue that a communicatively rationalized setting would be more conducive to 
ecological rationality than the piecemeal approach of the ideal-typical Popperian 
"open society" toward which liberal/pluralist democracies aspire. According to this 
liberal/pluralist model, political decisions concerning "who gets what, when, and 
how" are contested primarily by interested parties. Moreover, Dryzek argues that the 
formulation and implementation of public policies proceeds in a piecemeal fashion by 
way of "conjecture and refutation" in the same way that scientific theories are "tested" 
by the scientific community. According to Dryzek, this kind of decision making 
proceeds on the basis of "an instrumental problem solving" concept of rationality, that 
is, one "which involves devising and selecting means to ends, specifying tests to 
indicate the adequacy of means, and then criticizing these means in the light of 
62. Dryzek, Rational Ecology. 
63. Ibid., p. 36. Dryzek acknowledges the limitations of what he calls his 
"anthropocentric life-support" approach but argues that this approach is merely a 
"minimal" one that "can meet competing forms of functional rationality (whether 
economic, social, legal, or political) on their own ground: the ground of specifically 
human interests. Ecological rationality can therefore be made commensurable with 
its opposition" (p. 35). A similar kind of "ecological rationality" (which draws on 
Habermas) has been offered by Timothy Luke and Stephen White in "Critical Theory, 
the Informational Revolution, and an Ecological Path to Modernity," p. 30. See also 
Stephen K. White, The Recent Work of Jurgen Habermas: Reason. Justice and 
Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 137-38. 
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experience."64 Critical theory, on the other hand, is concerned to debate political 
ends via a disinterested discourse that is not corrupted by the pursuit of private 
interests (the question of appropriate means is considered to be secondary to the 
question of ultimate ends). In other words, a communicatively rationalized society 
provides for the proposal and rational acceptance of generalizable interests common 
to all humans In this context Dryzek argues that 
... the human life-support capacity of natural systems is Lk generalizable 
interest par excellence, standing as it does in logical antecedence to cppapeting 
normative principles such as utility maximization or right protection.°J 
Dryzek adds the further qualifier that "the likelihood that ecological concerns will be 
reflected in social norms in communicatively rationalized settings could be enhanced, 
one suspects, if the community in question were small-scale and self-sufficient." 66 
Yet Dryzek also concedes the limitations of Habermas's Critical Theory, 
particularly its anthropocentric, instrumental human orientation toward the nonhuman, 
world: 
Habermas sees technical or instrumental knowledge - natural science - and 
manipulative forms of practice as thoroughly appropriate to human dealings 
with the natural world ... Thus Habermas sees a discontinuity between the 
systems of the human world (potential subjects) and those of the natural world 
(inevitable objects). From the viewpoint of ecological rationality, this „ 
discontinuity is a misplaced decomposition of a non-reducible system.° I 
Despite this limitation in Habermas's communications theory, Dryzek concludes that 
a communicatively rationalized society is better than the modem Popperian open 
society from the point of view of ecological rationality. This is because the former at 
least holds the promise of a community developing a prudential and symbiotic 
orientation toward ecosystems (since it is concerned with defending generalizable 
interests) whereas such an orientation is forever beyond the reach of the latter (since it 
64. Dryzek, "Discursive Designs: Critical Theory and Political Institutions," 
American Journal of Political Science  31(1987): 656-79 at p. 660. 
65. Dryzek, Rational Ecology, p. 204. 
66. Ibid., p. 205. 
67. Ibid., p. 206. Why is this so? Dryzek suggests, inter alia, that it "may be rooted in 
a recognition that to be accorded full subject status an entity must have the potential 
to participate in social discourse. Clearly, the entities of the natural world fail this 
test" (p. 207). 
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is corrupted by private, sectional interests). Dryzek leaves the matter there, hoping 
that participants in a rational society will come to their senses by defining "problems 
broadly, in terms of sustainable life support from the ecosystems in question." 68 
However, Dryzek goes on to say that 
It should be stressed that such treatment of ecological systems would be 
justified here in terms of human interests (by the ecological rationality 
standard), though some philosophers ham argued for a similar treatment 
through reference to nature's "interest."w 
Yet such a communicatively rationalized social democracy is merely a 
necessary as distinct from a sufficient condition for emancipation writ large because it 
only deals with emancipation in the context of one particular sphere of relations in the 
myriad relations that constitute the world. In particular, it ignores the requirements 
that are presupposed in a more fundamental sphere of relations than human 
communication, namely, ecological relations. Under Habermas's framework, 
ecological rationality (as defined by Dryzek) is merely a potential by-product of 
communicative rationality - notwithstanding the fundamental fact that the very 
possibility and continuance of practical reason depends on the prior application of 
ecological reason (i.e., the preservation of human life support). 7° 
Now Habermas would probably reply that the refined application of 
ingnmicntal, reason to the nonhuman world would ensure the preservation of the 
polity (after all, that is its fundamental "interest.") Yet instrumental rationality and 
ecological rationality are la synonymous, as this reply assumes. The former 
presupposes a detached observer who is able to predict, manipulate, and control 
external objects and events. The latter recognizes the interdependence of the human 
and nonhuman worlds and the inherent complexity, noireducibility, variability, 
uncertainty, spontaneity, and collective nature of ecological problems. 71 Even from 
68. Ibid., p. 209. 
69. Ibid., p. 208. 
70. It is on these grounds that many theorists have argued that ecological rationality is 
the most fundamental kind of reason. See, for example, Robert V. Bartlett, 
"Ecological Rationality: Reason and Environmental Policy," Environmental Ethics 8 
(1986): 221-39 at p. 235. 
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within Dryzek's anthropocentric framework, these differences suggest that the quest 
for the complete mastery of nature through the application of instrumental reason is a 
deluded one - that we can no longer afford to approach the nonhuman world as merely 
so much manipulable matter. Indeed, Dryzek argues, unlike Habermas, that an 
ecologically rational human-nature relationship must be a symbiotic one. 72 
From an ecocentric perspective, there is clearly nothing in Habermas's ethics 
of communication that could redeem the instrumental character of the technical 
interest in control vis-a-vis the nonhuman world.73 This is because Habermas's 
delineation of the sphere of communication is such that the discursively adjudicated 
norms are restricted to serving the interests of speaking human participants. In such a 
schema, nonspeaking nonhuman entities - the objects of technical control - cannot be 
morally considerable subjects. As Whitebook summarizes it: "the proper norms for 
regulating the relations between society and nature would somehow follow from the 
communicatively conceived idea of the human good life without reference to nature 
as an end-in-itself."74 Habermas has endorsed these comments as an accurate 
extrapolation of his theory.75 Indeed, Habermas readily concedes the anthropocentric 
framework of his discourse ethic but argues that the "ecological problematic" can be 
dealt with satisfactorily within this framework. As we have seen, this may be true 
from an anthropocentric perspective. But it is not an adequate answer from an 
ecocentric perspective since the ultimate moral referents in any consideration of 
ecological problems will only ever be the human participants in the dialogue. Would 
this leave any basis for the preservation of species and ecosystems that serve no 
71. On the nature of ecological problems, see Dryzek, Rational Ecology, pp. 26-33. 
72. Ibid., p. 46. 
73. It is conceivable that individuals in a communicatively rationalized society might 
collectively decide to extend their concept of ecological rationality beyond Dryzek's 
anthropocentric life-support approach by including other human interests in the 
nonhuman world (e.g., aesthetic, scientific, and recreational). The point, however, is 
that the framework would remain anthropocentric. 
74. Whitebook, "The Problem of Nature in Habermas," p. 61. 
75. Habermas, "A Reply to My Critics," p. 247. 
205 
purpose for humans? How can their well-being be safeguarded in the absence of any 
recognition of their moral standing? 
Habermas can offer no guarantee that these "non-speaking interests" will be 
considered for their own sake. While he acknowledges that many of us share an 
intuition of "sympathetic solidarity" with the nonhuman world, he is unable to work 
the interests of nonhumans into his theory in any meaningful way because it is 
iheoretically grounded in human speech acts. The egalitarian reciprocity that he 
regards as implicit in human communication "cannot be carried over into the relation 
between humans and nature in any strict sense" because it presupposes that the 
referents are free and autonomous human subjects. 76 Habermas concedes that the 
range of communicative actions is broader than that of explicit human speech acts, 
but argues that his approach enables us to grasp the distinctive features of human 
communication. But why ground communicative ethics in this limited way by 
focussing exclusively on the "differential imperative"? As Anthony Giddens has 
argued, "the division we make with between nature and culture is one that dissolves 
the intimacy with nature that is one of the richest forms of human experience." 77 
Moreover, as Whitebook observes: 
The dignity and rights of the moral and legal subject have been secured by 
severing the subject from the realm of natural existence. Because they are 
characterized by self-consciousness or language, subjects are considered 
qualitatively different from the rest of natural existence. This is why they 
command respect and ought to be treated as ends-in-themselves. It is often 
feared that anything that threatens to disturb this distinction - which the concept 
of naturgels an end-in-itself certainly does - also threatens the dignity of the 
subject. 1 ° 
As we saw in Chapter 2, there are many other plausible ways of grounding ethics that 
recognize the dignity of both human and nonhuman beings. We need to revise and 
extend Habermas's communication ethic to a fully blown ecocentric ethic that is 
informed by not only the internal relatedness and reciprocity embedded in human 
speech, but also the internal relatedness and reciprocity embedded in ecological 
76. Ibid., p. 248. 
77. Giddens, "Reason Without Revolution?" p. 119. 
78. Joel Whitebook, "The Problem of Nature in Habermas," p. 53. 
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relations in general, which, in a very literal sense, sustain us all. The fact that the 
nonhuman world cannot participate in human speech should be no barrier to their 
special interests always being considered and respected by those who can participate 
in the dialogue. Indeed, as Animal Liberation theorists are quick to point out, not 
everyone within the human community is able to participate in the rational speech 
community (e.g., the very young, the mentally ill, and the senile) although their 
interests are generally considered by those who do. It is not necessary to be a 
rational, speaking moral Agent in order to be a morally considerable subject, as 
Habermas presumes.79 
Habermas goes on to point to the difficulties involved in delineating where 
the circle of supposed sympathetic solidarity with nature might end on the "lower" 
rungs of life (animals, plants?). In any event, he sees such solidarity as likely to 
conflict with what he describes as "the firmer imperatives of the self-preservation of 
the human race." 8° These are, of course, central questions in any attempt to widen 
the notion of the ethical community beyond the human realm, yet the challenging 
novelty of these questions is not a satisfactory justification for falling back on an 
anthropocentric ethics. Habennas seems unaware of the growing field of 
environmental philosophy that now offers a range of nonanthropocentric ethical 
positions, from Singer's utilitarian Animal Liberation ethics to ecocentric approaches 
such as autopoietic intrinsic value theory and transpersonal ecology. As we saw in 
Chapter 2, these approaches provide rationally justifiable criteria in cases of conflict 
or, alternatively, a general disposition with which to approach such conflict (in the 
case of transpersonal ecology). 
Finally, Habermas wonders how an ecocentric ethic might be grounded 
other than through reliance on what he considers must be outmoded religious or 
79. On the moral considerability of animals, see, for example, Peter Singer, Animal, 
Liberation (New York: Avon Books, 1975); on the moral considerability of plants and 
"natural objects," see, for example, Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have  
atanchng.?_;_l_miudIggaMghts_thr_N_LwrstS2bIrsa (Los Altos, California: 
Kaufmann, 1974). 
80. Habermas, "A Reply to My Critics," p. 248. 
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metaphysical world-views. If it is to have validity in Habermas's eyes, the extended 
ethic must "be grounded at the level of learning attained in the modern understanding 
of the world." 81 These problems lead Habermas to conclude that such an extended 
ethic is incapable of "being worked up cognitively, that is, [as] problems that could be 
stylized to questions of justice from the standpoint of normative validity.“82 Again, 
Habermas demonstrates his lack of familiarity with new developments in 
environmental philosophy, particularly the discussion concerning the 
"cross-disciplinary parallels" between an ecocentric world-view and the picture of 
reality offered by new developments in modern physics and biology. 83 As Martha 
Herbert shows, Habermas uses a hyper-reductionist interpretation of biological 
evolution as a foil for his more sophisticated model of social and cognitive evolution. 
In so doing, he "uncritically accepts neo-positivism's self-understanding and is 
content to hand over the material realm in toto to the positivists." 84 As we saw in 
Chapter 2, the ecocentric world-view (which is informed by an ecological model of 
internal relations) is more consistent with the findings of modern science and 
therefore more "grounded at the level of learning attained in the modern 
understanding of the world" than the anthropocentric world-view upon which most 
contemporary social and political theory (Habermas's included) rests. 
Habermas's reluctance to seriously entertain a nonanthropocentric ethic may 
be traced to his basic commitment to the Enlightenment view of progress and 
autonomy. The disenchantment of the world ushered in by the Enlightenment 
represents, in Habermas's eyes, a positive cognitive development of the species, a 
81. Ibid. 
82. Ibid., pp. 248-49. 
83. See Warwick Fox, "Deep Ecology: A New Philosophy of Our Time?" The  
Ecologist 14 (1984): 194-200 at p. 196 and following. See also Callicott, "Intrinsic 
Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 7 (1985): 
257-75; Charles Birch and John B. Cobb, Jr., The Liberation of Life: From the Cell to 
the Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Fritjof Capra, 
The Turning Point: Science. Society and the Rising Culture (London: Fontana, 1983). 
84. Martha Herbert, "Evolutionary Theory in Ferment," Telos 57 (1983): 107-28 at 
p. 123. 
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kind of intellectual maturing. He is therefore sceptical of any approach that seeks to 
make a radical break with the differentiated structures of modern consciousness (e.g., 
science, morality, art) by conceptualizing a more unified human/nonhuman 
relationship. Such approaches are seen as regressive, as trying to "reach behind" the 
level of learning attained in the modern age. For Habermas, the re-establishment of 
the "unity of reason" would sacrifice "successful" theory formation, which is another 
way of saying that it would involve a diminution of our technological capabilities. 
According to Habermas, history has been a valuable and progressive learning process 
for humans and we discard at our peril the different branches of knowledge that we 
have acquired. 
Ecocentric theorists do not, however, seek the kind of "unity of reason" 
rejected by Habermas. Nor do they seek to discard the different branches of 
knowledge that we have acquired and "reach behind" the level of learning attained in 
the modern age. Rather, they seek to further advance our modern knowledge and 
understanding by seeking ways in which it might become more integrated through 
greater interdisciplinary study. Habermas has himself made an important contribution 
to interdisciplinary study of this kind. My main contention here, however, is that his 
sophisticated model of social and cognitive evolution is undermined by his 
hyper-reductionist interpretation of physical and biological evolution (as Martha 
Herbert has shown). And, as I have pointed out above, it is precisely these latter 
branches of inquiry that have provided the most pointed challenge to our 
anthropocentric assumptions.85 
85. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the complex relationship between 
ecocenttism, modernism, postmodernism, and Habermas's social and political theory. 
Suffice to say that although ecocentric theorists share the postmodernist's critique of 
the anthropocentric and dualistic categories of the Enlightenment and its confidence 
in the power of human reason to master nature, they nonetheless share Habermas's 
concern to rescue the emancipatory impulse of the Enlightenment. However, 
ecocentric theorists differ from Habermas not only in the ways in which they 
reformulate Enlightenment ideals such as "autonomy" and "self-realization" but also 
in their elaboration of the conditions that will enable the proper realization of these 
ideals. Far from being "incredulous towards metanarratives," to adapt Lyotard's pithy 
formulation of postmodernism, and sounding the end of philosophy, then, ecocentric 
theorists are attempting to revitalize philosophy by offering a more integrated, 
nonanthropocentric theoretical approach as an alternative to Habermas' more 
differentiated, anthropocentric theoretical approach (Lyotard's formulation of 
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Habermas's project, then, has been to iron out distortions in the 
Enlightenment project in order to =Ara that project, namely, the pursuit of rational 
autonomy via the overcoming of all natural and social constraints on human thought 
and action. Ecocentric emancipatory theorists, on the other hand, are concerned to 
revise this project in a fundamental way. The Enlightenment notion of rational 
autonomy - particularly the quest to overcome all natural constraints - is seen as 
fundamentally illusory since it denies the fact of humanity's embeddedness in nature. 
Accordingly, ecocentric theorists are concerned, among other things, to emphasize 
our continuity with and relatedness to the nonhuman world rather than our separation 
and differentiation from it, and to cultivate an orientation that recognizes that "the 
development and fulfilment of the part can only proceed from its complex 
interrelationship and unfolding within the larger whole." 86 Such an orientation 
should imbue all of human activity - not only art, play, and contemplation but also 
work, science, and technology. As Vincent Di Norcia argues, the split in Critical 
Theory can only be resolved by the development of "a more ecological, fraternal but 
still rational conception of the science and technics of nature." 87 
A New Science?  
The outstanding question, however, is whether such a new science is 
possible. As we have seen, Habermas's response to this question is to argue (contra 
Marcuse) that science and technology are merely neutral tools that can be made to 
serve good and bad ends and that all that is needed is a rationalization of the sphere of 
postmodernism is from Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report 
on Knowledge, trans. by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi [Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1984], p. xxiv). In this respect, many postmodernists 
would be critical of ecocentric theorists for attempting to construct a metanarrative in 
the form of a new ecological world-view. • For their part, however, most ecocentric 
theorists would be sympathetic with Habermas's critique of postmodernism as 
"neo-conservative" and nihilistic on the grounds that it abandons a theoretical stand-
point, abandons constructive normative debate, and abandons the idea of "the better 
argument." (See Richard Rorty, "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity," in 
Habermas and Modernity, pp. 161-75.) 
86. John Clark, The Anarchist Moment: Reflections on Culture. Nature and Power 
(Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1984), p. 28. 
87. Di Norcia, "From Critical Theory to Critical Ecology," pp. 90 and 89. 
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communication so that science and technology can be made to serve rationally 
justified ends. The problem with this argument is that it is only partially correct. This 
is because the dialectic between science and society is more complex and interwoven 
than even Habermas has allowed (notwithstanding his pioneering critique of 
scientism). Indeed, I argue that the debate between Habermas and Marcuse has been 
overdrawn in that Imill are correct in the terms in which they address the problem, but 
that these terms are unnecessarily limited. For example, Habermas is right to point to 
the existence of human interests lying behind different forms of theoretical inquiry. 
Where he is wrong is in his insistence that only one very limited and anthropocentric 
kind of interest lies behind our scientific and technological endeavours. It is possible 
to find different kinds of interests determining different kinds of inquiry within the 
same branch of science. This is particularly evident within the science of ecology. In 
his examination of the history of ecological ideas, for example, Donald Worster has 
identified two main streams of ecological thought - the Imperialist and the Arcadian - 
that are distinguishable by their competing human interests in, or orientations toward, 
the nonhuman world. 88 The former is motivated by an interest in increasing 
humanity's power to predict, manipulate, and control the natural order whereas the 
latter proceeds from a more reverential and symbiotic perspective, drawing meaning 
and understanding from the study of the natural order. (Indeed, Worster has likened 
the distinction between Imperialist and Arcadian ecology to Adorn° and Horkheimer's 
distinction between instrumental and critical reason. 89) Unlike Habermas, who 
would insist that ecologists can only "know" their subjects (e.g., ecosystems, 
populations) insofar as they can predict, manipulate, and control them, Worster is 
arguing that many ecologists approach their subject of study in the manner of a 
pannerinsamilinicatisa Science, Worster reminds us, is as divided as the rest of 
88. Donald Worster, Nature's Economy: A Histov of Ecological Ideas (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
89. In the preface to the second edition of Nature's Economy Worster writes: "One of 
my chief regrets, in looking back over my own book, is that I failed to make explicit 
and sustained use of their [i.e., Horkheimer and Adonio's] insights, though my 
argument throughout is pervaded by a similar analysis" (pp. x-xi). 
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the Western civilization in terms of its orientation toward the nonhuman world. This 
poses a challenge to Habermas's rigid delineation of the technical and communication 
spheres, according to which "Imperialist" ecological science would be considered the 
only "true" or "efficacious" ecological science. 
Alford has argued that Habermas's abstract treatment of the idea of science 
(shared also by Marcuse) is the legacy of Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, which saw science as "that fragment of reason concerned with human 
self-assertion."90 Habermas continues this tradition by positing a direct and 
simplistic connection between science and technology, assuming that the role of pure 
science or "basic research" is always ultimately concerned to produce technically 
exploitable knowledge. Yet this is a very limited conception of science that ignores 
the role played by science in providing arming - especially in shaping our 
understanding of our place in the cosmos. As Fox argues, modern science has both an 
instrumental aspect =I a cosmological aspect The latter provides us with "an 
account of creation that is the equal of any mythological, religious, or speculative 
philosophical account in terms of scale, grandeur, and richness of detail." 91 
Moreover, we saw in Chapter 2 that modern science has served to undermine 
anthropocentric assumptions by showing that humans are part of a seamless web of 
interrelationships, that there are no radical divides between the human and the 
nonhuman. We also saw how some of the most vigorous challenges to the notion of a 
detached scientific observer standing above and apart from the object of study have 
come from within science itself (e.g., in quantum mechanics and ecology). 
At least Marcuse, for all his vagueness and contradictory statements 
concerning the issue of a new science (and despite his ultimate anthropocentrism), 
had a greater appreciation than Habermas of the historical relativity of human 
90. Alford, Science and the Revenge of Nature, pp. 9-10. But Horkheimer and 
Adorno have also argued that "Science is not conscious of itself; it is only a tool. 
Enlightenment, however, is the philosophy which equates the truth with scientific 
systematization." (Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 85) 
91. Warwick Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations  
for Environmentalism (Boston: Shambhala, 1990), forthcoming, p. 403 (page citations 
refer to the prepublication ms). 
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knowledge and the mutual interplay between different kinds of knowledge and 
different kinds of human interests. For example, just as science can shape the kinds 
of technologies we develop, it is also shaped by those very technologies (e.g., 
computers have enabled the development of chaos theory although they were not built 
for that purpose). 92 Similarly, just as science can be influenced by broad cultural 
paradigms, it can also help to change those very paradigms. As Di Norcia argues, "it 
is a half-truth to say that technologies are just utilitarian projections of bodily 
functions; they are also symbolic forms of self expression and objects of 
self-inquiry."93 A guided missile and a classical record embody vastly different 
forms of human self-expression. 
Science, then, has two aspects. It helps us to survive and prosper in the 
world by providing us with technically exploitable knowledge (the technical aspect) 
and it provides us with meaning concerning our place in the scheme of things (the 
cosmological aspect). These two aspects of science are closely interrelated in that 
technical advances can enhance understanding and meaning just as new areas of 
cosmological inquiry can give rise to unintended technological spin-offs. Both kinds 
of scientific endeavour employ empirical-analytic modes of inquiry, but it is a 
mistake to assume, as Habermas does, that such inquiry is insulated from broad 
cultural paradigms. Rather, empirical-analytic inquiry is a modem (and very 
powerful) human construct, the result of intersubjective agreement by successive 
communities of scientific scholars working within, as Marcuse notes, the horizons of 
an industrializing world. 
It is also a mistake to assume, as Habermas does, that those who employ 
empirical-analytic modes of inquiry must necessarily approach the subject matter of 
their inquiry as inert, manipulable matter. As Andrew McLaughlin notes, it is one 
thing to find "reward in acting on the world instrumentally" but it is another thing to 
92. For a general discussion of how technology determines science see Patsy Hanen, 
"What is Philosophy of Technology? An Introduction," The Trumpeter 5 (1988): 
142-44. 
93. Di Norcia, "From Critical Theory to Critical Ecology," p. 90. 
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"mis-take the world revealed under that interest as It world. This is the epistemic 
error."94 Now Habermas might acknowledge that not all scientists make this error in 
practice but point out that his technical cognitive interest is simply an analytical  
distinction. Yet Habermas invests this distinction with a "quasi-transcendental" 
status. In so doing, he reduces science to its technical aspect. This reduction leaves 
him unable to entertain the idea that the scientific community may proceed on the 
basis of an interest in nature that is not one of instrumental control and an image of 
nature that is not one of inert, manipulable matter. 
It is surely not incongruous to suggest that a different and better science 
might result from a community of scientists who employ empirical-analytic modes of 
inquiry but who proceed on the basis of an ecocentric "interest" in nature. Such an 
interest would not only influence the types of problems and questions examined by 
such scientists but also the way they go about their science, such as the types of 
theories they choose (given that theories are generally "underdetermined by the 
facts"), the types of "facts" they choose (given that sensory experience is 
underdetermined by sensory input), and the types of experiments and techniques they 
develop to test such theories.95 As Evelyn Fox Keller has argued, scientists who 
have a "feeling for the organism," that is, approach their subject in a spirit of 
attentiveness, humility, and respect for the uniqueness of what is studied can still 
produce reliable and sharable scientific knowledge about the natural order: 96 For 
ecocentric scientists, then, the test of "good" science (in its technical aspect) would 
not simply be that it "works" in the sense of enabling humans to exploit the world 
around them more efficiently but rather that it "works" in the sense of enabling 
humans to live in ways that preserve the health, safety, and well-being of both the 
94. Andrew McLaughlin, "Images and Ethics of Nature," Environmental Ethics  7 
(1985): 293-319 at p. 302. 
95. See Mary Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science 
(Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980), P.  187, and McLaughlin, "Images and Ethics of 
Nature," p. 295. 
96. Evelyn Fox Keller, A Feeling for the Organism: The Life and Work of Barbara 
McClintock (New York: Freeman, 1983), and Reflections on Gender and Science  
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). 
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human and nonhuman community. Far from being a mere "neutral" handmaiden of 
the polity, science itself might then become a further form of resistance to ecological 
degradation and the "colonization of the life-world." 
Alford has described the different categories of knowledge identified by 
Habermas as the cognitive categories of a disenchanted consciousness that act as an 
impediment to the growth of radically new categories of knowledge. Indeed, they 
serve to freeze the growth of knowledge and downplay "the creative freedom with 
which man constructs his philosophy and science. [They] seek in some measure to fix 
in advance the categories of what man makes: the intellectual artifacts of culture." 97 
I have sought to show that Habermas's rigid delineation of the technical and 
communicative spheres leads to the excessive insulation of the former vis-a-vis the 
latter, overlooking crucial aspects of the dialectical relationship between science, 
technology, and society. Although Habermas's professed goal is to subordinate 
instrumental reason to practical reason, his conflation of the scientific mode of 
inquiry with the project of science as a whole has led him ultimately to reinforce 
rather than challenge the domination of the nonhuman world. 
Conclusion  
My principal objection to Habermas's social and political theory has been 
that it is thoroughly human-centred in insisting "that the emancipation of human 
relations need not require or depend upon the emancipation of nature." 98 While 
Habermas has moved beyond the pessimism and utopianism of the first generation of 
Critical Theorists by providing the theoretical foundations for his practical and 
emancipatory cognitive interests, he has, as Whitebook points out, also "markedly 
altered the spirit of their project." 99 Yet it is precisely the "spirit" of the early 
Frankfurt School theorists (i.e., their critique of the dominant "imperialist" orientation 
toward the world, rather than their critique of a simplistically conceived idea of 
97. Alford, Science and the Revenge of Nature, p. 8. 
98. Ibid., p. 140. 
99. Whitebook, "The Problem of Nature in Habennas," p. 41. 
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science) and their desire for the liberation of nature, that is most relevant to the 
ecocentric perspective. Despite Habermas's many theoretical innovations and 
departures from Marxism, then, ultimately he has strayed very little from the structure 
of the basic Marxist response to the environmental crisis presented in Chapter 4 
(whether orthodox or humanist), which is to revolutionize social relations (rather than 
revolutionize our instrumental relationship to the nonhuman world) so that the forces 
of production can then be rationally controlled by society as a whole. 
Moreover, even within the human realm, Habermas is mainly preoccupied 
with the formal as distinct from the substantive ground rules for human emancipation. 
As Joel Whitebook has put it, "Habermas sees the discursive adjudication of validity 
claims for public issues exhausting the concept of emancipation." 10° To be sure, 
modern Critical Theory clearly holds out the promise of cultural and ecological 
renewal by providing the space for the expansion of the moral and aesthetic spheres 
vis-a-vis the technical sphere. (I say "promise" since Habermas himself, unlike 
Dryzek, and Luke and White, pays very little attention to the types of concrete 
institutions that might facilitate an ideal speech situation and the harmonious 
balancing of system-steering mechanisms and the life-world. 101)  Ecocentric 
theorists would agree that the discursive processes central to communicative 
rationalization are indeed conducive to protecting generalizable human interests 
(especially in smaller scale communities) and generating "cooperative" solutions to 
the environmental crisis that avoid the familiar "tragedy of the commons" scenario. 
Such processes are also more likely to produce just solutions to the many social 
pathologies of modernity, ranging from crime and urban decay to poverty and 
unemployment. As Luke and White argue, Habermas's communicative ethics will 
enable the "deconstruction of managed meanings" by the corporate capitalist and 
100.Whitebook, "Saving the Subject," p. 98. Whitebook also observes that "whereas 
the counter-Enlightenment evaluates history in terms of meaning and sees only 
regression, Habermas judges it in terms of formal validity and sees only progress." 
101. See David Held, "Crisis Tendencies, Legitimation and the State," in Habermas:  
Critical Debates, eds. John B. Thompson and David Held, pp. 181-95 at p. 187. 
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bureaucratic state apparatus that "will help open the way for rethinking what 
autonomy in everyday life can mean for average producers and citizens in an 
informational age." 102 
But this communicatively rationalized social democracy is merely a 
necessary as distinct from a sufficient condition for emancipation writ large. 
Although one of Habermas's professed goals is to redeem the promise of the classical 
concept of politics by reviving the inquiry into the "good life" and restoring the art of 
phronesis, or practical reason, his approach has been essentially procedural rather than 
substantive. That is, he has failed to revive the classical tradition's pedagogical 
concern for the cultivation of a range of specific virtues in its citizenry (i.e., in 
addition to the civic virtue of democratic participation). 103 
Ecocentric emancipatory theorists, on the other hand, have more in common 
with the classical tradition insofar as they are concerned to cultivate what might be 
called general "ecocentric virtues" (such as humility, compassion, knowledge of the 
local bioregion, and respect for the integrity and diversity of other life-forms) in 
addition to the civic virtue of participation. As we have seen in Chapter 1, the 
ecological crisis has been identified not simply as a crisis of participation or survival 
but also as a crisis of culture and character. To these theorists, a radical reconception 
of our place in the rest of nature is not only essential for solving our planetary 
problems, it would also offer a surer path for human self-development. It is in this 
context that primary ecopolitical questions concerning legitimate human needs and 
appropriate technologies and lifestyles are to be debated. Without the injection of 
substantive and constructive debate at the level of world-views, Habermas's 
democratic political theory holds no guarantee that ecological reforms would ensue 
for the benefit of humankind (let alone the nonhuman world). In the following 
chapter, we shall see whether the third, largely post-Marxist family of ecologically 
102.Luke and White, "Critical Theory, the Informational Revolution, and an 
Ecological Path to Modernity," 49. 
103.Jurgen Habermas, "The Classical Doctrine of Politics in relation to Social 
Philosophy." Cf. John Rodman's discussion of the new ecological virtues of limits, 
community, and diversity in "Paradigm Change in Political Science," &Ed= 
Behavioral Scientist 24 (1980): 49-78 at pp. 67-74. 
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informed socialism has succeeded in moving beyond the limited ecological horizons 
of the Marxist and neo-Marxist contributions to emancipatory ecopolitical thought. 
Chapter 6 
Democratic Ecosocialism: The Post-Marxist Synthesis 
Jntroduction 
The late Raymond Williams once described the ecology movement as "the 
strongest organized hesitation before socialism." Democratic ecosocialism - a 
position Williams himself defended increasingly in his later writings - represents a 
concerted attempt to revise and reformulate the democratic socialist case in the light 
of this hesitation or challenge presented by the ecology movement. Democratic 
ecosocialists have also used this opportunity for theoretical stock-taking to respond to 
other significant challenges before socialism - challenges that form part of, but are not 
unique to, the ecological critique - in an effort to address the concerns of new social 
movements and recapture the "high ground" of emancipatory ecopolitical discourse. 
As Frieder Otto Wolf has put it, "a socialism without qualification will never again be 
able to become a hegemonic force within emancipatory mass movements." 2 The 
three most significant of these other challenges have been (i) the historical legacies of 
bureaucratization, centralization, and authoritarianism; (ii) the problematic role of the 
working class as the agents of revolutionary change; and (iii) disillusionment with the 
traditional socialist "productivist" response to the indignities of poverty, which has 
usually been to augment the economic power of the state, seek a better mastery of 
nature through modem scientific techniques, and step up production. As Williams 
points out in relation to this last problem, history has shown that the traditional 
socialist response of increasing production has not alleviated poverty for the vast 
mass of humankind. Williams also argues that democratic socialists must now resist 
the pull of centralization and re-assert the principle of self-management and 
1. Raymond Williams, "Hesitations Before Socialism," New Socialist, September 
1986, pp. 34-36 at pp. 35-36. 
2. Frieder Otto Wolf, "Eco-Socialist Transition on the Threshold of the Twenty-First 
Century," New Left Review 158 (1986): 32-42 at p. 35. 
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production for human need. According to Williams, "this is now our crisis: that we 
have to find ways of self-managing not just a single enterprise or community but a 
society." 3 
The democratic ecosocialist theory presented in this chapter has emerged 
from a critical dialogue by democratic socialists with Marxist orthodoxy and Western 
social democratic thought, on the one hand, and the radical environmental movement, 
on the other. The result is that democratic ecosocialist theory is largely a 
post-Marxist theory that stands somewhat "betwixt and between" humanist 
eco-Marxism and the non-Marxist emancipatory ecopolitical perspectives of 
ecoanarchism and ecofeminism. 4 I use the term "post-Marxist" here in the sense 
defined by Carl Boggs as 
... a critical, dialectical framework that contains a philosophy of praxis that is no 
longer wedded to the canons of scientific materialism or to the primacy of 
objective historical forces; a social theory that confronts the reality of multiple 
and overlapping forms of domination (class, bureaucratic, patriarchal, racial) 
without reducing that reality to one of its aspects: and a democratic political 
theory compatible with the ideal of nonbureaucratic, self-managed society.' 
As I explained in the introduction to Part II, democratic ecosocialism and humanist 
eco-Marxism (including Critical Theory) remain close theoretical cousins having 
more in common with each other than with orthodox Marxism. Indeed, many of the 
democratic ecosocialist ideas presented in this chapter may be seen as representing 
the cumulative wisdom of ecosocialist thought to date. 
The first part of this chapter will provide a discussion of the influence of 
democratic ecosocialism on Green politics, an outline of the democratic ecosocialist 
analysis of the ecological crisis, and a presentation of the central features of the 
ecosocialist programme of social and political change. These sections are mainly 
3. Williams, "Hesitations Before Socialism," p. 34. 
4. This is so notwithstanding the important contribution of Andre Gorz, who I regard 
as more neo- than post-Marxist. 
5. Carl Boggs, Social Movements and Political Power: Emerging Forms of 
Radicalism in the West (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), pp. 16-17. 
Unlike some post-Marxist and postmodern theorists, who deconstruct managed 
meanings to the point of radical pluralism, democratic ecosocialists retain a normative 
commitment to the egalitarian project of the Enlightenment. See Boris Frankel, 
"Beyond Abstract Environmentalism," Island Magazine, Autumn 1989, pp. 22-25. 
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expository and are concerned to draw together the key ideas in the democratic 
ecosocialist literature while noting difference nuances and areas of controversy within . 
democratic ecosocialism. I then move on to a more critical discussion of the 
ecological perspective of democratic ecosocialism and point out the various ways in 
which it falls short of the ecocentric perspective defended in this inquiry. This is 
followed by a philosophical discussion of some of the historical sources that have 
helped to shape the anthropocentric foundations of socialism. After a brief 
recapitulation on the ecocentric critique of ecosocialism in general and a discussion of 
the possibility of theoretical "bridge building" between ecocentrism and the varieties 
of ecosocialism identified in this inquiry, I conclude that democratic ecosocialism is 
the only family of ecosocialism that has the potential to evolve in an ecocenrric 
direction. 
The Influence of Democratic Ecosocialism 
The growing influence of ecosocialist ideas within the Green movement, 
most notably in Europe, has rendered the popular Green slogan "neither left nor right" 
increasingly problematic. 6 That is, while this slogan originally served to publicize 
the Green movement's efforts to find a distinct, third alternative to the growth 
consensus of capitalism and "actually existing socialism" it has since served to 
generate a lively and sometimes acrimonious debate within the Green movement 
concerning the proper political characterization of Green politics. Democratic 
ecosocialists argue that the left (rather than the right) is the natural ally of the Greens 
and that only a new ecosocialism can provide a feasible, third alternative to capitalism 
and "actually existing socialism." 7 In particular, democratic ecosocialists have 
mounted a challenge to the presumed left-right ideological neutrality of Green politics 
6. Commenting on the nature of ecopolitical debate in the United States, Daniel Faber 
and James O'Connor have observed that while Barry Commoner "has raised the issue 
of socialism, only in a few isolated circles has socialism been a central topic either 
philosophically or strategically." See Daniel Faber and James O'Connor, "The 
Struggle for Nature: Environmental Crisis and the Crisis of Environmentalism in the 
United States," Capitalism. Nature. Socialism 2 (1989): 12-39 at p. 33. 
7. Martin Ryle, Ecology and Socialism (London: Century Hutchinson, 1988), p. 91. 
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by pointing out the various egalitarian and redistributional (and hence "leftist") 
measures that are needed to ensure an equitable transition toward a conserver 
society.8 Indeed, many such measures - such as the redistribution of resources from 
developed to developing countries, the sharing of work, and the implementation of a 
guaranteed minimum income scheme - are already included in most Green party 
platforms.9 With respect to these kinds of issues, Green political aspirations can 
indeed be fairly described as "more left than right." 
There are many points of convergence between the democratic socialist 
critique of capitalist modernity and the radical ecology movement's critique of 
industrialism that point toward the possibility of a synthesis of socialism and 
ecology. 10  Indeed, it is this convergence that has prompted the development of 
democratic ecosocialist theory. Democratic ecosocialists generally regard the 
ecological critique as strengthening the socialist critique of private and state 
capitalism, thereby giving socialism new vigour and relevance vis-a-vis the concerns 
of the Green movement. These arguments have had an important influence on Green 
Parties in Europe, especially Die Grunen (whose political platform has served as a 
model for many newly formed Green parties elsewhere). In particular, John Ely has 
argued that it has been ecosocialism (particularly that of Rainer Trampert and Thomas 
Ebermann) rather than the "ecocommunalism" of Rudolf Bahro that has had the 
greater influence in shaping the party programme of the West German Greens. 11 
According to Ely, 
8. The slogan "neither left not right" was coined by the West German C.D.U. 
dissident Herbert Gruhl, who failed to gain any support for his anti-socialist platform 
in the critical debates that led up to Die Grunen's formation. Gruhl's subsequent 
attempt to found an alternative Ecological Democratic Party has been described as "a 
complete failure." See Werner Hulsberg, The German Greens: A Social and Political 
Profile, trans. Gus Fagan (London: Verso, 1988), p. 96. 
9. See, for example, Die Grunen, Programme of the German Green Party (London: 
Heretic Books, 1983). 
10.For a general discussion, see Stephen Bell, "Socialism and Ecology: Will Ever the 
Twain Meet?" Social Alternatives 6(1987): 5-12. 
11.Formerly older members of the West German (mostly Maoist) radical left, Rainer 
Trampert and Thomas Ebermann are now both key figures in the West German Green 
party. According to Ely, their book The Future of the Greens represents a new 
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... though Bahro's intellectual and practical contributions have international 
importance and his interventions were crucial in the formation of the Greens, 
his path from "red" to "green" is not particularly indicative of general trends, 
precisely because of his unique experience. Tramp t and Ebermaim's Future of 
/he Greens, however, expresses a general tendency." 
Similarly, Werner Hulsberg has concluded in his comprehensive profile of the West 
German Greens that the real contribution of the Greens is that they have grasped the 
ecology crisis as "the decisive question, the acid test of left-wing politics." 13 
However, he also points out that Die Grunen  
... is a party to the left of the SPD but without any direct relationship with the 
labour movement or scientific socialism. Under those circumstances, the 
Greens are the orgnizers of opposition not only to bourgeois society but also to 
social democracy. 14 
Notwithstanding democratic ecosocialism's challenge to both orthodox 
Marxism and Western social democracy, however, I intend to show that democratic 
ecosocialism has not made any serious inroads into the deeply embedded, 
anthropocentric assumptions of socialist thought 15 Since I have earlier referred to 
socialism as "a mansion with many rooms," the case I propose to argue may be 
foreshadowed by way of an analogy with a building, with socialism representing the 
original building and ecosocialism representing renovations and extensions to that 
building. I will be arguing that the building upon which these extensions have been 
fashioned rests on foundations that are too narrow (i.e., anthropocentric). However, 
theoretical turn toward a no compromise, fundamentalist ecosocialism that is at odds 
with those pragmatic socialist factions (particularly that represented by Joschka 
Fischer) within the Greens who are prepared to enter into alliances with the S.P.D.. 
Ely also argues that their contribution "represents the first attempt to come to terms 
with Marxist pasts." John Ely, unpublished review essay of Thomas Ebennann and 
Rainer Trampert, pie Zukunft der Grunen [The Future of the Greens] (Hamburg: 
Konkret Verlag, 1984), 1988, ms., p. 13. 
12.Ibid., p. 11. 
13.Hulsberg, The German Greens, pp. 219-20. 
14. Ibid., p. 138. 
15.A reminder regarding terminology might be useful at this point. As I explained in 
my introduction to Part II, democratic socialists are much more zealous in their 
critique of capitalism than social democrats. Whereas social democrats merely seek 
to reform (in the sense of ameliorate the effects of) capitalism, democratic socialists 
seek to re-organize capitalism along more democratic and participatory lines. 
Democratic =socialists differ from conventional democratic socialists in their 
recognition of "ecological constraints" and their concern to bring resource 
consumption down to a level that is compatible with global justice. 
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since many of these theoretical renovations and extensions are skilfully crafted and, I 
would argue, defensible on social and ecological grounds, they should be incorporated 
into the design of a new building that rests on broader, ecocentric foundations. 
Before addressing the central question of foundations, however, it will be useful to 
begin with a general outline of the democratic ecosocialist analysis of the ecological 
crisis and the kinds of theoretical renovations and extensions to the socialist mansion 
that have been proposed. 
The Ecosocialist Analysis of the  
Ecological Crisis  
Democratic ecosocialists are unanimous in arguing that it is the competitive 
and expansionary dynamics of the capitalist system that are largely responsible for the 
ecology crisis. As early as 1973 Raymond Williams had argued that modern 
environmentalists miss their mark when they target the state and its development 
control agencies as their essential enemy, rather than looking to the economic system 
per se. 16 More recently, Joe Weston has argued that it is the accumulation of wealth 
and its concentration into fewer and fewer hands that is the main cause of both 
poverty and ecological degradation. 17 He goes on to argue that "it is time the greens 
accepted that it is capitalism rather than industrialism per se which is at the heart of 
the problems they address" - Weston, like most democratic ecosocialists, regards 
Soviet Russia as practicing "state capitalism" rather than socialism. 18 Not 
16. Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (London: Chatto and Windus, 
1973), pp. 294 and 301. According to Robin Blackburn, The Country and the City 
was Raymond Williams' first major excursion into ecological issues, an excursion that 
"prepared the ground for a thoroughgoing ecological critique of capitalism, and of 
'productivise distortions of socialism." See Robin Blackburn, "Raymond Williams 
and the Politics of the New Left," New Left Review 168 (1988): 12-22 at p. 17. 
17. Joe Weston, "Introduction," in Red and Green: The New Politics of the  
Environment, ed. Joe Weston (London: Pluto Press, 1986), pp. 4-5. Similarly, David 
Pepper is critical of what he calls "new paradigm" Greens for focussing on 
ecologically degrading methods of production rather than on "who owns and shapes 
it" and "the social relations that stem from it." See David Pepper, "Radical 
Environmentalism and the Labour Movement," in Red and Green, pp. 115-39 at 
p. 117. 
18. Joe Weston, "Introduction," p. • 5. 
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surprisingly, democratic ecosocialists are critical of nonsocialist Greens for neglecting 
class politics and failing to develop "an analysis of power" in their "new ecological 
paradigm." Such an analysis is considered by democratic ecosocialists to be essential 
if a fundamental opposition to the present means of production, distribution, and 
exchange is to be mounted. 19 
For his part, Gorz has argued that although an ecological perspective is 
incompatible with both the rationality of capitalism and authoritarian socialism, it "is 
not, by contrast, incompatible with a libertarian or democratic socialism: but it should 
not be confused with it." 20 Indeed, most democratic ecosocialists regard the ecology 
crisis as but one, albeit increasingly significant, item in a much broader agenda. As 
Gorz puts it: "the ecological movement is not an end in itself. but a larger stage in the  
larger struggle [i.e., to overcome capitalism]." 21 
While democratic ecosocialists share the basic Marxist diagnosis of the 
environmental crisis, they depart considerably from the Marxist prescription for social 
and ecological renewal. As Gorz explains, "Marxism, although irreplaceable as an 
instrument of analysis, has lost its prophetic value." 22 The real challenge facing 
democratic ecosocialists, as we shall see, is how to develop new, democratic, and 
noncentralist social institutions that are able to give expression to democratic socialist 
values such as self-management, producer democracy, and the protection of civil and 
political liberties. On these questions, Marx is singularly unhelpful since he 
repudiated bourgeois parliamentary politics but did not address the institutional 
mechanisms that would guarantee the communist utopia that he envisaged (apart from 
19.David Pepper, "Radical Environmentalism," p. 116. 
20. Andre Gorz, Ecology as Politics, trans. Patsy Vigderman and Jonathan Cloud 
(London: Pluto Press, 1980), P.  18. 
21. Ibid., p. 3. Examples of democratic ecosocialist theorists who conduct a similar 
analysis include Boris Frankel, The Post-industrial Utopians (London: Polity Press, 
1987); Frankel, "Beyond Abstract Environmentalism," pp. 22-25; Bell, "Socialism 
and Ecology"; John Wiseman, "Red or Green? The German Ecological Movement," 
&cm 68 (1984): 38-56; and Richard Worthington, "Socialism and Ecology: An 
Overview," New Political Science 13 (1984): 69-83. 
22. Gorz, Ecology as Politics, p. 11. 
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the interim dictatorship of the proletariat); indeed, he naively envisaged an end to 
politics in a communist society. 
Democratic ecosocialists, however, recognize an inextricable connection 
between economic freedom and political freedom and are reluctant to leave major 
economic decisions to either capitalists or state officials. Yet the problem of 
developing feasible alternatives is especially difficult given that most democratic 
socialists and democratic ecosocialists share the general conviction that there are 
some noncapitalist alternatives (namely the authoritarian central economic planning 
of Stalinism) that are demonstrably worse than the capitalist method of resource 
allocation in terms of the sacrifice to human freedom that is involved. 23  As I 
explained in the introduction to Part II, democratic ecosocialists are concerned to 
extend the democratic project and carry forward the substantial achievements of the 
liberal parliamentary democratic tradition. That is, they accept liberal political 
freedoms but argue that they are illusory without economic democracy and relative 
material equality. They are therefore concerned to reduce the dependency of the State 
on the market, and the personal dependency of welfare recipients on the State, by 
seeking ways of moving beyond the corporate welfare state of Western social 
democracy to a decentralized participatory democracy where producers and citizens 
have a more direct say in the organization of their work and community life. The 
basic democratic ecosocialist goal, then, is clear: to develop an allocative system that 
ensures ecologically benign production for genuine human need. To understand how 
this goal might be achieved, it is necessary to draw together the lessons democratic 
ecosocialists have learned from the failures of existing communist regimes and the 
revisions they have made to socialist theory in the light of the ecological challenge. 
23. See, for example, Wright, Socialisms, p. 125, and Raymond Williams, Towards 
2000 (Harmondsworth, U. K.: Penguin, 1983), P.  258. 
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(i) Farewell to Scientific Socialism and the 
Economic Growth Consensus 
Democratic ecosocialists accept that there are both ecological and social 
limits to growth and accordingly they reject the economic growth consensus of 
conservative, liberal, and social democratic parties in the West and communist parties 
in the East. According to Williams, the central ecological problem created by market 
capitalism and the economies of existing communist regimes is that there is "an 
effective infinity of expansion in a physically finite world." 24 In addition to their 
rejection of the indiscriminate commitment to mass manufacture and increased_ 
consumption, democratic ecosocialists also share the early Frankfurt School's 
rejection of "scientific socialism" as being unduly optimistic in believing in the 
unlimited power of scientific understanding, technical control, and the mastery of 
nature. In this respect, democratic ecosocialists wish to avoid replacing the 
4 
compulsion of the market with bureaucratic domination on the ground that both 
capitalist and communist economies dominate both people and nonhuman nature. 
They are generally critical of large scale institutions and alienating, "inappropriate," 
or destructive technologies and advocate what Ryle has called "eco-contraction" or 
ecological restructuring (in Ryle's case, this entails, inter alia, the gradual dismantling 
of major ecologically destructive industries such as the automobile, chemical, and 
defence industries). 25 
Democratic ecosocialists, then, question both the capitalist relations of 
production mci the capitalist forces of production. The orthodox Marxist prophecy 
that conventional socialist strategy had counted on - that the intensification of the 
contradictions of capitalism will finally be resolved by the industrial proletariat taking 
over the forces of production - will not, according to Gorz, end the ecological crisis or 
human alienation. This is because the expanded forces of production do not lend 
themselves to collective appropriation insofar as "there can never be effective self-
management of a big factory, an industrial combine or a bureaucratic department. It 
24. Ibid., p. 214. 
25. Ryle, Ecology and Socialism, p. 66. 
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will always be defeated by the rigidity of technical constraints." 26 In short, the 
appropriation of the capitalist forces of production would only result in a new ruling 
class taking over the machinery of domination. 
In accepting the early Frankfurt School's critique of instrumental reason, 
democratic ecosocialism reveals, in varying degrees, a =dal return to a 
pre-Marxist/romantic critique of industrialization. As Williams acknowledges, "Marx 
shared with his capitalist enemies an open triumphalism in the transformation of 
nature."27 Indeed, modes of production that preceded the capitalist one were seen by 
Marx as "mere prehistory; almost in effect pre-human." 28 Whereas human 
interventions with nature under Marxism were always as Producer, William declares 
that under democratic ecosocialism our interventions must now proceed 
... from a broader sense of human need and a closer sense of the physical world. 
The old orientation of raw material for production is rejected, and in its place 
there is the new orientation of livelihood: of practical, self-managing, 
self-reqgwing societies, in which people care first for each other, in a living 
world.L.Y 
This kind of general reorientation away from instrumental reason is fundamental 
according to Williams, "for it is the ways in which human beings have been seen as 
raw material, for schemes of profit or power, that have most radically to be 
changed." 3° As I show below, democratic ecosocialists have fully absorbed the 
arguments of the Human Welfare Ecology stream of modern environmentalism. 
However, as we saw in Chapter 2, although this stream is particularly critical of 
indiscriminate growth and the idea that science and technology alone can deliver us 
from the crisis, it has failed to transcend an anthropocentric framework. I shall return 
to this point below when discussing the role and meaning of ecology in democratic 
ecosocialist thought. 
26. Andre Gorz, Farewell to the Working Class: An Essay on Post-Industrial 
Socialism, (London: Pluto Press, 1982), p. 100. 
27. Williams, Towards 2000, p. 264. 
28. Ibid., p. 265. 
29. Ibid., p. 266. 
30. Ibid., p. 262. 
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(ii) The Problematic Role of the Working Class 
Democratic ecosocialist theorists recognize that the industrial working class 
has not only shrunk in relative size but also become increasingly conservative by 
virtue of its dependency on the industrial order. Indeed, most accept that the working 
class - whatever its history - is no longer the central agent of progressive social, 
cultural, and political change and concede that such change is more likely to emanate 
from a broad front of allied new social movements that operate outside the traditional 
labour movement and that are not easily defmed by their class location. Andre Gorz, 
in particular, has argued that the industrial proletariat cannot become the 
revolutionary force heralded by Marx since it has turned into a mere replica of capital, 
exercising functional but not personal power. Indeed: in Farewell to the Working 
Class, Gorz anticipates that the traditional, skilled proletariat will become more 
disciplined, conservative, and privileged over time as increased automation reduces 
the number of jobs available to it. As a result there will be a swelling in the ranks of 
what Gorz has called the "nonclass" or "post-industrial neo-proletariat," a "class" that 
encompasses all those who have been expelled from manual and intellectual work as 
a result of automation and computerization as well as those who are marginally 
employed and who have no real class identity or job security. 31 Gorz extends this 
line of argument in Paths to Paradise where he maintains that increasing automation 
and the micro-electronic revolution are (i) reducing the quantity of labour required for 
most material production', and (ii) breaking down the direct contact between worker 
and matter. Full employment has become an unrealizable goal, yet Gorz argues that it 
is continually pursued as an ideological tool to "maintain the relations of domination 
based on the work ethic." 32 This leads inevitably to an increasing split in the active 
population between 
... on the one hand, acting as a repository of industrialism's traditional values, an 
elite of permanent secure, full-time workers, attached to their work and their 
31. Gorz, Farewell to the Working Class, Chapter 6. 
32. Andre Gorz, Paths to Paradise: On the Liberation from Work (London: Pluto 
Press, 1985), p. 35. 
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social status; on the other, a mass of unemployed and precarious c 
workers, without qualifications or status, performing menial tasks. 
This latter "nonclass" occupies a pivotal place in Gorz's analysis in that it is seen as 
the prefiguration of a different kind of convivial community - beyond economic 
rationality and external constraint - that constitutes a potentially emancipatory 
extension of an already developing process.34 Indeed, Gorz's ultimate project is to 
abolish wage labour on the ground that there is no dignity to be had in the modern 
wage labour relationship. Instead he argues that true dignity and self-determination 
can only be found in autonomous spheres of production (i.e., in the neighbourhood 
rather than in the factory). Gorz thus severs the orthodox socialist equation between 
personal emancipation and the Amid appropriation and management of the forces of 
production. 
However, Gorz's preoccupation with the nonclass has led him to ignore the 
political potential of the highly educated New Class, who, as we saw in Chapter 3, 
form the bulk of the active membership of new social movements. In this respect, 
Gorz's special focus on the emancipatory potential of the nonclass is not 
representative of democratic ecosocialist thought in general. Rather, as I noted above, 
most democratic ecosocialists see the potential for social change emanating from a 
much broader alliance of new social movements working together with the labour 
rnovement.35 (As we saw in Chapter 3, new social movements tend to be supported 
by three main social groups or classes, namely, the New Class, decommodified 
groups [which roughly correspond to Gorz's "nonclassi, and disaffected members of 
the petty bourgeoisie. 36) While democratic ecosocialists concede that the labour 
movement's "productivist ideology" has traditionally not recognized the experiences 
33. Ibid. 
34. Farewell to the Working Class, p. 75. 
35. See, for example, Ryle, Ecology and Socialism, p. 88; Williams, Towards 2000, 
pp. 254-55; and Boggs, Social Movements and Political Power, p. 19. 
36. Claus Offe, "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional 
Politics," Social Research 52 (1985): 817-68 at p. 832-38. Offe does point out, 
however, that unlike the petty bourgeoisie, both the "New Class" and "decommodified 
groups" are more likely to grow in number than disappear (p. 837). 
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of other disadvantaged groups and classes (e.g., welfare recipients, women, and ethnic 
minorities) or environmental problems beyond the workplace, they nonetheless insist 
that effective and lasting change will not come about without the support of the union 
movement, indeed, the majority of "working people." 37 
However, building such an alliance between New Class radicals and the 
working class is no easy task. As Williams observes, the predominantly middle class 
membership of new social movements must confront the fact that the "effective 
majority" will remain committed to the dominant system §o long as they have no  
practical altemative. 38 In particular, Williams points out that 
... it is a consequence of the social order that, lacking the privileges of relative 
social distance and mobility, or of independent (often publicly funded) access to 
extended learning, the majority of employed people - a significantly wider 
population than the working-class in any of its definiticps - have still primarily 
to relate to short-range and short-term determinations?' 
Williams (unlike some ecosocialists), however, dismisses as absurd the claim that 
new social movements are elitist, or that their claims are in conflict with the interests 
of the working class. The reason why the demands of the New Class differ from 
those of the working class is primarily a matter of different social experience and 
different access to information. As Williams explains, 
... the fact that many of the most important elements of the new movements and 
campaigns are radically dependent on access to independent information, 
typically though not exclusively through higher education, [means] ... that some 
of the most decisive facts camt be generated from immediate experience but 
only from conscious analysis.' ) 
In this respect, Williams rightly points out that unless the bearers of the "new politics" 
can generate "serious and detailed alternatives at these everyday points where a 
central consciousness is generated" (i.e., the local, practical, and immediate 
interactions of the "effective majority" of working people), then the issues raised by 
the new politics will remain marginalized. 41 Williams argues that an important task 
37. Ryle, ecology and Socialism, pp. 31 and 94. 
38. Williams, Towards 2000, p. 254. 
39. Ibid., p. 255. 
40. Ibid., p. 254-55. 
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for democratic ecosocialism, then, is a "critical engagement" with the labour 
movement in order to prepare the way for a broad Green/labour alliance that will 
represent the "general interest" as distinct from the interests of a particular class. 
Democratic ecosocialists divide, however, on the question as to whether to pursue this 
critical engagement through the established social democratic and labour parties, 
through the fledgling Green parties and the Green movement, or through a new 
grassroots rainbow movement (i.e., of the kind I characterized in Chapter 3). 
As part of the move to widen the narrow, "productivist" focus of the 
traditional labour movement, democratic ecosocialists have also sought to expand the 
traditional democratic socialist preoccupation with class and producer democracy to 
include cultural renewal and the revitalization of civil society. This entails the 
promotion of new attitudes to work (such as job-sharing, reduction in the working 
week), health, lifestyle, and sexuality. However, unlike many ecoanarchists and 
ecofeminists, most democratic ecosocialists generally avoid any discussion of the 
need to develop a "new ecological paradigm" (ecocentric or otherwise), much less 
new forms of Western spirituality, and tend to adopt instead a secular approach that 
emphasizes the cultivation of public virtue or good citizenship rather than inner 
awakening. 
(iii) The New Internationalism 
In responding to the ecology crisis, democratic ecosocialists have sought to 
explore a broader range of contradictions than those based simply on class. For 
example, most share Rudolf Bahro's analysis that the "external" contradiction between 
humanity and the rest of nature and between "North" and "South" are more pressing 
than the "internal" contradictions between capital and labour within the developed 
countries of the First World. 42 The resolution of these contradictions is seen to " 
41. Ibid. 
42. Rudolf Bahro, Socialism and Survival (London: Heretic Books, 1982). Bahro's 
personal trajectory has moved from Marxism (The Alternative in Eastern Europe  
[London: New Left Books, 1978] to post-Marxist ecosocialism (From Red to Green 
[London: Verso, 1984] and Socialism and Survival) and finally to communal 
ecoanarchism (Building the Green Movement [London: Heretic/GMP, 1986]). 
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require a "new internationalism" that accepts that we cannot use the standard of living 
attained by the average family in the first world as a model to be pursued for all of 
humanity since this would put an intolerable ecological strain on the planet. 
Ecosocialists therefore argue that the transition toward a conserver society must begin 
in the "affluent society." 43 According to Williams, the deepest changes must come 
from the first world not only in the form of conservation and the production of more 
durable commodities "but also in their deep assumption that the rest of the world is an 
effectively vacant lot from which they extract raw materials." 44 Accordingly, 
democratic ecosocialists argue for the redistribution of wealth not only within nations 
but also internationally between the developed and developing countries in order to 
enable the mutual self-realization of all persons. 45 A cornerstone of this "new 
internationalism" is a redefinition of human needs that is global in scope. According 
to Ryle, ultimately, human needs have to be defined at a level that enables both 
present and future generations of humans to enjoy an equivalent measure of health 
and autonomy.46 Ryle suggests that a priority in this exercise should be the 
establishment of an agreed set of basic needs (i.e., education, health care, energy, 
basic infrastructural requirements such as sewage and water supply, housing, and 
transport), so that steps can then be taken to ensure that everyone has these basic 
needs met in both rich and poor countries. 47 Unlike democratic socialists, however, 
democratic =socialists address social and economic deprivation by means other than 
expanding production. That is, they seek to meet unmet human needs in ecologically 
Socialism and Survival may thus be seen as part of Bahro's "middle period." His 
more recent ideas are discussed in Chapter 7. 
43. See, for example, Erik Dammann, Revolution in the Affluent Society  (London: 
Heretic Books, 1984); F. E. Trainer, Abandon Affluence! (London: Zed Books, 
1985); also by Trainer, Developed to Death (London: Merlin, 1989); and Frankel, 
Post-industrial Utopians, pp. 261-62. 
44. Williams, Towards 2000, p. 216. Williams also presents this centre/periphery 
analysis in The Country and the City. 
45. Frankel, Post-industrial Utopians, pp. 261-63. 
46. Ryle, Ecology and Socialism, p. 70. 
47. Ibid., pp. 73-74. 
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benign and sustainable ways in order to bring overall resource consumption down to a 
level that is compatible with global justice. This, of course, is a much more 
challenging task than simply stepping up production and providing more commodities 
and social welfare services. 
Democratic ecosocialists argue that Third World solidarity can be achieved 
by promoting greater self-reliance in both the North and South. This strategy requires 
delinking the economies of developed and developing nations by reducing the volume 
of international trade, disarming, and increasing aid to developing countries. 
However, as Frankel and Ryle note, democratic ecosocialists must also encourage 
international co-operation to ensure control of transnational corporations and financial 
institutions, which will require parallel and reciprocal moves by other nations if it is 
to be effective.48 
(iv) Production for Human Need 
Democratic ecosocialists emphasize the need to develop long term 
socio-economic solutions that will bring the economy under more democratic control. 
As we have seen, the ultimate goal of this project is to ensure that the allocation of 
resources is determined according to "genuine human need" rather than the dictates of 
the profit motive or remote bureaucratic planning. Williams, for example, looks 
forward to a redefinition of socialism that entails "a positive redemption of the central 
socialist idea of production for equitable use rather than for either profit or power." 49 
This entails (i) "a long and difficult move away from the market economy," (ii) a shift 
in "production towards new governing standards of durability, quality, and economy 
in the use of non-renewable resources," and (iii) "as a condition of either of the 
former, we have to move towards new kinds of monetary institutions, placing capital 
at the service of these new ends." 5° The urgent democratic ecosocialist task, then, is 
48. Frankel, Post-Industrial Utopians, pp. 260-63, and Ryle, Ecology and Socialism, 
p. 86. 
49. Williams, Towards 2000, p. 216. 
50. Ibid., p. 256. 
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the development of new, democratic institutions that can give expression to the goal 
of self-management and production for equitable need. So far, democratic 
ecosocialists have tended to advocate a combination of state and local community 
economic planning and self-managed worker co-operatives. Beyond these general 
ideas, however, there exists considerable debate on the question as to the proper 
extent and level of operation of market mechanisms and the degree of state 
involvement in economic planning. 
One controversial ecosocialist blueprint has come from Andre Gorz, who 
has argued the case for a dual economy based on a fusion of the ideas of the young 
Marx and Ivan filch. According to Gorz, Illich (like Marx), envisaged a "synergic 
relation between the heteronomous [i.e., socially necessary] and autonomous 
[personal, creative] modes of production" aiming at a reduction of working time and 
hence "the utmost expansion of the sphere of autonomy." 51 However, whereas Marx 
foresaw the withering away of the state under communism, Gorz envisages the 
continuation of the state as the centrepiece of a post-industrial political economy that 
will make possible the flourishing of an ecologically benign, "convivial society." 
Indeed, Gorz presents his post-industrial ecosocialist society as striking a new balance 
between the familiar strengths and weaknesses of liberalism and socialism. As to the 
latter, Gorz acknowledges the past difficulties of classical socialist doctrine in 
accepting social and political pluralism. 52 In particular, he argues that ecosocialists 
must reject the old socialist idea that everyone must surrender their individuality to 
the democratically determined objectives of a central plan, a Rousseauian "general 
will," or the technical imperatives of the social machine as engineered by the state. 
For Gorz, "the source of the theoretical superiority of socialism over capitalism is ... 
the source of its practical inferiority." 53 From a practical standpoint, he notes that at 
least market capitalism confers on everybody a private niche, a personal life outside 
51. See Gorz, Farewell to the Working Class, p. 96, and Ivan Illich, Tools for 
Conviviality (London: Calder and Boyars, 1973), pp. 22-24. 
52. Farewell to the Working Class, p. 79. 
53. Ibid. 
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the workplace where their autonomy is no longer sacrificed to the dictates of capital 
or the laws of the state. 54 In this respect, Gorz's dual economy is an attempt to 
preserve and foster the classical liberal ideal of autonomy of thought and action by 
extending the individual's private area of manoeuvrability beyond the reach of the 
dictates of social production, the state, and the law. 
Notwithstanding Gorz's discussion of the virtues of liberalism, however, his 
notion of autonomy is ultimately more Marxist than liberal - indeed, it turns on 
Marx's distinction between freedom and necessity. As we saw in Chapter 4, Gorz . 
endorses and extends Marx's argument that true freedom is dependent upon the 
rationalization and minimisation and sharing of socially necessary social labour. That 
is, true freedom is to be achieved not in the factory in the form of self-management 
but rather outside the factory in civil society in the form of creative, convivial 
activity. Accordingly, Gorz proposes a dual economy that is made up of (i) the sphere 
of heteronomy, which deals with the production of socially necessary goods and 
corresponds to the realm of necessity (to be managed by the state), and (ii) the sphere 
of autonomy (corresponding to the realm of freedom, to civil society) where 
individuals can do what they want or create what they want using a free supply of 
convivial tools. The goal of the sphere of heteronomy (i.e., the state) is to enhance 
the sphere of autonomy by providing those socially necessary goods and services that 
cannot be supplied in the autonomous sphere with the same degree of efficiency. 55 
Ultimately, Gorz (like Marx and Marcuse) regards the expanded forces of 
production (which today includes not only automation, specialization, division of 
labour, and large scale organization but also computerization) as a crucial agent of 
54. On this point, Gorz rejects as dangerous and simplistic Bahro's argument that this 
sphere of privacy represents a sort of "compensation' for the repression and 
frustration of the 'emancipatory needs' of individuals under capitalism." (Gorz, 
Farewell to the Working Class, p. 80, quoting Rudolf Bahro, The Alternative in 
Eastern Europe,  p. 253 and following.) In Gorz's view, the private niche accorded to 
individuals under capitalism is not always filled by mindless consumption and 
frivolous leisure activities but rather is used to pursue many creative, personally 
fulfilling activities that are important ends in themselves. Indeed, he argues that for 
many people it is the sphere in which "real life" takes place. 
55. Gorz, Farewell to the Working Class, p. 101. 
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human emancipation on the ground that they reduce the time taken to perform 
"socially necessary labour." That is, the utilization of these forces of production is 
seen as both necessary and desirable to enable the conditions for the commotion and 
redistribution of socially necessary work time that will ultimately see to the expansion 
of the sphere of autonomy, where economic logic need no longer apply. 56 Gorz 
argues that heteronomous work must obey the technical imperatives of large scale 
organizations in order to minimize social labour time and maximize autonomous 
activity; collective planning, forecasting, computerization, and the like are necessary 
tools to this end. Moreover, heteronomous work must be standardized, simplified, 
and made interchangeable so that it can be performed by all "active" members of the 
population. Gorz makes no apologies for the fact that such work does not allow for 
individual self-fulfilment - indeed, he concedes that such work may be quite dull - 
since it must conform to technical imperatives. However, he argues that it is a 
worthwhile "price" to pay in order to keep "the sphere of necessity" to a minimum 
(Gorz agrees with the mature Marx that it can never be totally abolished). The upshot 
would be that waged work will no longer be the centre of anyone's life, yet it would 
provide everyone with a guaranteed living income, thereby enabling the recentering 
of life around self-determined, non-waged activities. Such an income would represent 
an equitable distribution of the wealth created by society's productive forces 
considered as a whole - which individuals have combined to produce through their 
shared, intermittent work. 
In the sphere of autonomy, on the other hand, individuals will be concerned 
with free-time and local neighbourhood activities where diversity rather than 
uniformity will be the norm. Insofar as these activities involve producing or creating 
things, they will concern "the optional, gratuitous, superfluous, of all which is not 
necessary, which gives life its spice and value; as useless as life itself, yet exalting life 
as the one end which gives all others their meaning" (by "useless" here Gorz means 
valuable for its own sake rather than as a means to some end such as subsistence). 57 
56. Gorz, Paths to Paradise, see p. 46. 
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How, then, is environmental protection to be secured under Gorz's dual 
economy? This turns on Gorz's distinction between the systematic and collective 
needs of society and the ethical norms of individuals and small communities. 58 As 
we have seen, he envisages that the sphere of heteronomy would be planned by the 
state and governed by technical imperatives; these imperatives are regarded as simply 
the function of "external necessity" rather than as ethical norms of a kind chosen by 
self-determining individuals. Just as economic regulation is a technical matter to be 
planned by the state, so too is ecological regulation. Indeed, Gorz insists that it is 
impossible to derive an ethic from either economic or ecological reasoning. 59 
Rather, he treats both economics and ecology merely as scientific tools that measure 
different levels of efficiency: 
In the same way that economics is concerned with the external constraints that 
individual activities give rise to when they generate unwanted collective results, 
ecology is concerned with the external constraints which economic activity 
gives rise to when it produces enyjonmental alterations which upset the 
calculation of costs and benefits. 
Although Gorz does not provide any further elaboration on the matter of 
environmental regulation, it would seem to follow from his dual economy and his 
characterization of ecology as a technical issue that environmental matters such as 
energy budgets, resource use, pollution control, nature conservation, recycling, and 
workers' safety would fall within the province of the state and need not concern 
citizens, at least in their autonomous activities (although Gorz envisages that citizens 
would use durable, convivial tools in their free time activity). As we shall see in the 
following chapter, such an approach stands in stark contrast to the community 
self-management approach of ecoanarchists, who seek full democratic participation in 
political, economic, and ecological decision making. Moreover, the ecoanarchists' 
goal of rounded, ecologically benign human development is not dependent on any 
distinction between freedom and necessity or ethics and technical imperatives. Not 
57. Ibid., p. 57. 
58. Farewell to the Working Class, Chapter 8. 
59. Ecology as Politics, pp. 15-16. 
60. Ibid., p. 15. 
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surprisingly, some ecoanarchists (notably Bookchin) are scathing in their critique of 
Gorz's technocratic post-industrial utopia. According to Bookchin, Gorz's analysis is 
riddled with paradoxes in attempting to combine central planning with neighbourhood 
self-help initiatives and worker self-management. In particular, Bookchin argues that 
Gorz promises the impossible - central planning without bureaucracy - but "tells us 
virtually nothing about the administrative structures around which his utopia will be 
organized."61 As Richard Swift asks, what will prevent the heteronomous sphere or 
state from becoming "a center for the centralization of power? The tools for political 
abuse remain here." 62 Similarly, Boris Frankel has argued that Gorz's dual economy 
as "fraught with economic and political inconsistencies." 63 In particular, Frankel 
observes that Gorz "conceives of states in too narrow a political or administrative 
form."64 Moreover, it is not clear what role, if any, the market would play in Gorz's 
dual economy. 65 
From an ecocentric perspective, Gorz's own brand of ecosocialism is not 
only politically flawed in naively defining the activities of the state - most notably, 
the provision of basic needs and environmental protection - as mere technical 
administration that is outside the realm of ethics and public participation. It is also 
philosophically flawed in perpetuating the Mandan distinction between freedom and 
necessity. As we saw in Chapter 4, the idea that true human freedom lies beyond the 
realm of socially necessary labour actively encourages the technological subjugation 
61. Murray Bookchin, review of F. cology as Politics, by Andre Gorz, Telos 46 
(1980-81): 176-90 at p. 182. 
62. Richard Swift, "Liberation from Work," review of Paths to Paradise, by Andre 
Gorz, Xick it Over, Winter 1986-1987, pp. 16-17 at p. 17. 
63. Frankel, Post-industrial Utopians, p. 60. 
64. Ibid., p. 63. 
65. In Paths to Paradise Gorz has modified his dual economy by introducing a third 
tier known as the sphere of micro-social activity that will partially mediate between 
the spheres of autonomy and heteronomy. This third tier would be "organized on a 
local level and based on voluntary participation, except where it replaces macro-social 
[i.e., heteronomous] work in providing for basic needs" (p. 63). Such a modification 
does little to answer criticisms concerning Gorz's silence on the question of citizen 
participation in the sphere of socially necessary production. 
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of the nonhuman world in order to minimize such labour. Accordingly, any 
emancipatory ecopolitdcal theory that rests on such a distinction is irredeemable from 
an ecocentric perspective since human freedom and embeddedness in nature are 
posited as inversely related. As I argue below in my discussion of the meaning and 
role of ecology in democratic ecosocialism, Gorz's ecotopia is based on a thoroughly 
human-centred ecological perspective that takes no cognizance of the needs of 
nonhuman life-forms. 
It should be clear that Gorz's dual economy is not necessarily representative 
of democratic ecosocialism as a whole, although there is no unanimity among other 
democratic ecosocialists on the matter of detailed alternatives. All that can be safely 
generalized is that the fulfilment of basic needs and the provision of social services 
• would be in some way funded by the wealth produced by society as a whole. For 
Martin Ryle, this requires "a clear break" with existing economic practice and a move 
toward a different structure of needs that owes more to William Morris than to 
Marx.66 As to the role of the market, democratic ecosocialists generally advocate 
increasing state control over market activity to enable ecological restructuring and the 
provision of basic needs as well as the regaining of public control over key resources 
(both economic and ecological). According to Ryle: 
While market-like mechanisms might continue to play an important role - 
providing consumer choice and flexibility in the supply of commodities - in an 
ecologically planned economy, these centreconomic functions would need to 
be planned in [a] directly political fashion. 
Although many democratic ecosocialists acknowledge that an unregulated market has 
certain advantages over a centrally planned economy in terms of efficiency and 
flexibility in the satisfaction of consumer wants, they argue that these advantages are 
overshadowed by the serious contradictions between market logic and ecological 
imperatives. Boris Frankel, in particular, rejects "market socialism" (in particular, the 
market socialism advocated by Alec Nove in The Economics of Feasible Socialism) 
on the ground that social and ecological objectives would be continually 
66. Ryle, Ecology and Socialism, pp. 64 and 69. 
67. Ibid., p. 65. 
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compromised by national and international market forces. 68 In short, most 
democratic ecosocialists argue that if we are to avoid both the "tragedy of the 
commons" and extreme wealth differentials then the only feasible alternative to the 
free market is economic planning, provided it is of a kind that provides for full 
community participation and the diversification and decentralization of political and 
economic power. 
(v) The State Under Ecosocialism 
- It should be clear from the preceding discussion that democratic 
ecosocialists regard the state as playing a vital role in controlling the operation of 
market forces and in laying down the framework for a socially just and ecologically 
sustainable society. According to Ryle: 
If one is to be honest ... about the objectives which an ecologically enlightened 
society would set for itself, it is difficult to avoid concluding that the state, as 
the agent of the collective will, would have to take an active law-making and 
-enforcing rgte in imposing a range of environmental and resource 
constraints.°Y 
This entails giving up, in the name of the "common good," a range of Western 
freedoms concerning the use of land and private capital as part of the process of 
ecological restructuring. As Ryle argues: 
Above all, it calls into being a collective subject, a "we," able to make political 
and cultural decisions directly, and this implies the transcendenps of the 
atomised individualism of the market place as ultimate arbiter.iu 
As we shall see in the following chapter, this aspect of the democratic 
ecosocialist case stands in stark contrast to the strongly anti-statist position of 
ecoanarchists. That is, ecoanarchists would argue that the collective "we" is the local 
community rather than the state and that society is best transformed through popular 
68. See Frankel, Post-industrial Utopians, pp. 93-97, and Alec Nove, The Economics  
of Feasible Socialism (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983). For a general 
democratic ecosocialist discussion of the kind of economic restructuring that might be 
relevant to the Australian economy, see John Wiseman, Peter Christoff, Rob Watts, 
Lorrie Read, Rob Reid-Smith, Joe Camilleri, Ian Ward, and Boris Frankel, New  
Economic Directions for Australia, Discussion Paper, Department of Social Work, 
Phillip Institute of Technology, Victoria, (April, 1988). 
69. Ryle, Ecology and Socialism, p. 60. 
70. Ibid., p. 65. 
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struggles, exemplary action, and local self-help initiatives. Indeed, many 
ecoanarchists wish to see the abolition (rather than the shrinking) of the modern 
nation state on the ground that it is inherently hierarchical in usurping the decision 
making power of the local community: 
While democratic socialists support the goal of community empowerment, 
they argue that this would be facilitated rather than thwarted by the state by means of 
protecting civil liberties, intervening in the market, redistributing resources between 
classes and regions, and providing international diplomacy (indeed, Frankel has 
argued that democracy would not survive the abolition of state institutions). 71 
Moreover, democratic ecosocialists argue that some degree of bureaucratic 
administration is inevitable if economic and ecological planning is to proceed. They 
argue further that the potential for bureaucratic domination or political abuse in an 
expanded state would be offset by parallel moves that extend the opportunity for 
democratic participation in all tiers of government. I shall return to this important 
dialogue in my discussion of ecoanarchism in Chapter 7. 
The Meaning and Lesson of Ecology According to 
Democratic Ecosocialism, 
So far, my discussion has been mainly concerned to introduce democratic 
ecosocialist thought and identify the major areas in which it has departed from 
Marxist orthodoxy and the major areas in which it differs from other schools of 
emancipatory ecopolitical thought (most notably, ecoanarchism). In the remainder of 
this chapter, I intend to explore further some of the criticisms already foreshadowed 
in my discussion of Gorz's ecosocialism by returning to the central question in this 
inquiry: how consistent is democratic ecosocialism with an ecocentric perspective? 
The heart of the philosophical difference between ecocentrism and 
democratic ecosocialism concerns the meaning and relevance of ecology to 
emancipatory ecopolitical theory. We have seen from our discussion of the 
democratic ecosocialist analysis of the environmental crisis that democratic 
71. Frankel, Post-industrial Utopians, p. 263. 
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ecosocialists regard the demands of the environmental movement for a safe and 
healthy environment are but a subset of the modern radical project. That is, the more 
environmental movement (by this they mostly have in mind what I refer to as the 
Human Welfare Ecology stream) is seen by ecosocialist theorists as part of a larger 
struggle to overcome capitalism and the accumulation and concentration of wealth 
into fewer and fewer hands. The radical environmental movement is seen to be part 
of that larger struggle because it highlights the incompatibility of market rationality 
with ecological limits by revealing the many ways in which the economic 
"externalities" of private capital have seriously compromised human welfare, health, 
and survival. Indeed, Pepper has argued "that most radical environmentalist aims are 
probably inherently socialist by nature" and in any event, "are certainly ... not 
compatible with laissez-faire capitalism."72 
As we have seen, the political priorities that emerge from this analysis of the 
ecological crisis are clear: to replace capitalism with a mode of production that 
satisfies genuine human need. The fundamental issue for democratic ecosocialists, 
then, is not simply human survival. What is at stake, and what is now attainable, 
according to democratic ecosocialism, is the full realization of human autonomy  
within a safe and healthy physical environment and a democratic and co-operative 
social environment In terms of my characterization of emancipatory ecopolitical 
theory in Chapter 1, democratic ecosocialists may be seen as revising the 
participatory theme of the New Left in the light of the survivalists' case in order to 
produce an anthropocentric emancipatory ecopolitical theory. Significantly, most 
democratic ecosocialists reject the idea that ecology can effect a fundamental 
paradigm shift in political theory along the lines suggested by many Green theorists 
(such as Capra, Spretnak, and Porritt).73 According to Ryle, ecological science can 
72. Pepper, "Radical Environmentalism," p. 115. See also Pepper, The Roots of 
Modern Environmentalism  (London: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 199. 
73. Fritjof Capra and Charlene Spretnak, Green Politics: The Global Promise (New 
York: E. P. Dutton, 1984), and Jonathon Ponitt, Seeing Green: The Politics of 
Ecology Explained (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984). 
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provide the limits and framework within which political and economic decisions must 
be made, but it 
... does not in itself determine in a positive sense the future development of 
social and economic reality ... Ecological limits may limit political choice but 
they do not determine them ... we should not assume that "ecology" can 
satisfactorily define the new politics we are trying to develop. 14 
Similarly, both Pepper and Weston reject the idea that ecological principles should 
provide the basis for a new politics as a confused mixture of romanticism, elitism, and 
ecological determinism.75 According to Pepper, such an approach leads to an 
excessive preoccupation with "nature protection" and deflects attentions away from 
the social origins of environmental degradation. 76 What must be grasped, they argue, 
is that the "environment" is an essentially human context that is socially determined 
rather than something before which we must humbly "submit." 77 More generally, 
democratic ecosocialists argue that if we wish to retain a commitment to the modern 
political ideals of justice, equality, and liberty, then we must look to the lessons of 
human history (in particular, the various tributaries of socialist thought) rather than 
natural history. Indeed, Gorz has gone so far as to declare that "it is impossible to 
derive an ethic from ecology." 78 
In support of the argument that ecological principles cannot provide the 
basis for a new politics, democratic ecosocialist theorists frequently point out that it is 
possible to have a society that respects ecological limits but is undemocratic and 
authoritarian. As Gorz explains: 
74. Ryle, Ecology and Socialism, pp. 7-8. 
75. Weston, "Introduction," p. 2, and Pepper, "Radical Environmentalism," p. 121. 
See also David Pepper, "Determinism, Idealism and the Politics of Environmentalism 
- A Viewpoint," International Journal of Environmental Studies  26 (1985): 11-19. 
76. Indeed, Pepper describes such concerns as reactionary and "largely an elitist 
defence of what a minority of ex-urbanites saw as 'wild nature' or 'traditional 
landscapes." Pepper, "Radical Environmentalism," p. 121. See also Frazilde Ashton, 
"Green Dreams, Red Realities," N.A.T.T.A. Discussion Paper No. 2, Alternative 
Technology Group, The Open University, Milton Keynes, U. K., 1985. 
77. Pepper, "Radical Environmentalism," p. 121. 
78. Gorz, Ecology as Politics, p. 16. 
244 
Ecology, as a purely scientific discipline, does not necessarily imply the 
rejection of authoritarian, technofascist solutions. The rejection of 
technofascism does not arise from a scientific understanding of the balances of 
nature, but from a political and cultural choice. Environmentalists use ecology 
as the lever to push forward a radical critique of our civilization and our society. 
But ecological arguments can also be usedutp justify the application of 
biological engineering to human systems.' Y 
Not surprisingly, democratic ecosocialists reject the claimed "newness" of 
the Green movement and the idea that it has transcended old political rivalries and 
instead point out the continuities between Green politics and many strands of 
socialism.80 The only "newness" of the Green movement is seen to reside in its 
recognition of "ecological limits" - something that democratic ecosocialists agree 
cannot be ignored. 81  "The point," argues Gorz, "is not to deify nature or to 'go back' 
to it, but to take account of a simple fact: human activity finds in the natural world its 
external limits." 82 
Yet the democratic ecosocialist argument that it is impossible to "derive" an 
ethic from ecology is misleading insofar as it suggests that ecocentrism represents a 
naive form of authoritarian ecological determinism while ecosocialism recognizes the 
active presence of humankind in constructing and shaping "ecological reality." The 
environmental ethic of democratic ecosocialism and ecocentrism are both informed 
by ecology but the environmental ethic of democratic ecosocialism is simply a 
different and more limited kind of ethic than that of ecocentrism. That is, the 
democratic ecosocialist ethic is a prudential ethic that largely represents an 
amalgamation of the Resource Conservation and Human Welfare Ecology 
perspectives, both of which are informed by life sciences such as ecology but which 
ultimately rest on anthropocentric norms of efficiency and human health and welfare. 
79. Ibid., p. 17. 
80. David Pepper, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism, pp. 193-94. See also 
Peter C. Gould, Early Green Politics: Back to Nature. Back to the Land. and 
Socialism in Great Britain 1880-1900 (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester, 1988). 
81. The terms of this debate were framed as early as 1974 by Hans Magnus 
Enzensberger in "A Critique of Political Ecology," New Left Review 84 (1974): 3-31. 
Since then, most of the discussion of the ecological crisis by democratic ecosocialist 
theorists (e.g., Ryle, Gorz, Weston, Pepper, Bell, and Hulsberg) has been mainly 
couched in the language of "ecological limits" or "constraints" on human action. 
82. Gorz, Ecology as Politics, p. 13. 
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Ecocentrism is also informed by the life sciences but it too finds its ultimate 
justification in a normative rather than scientific framework. Indeed, as I argued in 
Chapter 2, to appeal to nature as known by the science of ecology rather than to ethics 
as the ultimate arbiter of a Green political theory is misguided. As we also saw in 
Chapter 2, an ecocentric normative framework subsumes the human-centred norms of 
efficiency, health, and welfare in a broader ecological matrix that seeks the mutual 
flourishing of all life-forms. Such a perspective does not seek to downgrade human 
creativity nor deny the extent to which humans influence ecological and evolutionary 
processes. Rather, it asks that we employ our creativity to develop technologies and 
lifestyles that allow for the continuation of a rich and diverse human mid nonhuman 
world. 
To return to the democratic ecosocialist critique, if the only "lesson" 
provided by ecological science is one of ecological limits then it is indeed possible to 
have a range of different political regimes - including fascist ones - that observe such 
limits Robert Heilbroner's An Inquiry into the Human Prospect, which is essentially 
concerned with human survival, is a clear case in point. 83 Of course, an ecofascist 
regime might be successful in ensuring human survival (or, more likely, the survival 
of certain privileged classes of humans) and quite possibly the survival of many 
nonhuman life-forms. However, it would achieve this by severely restricting 
opportunities for human participation and self-determination - a route that is 
incompatible with the general ecocentric norm of mutual unfolding of both the human 
and nonhuman worlds. For democratic ecosocialists to reject ecocentrism on the 
ground that it does not rule out fascism is to mistake the inclusive nature of the 
ecocentric norm of "emancipation writ large." This is not to say that ecocentric 
theorists would necessarily rule out all forms of state coercion. The ecocentric 
commitment to the flourishing of All life means that ecocentrism is obliged to endorse 
the use of coercive measures where it is necessary to protect innocent victims from 
83. Robert L. Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 1974). For a discussion of the ecological ideas in Nazism, see Anna 
Bramwell, Ecology in the 20th Century: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989). 
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aggression and exploitation, whether it be human victims of physical violence or 
endangered species and habitats (e.g., wilderness policing). 
Now the democratic ecosocialist rejection of the idea of a "paradigm shift" 
in Green political theory is correct insofar as it applies to inter-human struggles. 
When viewed from the perspective of the traditional political spectrum, ecocentrism 
is, and must continue to be, generally "more left than right" in contending with "old 
political rivalries" based on differentials in wealth, power, and social privilege. 
However, ecocentric theory is most certainly new in the way it seeks to reorient 
humanity's relationship to the rest of nature. In this respect, it represents a new 
constellation of ideas that challenges the anthropocentric and cornucopian 
assumptions of post-Enlightenment political thought and calls for a radical 
re-assessment of human needs, technologies, and lifestyles - all of which are 
fundamental political questions. 
To be sure, democratic ecosocialism has itself travelled some distance down 
this new path insofar as it has acknowledged the many ways in which capitalism 
objectifies and commodities both peoplelust nonhuman nature. 84 However, the 
democratic ecosocialist critique of instrumental reason, like that of the Frankfurt 
School, ultimately comes to rest on the human-centred argument that it is wrong to 
dominate nature because it gives rise to the domination of people. For example, 
Gorz, in noting that the disregard of ecological limits will often set off an unwelcome 
ecological backlash, argues that 
... it is better to leave nature to work itself out than to seek to correct it at the  
cost of a growing submission of individuals to institutions, to the domination of 
others. For the ecologist's objection to system engineering is not that it violates 
nature (which is not sacrett)but that it substitutes new forms of domination for 
existing natural processes. °' 
And later, Gorz adds: 
Ecological concerns are fundamental; they cannot be compromised or 
postponed. Socialism is no better than capitalism if it makes use of the same 
tools. The total domination of nature inevitably entails a domination of people 
by the techniques of domination. If there were no other options, it would be 
84. See, for example, Williams, Towards 2000, pp. 214-15. 
85. Gorz, Ecology as Politics, p. 18. 
247 
preferable to have a non-nuclear capitalism than a nuclear socialism, fqj,the 
former would weigh less heavily on future generations [my emphasis].°' 
Similarly, to the extent that ecosocialists argue for the cultivation of a new way of 
seeing the world as a delicate interdependence between life-forms rather than as 
available raw materials, it is based on the same human-centred justification. As 
Williams explains, "it is the ways in which human beings have been seen, as raw 
material, for schemes of profit or power, that have most radically to be changed [my 
emphasis] "87 
Of course, this democratic ecosocialist concern for human betterment is 
laudable in and of itself. From an ecocentric perspective, however, it means that the 
case for the recognition and protection of nonhuman species is forever tethered to the 
cause of human emancipation. As Rodman has observed, Gorz has an intuition that 
we should "let nature be" not because it is sacred but because its makes us freer. 88 
While such an argument has a place within any ecocentric emancipatory theory 
(indeed, it serves to bolster such theory in that it shows that the flourishing of human 
and nonhuman life need not be a zero sum game), it provides no defence for 
threatened nonhuman species in those cases where there is no appreciable link with 
human domination and where such species appear to provide no present or potential 
use or interest to humankind. Moreover, as I argued in my critique of the Human 
Welfare Ecology perspective in Chapter 2, such an argument also serves to reinforce 
anthropocentric attitudes. As John Livingston has aptly put it, at best, wildlife might 
"emerge as a second-generation beneficiary" from Human Welfare Ecology 
reforms.89 In this respect, Raymond Williams' views on wildlife preservation are 
telling: 
... we are not going to be the people ... who simply say "keep this piece clear, 
keep this threatened species alive, at all costs." The case of a threatened species 
86. Ibid., p. 20. 
87. Williams, Towards 2000, p. 262. 
88. John Rodman, review of Ecology as Politics, by Andre Gorz, Human Ecology 12 
(1984): 319-25 at p. 324. 
89. Livingston, The Fallacy of Wildlife Conservation (Toronto: McClelland & 
Stewart, 1982), p. 42. 
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is a good general illustration. You can have a kind of animal which is 
damaging to local cultivation, and then you have the sort of problem that occurs 
again and again in environmental issues. You will get the eminences of the 
world flying in and saying: "you must save this beautiful wild creature." That it 
may kill the occasional villager, that it tramples their crops, is unfortunate. But 
it is a beautiful creature and it must be saved. Such people are the friends of 
nobody, and to think thgthey are allies in the ecological movement is an 
extraordinary delusion.''' 
This, of course, is consistent with my identification of wilderness or wildlife 
preservation as one of the "litmus tests" that enables us to distinguish ecocentric from 
anthropocentric emancipatory theorists. That is, wherever there is an apparent 
conflict between human interests and the interests of nonhuman species (in this case 
the protection of wildlife) that appear to be of no use to humankind, democratic 
ecosocialists consistently dismiss nonhuman interests. 
Similarly, to the extent that democratic ecosocialists have contributed to the 
human population debate (the other "litmus test" issue), it is usually by way of a 
critique of what are seen as the "neo-Malthusian" arguments of population control 
advocates such as Paul Ehrlich - a critique that follows the spirit, if not the letter, of 
Marx's critique of Malthus.91 According to this argument, the real causes of resource 
scarcity, famine, and environmental degradation are not the existence of too many 
people or the limited carrying capacity of the earth but rather social factors such as 
the maldistribution of resources and inappropriate technology, which arise under the 
capitalist mode of production. 92 The democratic ecosocialist solution, then, is not 
90. Raymond Williams, Socialism and Ecology , (London: Socialist Environment and 
Resources Association, n.d.), p. 14. See also Williams, The Country and the City, 
p. 82. 
91. See, for example, Enzensberger, "A Critique of Political Ecology," pp. 13-15. 
Marx had argued that the apparent phenomenon of over-population under capitalism 
arose not as a result of natural conditions but rather as a result of the contradictions in 
the capitalist relations of production - in particular, its need to maintain an "industrial 
reserve army." See Michael Perelman, "Marx, Malthus, and the Concept of Natural 
Resource Scarcity," Antipode 11(1979): 80-84. 
92. These arguments received a considerable public airing in the debate between 
Barry Commoner and Paul Ehrlich in the early 1970s. On the Ehrlich/Commoner 
debate, see Paul Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (New York: Ballantine Books, 1970; 
revised ed., London: Pan/Ballantine, 1972) and Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle:  
Nature. Man and Technology (New York: Bantam, 1972). For an exchange of views, 
see Paul Ehrlich, John Holdren, and Barry Commoner, "Dispute: The Closing Circle," 
Environment 14 (1972): 24-25, 40-52. 
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birth control but the replacement of capitalism with a co-operative social order that 
uses ecologically, appropriate technologies for the satisfaction of human need. 93 
From an ecocentric perspective, the democratic ecosocialist response goes 
only part of the way toward addressing the population problem. First, it fails to 
consider the many ways in which growing absolute numbers of humans can magnify 
environmental degradation and therefore impair the overall quality of human life. 
Second, it fails to consider the impact of growing absolute numbers of humans on the 
nonhuman community - a limitation that arises from the exclusive democratic 
ecosocialist preoccupation with human welfare. As I explain in the following chapter 
in my response to Murray Bookchin's critique of the ecocentric approach to the 
population issue, the environmental impact of humans is a function not only of 
technology and affluence (i.e., level of consumption) but also absolute numbers of 
humans.94 From an ecocentric perspective, it is not enough simply to wait for the 
"demographic transition" (i.e., the lower birth and death rates that usually follow 
improved living standards) to achieve a stable And well fed human population since 
the price of such a transition is further widespread ecological degradation and species 
93. See, for example, Pepper, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism, pp. 167-69. 
On the more specific problem of world hunger, most democratic ecosocialists focus 
on the need for land redistribution and a general shift in diet toward plant protein 
rather than on the need for birth control. See Francis Moore Lappe and Joseph 
Collins, with Cary Fowler, Food First: Beyond the Myth of Scarcity (New York: 
Ballantine, 1979). On the more general question of the human population explosion, 
see Frances Moore Lappe and Rachel Schuman, Taking Population Seriously  
(London: Earthscan Publications, 1989). Lappe and Schuman provide an excellent 
analysis of the power structures that contribute to high birth rates in developing 
countries. Although their primary focus is on the social causes and consequences of, 
and social solutions to, rapid population growth, Lappe and Schuman nonetheless 
argue (unlike most democratic ecosocialists) that their analysis is capable of 
incorporating a nonanthropocentric perspective (see pp. 70-71). In particular, they 
urge their readers to be cognizant of the impact of human population not only on 
humans but also on nonhuman life (see p. 4). 
94. As Paul and Anne Ehlich point out, the key to understanding the role of human 
population growth in the environmental crisis lies in the equation I = PAT (with I 
representing environmental impact, P representing the absolute size of the human 
population, A representing affluence or level of resource consumption, and T 
representing the environmental disruptiveness of the technologies that provide the 
resources consumed). See Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich, The Population  
Explosion (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), pp. 58-59. This basic formula was 
first published in P. R. Ehrlich and J. P. Holdren, "Impact of Population Growth," 
Science 171 (1974): 1212-17. 
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extinction. To minimize ecological degradation during this transition period, 
ecocentric theorists argue that it is necessary to bring about, in addition to 
technological and distributional reforms and a lowering of resource consumption, a 
wide range of humane family planning measures with a view to stabilizing and then 
reducing human population. By "family planning measures" I have in mind not only 
free contraceptives and free birth control information and counselling but also 
affirmative action to improve the status and social opportunities of women as well as 
ecological education that explains, inter alia, the impact of human growth on 
ecosystems and the need to reduce the size of families to one or two children. The 
synergetic effect of introducing ecologically benign technologies and lowering energy 
and resource consumption As well as lowering the birth rate would have a much more 
dramatic result in terms of lessening environmental degradation and protecting biotic 
diversity than would the more limited democratic ecosocialist solution. 
To conclude, then, the ecological perspective of democratic ecosocialism 
may be seen as an unapologetic reassertion of anthropocentrism and a general 
dismissal of the ecocentric emancipatory theorists' generalized concern for human mci 
nonhuman welfare. This is reflected in the democratic ecosocialist theorists' analysis 
of the environmental crisis, in their political priorities, and in their interpretation of 
the "message of ecology," namely, that ecological science merely informs us of the 
limits to human activity but it cannot provide the basis for a new ethics or politics. As 
we shall see in the following chapter, the ecoanarchist Murray Bookchin has 
criticized Gorz's ecosocialism for adopting a technocratic form of environmentalism 
that fails to yield a new ecological sensibility. Despite Gorz's intention to go beyond 
Marxism, Bookchin argues that Gorz has merely fused Marxism and 
environmentalism, transcending neither. 95 Indeed, this particular aspect of 
Bookchin's critique of Gorz may be applied to democratic ecosocialism in general. 
That is, democratic ecosocialism may be seen as merely fusing Human Welfare 
Ecology with democratic socialism, transcending neither. 
95. Bookchin, review of Ecology as Politics, especially pp. 178-82. 
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The Anthropocentric Foundations of Socialism 
Having reached the above conclusion concerning democratic ecosocialism, I 
now want to draw together some of the basic assumptions that have informed all of 
the families of ecosocialism examined in this inquiry. This will provide the 
opportunity for a brief recapitulation of the central ecocentric critique of the various 
ecosocialist contributions to emancipatory ecopolitical thought before I turn my 
attention, in the next chapter, to the relationship between ecocentrism and 
ecoanarchism. 
Notwithstanding the considerable diversity of socialist thought and the 
impossibility of providing an exhaustive and exclusive definition of socialism, I 
propose to trace and examine some basic premises and preoccupations that inform its 
critical posture toward capitalism. I am not claiming that these premises and 
preoccupations are common to every strand of socialism or that they are unique to 
socialism, only that they capture a basic orientation of socialism that is carried 
forward in the ecosocialist thought examined in this inquiry. (To the extent that these 
premises are shared by other social and political traditions, then those traditions are 
equally vulnerable to the criticism I intend to make.) 
Ecosocialism carries forward a major preoccupation of socialist thought in 
general: to find an allocative system that ensures production for human need as an 
equitable alternative to the social and economic order spawned by capitalism. This 
preoccupation is generally associated with a reaction against the possessive 
individualism of liberalism together with some kind of alternative egalitarian claim to 
the effect that, at a minimum, All persons are entitled to have their basic needs met 
from society's wealth. This alternative claim may be seen as the universalistic core of 
much socialist thought in that it is based on respect for fl  persons. This is reflected 
in the constant search for more co-operative, equitable, and democratic economic 
arrangements that maximise the mutual self-realization (i.e., fulfilment of human 
potential) of all rather than the individual self-realization of the few (namely, the 
strong, the competitive, the privileged, and the lucky). These political ideals of 
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equality of entitlement and/or opportunity are variously posited as ideals that are to 
have priority over other modern political ideals such as freedom and democracy, as 
ideals that are to be somehow balanced with the ideals of freedom and democracy, or 
as ideals that will enable the universal realization of freedom and democracy. (The 
last approach is the more usual type of claim made by democratic socialist theorists.) 
Whatever the precise status of these ideals and whatever their intended form of 
realization, they are generally premised (whether explicitly or implicitly) on a 
recognition of the equal intrinsic worth and dignity of all humans. 
Now this fundamental premise of the equal intrinsic worth and dignity of all 
humans is not unique to socialism; the idea of "the supreme and intrinsic value, or 
dignity, of the individual human being" has been identified by Steven Lukes as one of 
the "four unit ideas" of individualism, the other three unit ideas being rational 
autonomy, privacy, and self development. 96 Lukes argues that while these four ideas 
are logically and conceptually interrelated, "the idea of human dignity or respect for 
persons lies at the heart of the idea of equality, while autonomy, privacy and 
self-development represent the three faces of liberty or freedom." 97 Indeed, Lukes 
observes that the notion of human dignity or respect for all persons is one of the most 
basic ideas that has come to pervade modern social and political thought in the West 
to the point that it is now 
... enshrined in the American Declaration of Independence, in the Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948, which began by 
declaring its "recognition of the inherent dignity and of e equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family" 
This principle of the intrinsic value or dignity of the human individual has a 
long and complex history in Western humanist thought and has been traced to both 
Christian and Greek philosophical sources. Lindsay, for example, has described the 
principle of the intrinsic value or dignity of the individual as being "the great 
96. Steven Lukes, Individualism (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 45 and Part 
II generally. 
97. Ibid., p. 125. 
98. Ibid., p. 49. 
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contribution to individualism" of the New Testament and all Christianity. 99 
Similarly, the historian Lynn White has argued that the medieval Christian 
world-view - which assigned to humans a leading role in the cosmic drama, with 
humans seen as standing between God and the rest of citation - has shaped modem 
science as well as the modern secular ideologies of Marxism and other "post-Christian 
humanisms." 10° In particular, these more secular humanisms share the 
Judaeo-Christian teleology of humanity's perpetual progress and mastery of the nature 
(as Bertrand Russell said of Marx: "Marx professed himself an atheist, but retained a 
cosmic optimism which only theism could justify"). 101 However, the idea of human 
dignity and self-importance also forms a central aspect of the humanism of the 
Renaissance (perhaps the high point of which was Pico's Oration on the Dignity of 
Man, 1496), which signified a return to Greek sources and an open, inquiring mind (in 
contrast to the tradition of Scholasticism and religious authority). 102 Indeed, 
Sessions argues that while the notion of human self-importance vis-a-vis the rest of 
nature may be seen as arising from "the radically subjective epistemological 
development of Western philosophy since Descartes ... the roots of philosophical 
anthropocentrism can be traced to classical Greek philosophy." 103 Blacicham also 
points out in his historical inquiry into humanism that all the essentials of humanism 
were well understood in antiquity. These include all the characteristics of an open 
99. Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 7, s.v. "Individualism," by A. D. 
Lindsay (New York: n.p., 1930-1933), pp. 674-80 at p. 676 (quoted by Lukes, 
Individualism, p. 45). 
100. See Lynn White, Jr., "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis," Science 155 
(1967): 1203-7, and George Sessions, "Andiropocentrism and the Environmental 
Crisis," Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 2 (1974): 71-81 at pp. 72-73. 
101. Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1945), p. 788-89, quoted by Sessions, "Anthropocentrism and the 
Environmental Crisis," p. 73. 
102.George Sessions, "Ecocentrism and the Greens: Deep Ecology and the 
Environmental Task," The Trumpeter 5 (1988): 65-69 at p. 67. For an outline of the 
thought of Pico Della Mirandola, see W. L. Reese, Dictionary of Philosophy and 
Religion (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1980), p. 438. Pico's elevated view of 
humanity led him to reject astrology on the ground that "the stars cannot control 
human destiny because a lower being cannot control a being of a higher order" (ibid). 
103. Sessions, "Anthropocentrism and the Environmental Crisis," p. 76. 
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society, such as the free exchange of ideas and goods, as well as the "separation of the 
divine and the human, with concentration upon the human development of an 
alternative to religion." 1°4 Moreover, he argues: 
The peak periods of "humanisms," namely, the Greek Enlightenment, the 
Renaissance, the European Enlightenment and its prolongation into various 
movements of the nineteenth century ... were formative periods that 
transformed a dominant part of,thp original Europe of the Church into modern 
secular industrial democracies. lw 
Blackham concludes that the post-Enlightenment tradition of humanism had, by the 
19th century, become agnostic, positivist, and concentrated on humanity as its own 
end. 106 It was also a tradition that had inherited the progressive ideals of lcs 
philosophes: "enlightenment - reason. tolerance, and humanity; emancipation - 
liberty. equality. fraternity." 107  Indeed, Blackham has elsewhere described the 
Enlightenment as the "golden age of humanism." 108  And, of course, it was the 
Enlightenment that had been so "prodigious of political theory, much of it liberal, 
universalist, secular, and anti-authoritarian." 109 For example, Immanuel Kant 
(1724-1804) - whose ideas had a lasting influence on modern political and legal 
thought - laid down a moral philosophy that was based, inter alia, on the principle that 
humans, as rational beings, belonged to a "kingdom of ends" and therefore could not 
be treated as mere means. This gave rise to ICant's famous "categorical imperative": 
act as if the maxim of one's act were to become a universal law. Although Kant did 
conclude that it was morally wrong to mistreat =human animals, he did so on the 
104.Blackham, Humanism (New York: International Publications Service, 1976), 
p. 112. Blackham identifies two general streams of humanism: "a mainstream 
tradition which became dominant in Europe after the Renaissance and a minority 
tradition which expressly excludes the divine and immortal from human interests" 
(ibid., p. 103). 
105.Ibid., p. 102. 
106.Ibid., pp. 126-28. 
107.Ibid. p. 126. 
108. See H. J. Blackham, "Humanism: The Subject of the Objections," in Objections  
to Humanism, ed. H. J. Blackham (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1965), pp. 7-28 at 
P. 9 . 
109. See Roger Scruton, A Dictionary of Political Thought (London: Pan Books, 
1982), p. 149. 
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ground that it might lead to the maltreatment of humans rather than on the ground that 
nonhuman animals themselves possessed inherent worth or mattered to 
themselves. 110 This radically subjective epistemological tradition of modern 
Western philosophy, which celebrated the human mind and its powers of reason, 
extends from Descartes, Kant, and Hegel to phenomenology and existentialism. 111 
It is noteworthy that Lukes, like most modern political theorists, finds the 
modern humanist principle of universal human dignity to be a self-evident, moral 
truth - something that is so obvious and compelling that it is unnecessary to provide 
any further exploration of its content, ambit, and basis. As Lukes puts it: 
In general, this idea of the dignity of the individual has the logical status of a 
moral (or religious) axiom which is basic, ultinAtg and overriding, offering a 
general justifying principle in moral argument. "  
Yet it is precisely this modern principle of the equal intrinsic worth and dignity of all 
humans that is now being re-examined by environmental philosophers in the wake of 
the ecological crisis. This re-examination has not been directed to the notion of 
dignity or intrinsic value per se. Rather, it has been directed to the fact that it is 
generally taken to reside exclusively, or at least pre-eminently. in humans  - a belief 
that environmental philosophers argue has resulted in the systematic favouring of 
human interests over the interests of the nonhuman world. As David Ehrenfeld 
observes, while humanism "has its nobler parts," and therefore ought not to be totally 
rejected, 
... we have been too gentle and uncritical of it in the past, and it has grown ugly 
and dangerous. Humanism itself, like the rest of our existence, must now be 
protected against its own excestsq. Fortunately, there are humane alternatives 
to the arrogance of humanism."' 
The various arguments against the anthropocentric legacy of humanism 
together with the arguments in favour of an ecocentric alternative have already been 
110. See Elizabeth M. Pybus and Alexander Broadie, "Kant and the Maltreatment of 
Animals," Philosophy 53 (1978): 560-61. 
111. Sessions, "Anthropocentrism and the Environmental Crisis," see p. 76. 
112. Lukes, Individualism, p. 51. 
113. David Ehrenfeld, The Arrogance of Humanism (Oxford; Oxford University 
Press, 1981), pp. xiii-xiv. 
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canvassed in Chapter 2 and need not be repeated here. It will suffice merely to 
emphasize that any political philosophy (of which socialism is but one major 
example) that uncritically incorporates these pervasive yet problematic assumptions 
that are embedded in our otherwise laudable humanist heritage will remain unable to 
seriously entertain the idea of respect for nonhuman nature for its own sake. The 
result will be the perpetuation of a systematic blindness or disinterestedness toward 
those kinds of environmental degradation that do not appear to impinge on human 
interests. It has been a major contention of Chapters 4 and 5 and this chapter that it is 
the unquestioned acceptance of these anthropocentric assumptions by ecosocialist 
theorists that has given rise to a limited ecological perspective and held back the 
progressive evolution of ecosocialist thought. This explains why the ecological 
perspective of All of the varieties of ecosocialism examined in this inquiry has been 
unable to transcend the Resource Conservation, Human Welfare Ecology, and 
utilitarian Preservation perspectives outlined in Chapter 2. 
Conclusion  
Having explored some of the historical sources of the anthropocentric 
assumptions embedded in socialist thought that have been carried forward in 
=socialist thought, it is fitting to conclude with a recapitulation of the different 
forms in which these assumptions have been characteristically expressed in the 
different families of ecosocialist thought identified in this inquiry. It will be recalled 
from my discussion in Chapter 2 that social and political theories, as Fox has pointed 
out, are often legitimated on the ground that they will enable the realization of 
whatever are taken to be the most important qualities of "humanness." 114 Whatever 
these qualities, they are defended as providing us with our human dignity or 
worthiness in that the cultivation of these qualities helps to distinguish us from, and 
"raise" us above, the rest of nature. For example, as Andrew McLaughlin points out, 
if we are considered to be essentially homo faber, the fabricator or tool maker, 
114. Warwick Fox, "The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate and its Parallels," 
Environmental Ethics 11(1989): 5-25 at pp. 22-23. 
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... then our history appears as a nearly linear progression forward in the 
domination of nature through the development of increasingly powerful 
technologies ... These advances appear as a progressiv ie,ipalization of human 
nature and yield a clear definition of human progress."' 
Alternatively, if the criterion is taken to be our unique ability to communicate via 
language, then the more we can perfect that communicative ability through, say, 
aspiring toward the establishment of an "ideal speech situation," then the more we 
may be said to have progressed qua humans. More generally, if we are taken to be 
free, creative beings of praxis who consciously transform the world, ourselves, and 
our social relations, then the removal of any impediments to, or the creation of the 
conditions that enhance, free self-determining activity represents progress in terms of 
human emancipation. 
Each of these examples - taken from Marx, Habermas, and democratic 
socialist thought in general - indicate how particular conceptions of what is special 
about being human can determined what constitutes human progress or human 
self-realization. (Where socialists differ from liberal political theorists is in their 
more concerted attempt to create the social, political, and economic conditions that 
will enable ll  members of the human family to realize whatever is taken to be their 
special human potential.) Of course, not all of these conceptualizations of what is 
special about being human are equally problematic from an ecocentric perspective. 
The orthodox eco-Marxist conceptualization of what it means to be human constitutes 
the most active kind of socialist discrimination against the nonhuman world. As I 
argued in Chapter 4, Marx's conception of human beings as homo faber amounted to 
an invitation to expand the "forces of production" and subdue the rest of nature to the 
greatest possible extent so that humans could control the nonhuman world for human 
purposes. By contrast, the humanist eco-Marxist and democratic ecosocialist 
conceptualizations of what it means to be human are considerably more tempered and 
may be seen as constituting passive, as distinct from aggressive, expressions of 
anthropocentrism insofar as they discriminate against the nonhuman world, in varying 
115. Andrew McLaughlin, "Homo Faber or Homo Sapiens?," The Trumpeter 6 
(1989): 21-24 at p. 21. 
258 
degrees, generally by omission rather than active commission. 116 In other words, 
while they do not actively promote the domination of the nonhuman world, their 
exclusive focus on human well-being means that they systematically fail to consider 
the special interests and needs of the nonhuman world. In the case of humanist 
eco-Marxism, the price of overcoming human alienation from "inner" and "outer" 
nature is the thoroughgoing domestication of the nonhuman world in the name of 
human self-expression. 
Habermasian Critical Theory, however, contains both passive and aggressive 
expressions of anthropocentrism. Habermas's communicative ethics, for example, are 
passively anthropocentric in that they are restricted to serving the interests of human 
speaking participants. Here, the nonhuman world is simply neglected - the dignity 
and rights of the human subject are secured at the expense of the nonhuman world. 
However, Habermas assumes a more explicit anthropocentric posture in his insistence 
that science can only know nature in instrumental terms. As I argued in Chapter 5, 
this limited conceptualization of science serves to actively reinforce rather than 
challenge the domination of the nonhuman world. 
Now I must emphasize that my rejection of the anthropocentric premises of 
socialist thought - which have been carried over into ecosocialist thought - does not 
require a rejection of either the entirely defensible socialist concern to find an 
allocative system that ensures production for genuine human need Ds the more general 
and equally defensible concern to seek the mutual self-realization of all humans rather 
than the individual self-realization of some. Rather, I have tried to show that both of 
these concerns fall naturally into the orbit of the ecocentric perspective defended in 
this inquiry. In particular, there is already a strong resonance between ecocentric 
social goals and key democratic ecosocialist goals such as the "new internationalism," 
democratic participation, and production for human need. Indeed, there is a sense in 
which ecocentrism may be seen as extending and rounding out the basic socialist 
116. On the useful distinction between passive and active anthropocentrism, see 
Warwick Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for 
Environmentalism (Boston: Shambhala, 1990), forthcoming, p. 22 (page citations 
refer to the prepublication ms). 
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norm of mutual self-reali7ation so that it encompasses the entire biotic community 
rather than just the human community. (As we saw in Chapter 2, transpersonal 
ecology theorists express the notion of self-realization in terms of cultivating a sense 
of self that sustains the widest possible identification with all beings.) This is highly 
significant in terms of the central question posed in Chapter 1, namely, does an 
ecocentric perspective have a natural ally in the existing pantheon of modern political 
traditions with which is can forge a theoretical linkage? That is, this general 
resonance between socialist concerns and ecocentric concerns on inter-human 
questions suggests that some ecosocialist principles and arguments might be 
selectively incorporated into the broader theoretical matrix of ecocentrism once they  
are divested of their anthropocentric limitations.  This possibility would not extend to 
the more aggressive anthropocentric categories of Marxist thought that have been 
rejected in Chapter 4, nor the overly rigid theoretical categories of Habermas that 
have been rejected in Chapter 5. However, the possibility of theoretical bridge 
building does arise in the case of many of the principles of democratic ecosocialism 
discussed in this chapter (with the exception of the more Marxist influenced 
contribution of Andre Gorz). Such a possibility arises by virtue of the fact that both 
ecocentrism and democratic ecosocialism reject an atomistic model of reality in 
favour of a reciprocal model of internal relations (albeit with different horizons and 
ethical implications). 117 Moreover, the passive anthropocentrism that pervades most 
democratic ecosocialist thought is arguably not fatal to its revision and relocation into 
an ecocentric matrix. That is, it would seem possible to, as it were, excise the passive 
anthropocentric assumptions embedded in democratic ecosocialism without seriously 
distorting its basic theoretical orientation of inclusiveness. The fundamental norm of 
respect for all persons would thus become a subset of a more general norm of respect 
for all life-forms. 
The upshot for democratic ecosocialism would be a widening of its field of 
moral considerability and compassion so that it reaches beyond the human 
117. For a brief discussion of this holistic model as it relates to socialism, see 
Worthington, "Socialism and Ecology," p. 78. 
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community to include all of the myriad life-forms in the biotic community. In 
particular, this would mean a broadening of the democratic ecosocialist approach to 
wilderness protection and human population growth in accordance with ecocentric 
goals. More generally, it would mean a broadening in the context of political, 
economic, and technological decision making so that human interests are pursued, 
wherever practicable, in ways that also enable the flourishing of other life-forms. 
The upshot for ecocentrism would be a strengthening and broadening of its 
political and economic analysis that will enable it to determine the kinds of 
institutional changes and redistributive measures that would be required to ensure an 
equitable transition toward a sustainable and more co-operative society. It would also 
enable ecocentrism to anticipate and address in a more concerted way the likely forms 
of opposition that will be encountered in the attempt to give practical expression to 
ecocentric emancipatory goals. In this respect, democratic ecosocialists are right to 
argue that capital will not be placed at the service of emancipatory goals without 
increasing government intervention in the market and without a gradual 
democratization of the economy. Finally, as I show in the following chapter, the 
democratic ecosocialist discussion of the potential "enabling role" of the state in 
facilitating the realization of emancipatory goals provides an informative and 
pragmatic counterpoint to the anti-statism and excessive idealism of many 
ecoanarchist theorists, notwithstanding the stronger ecocentric orientation of the 
latter. 
Chapter 7 
Ecoanarchism: The Non-Marxist Visionaries 
himxinsaisza 
In the previous three chapters I examined emancipatory ecopolitical theories 
that have either drawn upon, or otherwise maintained some general sympathy or 
continuity with, the extensive heritage of Marxism. In this chapter I examine a body 
of emancipatory ecopolitical theory that defines itself, by and large, as a distinct 
alternative to, rather than as an extension, reformulation, or revision of, this Marxist 
heritage. 1 This body of Green political theory is ecoanarchism. The following 
chapter on ecofeminism is also non-Marxist in character and has a degree of 
sympathy with ecoanarchism, although ecofeminism possesses a number of unique 
features that warrant its separate treatment. 
In this chapter I identify and evaluate two general currents of ecoanarchist 
thought - social ecology and ecocommunalism (the latter includes bioregionalism and 
what I call "ecomonasticism"). While the two general currents of social ecology and 
ecocommunalism differ in many important respects they both share the following 
features. First, as my overarching anarchist categorization indicates, both seek to 
by-pass and/or abolish the modern nation state and confer maximum political and 
economic autonomy on decentralized local communities. Second, both argue not 
only that anarchism is the political philosophy that is most compatible with an 
ecological perspective but also that anarchism is grounded in, or otherwise draws its 
inspiration from, ecology (indeed, many observers consider that nonviolent, 
communitarian anarchism is the political philosophy that has most affinity with the 
Green movement). 2 Third, the theorists discussed in this chapter not only oppose all 
1. I say "by and large" since there are some theorists in this current who are 
ex-Marxists and whose work bears the stamp of this legacy (e.g., Murray Bookchin 
and Rudolf Bahm) and others about whom the question as to whether they are indeed 
a Marxist, ethical socialist, or anarchist/libertarian is hotly debated (e.g., William 
Morris). 
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forms of social domination but also oppose, in varying degrees, the domination of the 
nonhuman world; expressed more positively, ecoanarchism seeks emancipation writ 
large. In particular, all ecoanarchists ground their political theory on an ecological 
perspective that seeks to transcend the Resource Conservation, Human Welfare 
Ecology, and Utilitarian Preservation perspectives to which the ecophilosophical 
perspectives of eco-Marxism (including Habermasian Critical Theory), and 
democratic ecosocialism are limited. Fourth, all of the ecoanarchist theorists 
discussed in this chapter are strong defenders of the grassroots and 
extra-parliamentary activity of the Green movement. Fifth, and finally, all of these 
theorists emphasize the importance of maintaining consistency between ends and 
means in Green political praxis. 
Beyond this, however, ecoanarchists divide in terms of the various 
theoretical explanations they offer to account for the ecological crisis (e.g., social 
ecology attaches greater theoretical importance to social hierarchy than does 
ecocommunalism); the types of ecocommtmities they advocate (e.g., social ecology is 
more libertarian whereas the ecomonastic strand of ecocommunalism tends to be 
relatively more ascetic); and the degree to which they are critical of the Western 
anthropocentric heritage (e.g., the ecocommunal tradition - particularly 
bioregionalism - is generally more ecocentric than social ecology). A further 
difference is that social ecology is largely the work of one particular theorist - Murray 
Bookchin - who has developed a distinctive organismic ecophilosophical perspective 
whereas ecocommunalism is a more general category that I use to encompass a 
variety of other kinds of ecoanarchist approaches of a relatively more ecocentric 
persuasion. 
In view of these differences I have divided the first part of this chapter into 
two general sections dealing with social ecology and ecocommunalism respectively. 
The criticisms that are unique to each particular general current, and each particular 
tributary, of ecoanarchism are dealt with in this discussion while those criticisms that 
2. For example, Johan Galtung, "The Green Movement: A Socio-Historical 
Exploration," International Sociology 1 (1986): 75-90 at p. 79. 
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are common to ecoanarchism in general are dealt with in the evaluative discussion in 
the second half of this chapter. In both cases my discussion is concerned to explore 
and assess the case for ecoanarchism in the light of the ecocentric goals of social and 
ecological emancipation. In particular, I ask: how consistent is ecoanarchism with an 
ecocentric world-view? In any event, is an anarchist polity the only kind of polity 
that is consistent with an ecocentric emancipatory politics? Is ecoanarchism 
nonetheless the political philosophy that is most conducive to the promotion of 
ecocentric goals? I conclude that while certain strands of ecoanarchism are 
undoubtedly ecocentric in their general orientation, no ecoanarchist theorist has 
mounted a convincing case for the necessity of the abolition of - as distinct from a 
greater devolution of power from - the modern nation state and, further, that 
ecocentric goals are more likely to be realized by the retention and reform of the state 
rather than its abolition. Finally, drawing in part on democratic ecosocialism, I argue 
that a multi-tiered, democratic polity is more consonant with an ecocentric model of 
freedom in the context of the modern world than a stateless society. 
The Social Ecology of Murray Bookchin  
Murray Bookchin stands as one of the early pioneers of emancipatory 
ecopolitical theory in his advocacy of an alternative ecological society that will 
enhance rather than restrict freedom. Over the past three decades, Bookchin's 
numerous publications on "social ecology" have sought to undermine the cleavage 
between the social and the natural worlds and restore a sense of continuity between 
human society and the creative process of natural evolution as the basis for the 
reconstruction of an ecoanarchist politics. 3 Bookchin describes his thought as 
3. Bookchin's publications are too numerous to list exhaustively here. His major 
books include Our Synthetic Environment (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), 
published under the pseudonym Lewis Herber, Post-Scarcity Anarchism (Berkeley: 
Ramparts Press, 1971); Toward an Ecological Society (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 
1980); The Ecology of Freedom (Palo Alto, California: Cheshire, 1982); The Modern 
Crisis (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1986); and The Rise of Urbanization 
and the Decline of Citizenship (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1987). Along with 
the five last-mentioned books, the major articles by Bookchin relevant to the present 
discussion are "Toward a Philosophy of Nature - The Bases for an Ecological Ethic," 
in Deep Ecology, ed. Michael Tobias (San Francisco: Avant Books, 1984), 
pp. 213-35; "Theses on Libertarian Municipalism," Our Generation 16 (1985): 9-22; 
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carrying forward the "Western organismic tradition" represented by thinkers such as 
Aristotle, Hegel, and, more recently, Hans Jonas - a tradition that is process oriented 
and concerned to elicit the "logic" of evolution. 4 According to Bookchin, the role of 
an ecological ethics is "to help us distinguish which of our actions serve the thrust of 
natural evolution and which of them impede it." 5 For Bookchin, evolution is 
developmental and dialectical, moving from the simple to the complex, from the 
abstract and homogenous to the particular and differentiated, ultimately toward 
greater individuation and freedom or selfhood. Social ecology - a communitarian 
anarchism rooted in an organismic philosophy of nature - is presented as the "natural" 
political philosophy for the Green movement because it has grasped this "true" grain 
of nature and can promise the widest realm of freedom or "selfhood" for both 
nonhuman nature And society. For Bookchin, an anarchist society, free of hierarchy, 
is "a precondition for the practice of ecological principles." 6 
Although democratic ecosocialism and social ecology represent quite 
distinct schools of emancipatory ecopolitical thought, there is nonetheless a 
superficial resemblance between the two. For example, it is noteworthy that 
Bookchin has become a major voice of the "Green Left" in North America, sharing 
many of the European democratic ecosocialists' criticisms of deep/transpersonal 
ecology (this is not surprising, given Bookchin's former Marxist leanings and his 
familiarity with Continental political theory). This shared critique arises from the fact 
that both social ecology and democratic ecosocialism emphasize, as their names 
might suggest, the social or inter-human origins of environmental degradation - an 
emphasis that has led both to criticize the deep/transpersonal ecology focus on 
anthropocentrism for deflecting attention away from inter-human inequities such as 
"Freedom and Necessity in Nature: A Problem in Ecological Ethics," Alternatives 13 
(1986): 29-38; "Thinking Ecologically: A Dialectical Approach," Our Generation 18 
(1987): 3-40; and "Social Ecology Versus 'Deep Ecology': A Challenge to the 
Ecology Movement," Green Perspectives: Newsletter of the Green Program Project, 
Summer 1987, pp. 1-23. 
4. Bookchin, "Thinking Ecologically," p. 4. 
5. Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom, p. 342. 
6. Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism, p. 70. 
265 
those based on class, gender, and race. 7 It is also interesting to note that Bookchin 
has claimed that the West German Green party "has supplanted the traditional 
socialisms with a social ecology movement." 8 As we saw in Chapter 6, many 
democratic ecosocialists claim that the West German Green Party is essentially an 
ecosocialist party! The many factions within the West German Green party are such 
that both claims have some degree of truth. 
Beyond these superficial similarities, however, social ecology departs 
fundamentally from democratic ecosocialism in terms of both analysis and 
ecophilosophical perspective. Whereas democratic ecosocialists have singled out 
capitalism as the main driving force behind environmental degradation, Bookchin has 
conducted a more wide ranging critique that regards capitalism as but a subset of a 
more deep seated problem, namely, social hierarchy. Bookchin's social ecology, then, 
is not Marxist - it is libertarian: 
To create a society in which every individual is seen as capable of participating 
directly in the formulation of social policy is to instantly invalidate social 
hierarchy and domination. To accept this single concept means that we are 
committed to dissolving State power, audwrity, and sovereignty into an 
inviolate form of personal empowerment.Y 
Bookchin is also critical of what he regards as the productivist and authoritarian 
legacy of socialist thought and its lack of a thoroughgoing ecological perspective. 10 
Indeed, Bookchin's critique of Andre Gorz's ecosocialism is no less vehement than 
some of his recent criticisms of deep ecology. As we saw in Chapter 6, Bookchin has 
dismissed Gorz's ecosocialism for being fraught with paradoxes in attempting to 
combine central bureaucratic planning with neighbourhood self-help initiatives and 
7. For a thoroughgoing response to these criticisms by a leading deep (or, as he would 
say, transpersonal) ecology theorist, see Warwick Fox, "The Deep Ecology-
Ecofeminism Debate and its Parallels," Environmental Ethics 11(1989): 5-25. 
8. Murray Bookchin, "On the Last Intellectuals," Telos 73 (1987): 182-85 at p. 182. 
9. Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom, p. 340. 
10. See, for example, Murray Bookchin, "Beyond Neo-Marxism," Telos 36 (1978): 
5-28 and the chapter "On Neo-Marxism, Bureaucracy, and the Body Politic," in 
Toward an Ecological Society, pp. 211-48. See also John Clark, The Anarchist 
Moment: Reflections on Culture. Nature and Power (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 
1984). 
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worker self-management Despite Gorz's professed aim of going beyond Marxism, 
Bookchin argues that Gorz has merely fused Marxism and environmentalism, 
transcending neither, in a "politics that is environmentally oriented, not an ecological 
sensibility that is meant to yield a political orientation." 11 
Bookchin argues that social ecology, on the other hand, is grounded in an 
ecological sensibility that rejects the human-centred, instrumental posture toward 
nature that is characteristic of socialist thought. This follows from Bookchin's 
organismic philosophy, which recognizes "subjectivity" as present, however 
germinally, in all phenomena, not just humans. (By "subjectivity" Bookchin means 
any kind of purposive activity or striving, whether latent or advanced. 12)  Indeed, 
prior to Bookchin's much publicized attack on deep ecology at the National Greens 
Conference in Amherst, Massachusetts in July 1987, many ecopolitical theorists 
regarded social ecology and deep ecology as complementary ecophilosophies. 13 
Both Naess's deep/shallow ecology distinction and Bookchin's social 
ecology/environmentalism distinction (introduced in Chapter 2) were critical of 
scientism and a purely instrumental orientation toward the nonhuman world; both 
11. Murray Bookchin, review of Ecology as Politics, by Andre Gorz, Telos 46 
(1980-81): 176-90 at p. 179. 
12. As Bookchin explains: "The term subjectivity expresses the fact that substance - at 
each level of its organization and in all its concrete forms - actively functions to 
maintain its identity, equilibrium, fecundity, and place in a given constellation of 
phenomena" (Ecology of Freedom, p. 275). 
13. See Bookchin, "Social Ecology Versus 'Deep Ecology.' This is by no means the 
first critique of deep ecology delivered by Bookchin, but it is the most polemical and 
has become the most notorious. For some responses and counter-responses to this 
critique, see Kirkpatrick Sale, "Deep Ecology and its Critics," The jsafign, 14 May 
1988, pp. 670-75; for Bookchin's reply ("As if People Mattered") and Sale's 
counter-reply ("Sale Replies"), see The Nation, 10 October 1988, pp. 294 and 314; 
George Sessions, "Ecocentrism and the Greens: Deep Ecology and the Environmental 
Task," The Trumpeter 5 (1988): 65-69; Bill Devall, "Deep Ecology and its Critics," 
The Trumpeter 5 (1988): 55-60; for letters and responses by Bill McCormick, Bill 
Devall, George Sessions, and Arne Naess, see Green Synthesis, September 1988, 
pp. 3-5; for a reply, see Murray Bookchin, "A Reply to My Critics," Green Synthesis, 
December 1988, pp. 5-7; Brian Tolcar, "Exploring the New Ecologies: Social 
Ecology, Deep Ecology and the Future of Green Political Thought," Alternatives 15 
(1988): 30-43 (footnote 21 of Tokar's article contains many more references to the 
debate); contributions by Bill Devall, Mike Kaulbars, Bill McCormick, and Brian 
Tokar in Alternatives 16 (1989): 49-54; and Arne Naess, "Finding Common Ground," 
Green Synthesis, March 1989, p. 910. 
267 
sought to re-embed humans in the natural world; and, at a more practical level, both 
supported bioregionalism, small-scale decentralized communities, cultural and 
biological diversity, and "appropriate" technology. 
Despite these important commonalities, however, there are fundamental 
differences in the ecophilosophical orientation of deep/transpersonal ecology and 
social ecology that have given rise to fundamentally different perspectives concerning 
humanity's proper role in the evolutionary drama. These different orientations toward 
human stewardship are reflected in the different positions taken by deep/transpersonal 
ecologists and social ecologists in regard to what I have earlier identified as the two 
"litmus test" ecological issues, namely, human population growth and wilderness 
preservation. These differences will be discussed below. The point I wish to 
emphasize here is that since Bookchin's much publicized critique of deep ecology, the 
differences between social ecology and deep/transpersonal ecology have now become 
much more discussed, and hence much more marked, than the many commonalities. 
Not only are important ecophilosophical issues at stake here; there is also a struggle to 
influence the political priorities of the growing Green movement. 
For the purposes of the following examination, Bookchin's oeuvre may be 
conveniently divided into his social philosophy and his ecological ethics, although 
both are closely interrelated. In the first section, I evaluate Bookchin's central 
contention that the root of the ecological crisis is social hierarchy. In the following 
section, I examine whether Bookchin's ecological perspective is, in any event, an 
ecocentric philosophy of the kind defended in this inquiry. Does it offer the widest 
realm of freedom for both the human and nonhuman worlds as Bookchin claims? 
Here I will be drawing out the major differences between, on the one hand, what 
might be called Bookchin's "ecological humanism" and, on the other hand, an 
ecocentric perspective, in the context of a discussion of the litmus issues of 
wilderness preservation and human population growth. I conclude that the kind of 
ecological freedom promised by Bookchin is best delivered by an ecocentric 
emancipatory perspective (of which transpersonal ecology is but one example) rather 
than by Bookchin's ecological humanism. 
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(i) Bookchin's Social Hierarchy Thesis 
From as early as the 1960s Bookchin has maintained the thesis that the 
domination of nonhuman nature by humans arose from the domination of humans by 
humans This argument finds its most developed expression in Bookchin's magnum 
opus The Ecology of Freedom: The mergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy.14 in 
this work, Bookchin seeks to explore and develop this thesis by tracing the emergence 
of hierarchy and domination in human societies from the Palaeolithic Age to modern 
times. According to Bookchin, the breakdown of early, "organic" or pre-literate 
communities based on kinship ties into hierarchical and finally class societies, 
culminating in the State, was to gradually undermine the unity of human society with 
the nonhuman world. Bookchin argues that incipient domination arose originally in 
preliterate societies in the form of social hierarchies rooted in age, sex, and 
quasi-religious and quasi-political needs. These social hierarchies are presented as 
providing the conceptual apparatus of domination or what Bookchin calls the 
"epistemologies of rule" - the repressive sensibility of command and obedience that 
enables some humans to see others as objects of manipulation. According to 
Bookchin, "from this self-imagery, we have extended our way of visualizing reality 
into our image of 'external' nature." 15 This position has been reaffirmed in his more 
recent writings, where he argues that 
... the domination of nature first arose within aKitizz as part of its 
institutionalization into gerontocracies that placed the young in varying degrees 
of servitude to the old and patriarchies that placed women in varying degrees of 
servitude to men - not in any endeavour to "control" nature or natural forces. 
Various modes of social institutionalization, not modes of organizing human 
labour (so crucial to Marx), led to domination. Hence, domination can be 
removed only by resolving problematics that have their origins in h*yarchy and 
status, not simply class and the technological domination of nature. '° 
14.For an earlier statement of this thesis, see Bookchin, post-Scarcity Anarchism, 
p.63. 
15.Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom, p. 350. Bookchin argues that "the objective 
history of the social structure becomes internalized as a subjective history of the 
psychic structure" (ibid., p. 8). In other words, it is the institutions of human 
domination that fostered the development of a metaphysics of radical separation 
between subject and object, which then made possible the domination of the 
nonhuman world. 
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Bookchin's thesis that the domination of "external nature" by humans stems from the 
domination of humans by humans is a reversal of the general Marxist reading of 
history (welcomed by orthodox Marxists as a necessary stage toward communism and 
lamented by the first generation of Critical Theorists) that it is the increasing human 
mastery of nature that has given rise to class society and social domination. 
According to Bookchin, this Marxist reading of history saw the domination of nature 
as wedded to human survival in a hostile natural world that was "mute," "stingy," and 
"cruel." What was seen as humanity's ascent toward freedom from material want 
therefore demanded struggle, conquest, and our increasing disembeddedness from 
nature in order to overcome natural necessity. Social ecology, on the other hand, does 
not see the conquest of nature as the necessary "price" of human freedom. Rather, it 
looks to nature as the ground of freedom and seeks to re-embed humans in the natural 
world. 17 This, argues Bookchin, demands the creation of a libertarian, stateless 
society, with the notion of libertarianism being guided by Bookchin's description of 
the ecosystem: "the image of unity in diversity, spontaneity, and complementary 
relationships, free of all hierarchy and domination." 18 This translates politically into 
a society that is free of "gerontocracies, patriarchies, class relationships, elites of all 
kinds, and finally the State, particularly in its most socially parasitic form of state 
capitalism." 19 
The radical thrust of social ecology is seen to derive from its ecological 
outlook, which recognizes what is seen to be the nonhierarchical interdependence of 
living and nonliving things. According to Bookchin, the case for hierarchy is 
undermined once we perceive nature from the perspective of social ecology, that is, 
"as a web - a circular inter-lacing nexus of plant/animal [including human] 
relationships," rather than as a ladder or a pyramid. Such a perspective is also seen to 
come from those strands of ecofeminism that are based on an alternative, 
16. Bookchin, "Thinking Ecologically," pp. 7-8, footnote 1. 
17. Ibid., p. 7, see footnote 1. 
18. Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom, p. 352. 
19. Ibid., p. 353. 
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nonhierarchical sensibility of reciprocity (these ecofeminist perspectives are discussed 
in detail in the following chapter.) 2° According to Bookchin, such an ecological 
outlook implicitly undermines the conventional notion that hierarchy is part of the 
"natural" order of things: 
What renders social ecology so important is that it offers no case whatsoever for 
hierarchy in nature and society; it decisively challenges the veu function of 
hierarchy as a stabilizing or ordering principle in Ii  realms." 
Only human communities are seen to be capable of creating repressive structures and 
institutions that are capable of taking on a life of their own. In this respect, Bookchin 
explains that "the seemingly hierarchical traits of many animals are more like 
variations in the links of a chain than organized stratifications of the kind we find in 
human societies and institutions." 22 Bookchin argues that only an ecological society 
can avoid, or at least minimize; these pitfalls because it is free of the domineering 
sensibility that is institutionally fostered in a hierarchical society. 
Although Bookchin warns that we must avoid anthropomorphic judgements 
that project the distinctive features of these socially created institutions onto the 
nonhuman world, he considers that the reverse is both legitimate and desirable. That 
is, in the context of an appreciation of Bookchin's ecological tenets, we may 
"transpose the nonhierarchical character of natural ecosystems to society" provided 
we do not reduce social ecology to natural ecology. 23  This one-way mapping of 
ideas flows directly from Bookchin's organismic philosophy of nature, according to 
which humans are "nature rendered self-conscious," able to discern the thrust of 
evolution. 
The problems associated with this last-mentioned aspect of Bookchin's work 
are treated in more detail in the following section on Bookchin's ecological ethics. In 
this section I want to confine my critical comments to two aspects of Bookchin's 
20. Ibid., p. 341. 
21. Ibid., pp. 36-37. 
22. Ibid., p. 29. 
23. Ibid., p. 36. 
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social hierarchy thesis, namely, his method of justification and the plausibility of his 
argument. By method of justification, I am referring to Bookchin's assertion that 
social hierarchy is undermined once we grasp that there is no hierarchy in nature. My 
contention is that it is not an adequate argument simply to invoke a presumed telos in 
nature as a justification for social ecology, since even if such a telos accorded with the 
picture of reality provided by modern science (which, in any case, I argue in the 
following section that it does not) this does not in itself tell us why we ought to follow 
it. As J. Hughes observes, "the reason for us to oppose hierarchy has to do with an 
existential human ethical decision, not with its 'unnaturalness.'" 24 
An evaluation of the plausibility of Bookchin's social hierarchy thesis 
requires a clarification of the concept of hierarchy. According to Bookchin, hierarchy 
is 
... the cultural, traditional and psychological systems of obedience and 
command, not merely the economic and political systems to which the term 
class and state most appropriately refer ... I doubt that the word [hierarchy] can 
be encompassed by a formal definition. I view it historically and existentially 
as a complex system of command and obedience in which elites enjoy varying 
degrees of control over their subordinates without necessarily exploiting them. 
Such elites may completely lack any form of material wealth; they may even be 
dispossessed of is, much as Plato's "guardian" elite was socially powerful but 
materially poor.J 
Bookchin also uses the term hierarchy to encompass a dualistic metaphysics or 
pyramidal sensibility that ranks the higher as superior and the lower as inferior, which 
he opposes to his metaphysics of "unity in diversity." 
For Bookchin, then, hierarchy is not stratification per se. Rather, it is 
stratification am a relationship of obedience and command that arises from a ranking 
of some strata as "higher" and others "lower." In this respect, he takes the definition 
somewhat beyond the etymology of the word hierarchy - from the Greek bieros  
(divine, holy) and atidies (to rule) - which simply means "a system of persons or 
things arranged in a graded order" (i.e., this does not necessarily imply a relationship 
24. J. Hughes, "Beyond Bookchinism: A Left Green Response," Socialist Review 3 
(1989): 103-8 at p. 107. 
25. Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom, p. 4. 
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of command and obedience). 26 Nonetheless, Bookchin argues that although 
hierarchy involves a relationship of command and obedience, it does not necessarily 
involve  xploitation. (If it did, Bookchin's entire social hierarchy thesis would be 
rendered tautological.) 
It is useful to compare Bookchin's notion of hierarchy with that of Fritjof 
Capra in The Turning Point. Whereas Bookchin insists that there is no hierarchy in 
nature, Capra maintains that hierarchy - or "stratified order" as he prefers to call it - is 
a basic principle of self-organizing systems. However, to avoid any misinterpretation 
in his discussion of what he calls the "systems view of life," Capra reserves "the term 
'hierarchy' for those fairly rigid systems of domination and control in which orders are 
transmitted from the top down. The traditional symbol for these structures has been a 
pyramid."27 Capra uses the notion of stratified order, in contrast, to refer to the 
multilayered structure of living organisms, with each layer (or what Arthur Koestler 
refers to as a "holon") exhibiting both self-assertive and integrative tendencies. 28 
Capra employs the metaphor of a tree to explain such a system, since information and 
energy flow in bmh directions through many intricate and nonlinear pathways. 29 
This seems to be what Bookchin is getting at in his nonhierarchical image of nature as 
"unity-in-diversity," although he Wks of "differentiation" and "complementarity" 
rather than stratified order. 
With this useful distinction between hierarchy and stratified order (or 
differentiation) in mind, we can now assess Bookchin's claim. Bookchin is concerned 
to criticize any social structure that inhibits self-determining activity, which is 
26. Collins English Dictionary (London: Coffins, 1983). 
27. Fritjof Capra, The Turning Point: Science. Society and the Rising Culture  
(London: Fontana, 1985), p. 305. 
28. Arthur Koestler, Janus (London: Hutchinson, 1978), p. 57 (for a discussion, see 
Capra, The Turning Point, p. 27). 
29. According to Capra, from an evolutionary point of view, living systems that 
exhibit stratified order are more resilient than nonstratifial systems because they can 
break down into their various subsystems without being destroyed when disturbed. In 
this way they can evolve through both adaptation and creation. Nonstratified systems, 
on the other hand, are more likely to disintegrate altogether in the face of 
perturbations (ibid., pp. 303-4). 
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Bookchin's highest norm since it coincides with what he takes to be the thrust of 
evolution. The gist of Bookchin's argument seems to be that by ridding society of 
social hierarchy (as distinct from differentiation) we will remove the possibility of us 
developing hierarchical sensibilities vis-a-vis ourselves and the nonhuman world. 
Bookchin's thesis can be interpreted in a number of ways. An emphatic 
version of his thesis might be that social hierarchy necessarily inhibits the free 
unfolding of the human and nonhuman worlds; the corollary of this is that 
self-determining activity is only possible in a nonhierarchical society. If this thesis 
were true, it would justify the complete abolition of all social hierarchy. Such an 
argument, however, is difficult to sustain. In human societies, social hierarchy can 
either enable or oppress, depending on the circumstance. Bookchin himself concedes 
that the existence of ranking (read "social hierarchy") in terms of social elites is not 
necessarily domineering, at least in relation to so-called "organic" societies, for he 
states that "the appearance of a ranking system that conferred privilege on one stratum 
over another, notably the young over the old, was in its own way a form of 
compensation that more often reflected the egalitarian features of organic society 
rather than the authoritarian features of later societies." 3° Indeed, it is possible to 
envisage circumstances where social hierarchy can provide meaning, identity, and a 
context that facilitates personal self-realization. Take, for example, a monastery in 
which members may at any time renounce their vows and leave but who nonetheless 
voluntarily submit themselves to the authority of the abbot or Zen Master. Here, the 
members are clearly self-determining individuals in the sense that they have freely 
chosen a disciplined lifestyle of obedience to a superior as a means of facilitating their 
own self-realization. Indeed, the monastic paradigm has been widely referred to by 
other ecoanarchist theorists such as Bahro and Roszak as providing an exemplar of 
ecocomniunal living by providing social solidarity, identity, and ecological harmony, 
as I show below. Of course, this ecocommunal model of living does not necessarily 
require a guru, master, or governing committee at its apex. However, such a 
30. Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom, pp. 6-7. 
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hierarchical arrangement, when accompanied by the qualities of personal example, 
integrity, and leadership (both spiritual and otherwise) in those who "rule," are quite 
acceptable to this ecocommunal tradition. 
Of course, there are countless examples of human societies where social 
domination can be attributable to some kind of social hierarchy. Indeed, it would 
seem plausible to argue (and this may be all Bookchin intends to argue) that social 
hierarchy is merely a necessary (as distinct from sufficient) condition for social 
domination. In this case it is not necessary to show that social hierarchy will Always  
give rise to social domination in every case - only that it always be present in those 
cases where social domination does exist and that social domination will never be 
found in those societies in which social hierarchy is absent. Even here, however, one 
might want to consider the positive benefits of social hierarchy and weigh these 
benefits against the potential downside rather than argue that social hierarchy ought to 
be completely abandoned in every instance. 
While the argument that social hierarchy gives rise to social domination has 
some plausibility, the second aspect of Bookchin's social hierarchy thesis is much 
more contentious, namely, that the root of the ecological crisis is social hierarchy and, 
accordingly, the solution to that crisis is the removal of all forms of social hierarchy. 
If by this argument Bookchin means that there is a necessary connection between 
social hierarchy and the domination of the nonhuman world, then his thesis can be 
simply refuted: first, by the many historical examples of hierarchical societies that 
have lived in relative harmony with the nonhuman world (e.g., Benedictine 
communalism, feudalism, many pre-literate societies), and, second, by the theoretical 
possibility of an egalitarian, nonhierarchical society that nonetheless continues to 
dominate the nonhuman world. As to the latter, Marx's communist society of the 
future would have been a clear example of this had it eventuated, as we saw in 
Chapter 4. As Fox puts it, "Bookchin's presentation of social ecology thus conveys no 
real appreciation of the fact that the relationship between the internal organization of 
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human societies and their treatment of the nonhuman world can be as many and 
varied as the outcome of any other evolutionary processes." 31 
Now it is possible that I have overstated or oversimplified this aspect of 
Bookchin's case - indeed, it is often very difficult to pin down Bookchin's arguments 
with any degree of precision. In view of this, it will be useful to examine a less 
emphatic and more qualified (and more plausible) version of his social hierarchy 
thesis as it relates to the nonhuman world. That is, it is possible to interpret Bookchin 
as saying only that history has shown that hierarchical societies create the 
psychological conditions for the domination of the nonhuman world but that the 
actual domination of the nonhuman world is dependent upon a society possessing the 
requisite tools. In this case, social hierarchy is merely a necessary as distinct from 
sufficient condition for the domination of the nonhuman world, just as it is merely a 
necessary as distinct from sufficient condition for social domination. 
Yet even when Bookchin's thesis is expressed in these more qualified terms, 
it arguably has no more plausibility than the early Frankfurt School thesis that 
Bookchin reverses. As we saw in Chapter 5, the early Frankfurt School theorists had 
argued that the domination of external nature through the development of more 
sophisticated and large-scale technologies (a development that resulted from the 
ascendancy of instrumental rationality over other kinds of rationality) has given rise 
to social hierarchy and the domination of people. Note that the crucial link in both 
theses is the presence of a certain mental framework or way of seeing 
("epistemologies of rule" in the case of Bookchin, instrumental reason in the case of 
the Frankfurt School); note also that in both cases the domination of the nonhuman 
world is dependent on this mental framework finding practical expression in 
repressive technologies. When broken down in this way, the qualified version of 
Bookchin's thesis and the Frankfurt School thesis may appear more as complementary  
(rather than oppositional) theses that examine, as it were, different sides of the same 
coin. 
31. Fox, "The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate," p. 15. 
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Nonetheless, it is arguable that the Frankfurt School's thesis has more to 
commend it than Bookchin's thesis. If it is accepted that technology is our principal 
mediator with the rest of nature, conditioning how we conceive of and interact with 
ourselves and the nonhuman world, then the Frankfurt School's thesis concerning the 
link between social and ecological domination would seem to provide a more 
plausible explanation than either the emphatic or qualified versions of Bookchin's 
thesis. For example, the historical exploration of the oriental despotism of "hydraulic 
societies" by the Frankfurt School theorist Karl Wittfogel shows how large scale 
interventions in the "natural" flow of water through the mighty irrigation projects of 
ancient China, India, Mesopotamia, and Egypt necessitated large scale, totalitarian, 
and centralized bureaucracies that impoverished the lives of peasant populations. 32 
More recently, the American environmental historian Donald Worster has employed 
the early Frankfurt School thesis to explain the highly centralized bureaucratic 
political order that accompanied the intensive irrigation of the Colorado River - a 
development that resulted in the farmers of the Colorado River basin becoming virtual 
wards of the massive U. S. Bureau of Reclamation. 33 A similar analysis might be 
applied to the hydro-industrialization policy of a succession of Tasmanian state 
governments from the 1920s to the mid-1980s, which resulted in the steady 
augmentation of the power of the State's Hydro Electricity Corporation to the point 
where it was, for a time, no longer answerable to Parliament for the conduct of its 
affairs.34 In these and many other examples of large scale technological 
interventions in nature - such as the modem day massive hydroelectricity projects in 
32. Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1957). 
33. Donald Worster, "Water and the Flow of Power," The Ecologist 13 (1983): 
168-74. 
34. The significant turning point in this saga was the Australian grassroots 
environmental campaign to prevent the damming of the Franklin river. For an 
account of the impact of this campaign upon Tasmanian public affairs, see R. A. Herr 
and B. W. Davis, "The Tasmanian Parliament, Accountability and the 
Hydro-Electricity Commission: The Franldin River Controversy," Parliament and  
Bureaucracy. Parliamentm Scrutiny of Administration: Prospects and Problems in  
the 1980s, ed. J. Nethercote (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1982), pp. 268-79. 
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India, Egypt, and Brazil - "administered life' is coming to be the common experience 
for rivers, deserts, and people alike."35 
Now Bookchin would no doubt reply that these examples support at least the 
qv Riffled version of WI social hierarchy thesis by pointing to a pre-existing social 
hierarchy in these societies that was able to envisage and implement these gigantic 
technological feats in the first place. Moreover, he would insist that if we are to 
overcome these domineering institutions, we must first change our social organization 
rather than our technologies because "a liberatory technology presupposes liberatory 
institutions."36 Yet we have already seen that it is theoretically possible to have a 
society that is free of social hierarchy but that nonetheless dominates the nonhuman 
world through large scale technologies in order to minimise "necessary labour" (such 
as Marx's communist society). In this case, human emancipation is dependent on the 
domination of "external nature." 
Of course, Bookchin rejects this Marxist route to human emancipation and 
emphasizes the importance of democratically manageable technologies and "soft" 
energy paths - reforms that Bookchin argues will naturally flow from the kind of 
social reorganization he envisages. However, in terms of the argument I wish to 
advance here it is not necessary to attempt to resolve this debate - indeed it is in all 
likelihood impossible to do so in view of the chicken-and-egg nature of the problem 
we are examining. The above debate simply highlights the mutually reinforcing 
nature of the domination of the human and nonhuman worlds by some humans, at 
least in relation to large scale, technological interventions in nature. It also highlights 
the complexity and mutually reinforcing relationship between a society's social and 
technical matrix and its orientation toward the nonhuman world. What I am primarily 
concerned about, however, are the different political priorities that flow from these 
opposing theses given that it is possible to address the general problem of domination 
from, as it were, opposite sides. 
35. Worster, "Water and the Flow of Power," p. 172. 
36. Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom, p. 243. 
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Although both approaches arrive at broadly similar political conclusions 
(that is, the need to move toward a society operating on the basis of smaller scale, 
decentralized and ecologically benign technology and energy sources, and greater 
local democracy and social co-operation) the political route by which such a society 
would be arrived at is quite different. Bookchin's thesis gives priority to removing 
social hierarchy; the resolution of ecological problems will come later by virtue of the 
general nonhierarchical sensibility that his anarchist society would engender, a 
sensibility that Bookchin argues would be extended to the nonhuman world. In 
contrast, the early Frankfurt School thesis gives priority to scaling down and 
reforming our technological interventions in the nonhuman world (and hence our 
material throughput), developing a more empathic sensibility toward "external" nature 
(and releasing those empathic, aesthetic, and expressive aspects of our "internal" 
nature), and ensuring that instrumental reason serves rather than determines political 
choices. This thesis maintains that opportunities for greater democratic participation 
and individual autonomy in society will flow from a reorganization of society's 
technological matrix, which would entail the breakdown of bureaucracies, the 
decentralization of energy resources, the development of a more socially responsible 
and democratic science, and the liberation of repressed human sensibilities. 
Given the urgency of the ecological crisis, this second political route is • 
preferable for the simple reason that the protection of the life-support capacity of 
ecosystems (through the introduction of ecologically benign technologies) is logically 
antecedent to the resolution of inter-human problems. This is the case whether one's 
ecological perspective is anthropocentric or ecocentric. Bookchin's social hierarchy 
thesis, however, gives strategic priority to dismantling all hierarchical institutions 
within society and establishing a direct democracy at the community level - the 
foundations for the establishment of an ecological society. Of course, Bookchin has 
also argued on many occasions for the cultivation of an ecological technics. 37 
37. See, for example, the chapters "Energy, 'Ecotechnocracy' and Ecology" and "The 
Concept of Ecotechnologies and Ecoconununities," in Bookchin, Toward an 
Ecological Society. 
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However, in terms of his theoretical analysis, this would not be given the same 
priority as removing social hierarchy because the wide-spread use of ecological 
technics is made to depend upon the removal of social hierarchy. The question 
ecocentric theorists would pose is: can we afford to wait in view of the urgency of the 
ecological crisis and the alarming rate of species extinction? As Fox points out in his 
response to Bookchin's critique of deep/transpersonal ecology, the political priorities 
that flow from Bookchin's social hierarchy thesis mean that human social concerns 
systematically eclipse concerns regarding the fate of the nonhuman world. 38 Of 
course, ecocentric theorists would agree with Bookchin that the revival of local 
democracy and the breakdown of concentrations of economic and political power are 
essential to social emancipation (just as Bookchin accepts the need for an ecological 
technics). Yet, as Lorna Salzman argues, "a radical, ecologically inspired-politics that 
aims at ecological sanity and reconstruction necessarily subsumes all the issues of 
5ocio-economic injustice and oppression with which social ecologists are 
concerned."39  For example, the straightforward decision by a democratically elected 
parliament to move toward a decentralized and predominantly solar and wind 
powered local economy would have the effect of breaking down the economic and 
political power of large scale, centralized bureaucracies and corporations. It would 
also change the scale and nature of institutions in such a way as to make them more 
amenable to participatory democracy. 
Finally, as I argue later in this chapter in my evaluation of ecoanarchism, 
social emancipation is not incompatible with the continued existence of the state - 
indeed, it can be facilitated by the state. Moreover, I argue below that the urgency of 
the ecological crisis is such that we cannot afford DIA to "march through" and reform 
the existing institutions of liberal parliamentary democracy (where they are available 
and despite their many limitations) and employ the resources (legal, financial, and 
38. Fox, "The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate," see p. 17. 
39. Lorna Salzman, "POlitics as if Evolution Mattered: Some Thoughts on Deep and 
Social Ecology," Paper presented to the Ecopolitics IV Conference, University of 
Adelaide, South Australia, 21-24 September 1989, pp. 1-15 at p. 15. Fox also argues 
precisely along these lines in "The Deep Ecology-Ecoferninism Debate." 
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diplomatic) of the state to promote national and international action, curb ecological 
degradation, and foster the redistribution of resources between the rich and poor 
nations of the world. 
Bookchin's Evolutionary Stewardship Thesis 
Bookchin's anarchist ideal of freedom is one that sees any kind of other- or 
external-directedness, as distinct from self- or internal-directedness, as thwarting 
impulses that are deemed to be natural and good. Like many anarchists, Bookchin 
enlists evolutionary theory to support the notion of the inherent sociality of humanity 
and to claim that any form of higher or external authority is against nature. In this 
respect, George Woodcock's general observations on anarchism are pertinent to social 
ecology: 
The whole world-view within which anarchism is embraced depends on an 
acceptance of the natural laws manifested through evolution, and this means 
that the anarchist sees himself as the representative of the true evolution of 
human society, agcl, regards authoritarian political organizations as a perversion 
of that evolution.'" 
In this section, I want to explore the implications of the evolutionary picture of 
"nature" to which Bookchin appeals in justifying his anarchist politics rather than 
explore his method of justification per se. (I have briefly criticized the latter above 
and at length elsewhere. 41 Here I am looking at the desirability rather than the 
claimed objectivity of Bookchin's ecological ethics.) In particular, I will be focussing 
on the differences between Bookchin's ecological humanism and an ecocentric 
perspective and showing how they give rise to diverging responses to the litmus 
issues of wilderness preservation and human population growth. 
As we have seen, Bookchin's organismic philosophy of nature is one that 
sees evolution as developmental and dialectical, moving from the simple to the 
complex, from the abstract and homogenous to the particular and differentiated, 
40. George Woodcock, "Anarchism: A Historical Introduction," in The Anarchist 
Reader (London: Fontana, 1983), pp. 11-56 at p. 27. 
41. Robyn Eckersley, "Divining Evolution: The Ecological Ethics of Murray 
Bookchin," Environmental Ethics 11(1989); 99-116 especially at pp. 106-110. Parts 
of this section draw on other arguments from this paper. 
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ultimately toward greater individuation and freedom or selfhood. 42 It is also a 
philosophy that emphasizes the active, creative role played by humans in the 
evolutionary drama. Bookchin often refers to humans as "nature rendered 
self-conscious," or, as J. Hughes has paraphrased it, the "forebrain of the 
ecosystem."43 Bookchin emphasizes humanity's creative role in natural evolution by 
distinguishing between what he calls first and second nature, which is intended to 
capture the graded development of the human world (second nature) out of the 
nonhuman world (first nature): 
It is eminently =AI for humanity to create a second nature from its evolution 
in first nature. By second nature, I refer to humanity's development of a 
uniquely human culture, a wide variety of institutionalized human communities, 
an effective human technics, aijehly symbolic language, and a carefully 
managed source of nutriment." 
Second nature, according to Bookchin, enables first nature to act upon itself 
We cannot hope to find humanity's "place in nature" without knowing how it 
emerged from nature with all its problems and possibilities. Our result yields a 
creative paradox: second nature in an ecological society would be tl 
actualization of first nature's potentiality to achieve mind and truth. `+' 
This creative role assigned to humans in fostering nature's evolution is the essential 
basis upon which Bookchin rejects asceticism, stoicism, biocentrism (i.e., 
ecocentrism), or any world-view that he interprets as involving the "quietistic 
surrender" or resignation by humans to the natural order. Bookchin interprets such 
approaches (quite wrongly, in the case of ecocentrism) as idolizing and reifying 
42. Although the terms "freedom" and "selfhood" appear throughout Bookchin's 
writings as ultimate norms and the desiderata of evolution, he does not specifically 
define them. They are best encapsulated in the notion of 5elf-directedness, which is 
central to both Bookchin's organismic nature philosophy and his social philosophy of 
anarchism - both of which have strong Hegelian overtones. Indeed, Bookchin 
acknowledges the Hegelian resonance but adds the qualification that his ecological 
dialectic differs from the Hegelian dialectic insofar as his ecological dialectic (a) is 
more concerned with the existential details of nature rather than the idea of nature, (b) 
does not terminate in an Absolute, (c) leans more toward differentiation rather than 
conflict, and (d) would "redefine progress to emphasize the role of social elaboration 
rather than social competition." See Bookchin, 'Thinking Ecologically," pp. 26-27. 
43. Hughes, "Beyond Bookchinism," p. 104. 
44. Bookchin, "Thinldng Ecologically," p. 21. 
45. Ibid., p. 35. 
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nature and setting it apart from a "fallen humanity" - an approach that Bookchin 
claims is an insult to humanity by denying us our creative role in evolution. 46 There 
must be an infusion of human values into nature, he argues, because humans are the 
fulfilment of a major tendency in naiad evolution. Indeed, Bookchin claims that our 
uniqueness cannot be emphasized too strongly "for it is in this very human rationality 
that nature ultimately actualizes its own evolution of subjectivity over long aeons of 
neural and sensory development."47 The clear message of Bookchin's ethics, then, is 
that humanity, as a self-conscious "moment" in nature's dialectic, has a responsibility 
to rationally direct the evolutionary process, which in Bookchin's terms means 
fostering a more diverse, complex, and fecund biosphere. Indeed, he suggests that we 
may "create more fecund gardens than Eden itself." 48 
Bookchin's view of humans as evolutionary stewards is considerably at odds 
with an ecocentric orientation toward the world in two important respects. First, an 
ecocentric orientation, particularly that of deep/transpersonal ecology, is more 
concerned with "letting things be," that is, allowing the nonhuman world to unfold in 
its own way (the means of achieving this goal, of course, require active political 
engagement in defence of the earth). From a long term ecological and evolutionary 
perspective, adaptation, change, innovation, destruction, and extinction are 
recognized as basic features of natural systems, but rather than being fostered or 
accelerated they are allowed to unfold in accordance with natural successional and 
evolutionary time. Moreover, an ecocentric orientation does not see later, more 
developed, or more complex life-forms as necessarily "higher" or "better" than earlier, 
less developed, or more simple ones. This general orientation applies equally to 
46. This is a misinterpretation since the central concern of deep/transpersonal ecology 
theorists such as Arne Naess, Bill Devall, George Sessions, Warwick Fox, and Alan 
Drengson is to cultivate a sense of identification or empathy with all of nature @I 
which humans are part). This identification or empathy stems from the realization of 
our interdependence with other life-forms. This can hardly be interpreted as an 
approach that "reifies" nature and sets it apart from humanity since it clearly includes  
humanity. 
47. Bookchin, "Thinking Ecologically," p. 20. 
48. Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom, p. 343. 
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human cultures and civilizations insofar as Western culture is not seen as "higher" or 
"better" than the cultures of indigenous peoples. (I am not suggesting here that 
Bookchin argues that certain human cultures are superior to others; I am merely 
elaborating, by way of example, the theoretical orientation of ecocentrism.) Second, 
an ecocentric perspective adopts a more humble position than social ecology insofar 
as it does not claim to know what the thrust or telos of evolution is. Rather, an 
ecocentric perspective remains open-minded toward what is seen as an essentially 
open-ended process. As Loma Salzman points out 
Extinction of species has been a fact - a second species of Immo coexisted with 
h. sapiens until relatively recently. The fact that we are (or believe we are) the 
only self-aware species on earth (which we cannot prove) does not mean that 
this was evolution's impulse or "striving." Wueed not have survived at all; 
there was and is no "necessity" that we do so." 
From an ecocentric perspective, then, it is both arrogant and self-serving to 
make, as Bookchin does, the unverifiable claim that first nature is striving to achieve 
something (i.e., greater subjectivity, awareness, or "selfhood") that "just happens" to 
have reached its most developed form in Li - second nature. Bookchin, in contrast, 
insists that "Gala' and subjectivity are more than the effects of life; they are 
[expressions of] its integral attributes." 50 His philosophy of nature is predicated on 
the intuition that there muse be a telos (in the sense of a general directionality as 
distinct from a fixed end) in nature by virtue of the wondrous patterns it reveals: 
From the ever-greater complexity and variety that raises sub-atomic particles 
through the course of evolution to those conscious, self-reflective life-forms 
called human beings, we cannot help but speculate about the existence of a 
broadly conceived jellpA and latent subjectivity in substance itself that eventually 
yields intellectuality.J 
Bookchin's speculations go well beyond the more parsimonious explanation for the 
evolution of human consciousness provided by modern evolutionary theory. Here, 
the basic Darwinian idea of natural selection (i.e., random mutation and "selective" 
environmental pressures) remains, despite many important additions and revisions, 
49. Salzman, "Politics as if Evolution Mattered," p. 15. 
50. Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom,  p. 363. 
51. Ibid., p. 364. 
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the cornerstone of modem evolutionary theory (although the emphasis has shifted 
from the evolution of an organism against an environment as background to the 
coevolution of an organism with its environment). 52 According to this picture, 
"evolution is basically open and indeterminate. There is no goal in it, or purpose, and 
yet there is a recognizable pattern of development." 53 Of course, the current 
scientific understanding of evolution is surrounded by much controversy and is hardly 
complete. But in the face of this uncertainty it is noteworthy how often we select, 
from a range of possible conclusions, those conclusions that are most comforting to 
humans. For his part, Bookchin scorns any attempt to explain the development of 
natural phenomena as an accident: "To invoke mere fortuity as the deus ex machina of 
a sweeping, superbly organized development that lends itself to concise mathematical 
explanations is to use the accidental as a tomb for the explanatory." 54 
But, as Fox and other nonanthropocentric environmental philosophers point 
out, the challenging thing about science vis-a-vis our understanding of our place in 
the scheme of things is that it often delivers us news about the universe that we might 
not wish to hear (indeed, George Sessions has argued that modern science has "been 
the single most decisive nonanthropocentric intellectual force in the Western 
world").55 In developing an ecopolitical theory, then, we must remain open to this 
"news" while at the same time recognizing our own fallibility and the contingency of 
scientific explanation. In particular, ecocentric theorists, unlike social ecologists, are 
prepared to recognize that nature is not only more complex than we presently know 
but also quite possibly more complex than we gan know. It is accordingly foolhardy 
to suggest, as Bookchin does, that we presently know enough about evolutionary 
52. Capra, The Turning Point, see p. 311. 
53. Ibid., p. 312. See also Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (London: 
Penguin, 1988). 
54. Bookchin, Ecoloey of Freedom, p. 354. 
55. See George Sessions, "Anthropocentrism and the Environmental Crisis," 
Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 2 (1974): 71-81 at p. 73, and Warwick Fox, 
Toward a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for 
Environmentalism (Boston: Shambhala, 1990), forthcoming, pp. 14-16 (all page 
citations refer to the prepublication ms). 
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processes to foster and accelerate them. In particular, it is highly contentious to 
ascribe a purpose to a particular development on the basis of its outward results. The 
wisest course of action from an ecocentric perspective is not to presume that there is 
necessarily a telos in nature, nor to presume any knowledge of the ends of evolution, 
and instead remain open-minded and, wherever practical, simply "tread lightly" in the 
course of sustaining ourselves and our human society. 
The different ecophilosophical orientations of social ecology and 
ecocentrism give rise to diverging responses when it comes to the controversial issues 
of wilderness preservation and human population growth. As to the first of these 
"litmus issues," it is noteworthy that Bookchin has said very little on the subject of 
wilderness preservation as compared to, say, issues concerning the urban and 
agricultural or "domestic" environment (i.e., second nature). Indeed, the one 
reference to wilderness I have come across in Bookchin's large oeuvre is generally 
dismissive of the idea of setting asides large tracts of wilderness: 
In advocating human stewardship of the earth, I do not believe it has to consist 
of such accommodating measures as James Lovelock's establishment of 
ecological wilderness zones ... what it should mean is a radical int 	tion of 
second nature with first nature along far-reaching ecological lines. 
This view is in keeping with Bookchin's preoccupation with humans as ecological 
stewards, playing an active and creative role in the evolution of the planet. Indeed, 
the idea that large areas of "first nature" should be cordoned off as generally out of 
bounds to "second nature" (except for very low impact uses) is, in Bookchin's schema, 
as "unnatural" as the idea that the body should be segregated from the brain. Such a 
step would deny or curtail the opportunity for humans to "create more fecund gardens 
than Eden itself."57 In sharp contrast to Bookchin, ecocentric theorists (particularly 
deep/transpersonal ecologists), consider that the preservation of large tracts of 
56. Bookchin, "Thinking Ecologically," p. 32. This is in contrast to fellow social 
ecology writer John Clark, who has written that "planetary integrity may require that 
much or even most of the earth be returned to the condition of wilderness." See John 
Clark, "The Promise of Social Ecology," in Renewing the Earth: The Promise of 
Social Ecology, ed. John Clark (Basingstoke, U.K.: Green Print, 1990), forthcoming, 
p. 21 (page citation refers to the prepublication manuscript). 
57. Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom, p. 343. 
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wilderness is now the most reliable and appropriate means of protecting a threatened 
array of nonhuman life-forms (and a diminishing number of indigenous human 
cultures) from the seemingly insatiable resource demands of human economic 
development. Indeed, ecocentric theorists are generally opposed to the idea of any 
further destruction of the remaining areas of wilderness throughout the world. 58 
Moreover, the subject of wilderness has been a major preoccupation of, and 
inspiration for, ecocentric theorists and activists. Indeed, it has been the intensive 
philosophical investigation of wilderness issues and the question of the moral 
standing of nonhuman life-forms and entities by many ecophilosophers that has led to 
the formulation and development of the modern ecocentric perspective. 
Consistent with their strong stand on the need for wilderness preservation, 
ecocentric theorists advocate a population policy that seeks a long term reduction, in 
human numbers. This position flows directly from the ecocentric concern for 
biological and cultural diversity; from the ecocentric concern of allowing all beings to 
unfold in their own ways. To the extent that Bookchin's own approach to the 
population question can be discerned from his criticisms of ecocentrism, his emphasis 
has been on the need to overcome social hierarchy, decentralize society, redistribute 
resources, and cultivate an "ecological technics" rather than on the need to address the 
problem of absolute numbers per se by means of birth control programmes. 59 (In this 
58. For example, Anne and Paul Ehrlich have argued that "whatever remaining 
relatively undisturbed land exists that supports a biotic community of any significance 
should be set aside and fiercely defended against encroachment." See Anne H. 
Ehrlich and Paul R. Ehrlich, Earth (New York: Franklin Watts, 1987), p. 242. For a 
more general discussion, see George Sessions, "Ecocentrism and Global Ecosystem 
Protection," Earth First!, 21 December 1989, pp. 26-28. 
59. On the vexed subject of human population, Bookchin's position has emerged 
largely as a response to, and critique of, certain controversial statements made by 
prominent members (such as Dave Foreman) of the U. S. environmental movement 
Earth First!, which Bookchin has wrongly taken as representative of the views of all 
Earth First! supporters as well as deep ecology theorists. For example, Foreman has 
remarked that it is better to leave Ethiopian children to starve than "save these half 
dead children who will never live a whole life. Their development will be stunted." 
See Dave Foreman, "A Spanner in the Woods," Interviewed by Bill Devall, Simply 
Living 2(12), n.d.: 40-43 at p. 43. Yet, as Fox points out, "it is as =reasonable for 
Bookchin to condemn the body of ideas known as deep ecology on the basis that he 
does as it would be for a critic of Bookchin to condemn the body of ideas known as 
social ecology on the basis of whatever personal views happen to be put forward by 
individual activists who support any environmental organization that claims to draw 
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respect, it is very similar to the democratic ecosocialist response to the population 
question.) Again, Bookchin's social philosophy is consistent with his 
ecophilosophical perspective (although Bookchin has not expressed his position in 
quite the following terms): if the telos of evolution is to maximise "subjectivity," and 
if humanity (second nature/nature rendered self-conscious) is the most developed 
form of "subjectivity" then it hardly makes sense to advocate a reduction in human 
numbers. 
On the population question, then, Bookchin has much more in common with 
democratic ecosocialism than ecocentrism insofar as he points to social relations 
rather than human numbers per se as the "real causes" of famine and environmental 
degradation. Indeed, Bookchin has gone much further than ecosocialism in criticizing 
ecocentrism as racist and misanthropic for ignoring inter-human inequities. While it 
is not my concern to present a detailed overview of Bookchin's accusations in this 
controversy, it is important to lay to rest one serious misconception of the ecocentric 
position that arises from Bookchin's critique. As should be clear from my discussion 
of the population question in the previous chapter, ecocentric theorists do not only  
advocate a long term reduction in human numbers in response to the population issue, 
as some of their critics suggest. They also advocate a more equitable inter-human 
distribution of resources, a lower overall level of resource consumption per capita, 
and the introduction of ecologically benign technologies. Moreover, the charge by 
social ecologists and ecosocialists that the ecocentric analysis is Malthusian (i.e., 
famine is inevitable and/or necessary to preserve carrying capacity) is completely 
misleading since it conflates the debate concerning the relationship between human 
population, hunger, and food distribution (which is the basic Malthus/socialist 
controversy) with the debate concerning the relationship between human population 
on social ecology principles" (Fox, "The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate," p. 20, 
footnote 38). Needless to say, deep/transpersonal ecology theorists and supporters 
have dissociated themselves from the controversial misanthropic utterances singled 
out by Bookchin. In addition to Fox, see George Sessions, "Ecocentrism and the 
Greens," p. 65-66; and Kirkpatrick Sale, "Deep Ecology and its Critics," p. 675. 
Naess has also made it clear that "faced with the problem of hungry children, 
humanitarian action is a priority." See Arne Naess, "Sustainable Development and 
the Deep Long-Range Ecology Movement," The Trumpeter 5 (1988): 138-42 at 
p. 141. 
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growth and general environmental degradation. As to the former debate, an 
ecocentric emancipatory perspective would necessarily reject the Malthusian response 
and support the case for a more equitable pattern of control and distribution of 
resources among the world's existing human population alongside the development of 
more "appropriate" food sources and production methods. This is because an 
ecocentric perspective is concerned with human And nonhuman emancipation. As to 
the latter debate, however, the ecocentric position maintains that even if we assume 
that these social reforms would overcome the problem of hunger for the world's 
existing population (an assumption some scientists would now dispute), it would not 
alone solve the ecology crisis for the existing nonhuman community or for future 
generations of humans and nonhumans. As I explained in the previous chapter, 
environmental impact is a function not only of technology and affluence (i.e., level of 
consumption) but also absolute human numbers. Accordingly, pollution, habitat 
destruction, and species extinction would continue apace as more intensive 
agriculture and industry expanded to meets the needs of an expanding population. 
This is why we cannot afford to await the "demographic transition." 
According to projections by the United Nations Population Division, the 
world's human population is expected to increase to 8.5 billion over the next 35 years 
(to 2025), and 95 percent of the projected increase of 3.2 billion is expected to occur 
in the less developed countries. 60 This raises pressing international equity issues that 
threaten global environmental integrity and security. From an ecocentric perspective, 
it demands that the first world redistributes resources to developing countries (to 
assist them in undergoing an ecologically benign demographic transition) while 
scaling down its own consumption of resources to a level that is compatible with 
global justice. But this alone is not enough. The ecocentric argument is that both 
human and nonhuman communities need space and a healthy and varied diet and 
environment in which to flourish; if this is accepted, then it is essential that we also 
address the problem of absolute human numbers through family planning in addition  
60. See Nathan Keyfitz, "The Growing Human Population," Scientific American, 
September 1989, pp. 71-77 at p. 71. 
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to technological and inter-human distributional questions. This is a 
=anthropocentric population policy and it should not be confused (as democratic 
ecosocialists and social ecologists are prone to do) with a misanthropic or racist one. 
As Arne Naess and George Sessions state in their deep ecology platform: "The 
flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the 
human population. The flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease." 61 
Indeed, Arne Naess argues that the "destruction of cultural diversity is partly the 
result of too many humans on earth" and that cultural diversity might therefore be 
enhanced if we move toward a long term reduction in the human population. 62 
From an ecocentric perspective, then, Bookchin's approach to the population 
question remains anthropocentric in not paying sufficient heed to the way in which 
growing absolute numbers of humans destroy the environmental conditions necessary 
for the flourishing of the nonhuman world. Bookchin, of course, has been highly 
critical of the notion of biocentrism on the ground that it implies the passive surrender 
of humans to the natural order, and that humans are no more valuable than a mosquito 
or the AIDS virus. I have argued in Chapter 2 and elsewhere that these criticisms are 
misplaced and do not intend to repeat them here. 63 It will suffice to reiterate that 
ecocentrism merely promotes a prima facie orientation of nonfavouritism or openness 
to other life-forms. Humans are just as entitled to live and blossom as any other 
species, and this inevitably necessitates some killing of, suffering by, and interference 
with, other species, particularly where such species threaten human life. The general 
61. Arne Naess, Ecology. Community and Lifestyle, trans. David Rothenberg 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 29. 
62. Naess, "Sustainable Development," p. 140. Elsewhere, Naess has provocatively 
asked: "Are cultural diversity, development of the sciences and arts, and of course 
basic human needs not served by, let us say, 100 million?" (Naess, Ecology, 
Community and Lifestyle, p. 141). This, of course, is merely an arbitrary figure and 
should not be taken literally. Naess's point is simply that there is no reason to believe 
that there will be less cultural diversity with a long term human population target that 
is considerably lower than the present 5.3 billion people. 
63. Eckersley, "Divining Evolution," see p. 114. 
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orientation, however, is "live simply that others may simply live." Expressed more 
positively, this means seeking a lifestyle that is "simple in means and rich in ends." 64 
In the above critique of social ecology, I have (i) criticized Bookchin's social 
hierarchy thesis and his claim that only an anarchist society is consistent with social 
and ecological harmony, and (ii) criticized Bookchin's evolutionary stewardship thesis 
as being unverifiable, self-serving, and anthropocentric in terms of the various ways 
in which it distinguishes and privileges "second nature" over "first nature." More 
generally, I have sought to show that Bookchin's goal to maximise freedom or 
self-directedness in general is best achieved by an ecocentric emancipatory 
perspective rather than by his own social ecology perspective. I conclude, then, that 
while social ecology is less anthropocentric than all of the emancipatory ecopolitical 
theories examined so far in this inquiry, it is not an ecocentric emancipatory 
ecopolitical theory. Rather, in terms of the anthropocentrism/nonandiropocentrism 
distinction, social ecology may be seen as offering an ecological humanism that 
stands somewhere between democratic ecosocialism and ecocommunalism. 
The foregoing critique of Bookchin leaves two important questions 
unanswered: (i) although I have argued that an anarchist society, free of social 
hierarchy, is not the only kind of society that is consistent with social and ecological 
harmony, is anarchism nonetheless the most conducive political philosophy to the 
promotion of these ecocentric goals?: and (ii) are there other kinds of ecoanarchism 
that are consistent with an ecocentric perspective? 
In the remainder of this chapter I examine the more general ecoanarchist 
tradition that I refer to as "ecocommunalism." I intend to show that while this 
tradition represents the only truly ecocentric emancipatory theory in the ecopolitical 
literature to date in terms of its ecophilosophical orientation, it is nonetheless in need 
of considerable political revision and reformulation if it is to meet the challenges of 
the closing 20th century and beyond. 
64. See Bill Devall, Simple in Means. Rich in Ends: Practicing Deep Ecology 
(Layton, Utah: Gibbs Smith, 1988). 
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Ecocommunalism 
Ecocommunalism is a generic term that I use to refer to a diverse range of 
utopian, visionary, and essentially anarchist Green theories that seek the development 
of human scaled, co-operative communities that enable the rounded and mutualistic 
development of humans while at the same time respecting the integrity of the 
nonhuman world. Progress, according to ecocommunal theorists, is generally 
measured by the degree to which we are able to adapt human communities to 
ecosystems (rather than the other way around) and by the degree to which the full 
range of human needs (not just material needs) are fulfilled. As with Bookchin, these 
theorists are generally critical of purely instrumental valuations of the nonhuman 
world and instead appeal to nature as a source of both inspiration and guidance. 
The idea of building stable communities in accordance with the "principles 
of nature" is not new. According to Robert Nisbet, since the fall of the Roman 
Empire, the idea of an "ecological community" has been an enduring theme in 
Western social philosophy. It began with the monastic orders founded by Saint 
Benedict of Nursia following the collapse of the Roman Empire and has continued 
through the Utopian tradition in political thought, from Sir Thomas More's Utopia in 
1516 down to the communal longings of the 19th and 20th century anarchist 
philosophers (most notably William Godwin and the Russian Prince ICropotkin). 65 
Writing in the early 1970s - well before the flowering of the Green movement and 
Green parties - Robert Nisbet defined the essence of the ecological community as 
... peaceful, not concerned with capture and forced adaptation, noncoercive, and 
seeking fulfilment through example or vision rather than through revolutionary 
force and the centralization of power. The uncovering of those autonomous and 
free interdependencies among human beings which are believed to be natural to 
man and his morality: this - not the violent capture of government, army, and 
police - is the most fundamental. 	of the tradition of community in Western 
social thought I call ecological.° 
Nisbet defends his use of the adjective "ecological" to describe this tradition of 
thought on the grounds that (i) the Greek word oikos refers to the household, and by 
65. Robert Nisbet, The Social Philosophers: Community and Conflict in Western 
Thought (London: Heinemann, 1974), see p. 320. 
66. Ibid., p. 320. 
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implication, "to the natural and harmonious interdependencies of the household 
economy," (ii) in post-Darwinian usage, ecology refers to the natural 
interdependencies among organisms and between organisms and their environment, 
and (iii) in recent times ecology has taken on a mcdt overtone concerned with 
protecting "natural" interdependencies as distinct from those which are artificial or 
contrived.° Nisbet's characterization is one that runs together the ideas of ecology as 
a science and ecology as philosophy of life; it thus provides a statement of what the 
natural order is like (if left to unfold according to its own "laws") as well as a 
statement of how it ought to be. 
Nisbet identifies five characteristics of the ecological community. The first 
of these is the idea of nature serving as a regulative ideal. Nisbet uses the term nature 
here in the Greek sense of what is "the normal, inherent constitution or manner of 
growth of an entity in time," unimpeded by alien impact, accident, or human evi1. 68 
While he notes that many other political philosophers have employed the concept of 
nature as a justificatory aid (e.g., Plato, Aquinas, Rousseau, and Spencer) Nisbet 
claims that "its paramount and distinctive significance has been among the 
philosophers of the ecological community." 69 
Related to the idea of nature as a regulative ideal is the notion of the "web of 
life" - a profound sense of our "relationship with other beings in the kingdom of life 
and the necessity of maintaining this relationship, indeed of heightening it, through 
close contact with the land and all that grows on the land." 7° Humans were seen as 
part of a larger natural order that was divine, a conviction that was expressed in the 
Benedictine respect for the seasons and the soil and, more explicitly, in the sermons to 
birds, animals, the sun, and the moon given by Saint Francis of Assisi, the founder of 
the Franciscans (it is noteworthy that the historian Lynn White has proposed St 
67. Ibid. 
68. Ibid., p. 322. 
69. Ibid., p. 323. 
70. Ibid., p. 324. 
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Francis as "a patron saint for ecologists"). 71 Nisbet maintains that "whether religious 
or secular in premise, this conception carries with it a strong conviction of the 
inviolability of nature" together with a strong objection to "the evil desecrations and 
bootless exploitations of nature" by humans. 72 Associated with the idea of a 
harmonious balance in nature is the insistence on developing a harmonious balance 
between thought and labour, factory and field, mind and body, and culture and nature 
- themes that were particularly dear to the hearts of 19th century ecocommunal and 
utopian theorists such as Petr Kropotkin and William Morris. 
A third feature of this tradition identified by Nisbet is a hostility to greed and 
competition and the fostering of community-based, co-operative modes of living and 
working. Co-operation or "mutual aid" (ICropotkin's oft-quoted phrase) was accepted 
as an essential part of the web of life and, according to Nisbet, the "highest ideal" of 
the ecological community. 
• 	Fourth, such communities were also to be free from arbitrary authority, 
coercion, or repressive law. Nisbet argues, however, that they were not, except in 
their naive form, without order or discipline. This principle of "autonomous 
association" was well illustrated in the Benedictine Rule where membership of the 
monastery was conditional upon the member's desire to remain part of the 
community. For so long as a person remained a member of the community, however, 
authority would be asserted (by the Abbott) in respect of errant members through the 
sparing applications of certain sanctions. Unlike Bookchin's social ecology, then, this 
tradition of the ecological community has countenanced certain localized forms of 
social hierarchy. 
Finally, Nisbet has found in this tradition of ecological communities "a clear 
and unwavering emphasis upon simplicity." Hyperorganization and complexity were 
condemned as working against the ideal of harmonious balance between mind, body, 
71. Lynn White, Jr., "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis, 3cience 155 
(1967): 1203-7 at p. 1207. 
72. Nisbet, The Social Philosophers, p. 324. 
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and spirit "Nature, it is said, is simple for those who understand; society should be 
also. 1173 
These five elements identified by Nisbet - nature as a regulative ideal, a 
profound respect for the web of life, co-operation, autonomous association, and 
simplicity - in may ways capture the essence of what I have identified as the 
ecocommunal strand of emancipatory ecopolitical thought that has emerged in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. For example, all of these themes can (with varying degrees of 
emphasis and articulation) be found in the bioregionalism of Kirkpatrick Sale, the 
"small is beautiful" theme and "Buddhist economics" of Fritz Schumacher, the 
"Liberated Zones" of Rudolf Bahro's eco-fundamentalism, and in Theodore Roszak's 
theme of "person/planet," to name four significant contributors to this body of Green 
thought.74  The most noteworthy feature of the modern incarnation of this tradition of 
"ecological community," however, is its general ecocentric orientation. 
Ecocommunalism sees humans as forming part of and respecting a larger (and to 
some, divine) order or process. It thus stands at odds with the general human-centred 
orientation of most modern political theory (particularly liberalism and Marxism), 
which, as we have seen, posits humans as the centre of meaning and value in the 
universe and regards everything else as background or mere means to the realization 
of human ends. Whereas liberalism and Marxism have generally regarded the 
domination of nature as the necessary price of human freedom, ecocommunal 
theorists argue that the cultivation of an attitude of respect for nature is a necessary 
aspect of human self-realization. A further notable feature of ecocotnmunalism is that 
its concern to develop local socio-economic arrangements that are geared toward the 
satisfaction and integration of the full range of human needs (that is, psychological, 
spiritual, intellectual, creative, and social needs, as well as material needs) 
73. Ibid., p. 326. 
74. Kirkpatrick Sale, Dwellers in the Land: The Bioregional Vision (San Francisco: 
Sierra Club Books, 1985); E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: Economics as if 
People Really Mattered (London: Abacus, 1973); Rudolf Bahro, Building the Green  
Movement (London: Heretic/GMP, 1986); and Theodore Roszak, Person/Planet: The 
Creative Disintegration of Industrial Society (London: Paladin, 1981). 
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considerably blurs the Marxist and neo-Marxist distinction between freedom and 
necessity. True freedom or self-realization is not something that can only be 
experienced beyond "bread labour." Rather, freedom is a function of the extent to 
which an individual's entire range of needs are integrated and satisfied so that they 
may become self-determining beings. What liberals call negative freedom or 
"freedom from" (meaning the absence of constraints) is, for ecocommunal theorists, 
merely a condition for the realization of positive freedom or "freedom for," which is 
the rounded, mutual development or self-realization of the individual and 
ecocommunity. 
Ecocommunalism, like the other currents of emancipatory ecopolitical 
thought examined in this inquiry, provides another means of integrating the four 
pillars of the Green movement (that is, ecology, social responsibility, grassroots 
democracy, and nonviolence). Where it differs from the various ecosocialist 
integrations of these principles is in its adoption of an ecocentric as distinct from an 
anthropocentric ecophilosophical perspective (this is most pronounced in 
bioregionalism), its greater emphasis on decentralization and local autonomy, and its 
emphasis of, or openness to, a "spiritual dimension" in a Green society. Beyond these 
general points, however, there is a considerable variety of approaches in the 
ecocommunal tradition, a fact that is to be expected in view of its emphasis on 
diversity and local autonomy. 
The utopian and anarchist dimensions to ecocommunalism have made it 
vulnerable to criticisms that it is naive, voluntarist, simplistic, and blind toward 
certain recalcitrant aspects of human nature. These are serious obstacles to the 
widespread acceptance of ecocommunalism as an appropriate political framework for 
social and ecological renewal. Indeed, I argue below, inter alia, that 
ecocommunalism needs to be supplemented by engagement with state institutions if it 
is not to remain marginal. I also intend to show that the idea of nature as presented by 
some ecocommunal theorists is often anachronistic and/or idealized and in need of 
reformulation. This does not, however, invalidate the general orientation of this 
tradition and the importance of exemplary action. Indeed, despite the above 
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shortcomings, this tradition - when supplemented by engagement with state 
institutions - provides the necessary vision and the most appropriate cultural 
orientation for the kind of ecocentric political theory we are working toward in this 
inquiry. 
Before exploring the general limitations associated with the utopian and 
anarchist character of this tradition, it will be helpful to introduce some modern 
examples of the types of human communities that ecocommunal theorists envisage 
will link together the themes discussed above. In the first case I discuss and explore 
the significance and implications of what I have found to be a recurring analogy used 
in ecocommunal argument, namely, the monastic paradigm. In the second case, I 
outline what is arguably the most distinctive and innovative body of ecocommunal 
thought - bioregionalism. 
Monasticism Revisited 
A common theme among ecocommunal theorists is the idea of 
disengagement or withdrawal from corrupt social and political institutions and the 
establishment of exemplary institutions and/or the pursuit of exemplary personal 
action. In view of the sweeping ecocommunal critique of most aspects of modern 
industrial society, such a strategy is, in many respects, the only reliable and authentic 
strategy that will maintain consistency between ends and means. In arguing for the 
establishment of ecological communities as the solution to the multifaceted crises 
facing modern society, a number of ecocommunal theorists have employed the 
analogy of the emergence of the medieval communalism of Saint Benedict of Nursia 
out of the ruins of the Roman Empire. This reference to the monastic paradigm as the 
nucleus for an ecological community is not just a recent phenomenon but can also be 
found in some strands of utopian socialism. William Morris, for example, 
... wrote of setting up a brotherhood, a new monastic order for a "Crusade and 
Holy Warfare, against the age, 'the heartless coldness of the times." He read 
Thomas Carlyle's book, Past and Present (1$,43) - a glowing account of a 
twelfth century monastery - with eagerness. 
75. Peter C. Gould, Early Green Politics: Back to Nature. Back to the Land. and 
Socialism in Britain 1880-1900 (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester, 1988), p. 17. See also 
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Indeed Morris's own medievalist and romantically inspired social and political 
thought possessed all the characteristics of the ecological community. He rejected 
what he called "utilitarian sham Socialism" (concerned merely with the organizational 
means for improving the material conditions of the working class) in favour of a 
community-based, "ethical socialism" that coexisted in harmony with nature, 
cultivated the "whole person," and restored the dignity and creativity of labour as 
craft. (It is noteworthy that the romantic and utopian character of Morris's socialism - 
particularly his utopian novel News From Nowhere - has generated a considerable 
debate as to whether he properly qualifies as a Mandst. 76) 
In contemporary ecocommunal literature, references to the monastic 
paradigm abound. For example, the ideal of "withdrawal and renewal" is central to 
Rudolf Bahro's ecofundamentalism and he has often claimed that the establishment 
and growth of small-scale co-operatives or "Liberated Zones" (his ecocommunal 
solution to the ecological crisis) would lead society toward a better future in the same 
way that the communes founded by Saint Benedict were intended as a return to 
community and order after the chaos and social decay that had set in following the 
collapse of Rome. 77 Liberated Zones would ensure consistency between ends and 
means by providing both a supportive refuge from the destructiveness and alienation 
of industrialism and the nucleus of a new "biophile [i.e., life-loving] culture." Bahro 
is at pains to point out that the challenge of ecological degradation is primarily a 
E. P. Thompson, William Morris: Romantic to Revolutionary (New York: Pantheon, 
1976), pp. 27-32. 
76. Ibid., p. 24. See William Morris, News From Nowhere and Selected Writings and 
Designs (Harmondsworth, U. K.: Penguin, 1980). For a discussion of Morris's 
Marxist credentials, see the 1976 Postscript in Thompson, 36/Ehni.Molth, 
pp. 763-819. On the popularity of News From Nowhere in West Germany, see Elim 
Papadakis, The Green Movement in West Germany (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 
pp. 54-55. 
77. See Rudolf Bahro, Building the Green Movement, especially pp. 86-98. 
Ecocommunalism is something Bahro has arrived at in his more recent work. In his 
earlier publications (for example, Socialism and Survival [London: Heretic/GMP, 
1982] and From Red to Green [Verso/NLB, 1984]) Bahro's position was closer to 
democratic ecosocialism than ecocommunalism. For a general discussion of the 
trajectory of Bahro's thought since he left East Germany, see Robyn Eckersley, "The 
Prophet of Green Fundamentalism," review essay of Building the Green Movement, 
by Rudolf Bahro, The Ecologist 17 (1987): 120-22. 
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cultural and spiritual one and only secondarily an economic one. Accordingly we 
must direct our attention to cultural and spiritual renewal rather than structural or 
economic reform. Liberated Zones thus provide, in Bahro's view, a total solution to 
the multifaceted crises of modern times. 
Similarly, Gilbert LaFreniere looks to the monastic paradigm as a model for 
intentional ecocommunities. Such quasi-monastic communities or "ecosteries" would 
provide a personal and local anchor in a world of uncertainty and cultural transition: 
Such communities, which we might call ecosteries on the basis of their debt to 
ecological principles and the utopian model of the Christian monastery, may 
furnish the future steady state society with the same guidance that monasteriq o 
of the Dark Ages provided to the rising medieval culture of Western Europe. '° 
Edward Goldsmith, a chief author of A Blueprint for Survival, has also 
drawn a parallel between the Fall of the Roman Empire and what he sees as the 
impending collapse of industrial society, although he argues that in modern times the 
rate of collapse will be a faster and more cataclysmic event. 79 Goldsmith argues that 
in. both cases the collapse is "the cost of violating in so radical a manner the basic 
laws of social and ecological organization." 8° Instead of suggesting the formation of 
ecomonasteries as exemplary communities, however, Goldsmith is more ambitious in 
arguing for widespread, state sponsored societal change. For example, he argues for 
economic and demographic contraction and the organization of society into relatively 
closed, self-regulating family and community systems in accordance with what he 
calls the "Hierarchical co-operation principle" (where behaviour satisfies the needs of 
78. Gilbert F LaFreniere, "World Views and Environmental Ethics," Environmental  
Review 9 (1985): 307-22 at p. 319 LaFreniere's ideas have been incorporated in a 
proposal to form a nonprofit Ecostery Foundation of North America to acquire and 
administer large parcels of rural land and small parcels of urban land as centers for 
the promotion of "environmental research and education, [the] restoration and 
preservation of land ... [and] the cooperative cultivation of ecological wisdom and 
harmony." See Alan Drengson, "The Ecostery Foundation of North America 
(T.E.F.N.A.) - Statement of Philosophy." 1989, ms., p. 1. 
79. Edward Goldsmith, "The Fall of the Roman Empire: A Social and Ecological 
Interpretation," The Ecologist 5 (1975): 196-206. This is reprinted in Goldsmith, The  
Great U-Turn: De-industrializing Society (Hartland, Bideford: Green Books, 1988), 
pp. 3-29. 
80. Edward Goldsmith, "De-industrializing Society," in The Great U-Turn, 
pp. 183-217 at p. 206. Goldsmith's particular characterization of these "laws" is set 
forth in "The Way: An Ecological World-view," The Ecologist 18(1988): 160-85. 
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both the parts and the whole in a self-regulating system). 81 In the long term, 
Goldsmith argues that the family and the community must take over the functions of 
the state so that social and ecological problems are dealt with at the lowest level 
possible (on the ground that this would stop such problems being "exported" 
elsewhere). Humanism would be replaced with naturalism, individualism with 
communitarianism, materialism with modesty, scientism with culturalism, 
technologism with respect for nature, institutionalism with self-regulation, and 
economism with ecologism. 
It should be noted, however, that there are some paternalistic features of 
Goldsmith's particular solution that put him at odds with the ecoanarchist tradition 
and more in the company of the authoritarian survivalist ecopolitical theorists 
discussed in Chapter 1. Despite his emphasis on the devolution of power, Goldsmith 
envisages that the move toward the Gandhian ideal of "village republics" would be 
instituted and supervised by the nation state. 82 His "self-regulating" communities 
would thus be established "from above" rather than left to emerge organically "from 
below." Moreover, it is unclear to what extent Goldsmith would be willing to 
condone the use of the full force of the state to coerce recalcitrant people to move 
toward village republics (and here the Tanzanian villagization experiment provides a 
sobering reminder of how seemingly worthy ideals can prove to be disastrous in 
practice). In contrast, the other ecoanarchists examined here are consistent in terms 
of ends and means, preferring exemplary and voluntary local action rather than state 
enforced change. 
However, it is Theodore Roszak in his book Person/Planet who has 
presented the fullest defence of ecomonasticism as a solution to the contemporary 
crisis. Roszak argues that monasticism (he does not confine his attention to the 
81. Goldsmith, "De-industrializing Society," see pp. 193 and 203. 
82. Goldsmith, "De-industrializing Society," pp. 204 and 208. Other nonlibertarian 
measures recommended by Goldsmith include support for the use of advertising 
techniques to "convert" people to pursuing less wasteful patterns of consumption and 
a proposal to enrol unemployed people in a "Restoration Corps," and, after graduation 
from that, a Civil Militia along the Swiss model, which would enhance local 
patriotism! 
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Benedictine example) provides "a model, a tested, historical paradigm of creative 
social disintegration" where a "vital, new sense of human identity and destiny could 
take root."83 • According to Roszak, this tradition has shown that it is possible to 
create relatively self-sufficient and stable domestic economies from very small and 
humble beginnings. Moreover, it is a tradition that fosters a community that is 
"simple in means and rich in ends," provides an economics of permanence, offers 
egalitarian fellowship, and is able to synthesize qualities that have become polarized 
in modern life such as the personal/social and the practical/spiritual. In Roszak's 
view, most modern political ideologies have overlooked the spiritual and personal 
dimension of human experience: 
If the socialist and communist ideologies of our time had not opted to become 
so fanatically anti-religious in orientation, they might have learned a great truth 
from the communitarian experience of the monasteries. They might have come 
to see conviviality, not as a difficult social duty that must be strenuously 
inculcated upon us as a matter of class consciousness (an approach that only 
produces mass movements), but as a culminating relationship between free and 
unique persons. They might have come to respect the existence of a personal A 
reference which supports, but also delimits, the claims of the collective will.°4 
According to Roszak, of the modern political ideologies, the ideals of Maoist 
communism come closest to the monastic ideal, with its emphasis on agrarian 
communalism, social service, and the balancing of intellectual and manual labour. 
What was lacking in Maoism, however, was the personal and spiritual motivation that 
was so central to the monastic tradition - a motivation that Roszak believes was 
replaced by a crude political propaganda that tapped and encouraged "the belligerence 
of patriotic pride, the appetite for vicarious collective power, competitive material 
standards of national production, constant agitational appeals to comradely duty that 
draw their force from the people's guilt and fear." 85 The thoroughgoing 
secularisation of Maoist communism meant than Mao's humble agrarian ideals were 
soon overshadowed by the exhortations of his own propaganda to build a "Great 
Power" in the world - a goal that demanded the ongoing sacrifice of the needs of the 
83. Roszak, Person/Planet, pp. 298-99. 
84. Ibid., p. 301. 
85. Ibid., p. 302. 
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individual in favour of the collective will. In Roszak's view, it was but a short step 
from here to the introduction of technocratic planning methods and large scale 
industrialization. In monasteries, on the other hand, "the cause of justice is no longer 
grounded in the myth of progress." 86 Rather, economic activity is conducted on a 
sustainable basis for the satisfaction of basic needs. Moreover, the modern distinction 
between work and leisure has little relevance in monasteries since personal fulfilment 
and a sense of the sacred were found as much within work as outside it. The monastic 
paradigm, argues Roszak, offers "liberation from waste and busywork, from excessive 
appetite and anxious competition that allows one to get on with the essential business 
of life, which is to work out one's salvation with diligence." 87 
Roszak sees the humble beginnings of a modern revival of the ecological 
community in the decentralist socialist tradition, in E. F. Schumacher's economics of 
permanence, and in the goals of ecological activists and the personal growth 
movement. He welcomes a proliferation of designs and experiments for shared and 
simplified living that are contemporary trial-and-error adaptations of the monastic 
paradigm, which may hopefully give rise to the "creative disintegration" of modern 
industrialism. Roszak has no illusions, however, about the likelihood of its immediate 
or general appeal in modern society. "But then," he observes, "cultural creativity is 
always the province of minorities." 88 
The ecomonastic paradigm, then, provides one kind of holistic solution to 
the social and ecological problems of the modern world in that it offers a lifestyle that 
integrates work and leisure, the personal and the political, and the mundane and the 
sacred. As an ideal, it fulfils the aspirations of ecocentric emancipatory theory insofar 
as it offers the space for metaphysical reconstruction and cultural, moral, spiritual, 
political, and ecological renewal. It does this by providing a concrete model of a 
steady state society that is cognizant of the needs of other life-forms but which 
86. Ibid., p. 309. 
87. Ibid., p. 306. 
88. Ibid., p. 312. 
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nonetheless enables the rounded development of human beings in a co-operative 
community setting. 
Before leaving this model, it is instructive to contrast the support for the 
monastic ideal given by ecocommunal theorists with Andre Gorz's dismissal of this 
kind of model - a dismissal that highlights, among other things, the more secular and 
pragmatic orientation of ecosocialist theorists. Gorz argues that the sanctification of 
daily activities and the supposed unity of what he calls the spheres of heteronomy and 
autonomy in monastic communities are more apparent than real. In Gorz's view, this 
is because the realm of "necessary labour" is sublimated by the transformation of 
external constraints into internal obligations, a sublimation that is mediated by the 
religious experience. 89 This, argues Gorz, usually takes the form of submission to a 
spiritual or communal leader who is able "to demand and obtain submission to  
necessity as a submission to their own person. The leader enunciates the law, which 
is also duty." 	argues that only a state and an objective system of law makes 
"it possible to confine objective necessities and obligations to a clearly circumscribed 
area, and thus to open up a space for autonomy entirely free of their imperatives." 91 
According to Gorz, the only enduring type of commune is that which manages to 
separate these two spheres, such as the Israeli kibbutzim. 
It is not necessary to endorse Gorz's rigid separation between socially 
necessary labour and autonomous activity to acknowledge the well-known dangers 
that can arise with charismatic leaders, religious or otherwise. Indeed, many 
supporters of ecomonasticism are alive to these dangers and are critical of the idea of 
blind personal allegiance to a particular leader and instead envisage that appropriate 
behaviour would stem from what might be called a shared ecocommunal ethos and 
from mutual self-development (i.e., beyond egoism). Roszak, in particular, 
89. Andre Gorz, Farewell to the Working Class (London: Pluto Press, 1982), 
pp. 108-10. 
90. Ibid., p. 111. 
91. Ibid. 
303 
repeatedly emphasizes the importance of the person, of individual reflection, and of 
free association as opposed to blind obedience or the surrender of critical judgement. 
As I argued in Chapter 6, Gorz's ecosocialism is premised on a notion of 
human autonomy lying beyond bread labour, a notion that I have already criticized as 
encouraging the technological domination of nature so as to minimise socially 
necessary labour. Moreover, I also argued that the question as to what is "socially 
necessary production" and how it might best be organized is not a simple technical 
question that can be left to administrators, as Gorz seems to believe. Ecocommunal 
theorists avoid this sharp distinction between the so-called "objective technical 
requirements of society" and the personal desires of its individual members and 
instead suggest (implicitly at least) a notion of positive freedom as the rounded 
development of the individual that requires a balance between thought and labour 
(mind and body), factory and field, reason and emotion, and culture and nonhuman 
nature. Unlike Gorz's approach, this model of human freedom encourages modest, 
small-scale (as distinct from large-scale, highly automated) technological 
"interventions" in ecosystems. As William Morris saw it, the point was not to reduce 
labour to a minimum but to reduce the boredom and alienation in labour to a 
minimum (in Morris's case, a promise that could be fulfilled by architecture and the 
decorative arts).92 
Nonetheless, Gorz does raise familiar classical arguments in favour of the 
State as an impartial protector and guarantor of individual liberty - arguments that 
provide a counterpoint to the ecocortununal reliance on voluntary co-operation and 
community censure. None of the above ecocommunal theorists satisfactorily address 
the mechanisms by which recalcitrant community members may be dealt with or the 
dangers of parochialism and personal affiliation that can often infect the dispensation 
of "popular" justice. In particular, they have yet to demonstrate how anarchist forms 
of social control (i.e., non-institutionalized community censure and coercion, 
92. See Ruth Levitas, "Marxism, Romanticism and Utopia: Ernst Bloch and William 
Morris," Radical Philosophy (Spring 1989): 27-36 at p. 30. In this respect, Moths 
remains true to that aspect of Marx that saw self-realization as attainable through. 
unalienated labour rather than beyond necessary labour. 
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violence, or self-defence) would necessarily be superior to, or at least no worse than, 
those employed by the modern state (i.e., publicly legitimated institutionalized 
"coercion" and protection). Nor do ecocommunal theorists satisfactorily address the 
matters of inter-regional justice and the problem of disparities in resource endowment 
Imre= local ecocommunities. I will return to these matters below after outlining the 
distinctive contribution of bioregionalism. 
Bioregionalism 
Although the exact source of the neologism "bioregionalism" 
(etymologically, bioregion means "life-place") is a matter of some uncertainty, its 
popularization as a unifying principle celebrating cultural and biological diversity and 
providing an ecological politics of living-in-place is generally traced to Peter Berg 
and Raymond Dasmann of the San Francisco Planet Drum Founciation.93 The term 
bioregion, according to Berg and Dasmann, "refers both to a geographical terrain and 
a terrain of consciousness - to a place and the ideas that have developed about how to 
live in that place." 94 Geographically, bioregions are areas having common 
characteristics such as geological formations, soils, watersheds, climate, native plants 
and animals, and the human settlements and cultures to which these characteristics 
have given rise. Culturally and psychologically, bioregionalism seeks the integration 
of human communities with the nonhuman world "at the level of the =Iglu 
ecosystem and employs for its cognition a body of metaphors drawn from and 
structured in relation to that ecosystem." 95 This goal of adapting human 
communities to the local bioregion is facilitated through the practice of 
"reinhabitation": 
93. Peter Berg and Raymond F. Dasmann, "Reinhabiting California," in Reinhabiting 
A Separate Country: A Bioregional Anthology of Northern California, ed. Peter Berg 
(San Francisco: Planet Drum Foundation, 1978), pp. 217-20. For a discussion of the 
possible origins of the term, see James J. Parsons, "On 'Bioregionalism' and 
'Watershed' Consciousness," The Professional Geographer , 37 (1985): 1-6 at p. 4. 
94. Berg and Dasmann, "Reinhabiting California," p. 218. 
95. Morris Berman, The Reenchantment of the World (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1981), P.  294. 
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Reinhabitation means learning to live-in-place in an area that has been disrupted 
and injured through past exploitation. It involves becoming native to a place 
through becoming aware of the particular ecological relationships that operate 
within and around it. It means understanding activities and evolving social 
behavior that will enrich the life of that place, restore its life-supporting 
systems, and establish an ecologically and socially sustainable pattern of 
existence within it. Simply stated it involves becoming fully alive in and with a 
place. It involves Applying for membership in a biotic community and ceasing 
to be its exploiter.Y° 
Bioregionalisni is principally a North American phenomenon that has grown into a 
significant tributary of the North American Green movement. 97 In addition to Berg 
and Dasmann, its principal theorists include Gary Snyder, Kirkpatrick Sale, Ernest 
Callenbach, David Haenke, Jim Dodge, Morris Berman, and Brian Tokar. 98 
Interestingly, too, it enjoys the general support of proponents of both social ecology 
and deep/transpersonal ecology - a point that underscores the broad commonality 
between these two schools, at least in the period before Bookchin's critique of deep 
ecology had been delivered. 99 Consistent with the tradition of the ecological 
community, bioregionalism emphasizes decentralization, human scale communities, 
cultural and biological diversity, relative self-sufficiency, and co-operation and 
community responsibility (both social and biotic). In differs from ecomonasticism 
mainly in its greater emphasis on protecting, and rehabilitating if necessary, the 
96. Berg and Dasmann, "Reinhabiting California," pp. 217-18. 
97. It has spawned a plethora of local bioregional groups that come together to share 
information in what have become biennial North American Bioregional Congresses 
(so far, three have been held - in 1984 in Missouri, in 1986 in Michigan, and 1988 in 
British Columbia). 
98. See, for example, Peter Berg, 'Devolving Beyond Global Monoculture," 
CoEvolution Ouarterly, Winter 1981, pp. 24-28; Gary Snyder, Turtle Island (New 
York: New Directions, 1969); Snyder, "Reinhabitation," in The Old Ways (San 
Francisco: City Lights Books, 1977), pp. 57-66; Snyder, "The Plowboy Interview 
with Gary Snyder: Choosing Your Place - and Making a Stand!" Tha.mathstr_auth 
News, September-October 1984, pp. 17-20 at pp. 22 and 24; Kirkpatrick Sale, 
Dwellers in the Land; Sale, "Bioregionalism - A New Way to Treat the Land," Ihg 
Ecologist 14 (1984): 167-73; Ernest Callenbach, Ecotopia (London: Pluto Press, 
1978); David Haenke, Ecological Politics and Bioregionalism (Drury, M. 0.: New 
Life Farm, 1984); Jim Dodge, "Living by Life: Some Bioregional Theory and 
Practice," The CoEvolution Ouarterly, Winter 1981, pp. 6-12; Morris Berman, Th 
Reenchantment of the World; and Brian Tokar, The Green Alternative: Creating an  
Ecological Future (San Pedro, California: R & E Miles, 1987). 
99. See, for example, Bill Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living as if 
Nature Mattered (Layton, Utah: Gibbs M. Smith, 1985), pp. 21-24, and Murray 
Bookchin, "A Letter of Support," in North American Bioregional Congress  
Proceedings. May 21-25 1984 (Drury, MO: New Life Farm, 1984), pp. 77-78. 
306 
characteristic diversity of native ecosystems. This is manifested in its concern to 
develop a sense of rootedness that is, as Morris Berman put it, "biotic, not merely 
ethnic." 10° (Ecomonasticism, on the other hand, has a more pastoral flavour and 
focuses less on natural history and more on the ideas of personal growth, social 
co-operation, and spiritual renewal, albeit within an ecologically benign setting. 
These, of course, are differences in emphasis only.) To the extent that political forms 
are discussed by bioregional theorists (many have just been concerned to explore 
innovative ways of cultivating a bioregional consciousness), the tendency is to 
promote as a long term goal a patchwork of anarchist polities linked together by 
networking and information exchange rather than through a formal state apparatus. In 
this respect, the general bioregional response to global problems is encapsulated in 
the idea of "saving the whole by saving the parts" - the parts, of course, being 
bioregions. 101 
In terms of general orientation, bioregionalism is undoubtedly the most 
ecocentric of all the emancipatory currents of ecopolitical thought examined in this 
inquiry. Indeed, as Don Alexander observes, it may be seen as the regional fulfilment 
of Aldo Leopold's land ethic insofar as it sees humanity as a "plain member" rather 
than conqueror of the biotic community. 102 This nonanthropocentic stance is much 
more emphatic in bioregionalism than in ecomonasticism and much more so than in 
social ecology (notwithstanding Bookchin's earlier support of bioregionalism). 
However, I intend to show that the political forms suggested by some bioregional 
theorists are neither the only nor necessarily the best political forms for facilitating 
the realization of ecocentric goals, although they are broadly compatible with 
ecocentric goals. In the following discussion, I focus on the work of Kirkpatrick Sale 
not only because he is a leading bioregional theorist but also because he has had the 
100.Berman, The Reenchantment of the World, p. 294. 
101.Peter Berg, "Growing a Bioregional Politics," RAM„ July-August 1985, 
pp. 14-16 at p. 14. 
102.Don Alexander, "Bioregionalism: Pseudo-Science or Sensibility?" 1989, ms, 
p. 2. 
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most to say about political structures. In this respect, it must be borne in mind that 
much of the bioregional literature is poetic, inspirational, and visionary and more 
concerned with cultivating a bioregional consciousness than with presenting detailed 
political analysis. 
Kirkpatrick Sale articulates the view of most bioregionalists in arguing that 
self-government by the various human communities within a bioregion - possibly 
linked by a bioregional confederation - offers the best guarantee of social and 
ecological harmony. (A confederation is a mutual association of many autonomous 
communities or states, each of which retains sovereignty. It should not be confused 
with a federation, which is a mutual association of semi-autonomous states or 
provinces under one, central sovereign state. 103)  According to Sale, the task of 
linking communities via a confederation would not be difficult: 
We start, after all, with a clear identity of interest among these communities, a 
clear understanding of how they are interwoven into the bioregional tapestry, a 
clear historical record of their mutual needs and responsibilities and what 
happens when those are ignored. A confederation within bioregional limits has 
the logic, the force, of coherence and commonality; a confederation beyond 
those limits does not. Any larger political form [such as the nation state] is not 
only superfluous, it stands every chance of being downright dangerous, 
particularly in that it is no longer organically grounded in ail ological identity 
or limited by the constraints of homogeneous communities.' 
Yet Sale also argues that the bioregional emphasis on diversity is such that it does not 
ultimately matter what political forms are chosen within a particular bioregion - 
indeed, it is to be expected that not every bioregion will follow the American liberal 
tradition - provided they serve bioregional principles, namely, human scale, 
conservation and stability, self-sufficiency and co-operation, decentralization, and 
diversity. 105  Nonetheless, he suggests that these bioregional principles would 
generally (though not always) impel the "polity in the direction of libertarian, 
103. In a federation, political power is divided between the component states and a 
federal government under a federal constitution; moreover, the federal government 
can enact laws within its purview that apply directly to the citizens in the component 
states. See Roger Scruton, A Dictionary of Political Thought (London: Pan Books, 
1982), pp. 86 and 170. 
104. Sale, Dwellers in the Land, p. 96. 
105. Ibid., see p. 108. 
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noncoercive, open, and more or less democratic governance." 1°6 Elsewhere, he has 
described these political principals as being "grounded in the dictates presented by 
Nature. .407 
On the positive side, the idea that political decision making communities 
should be based on bioregional contours has much to commend it - particularly in 
relation to land and water management (indeed, many existing management regimes 
for internal waters are already modelled along watershed lines). From an educational 
perspective, bioregionalism plays an invaluable role in underscoring the importance 
of thinking in terms of ecological relationships, asking where everything comes from 
and where everything goes, learning to identify, and become "respectful neighbours" 
with, the local species of flora and fauna. Such an orientation and understanding is 
crucial to the critical evaluation of existing development decisions. Indeed, some 
bioregionalists have suggested the formation of "ad hoc watershed shadow 
governments. Their function would be to serve as moral stewards for specific 
watersheds and bioregions and to help inhabitants learn the true ecological cost of any 
proposed development." 108 
At the more practical level, however, bioregionalism is confronted with the 
problem that linguistic, religious, and cultural boundaries do not necessarily follow 
bioregional lines. As Don Alexander argues, it is too simplistic to locate human 
communities on the basis of geography alone. 109  While the patterns of human 
settlement and movement and the cultures of many traditional societies have tended to 
be influenced quite strongly by geographical criteria, modern transport and 
communications have meant that regional consciousness in Western society is 
determined as much by functional (and, as already noted, linguistic, religious, and 
106.Ibid. 
107.Sale, "Bioregionalism - A New Way to Treat the Land," p. 170. 
108.Michael Helm, "Bioregional Planning," RAIN, October-November 1983, 
pp. 22-23, P.  23. 
109.Alexander, "Bioregionalism," see p. 7. 
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cultural) criteria than formal geographical criteria. 11° This seriously challenges the 
basic assumption on which Sale's entire discussion of political forms is premised, 
namely, that there is a "clear identity of interest" among the various communities 
within a bioregion, that they are relatively homogeneous and organically bound 
together by an ecological identity. What bioregional theorists should ask when 
considering the issue of institutional design is this: what political forms will best 
promote bioregional goals given that the many and varied communities within the 
many and varied bioregions of the world (however determined - another vexed 
question) do n.Q./ all possess a bioregional consciousness? Ceding complete political 
autonomy to the existing local communities that inhabit bioregions will provide no 
guarantee that development will be ecologically benign or co-operative. Nor will it 
provide any guarantee that they will form a confederation with neighbouring local 
communities in their bioregion so as to enable proper bioregional management. 
While the goals of bioregional theorists are admirable, then, their discussion 
of political forms is based on starting assumptions that are politically naive. Yet any 
revision of these assumptions raises the question as to whether an anarchist polity is 
indeed the best kind of polity to ensure the realization of bioregional goals, at least in 
the short and intermediate term. In any event, the flexible notion of bioregions is 
such that they can vary enormously in size, from the simple ecosystem of a puddle to 
the earth, depending on the scale and criteria used. 111 In these and other respects, 
bioregionalism shares many of the tensions and problems to be found in the general 
ecoanarchist tradition of which it forms part. In my evaluation of ecoanarchism 
below, I suggest that a multi-layered democratic decision making structure such as 
federalism might be more conducive to realizing ecocentric goals than the simple 
horizontal decision making structure of anarchism insofar as it acknowledges the 
multi-layered nature of social and ecological problems and does not presume a shared 
social and ecological identity. 
110. Ibid., see p. 18. 
111.Alexander, "Bioregionalism," see p. 10. 
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Does Ecocentrism Demand Ecoanarchism?:  
A Critical Evaluation  
Despite the important differences between social ecology and 
ecocommunalism (of which ecomonasticism and bioregionalism are tributaries), both 
seek to dismantle or by-pass the modem nation state and establish decentralized, 
autonomous, and human scaled communities. For social ecology and bioregionalism, 
ceding complete political and economic autonomy to such communities is considered 
the best means of reintegrating human communities into the natural world of which 
they are part. Ecomonasticism, on the other hand, is less concerned with general 
political forms and more concerned with planting seeds of cultural renewal through 
the establishment of exemplary intentional ecocommunities that co-exist within 
mainstream society. In this final section, I intend to assess the ecoanarchist case in 
the light of the ecocentric goals of social and ecological emancipation. There are 
several aspects of ecoanarchism that warrant closer scrutiny. First, how realistic are 
ecoanarchist assumptions concerning human nature? Second, is decentralization, 
maximum local democracy, and human scale the only or best means for realizing 
social and ecological emancipation in the context of the modem world? Finally, how 
ecologically informed is the ecoanarchist theoretical model of human freedom? How 
does it compare to the ecocentric model of freedom outlined in Chapter 2? Each of 
these questions will be addressed in turn. (A discussion of the relevance of the 
ecosocialist critique of ecoanarchism to the development of an ecocentric political 
theory will be reserved for the Conclusion to this inquiry.) 
(i) Are Humans "Essentially" Co-operative? 
Ecoanarchists argue that decentralization, local democracy, and human 
scaled institutions maximise opportunities for co-operative self-management. Social 
ecologists and bioregionalists, in particular, are suspicious of any form of hierarchical 
social or political arrangement, which they see as thwarting the otherwise 
spontaneous human impulse to co-operate. In terms of spatial metaphors, they 
contrast the vertical pyramid with the horizontal web and argue that only the latter is 
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in keeping with the mutualistic nature of ecological relationships. (Recall here 
Bookchin's libertarian model of society that is guided by his interpretation of the 
ecosystem: "the image of unity in diversity, spontaneity, and complementary 
relationships, free of all hierarchy and domination." 112) As I noted in my discussion 
of social ecology, this kind of reasoning is not new to anarchism: indeed, 
ecoanarchism may be seen as the latest in a long series of attempts by anarchist 
philosophers to find a model of society in nature. 113 Peter ICropotkin's Mutual Aid is 
a seminal anarchist tract of this kind insofar as it emphasizes, in seeking to redress the 
Darwinian stress on competition, the "natural" tendency of animals (including 
humans) to engage in intra-species co-operation. Anarchists, as George Woodcock 
points out, do not all assert that humans are naturally good, but they do fervently 
assert that humans are naturally socia.114  Roszak goes considerably further in 
relation to what he calls the mystical anarchist tradition (which includes Tolstoy, 
Martin Buber, Walt Whitman, Thoreau, Gustav Landauer, and Paul Goodman): 
Anarchists of this stripe [and Roszak includes himself] ... find their way to a 
characteristic kind of mysticism, to a warm, intuitive trust in the essential 
goodness of God, nature anct twman community. They have known the 
darkness, but never despair."' 
Unlike the individualistic freedom of liberalism, the freedom defended by 
ecoanarchism is a social, rather than individual virtue that is secured by voluntary 
co-operation and responsibility to the "human scaled" community of which the 
individual is part. 116 The dismantling of the state would not lead to social 
fragmentation, they argue, but rather to spontaneous co-operation and the 
strengthening of social bonds between people. Anti-social behaviour would be dealt 
112. Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom, p. 352. 
113.Woodcock, "Anarchism: A Historical Introduction," see p. 17. 
114. Ibid., see p. 19. 
115.Roszak, Eemgaanci, p. 138 
116. Koula Mellos's reading of Bookchin's ecoanarchism as a petit bourgeois form of 
radicalism based on solitary or "asocial individual self-sufficiency" seems to 
completely miss Bookchin's emphasis on symbiosis and community (see Koula 
Mellos, Perspectives on Ecoloey: A Critical Essay [London: Macmillan Press, 1988], 
Chapter 4). 
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with via community censure (as in traditional, small-scale hunting and gathering and 
horticultural groups) rather than via the abstract and inflexible legal rules laid down 
by a remote nation state. 117 Moreover, the anarchist assumption that humans are 
naturally co-operative, but are presently corrupted by hierarchical institutions, also 
stands in contrast to the classical liberal view, which saw humans as naturally 
self-seeking and in need of restraint through, say, a limited government based on a 
social contract It was on the basis of this latter model of human behaviour that the 
survivalist ecopolitical theorists reached a conclusion that is diametrically opposed to 
that of ecoanarchists: that only a centralized, authoritarian government can rescue us 
from the ecological crisis and save us, as it were, from ourselves. 
The ecoanarchists examined in this inquiry, then, share a deeply felt desire 
for humans to co-operate more than they do and a conviction that they can do so in 
the appropriate social environment The problem with the ecoanarchist model of 
human nature, however, is that it conflates people's potential nature with their 
essential, nature. That is, ecoanarchists present our potential nature II our essential 
nature and appeal to the reciprocity and mutual aid in nature (either implicitly or 
explicitly) as evidence that their model of human nature is in alignment with "the 
natural order of things" and perforce "objectively" right. I have already criticized this 
ecoanarchist appeal to the natural as adding nothing to the nonnative force of 
ecopolitical argument and do not intend to repeat these points here. 118 Here, I want 
to note the more obvious problems associated with such a model when it comes to 
rethinking political forms. Specifically, the presumption that humans are 
"essentially" of a certain nature (i.e., co-operative) and that this nature can be "re-
awakened" under the right social and institutional circumstances (i.e., anarchism) 
leads to institutional designs that cannot adequately accommodate human behaviour 
that defies this model of human nature. A more agnostic approach that avoids this 
117.For an example of how community censure operates in traditional societies, see 
Harold Barclay, People Without Government (London: Kahn & Averill with 
Cienfuegos Press, 1982). 
118. See Chapter 2 and Eckersley, "Divining Evolution." 
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kind of essentialism might be to say that the question as to whether humans are 
"inherently" good or bad (or co-operative or selfish) is meaningless and/or 
unknowable and to suggest that most, but not all, humans are more or less as "good" 
as the social and economic institutions of their particular society and culture generally 
encourages or allows them to be. This acknowledges the importance of social and 
economic institutions in influencing (as distinct from dictating) human behaviour 
while also recognizing the idiosyncrasies of individuals and the inevitability of 
varying degrees of "anti-social" and, occasionally, pathological behaviour in any 
community. This more agnostic approach thus remains open to the possibility that 
not everyone will respond to new institutions in the way that their designers might 
wish - a possibility that is likely to be enhanced if institutional change is rapid and/or 
pressured by crisis. 
Where does this leave ecocentric emancipatory theory? As I argued in 
Chapter 1, all the emancipatory ecopolitical theorists examined in this inquiry reject 
the authoritarian solution proffered by the survivalists on the ground that it merely 
responds to, rather than seeks to challenge and transform, the culture of possessive 
individualism that characterizes market capitalism. Indeed, I have characterized 
emancipatory ecopolitical theorists by, inter alia, their concern to find a more lasting 
solution to the crisis by moving toward a culture of social co-operation and ecological 
responsibility. 
However, ecocentric emancipatory theorists are confronted with a dilemma 
created by the urgency of ecological crisis. While they agree that long term cultural 
change will provide the most appropriate and lasting solution to the ecological crisis, 
they recognize that legislation can at least bring about an immediate response to the 
crisis. In view of the present rate of global ecological degradation, many threatened 
habitats, species, and tribal communities are unlikely to survive to see whether mutual 
aid and ecological restoration will indeed ensue from the ecoanarchists' strategy of 
withdrawing support from, or seeking to dismantle, hierarchical structures such as the 
nation state. The ecocentric concern to allow a beings (not just humans) to unfold in 
their own ways demands, at the very least, interim protection of biological and 
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cultural diversity. Such protection can be most effectively achieved by the 
introduction of state laws and sanctions restraining human conduct - measures that are 
anathema to ecoanarchists. 
More importantly, however, ecoanarchists have not demonstrated that social  
emancipation (let alone ecological restoration) can gay occur following the removal 
of, or the withdrawal of support from, "higher" forms of political authority. 
Ecosocialism provides a useful counterpoint here in arguing that a democratic state 
can act as an enabling institution that facilitates social emancipation by maintaining 
basic standards of income, health, education, and welfare, and by protecting basic 
freedoms via the rule of law. In this respect, democratic ecosocialists wish not to 
abandon but rather to fulfil the promise of parliamentary democracy. Yet Bookchin, 
for example, insists in his critique of Gorz's ecosocialism, that it must be 
centralization a decentralization, state Qt society, Marxism sx- libertarianism. But is 
the complete decentralization and devolution of power to the local community the 
most appropriate organizational means of realizing ecocentric emancipatory goals? Is 
it not the case that the more a society moves away from the centralized modern 
welfare state and toward decentralization and diversity, the more we might expect to 
find disparities in income and social services between communities? How can an 
anarchist polity mediate between, on the one hand, local interests, and on the other 
hand, regional and international interests? 
(ii) The "Other Side" of Decentralization, Local 
Democracy, and Human Scale 
The ecoanarchist case for decentralization, local democracy, and human 
scale institutions has been heralded by its supporters as the "third" way (i.e., beyond 
liberal parliamentary democracy and state socialism). Direct democracy at the 
community level is considered to be essential to the anarchist goals of personal and 
community empowerment and self-management. As we have seen, ecoanarchists 
(like all anarchists) argue that the breakdown of the hierarchical nation state and the 
ceding of power to local communities will enable face to face interaction and direct 
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political involvement in accordance with the ideal of the Athenian polls. 
Representative democracy, on the other hand, is seen to deliver "top down" decisions 
that are out of touch with the needs of the local community and therefore less likely to 
win local allegiance. The complete devolution of power is also seen to liberate what 
is believed to be a natural human instinct for co-operation as well as make possible 
self-sufficient and ecologically harmonious local economies. For social ecologists, a 
co-operative local polity of this kind will avoid the development of 
hierarchical/domineering sensibilities both between humans and between humans and 
the nonhuman world; for supporters of ecomonasticism, self-management will enable 
the reinvigoration of human community, social identity, and the growth of what 
Bahro has called a "biophile culture"; and for the bioregionalists, local democracy 
will enable the practice of reinhabitation. 
The problem with this approach, as I pointed out in my discussion of 
bioregionalism, is that the general ecoanarchist approach of "leave it all to the locals 
who are affected" only makes sense when the locals possess an appropriate social and 
ecological consciousness. It also presumes that local bioregion A is not a matter of 
concern to people living in bioregion B and that these latter "outsiders" can have no 
effective input to development decisions made by the inhabitants of bioregion A. 
Moreover, the rejection of a vertical, representative, and more centralized model of 
democracy in favour of a horizontal, direct, and completely decentralized model 
underrates the innovative potential of what might be called the "cosmopolitan urban 
centre" vis-a-vis the "local rural periphery." For example, historically most 
progressive social and environmental legislative changes - ranging from affirmative 
action, humans rights protection, and homosexual law reform to the preservation of 
wilderness areas - have tended to emanate from more cosmopolitan central 
governments rather than provincial or local decision making bodies. 119 In many 
119. Stephen Rainbow has also criticized what he calls the "soft" Green, 
ultra-democratic approach for naively assuming that local people will always choose 
to attract ecologically sensitive industry. See Stephen Rainbow, "Eco-politics in 
Practice: Green Parties in New Zealand, Finland, and Sweden," Paper presented to the 
Ecopolitics IV Conference, University of Adelaide, South Australia, 21-24 September 
1989, pp. 1-53 at p. 21. 
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instances, such reforms have been carried through by central governments in the face 
of opposition from the local community or region affected - a situation that has been 
the hallmark of many environmental battles in the Australian federal system of 
government. 120 At an even "higher" level, bodies such as the International Court of 
Justice and the World Heritage Committee are salutary reminders of the ways in 
which institutions cleated by international treaties can serve to protect both human 
rights and threatened species and ecosystems from the "excesses" of 1=1 political 
elites. Indeed, there is a large number of Green social and environmental reforms, 
ranging from the redistribution of resources from the developed to the developing 
countries to the abatement of the Greenhouse effect, that can only be effectively 
implemented via international agreement between nation states. Successful 
eco-diplomacy of this kind is more likely to be achieved by the retention and reform 
of a democratically accountable state that can legitimately claim to represent in the 
international arena at least a majority of people in a nation. While unilateral action by 
"right minded" citizens in local bioregions is to be encouraged, it will have minimal 
effect for as long as recalcitrant neighbouring local communities and regions continue 
to "externalize" their environmental costs. In view of the urgency and ubiquity of the 
ecological crisis, ultimately only a supra-regional perspective and multilateral action 
by nation states can bring about the kind of dramatic changes necessary to save the 
"global commons" in the short and medium term. It must be emphasized that none of 
these arguments are intended to deny the innovative potential of local and municipal 
action and the importance of enhancing local autonomy, nor the many obstacles 
facing international agreement. I am merely concerned to point out the two-edged 
nature of the argument for the complete devolution of political and legal power to 
120. The two most publicised of these battles are the World Heritage listings of the 
Franklin River in Tasmania and Kakadu National Park in the Northern Territory. For 
a detailed analysis of the Franklin controversy, see M. Sornarajah, ed., The South 
West Dam Dispute: The Legal and Political Issues (Hobart: University of Tasmania, 
1983). On the Kakadu controversy, see Clem Lloyd, "The Politics of Kakadu," in 
Environmental Politics in Australia and New Zealand, eds. Peter Hay, Robyn 
Eckersley, and Geoff Holloway (Hobart: Centre for Environmental Studies, 
University of Tasmania, 1989), pp. 103-18. 
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local assemblies. We need not only to act locally and think globally, but also to act 
globally. 
Decentralization can also be ecologically and socially problematic when 
pressed too far. Indeed, there are strong ecological arguments against complete 
decentralization in the terms of a more uniform distribution of the human settlement. 
As Robert Paehlke has argued, urban settlements are a less ecologically stressful and 
more energy efficient way of accommodating large numbers of people on the land 
than dispersing the human population more thinly and widely throughout existing 
wilderness and rural areas. 121 Cities also provide a cosmopolitan culture in contrast 
to the parochialism that can often be found in small rural communities. In criticizing 
the rural romantic current in the Green movement, Stephen Rainbow points out that 
... while the urbanization accompanying industrialization has many negative 
side-effects it has also bred many social-emancipatory movements and 
facilitated a much more interesting life for many of the city's inhabitants than 
they might have enjoyed in the countryside. A simple rural romanticism is far 
too hard to sustain against the reality of history, and iit As not the only basis upon 
which the Green desire for community can be built. 144 
While there are some strands of ecocommunalism that are vulnerable to these 
criticisms and while many ecoanarchists are critical of extensive urbanization and 
large cities (for example, Roszak), most ecoanarchists recognize the ecological and 
cultural advantages of cities. 123 Indeed, far from advocating the demise of cities as 
cultural and civic centres, bioregionalists and social ecologists advocate 
reinvigorating and greening cities and developing an urban "life-place" 
consciousness. 124 Peter Berg, for example, has developed a proposal for Green cities 
while Bookchin advocates the reinvigoration of city neighbourhood assemblies in his 
"New Municipal Agenda." 125 The ecocentric perspective defended in this inquiry is 
121. Robert Paehlke, Bucolic Myths: Towards a More Urbanist Environmentalism 
(Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, 1986). 
See also Paehlke, Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 156-57 and 244-50. 
122. Stephen Rainbow, "Eco-politics in Practice," p. 36. 
123. For a provocative critique of the city, see Roszak, Person/Planet, Chapter 9. 
124. Bookchin, The Rise of Urbanization. 
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more consistent with a diversity of human dwelling patterns (i.e., medium sized cities 
And decentralized communities) than with all of one or the other. This would be in a 
context of a lower human population and with less giant agglomerations. 
Insisting too emphatically on decentralization, local political autonomy, and 
direct democracy can also compromise the ecocentric goal of social justice. I have 
already noted that the more we move away from the modern welfare state to local 
autonomy, the less we can expect to find the same levels of wealth, welfare and social 
services among different local communities. This is because there is no longer an 
effective central decision making forum able to redistribute resources between regions 
to overcome, say, inter-regional disparities in resource endowment, wealth, and public 
infrastructure or provide relief in times of hardship or disaster. 126 This has particular 
relevance to developing countries. Bioregionalists, for example, do not address the 
fact that not all bioregions are equally endowed with the resources that enable the 
satisfaction of basic human needs. To what extent do we allow migration, trade, or 
compensation to promote social equality on an inter-bioregional and international 
basis? Won't migration be likely to disrupt the bioregional goals of social cohesion 
and self-sufficiency and put a strain on the carrying capacity of the better endowed 
bioregions? Can we afford to depend on the ecoanarchist reliance on goodwill and 
voluntary networking to resolve these many tensions? In view of the centrality to 
ecocenttism of promoting a level of resource consumption that can be sustained for 
all humans and that is compatible with the flourishing of nonhuman communities, the 
ecosocialist case for an "enabling state" to facilitate this transition begins to appear 
much more robust than the ecoanarchist case for spontaneous co-operation and 
voluntary inter-regional networking. 
An ecocentric perspective would seem to be more consonant with a decision 
making framework that can represent, address and resolve - or at least accommodate - 
social and cultural differences both within and across communities and regions. A 
125.Peter Berg, "The Bioregion and Ourselves II," Fourth World News 25 (1988): 
8-9 & 11, see p. 8. Bookchin, The Rise of Urbanization, Chapter 8. 
126.Robyn Eckersley, "Green Politics: A Practice in Search of a Theory?" 
Alternatives 15 (1988): 52-61, see p. 60. 
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multi-tiered, democratic political structure that follows the general principle of local 
control unless a good case can be made for the intervention of a "higher" tier of 
government at least has the advantage over anarchism of providing a better protection 
of interests beyond those of the local community and of providing for feedback and 
checks and balances in hot directions. For example, a decentralized federalist 
framework or decentralized "municipal ecosocialism" operating under a national 
government would both allow for some measure of supra-regional (e.g., national, 
state/provincial) decision making that could, in certain circumstances, override the 
decisions of more local decision making bodies. This is not possible under 
confederalism since sovereignty is retained by the constituent units. 
These two multi-tiered frameworks retain a considerable sympathy with 
anarchism insofar as they support a greater devolution of power from central to local 
assemblies to enable greater social and economic local autonomy and possibly 
community ownership of some means of production. In this respect, the case I am 
putting forward accepts that it is essential to avoid the concentration of economic and 
political power in centralized institutions. However, the solution to the problem 
should not be the simple transference of ail the power wrested from the nation state to 
local communities for that merely results in a different kind of concentration of 
power. Rather, it should mean breaking down the concentration of power in the 
nation state and dispersing it between local communities and democratically 
accountable international bodies. 
To recapitulate, then, ecoanarchism has not demonstrated that an anarchist 
polity is the only or best way to promote community empowerment or social equity or 
that it is the only or best way of restoring and protecting the environment. History has 
shown that some local communities can be just as socially and ecologically 
unsympathetic as some national governments. This underscores the virtues of 
dispersing political power between the centre and periphery (rather than concentrating 
political power in either the centre or periphery) in order to provide checks and 
balances in both directions. Moreover, a democratically accountable nation state 
(operating in the context of a relatively decentralized, multi-tiered governmental 
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framework) is much better placed than a large number of autonomous local 
governments to provide eco-diplomacy, interregional and international redistributive 
justice, and the protection of uniform human rights and freedoms via the rule of law. 
In the following section I argue that a multi-tiered democratic political 
structure is also more compatible with an ecocentric world-view than the simple 
web-like, horizontal structure of anarchism insofar as it recognizes the layered 
interrelationships between parts (social and ecological) of larger wholes. In 
particular, it recognizes that the maintenance of "healthy" and diverse bioregions is 
not only a matter of concern to the people who inhabit them. 
The Ecoanarchist Model of Freedom 
as Self-management 
The ecoanarchist model of human freedom is encapsulated in the notion of 
political, economic, and social self-management. Ecoanarchist theorists generally see 
any kind of external or "other" directedness, as distinct from internal or "self' 
directedness, as encroaching on this fundamental norm. As we have seen, the kind of 
"self' that is to be managed in the ecoanarchist model of freedom-as-self-management 
is a co-operative, social self rather than the atomistic and self-seeking individual of 
classical liberalism. Selfhood, according to social ecology, means having the power, 
competence, and necessary social development to be a fully participating citizen in 
the polis; until such selves are minimally attained, argues Bookchin, self-management 
becomes a contradiction in terms. 127 If democratic socialism may be seen as 
pressing forward the liberal notion of freedom by insisting on political and economic 
democracy (both representative and direct), then anarchism may be seen as pressing 
forward this notion yet further by insisting on direct democracy in all spheres of life. 
Unlike democratic socialists, anarchists do not accept representative democracy or the 
delegation of political or economic power to any higher authority. While some 
127. Bookchin, "Self-Management and the New Technology," in Toward an 
Ecological Society, see pp. 118-21. Two important "educational instruments" for 
cultivating selfhood are direct action and participation in small affinity groups; the 
latter, in particular, is seen as facilitating the kind of mutual recognition of each 
other's competences that makes consensual rule possible. 
321 
anarchists accept the idea of larger political units beyond the local community, such 
as a confederation of self-managing communities, these larger units are to remain 
thoroughly subservient to the member communities. In Bookchin's words, "only if 
assemblies of the people, from city neighbourhoods to small towns, maintain the most 
demanding vigilance and scrutiny over any coordinating confederal bodies is a 
libertarian democracy conceivable." 128 
Likewise, bioregionalists and defenders of the ecomonastic paradigm defend 
the local, human scale community as the most appropriate locus of self-management, 
both politically and ecologically. While Sale acknowledges the importance of 
thinking globally, he argues that only by restricting the size of political decision 
making units to humanly scaled proportions can social and ecological problems be 
addressed in personal, local, and concrete ways. According to Sale, this is because 
"the human animal, being small and limited, has only a small view of the world and a 
limited comprehension of how to act within it." 129 
How ecologically informed is this ecoanarchist model of freedom? Is it 
compatible with the process oriented, ecological model of internal relations that 
informs ecocentrism? As we saw in Chapter 2, this ecological model emphasizes 
relationships rather than discrete entities. An individual human may be seen as one 
kind of relatively autonomous organism that is, like other entities, embedded in a 
myriad of multi-levelled relationships of many different kinds (in the case of humans, 
this includes physiological, psychological, social, and ecological relationships). The 
metaphor of a body is a useful way of conceiving of these relationships since the 
many and varied parts that constitute the whole (cells, organs, circulatory systems) 
themselves manifest both the dependent properties of parts and the independent 
properties of wholes. Moreover, these many relationships are intrinsically dynamic, 
nonlinear, and flexible in responding to feedback (within certain parameters) - often 
in unpredictable ways. In the light of this picture of ecological reality, we may 
128.Bookchin, "Theses on Libertarian Municipalism," p. 15. 
129. Sale, Dwellers in the Land,  p. 53: 
322 
conceive of ourselves as cells in the body of Gaia, forming part of larger wholes that 
themselves have unique properties and which form part of still larger wholes 
(ecosystems, ethnic and cultural groupings, states, geopolitical regions and so on). 
According to Capra, nature has favoured systems that are characterized by 
stratified order since they have greater flexibility and resilience than nonstratified 
systems in the face of perturbations. 13° From the perspective of this dynamical 
systems view of life, neither the direct democracy of an anarchist polity nor a 
completely centralized bureaucratic state possess the flexible properties of stratified 
order. The simple web-like, horizontal decision making structure of anarchism, while 
flexible and responsive to the needs of local communities, has no built in recognition 
of the "self-management" interests of similar or larger social and ecological systems 
that lie beyond the local community. This is because a confederal body cannot 
proceed without the voluntary co-operation of its member units and cannot override 
the decisions of its member units; the latter are determining but not determined. The 
ecoanarchist insistence on the sovereignty of the local community can therefore only 
admit of differentiation of function and competence (and hence sovereignty) by 
individuals and groups within a local community, not beyond it. Of course, many 
ecoanarchists (particularly bioregionalists) subscribe to the ecological model of 
internal relations and seek the cultivation of an ecological consciousness; my point, 
however, is that this recognition is not adequately reflected in the organizational 
forms recommended by ecoanarchists. Conversely, the centralized bureaucratic state 
can purport to represent the interests of a larger social and ecological whole but its 
"top heavy" and "top down" hierarchical structure cannot respond flexibly to the 
special needs and interests of local communities. Such a concentration of power has 
the potential to lead to far-reaching domination. 
What kinds of democratic political forms, then, are best suited to an 
ecocentric conception of reality? What is the most appropriate locus of 
self-management in the context of an interconnected world made up of many different 
130. Capra, The Turning Point, see pp. 303-4. 
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kinds of relatively autonomous autopoietic entities? Clearly, whatever social and 
ecological "whole" we identify as the locus of political self-management will always 
be partial insofar as there will always be other kinds of social and ecological "wholes" 
or communities with their own, somewhat different "interests" to be represented. 
This suggests the need for a layered and flexible decision making structure - with a 
two-way flow of information - to ensure that political and economic power is not 
excessively concentrated at any one level, whether "top" DE "bottom." It means a 
greater dispersal of power both "down" and "up" in the sense of a simultaneous 
devolution of some areas of legal and fiscal power from the nation state to local 
communities as well as the ceding of other areas of legal and fiscal power from the 
nation state to international democratic forums. At present, the concentration of 
political power in the nation state not only gives rise to inflexibility toward the special 
needs of local communities but also gives rise to a limited, nationalistic notion of 
security that hampers international efforts (urged by many nongovernment 
organizations) toward ecological co-operation and a more equitable distribution of 
resources between developed and developing nations. Indeed, the growth in 
international environmental awareness is such that it is already possible to discern - 
particularly in Europe - a lessening of state power and national sovereignty brought 
about by the strengthening of local democracy, on the one hand, and greater regional 
and international co-operation and agreement brought about by the recognition of 
mutual ecological interests, on the other hand. 
The two multi-tiered, democratic political structures discussed in the 
previous section - decentralized federalism and municipal ecosocialism - are more 
consistent with an ecocentric perspective than the horizontal structure of anarchism 
because they are able to represent different layers of social and ecological interests 
(local, national, regional, international) and provide an institutional means for 
resolving conflict. Both models are sympathetic toward anarchism in that they seek 
to promote local diversity and the dispersal of political and economic power while 
allowing - in ways that anarchism cannot - for regional integration, representative 
democracy, and the delegation of power beyond the local community. This is not an 
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abdication of the self-management prerogatives of the local community (as the 
anarchists might see it) since this model recognizes that the local community is not 
the only kind of community to be managed. 
In terms of economic management, an ecocentric model is inconsistent with 
extensive state economic planning or a complete "command economy" since it seeks 
the dispersal of political and economic power in both state and private hands. It is, 
however, consistent with government intervention in the economy (whether local, 
provincial, or national) to break down the excessive concentration of market power or 
to ensure that the operation of the market does not compromise ecological integrity or 
social justice. Finally, an ecocentric model is consistent with a greater degree of local 
community ownership and control of the means of production as well as co-operative 
enterprises and worker self-management. 
Before leaving this discussion of self-management, it is illuminating to 
contrast the ecoanarchist notion of the self that is to be politically managed or 
"realized" with the distinctive ecocentric philosophical model of self-realization 
advocated by transpersonal ecology. As we saw in Chapters 2 and 3, transpersonal 
ecology seeks the this-worldly cultivation of as expansive a sense of self as possible 
through the process of widening and deepening one's identification with all entities 
(human and nonhuman). Optimally, the larger, unfolding whole as well as the myriad 
of relatively autonomous parts are experienced as aspects of the Self that is to be 
realized or "managed." This wider sense of Self is "transpersonal" since it transcends, 
in the sense of including And going beyond, the personal, egoic sense of self as well as 
the local community of which the individual is part. Self-management under this 
notion of self means acting in a way that maximises the unfolding and flourishing of 
a entities rather than simply those in the local social and ecological community of 
which the individual is a member. 
In discussing three different forms of identification - personal, ontological, 
and cosmological - that can lead to the experience of a wider sense of self, Fox 
concludes that cosmological identification is the best approach since it is easier to 
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communicate and grasp than ontologically based approaches and more impartial than 
personally based approaches. As Fox argues: 
... emphasising a cosmological basis for identification means attempting to 
convey a lived sense that all entities (including ourselves) are relatively 
autonomous modes of a single, unfolding process; that all entities are leaves on 
the tree of life. A lived sense of this understanding means that we strive, 
insofar as it is within our power to do so, not to identify ourselves exclusively 
with our leaf (our personal, biographical self), our twig (our family), the leaves 
we are in close proximity to on other twigs (our friends), our minor subbranch 
(our community), our major subbranch (our race), oturabranch (our species), and 
so on, but rather to identify ourselves with the tree."' 
According to Fox, cosmological identification provides an important corrective to the 
partiality and problems of attachment that are associated with personally based 
identification, which in practice "tends to mean that one identifies with my self first, 
my family next, my friends and more distant relations next, my ethnic grouping next, 
my species next, and so on." 132 Fox observes that partial, personally (including 
locally) based kinds of identification, while admirable in and of themselves, also have 
"far more to do with the cause of possessiveness, greed, exploitation, war, and 
ecological destruction than with the solution to these seemingly intractable 
problems." 133 This is not to say that there is anything wrong with personally based 
kinds of identification per se. Indeed, Fox acknowledges that personally based kinds 
of identification have a significant place in everyday life. From a transpersonal 
ecology perspective, however, personally based kinds of identification must take 
place in a larger cosmological context. 
Fox's distinction between cosmologically-based and personally-based forms 
of identification enables us to see that the ecoanarchist sense of self tends more 
toward the personal, concrete, and local (the familiar branch, twigs, and leaves of the 
local community) rather than the larger, unfolding whole (i.e., the entire tree, 
including all of its branches, twigs, and leaves). As Bookchin has argued, "the living 
131.Warwick Fox, "The Meanings of Deep Ecology," Island Magazine, Autumn 
1989, pp. 32-35 at p. 35. 
132.Fox, "The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate," p. 12. See also Fox, 
Transpersonal Ecology, Chapter 8. 
133. Ibid., p. 414. 
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cell which forms the basic unit of political life is the municipality from which 
everything else must emerge: confederation, interdependence, citizenship, and 
freedom." 134 In contrast, there is nothing in the transpersonal ecology model of 
freedom as Self-realization that requires that political power reside exclusively in the 
local community at the expense of the needs of broader social and ecological 
aggregations. While transpersonal ecology would support a life-place politics of the 
kind advocated by bioregionalism, the self that is to realized or "managed" in this 
context includes yet goes beyond the local community to encompass the myriad of 
life-forms and entities that inhabit "Gaia." It is therefore quite consistent with the 
idea of local communities accepting in certain cases the decisions of units 
representing broader social and ecological communities in the name of furthering the 
interests of these larger wholes. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that a multi-tiered, democratic political 
decision making framework is more consistent (both theoretically and practically) 
with an ecocentric perspective than the political forms advocated by ecoanarchism. 
Of course, no democratic decision malting framework can provide any guarantee of 
social and ecological outcomes that are consistent with an ecocentric perspective. In 
this respect, the ecoanarchist stress on ecological and cultural renewal, such as 
cultivating a bioregional consciousness, social responsibility, and spirit of civic 
participation, provide the crucial life-blood of a successful ecocentric polity (more 
about this in the Conclusion). Nonetheless, this chapter has been concerned to show, 
among other things, that some decision making frameworks are more conducive than 
others to the realization of ecocentric goals. In particular, [have argued that 
ecocentric emancipatory goals are more likely to be furthered by the retention and 
reform (rather than abolition) of the nation state. Significantly, although 
ecoanarchism is generally more ecocentric than democratic ecosocialism in terms of 
general orientation and sensibility, I have argued that the political forms defended by 
134. Bookchin, The Rise of Urbanization, p. 282. 
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democratic ecosocialists are more appropriate for the realization of ecocentric goals 
than those defended by ecoanarchists. 
Chapter 8 
Ecofeminism: What Does it Add? 
Introduction  
The women's movement and the ecology movement represent two of the 
most influential new social movements in modern times. For a growing number of 
Green theorists, the emergence of ecofeminism in the late 1970s represents a timely 
convergence of ecological and feminist concerns. 1 The principal objective of the 
ecofeminist project has been to explore the links between the domination of 
nonhuman nature and the oppression of women and to outline an emancipatory 
ecopolitical praxis based on a theoretical synthesis of feminist and ecological insights. 
Unlike democratic ecosocialism and ecoanarchism, ecofeminism does not 
directly address the question of political forms, although its strong anti-hierarchical 
outlook makes it clear that it would have considerably more sympathy with the 
community self-management approach defended by ecoanarchism than the "enabling 
state" approach defended by democratic ecosocialism. Rather, the main contribution 
of ecofeminist theory has been to provide a philosophical, social, and psychological 
critique of the domination of women and the nonhuman world. In this chapter I 
examine and critically evaluate this contribution of ecofeminism to emancipatory 
ecopolitical theory. My main objectives are (i) to assess the various explanations that 
ecofeminist theorists have provided to account for the links between patriarchy and 
anthropocentrism, and (ii) find out to what extent, if any, ecofeminism is 
distinguishable from the ecocentric perspective defended in this inquiry (I say "to 
what extent" since it is clear that ecofeminism is seeking to develop a. 
nonanthropocentric emancipatory theory). 
1. Although ecofeminism is generally discussed as a synthesis of the ecology and 
women's movements, it also has strong links with the peace movement. Indeed, for 
many ecofeminists, militarism is seen as one particularly extreme expression of the 
domination of nature. The main focus of this chapter, however, will be on the 
theoretical connection between feminism and ecology rather than militarism. 
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Ecofeminists have staked out a new political and theoretical terrain. In 
terms of political issues, ecofeminists have focused attention on the problematic 
relationship of women to science and technology (particularly the 
under-representation of women in science); the politics of women's health; the 
survival needs of women in developing countries; earth-based women's spirituality; 
the division of labour between the sexes; and, in relation to the population question, 
the issues of female infanticide, new reproductive technologies, and reproductive 
freedom.2 Ecofeminists have also pointed to the growing number of women 
participating in grassroots environmental and disarmament campaigns, two 
noteworthy examples of the latter being the long-standing Greenhorn Common 
women's peace camp in the U. K. and the Women's Pentagon Action in the U. S. in 
1980 and 1981. 
At the theoretical level, the symbolic association of women with nature is 
taken by many ecofeminist theorists as demonstrating a special convergence of 
interest between feminism and ecology (although, as we shall see, not all feminists - 
and not all ecofeminists - welcome this association). The convergence is seen to 
arise, in part, from the fact that patriarchal culture has located women somewhere 
between men and the rest of nature on a conceptual hierarchy of being (i.e., God, 
Man, Woman, rest of Nature). Ecofeminists have also identified what they see as a 
similar logic of domination between the destruction of nonhuman nature and the 
oppression of women. Indeed, it is a central (and highly contentious) claim of many 
ecofeminists (writing mostly from a radical feminist perspective) that the logic of the 
human domination of nonhuman nature follows the logic of the male domination of 
women. According to this argument, patriarchy is identified as the source of both 
forms of domination. In the words of Ynestra King, the domination of women is "the 
prototype of other forms of domination" of which the domination of nature is but one 
2. See, for example, Leonie Caldecott and Stephanie Leland, eds., Reclaim the Earth:  
Women Speak Out for Life on Earth  (London: Women's Press, 1983); Joan 
Rothschild, ed., Machina Ex Dea: Feminist Perspectives on Technology (New York: 
Pergamon Press, 1983); and Judith Plant, ed., Healing the Wounds: The Promise of 
Ecofeminism (Philadelphia: New Society, 1989). 
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example. 3 Finally, it is frequently claimed that women, by virtue of their 
reproductive capabilities and special bodily and social experiences, are the bearers of 
a special consciousness that is more attuned with an ecological world-view than the 
stereotypical "male" consciousness. Here, ecofeminists point to the parallels in the 
epistemology and metaphysics of radical feminism and radical ecology. Both are 
nonhierarchical, process oriented, and seek mutualistic social and ecological 
relationships based on a recognition of the interconnectedness, interdependence, and 
diversity of all phenomena. 
It is these last two claims that have sparked the most controversy and debate 
- not only within ecofeminist and feminist circles but also between ecofeminists and 
theorists of the ecology and broader Green movements. In particular, the claim that 
patriarchy is the root cause of the domination of nonhuman nature forms the basis of a 
number of recent ecofeminist critiques of the deep ecology perspective. 4 The direct 
implication of this ecofeminist argument is that the principal focus of an 
emancipatory ecological praxis must be patriarchy rather than anduopocentrism. 
3. Ynestra King, "Toward an Ecological Feminism and a Feminist Ecology," in 
Rothschild, ed., Machina Ex De, pp. 118-29 at p. 119. King has also argued that "if 
male ecological scientists and social ecologists fail to deal with misogyny, the deepest 
manifestation of nature-hating in their own lives, they are not living the ecological 
lives or creating the ecological society they claim" (ibid., p. 123). While King 
endorses Murray Bookchin's thesis that domination and hierarchy in human society 
leads to the domination of nonhuman nature, she argues that it is misogyny that lies at 
the root of 5ocial (as distinct from nonhuman) oppression. See also Janet Biehl, "It's 
Deep, But is it Broad?: An Ecofeminist Looks at Deep Ecology," Special Supplement 
to Kick It Over, Winter 1987, pp. 2A-4A. 
4. This is not the only kind of criticism that has been levelled against deep ecology by 
ecofeminists; it does, however, represent what both Michael Zimmerman and 
Warwick Fox have taken to be the essential, substantive charge against deep ecology. 
See Michael E Zimmerman, "Feminism, Deep Ecology, and Environmental Ethics," 
Environmental Ethics 9 (1987): 21-44, and Warwick Fox, "The Deep 
Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate and it Parallels," Environmental thica 11 (1989): 
5-25. For the charge that deep ecology is itself androcentric, see Jim Cheney, 
"Eco-feminism and Deep Ecology," Environmental Ethics 9 (1987): 115-45; for a 
reply to this particular charge, see Fox, "The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate," 
pp. 11-13. Contrary to what is implied in this ecofeminist argument, 
deep/transpersonal ecology theorists do not assert that anthropocentrism is the root 
cause of the ecological crisis since they are critical of reductionism. However, Fox 
distinguishes (in "The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate") between social causation  
and social/philosophical legitimation and argues with respect to the latter that the 
unwarranted assumption of human self-importance j  the most fundamental 
legitimating ideology underlying ecological domination. 
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Similarly, the related claim that women are the bearers of a special ecological 
consciousness suggests that women have a unique vantage point from which to 
critically evaluate existing ecological problems and develop an alternative ecological 
ethic. This last-mentioned claim provides a challenge to the nonsectional orientation 
of the wider Green movement by suggesting that women (rather than, say, citizens in 
general) are to be the "historic subject" that will usher in an ecological society. These 
various debates will be explored below. For the moment, it is important to note that 
not all ecofenainists have pursued these last two arguments and, of those who have, 
not all have pursued them in the same way and to the same political end. Indeed, 
given that there are many different kinds of feminism (e.g., liberal, Marxist, socialist, 
radical, existentialist, psychoanalytical, and postmodern), it is hardly surprising to 
find that there is more than one kind of ecofeminism, as we shall see below. 
The political and theoretical issues introduced above have been examined 
from a wide range of perspectives and have generated a growing body of ecofeminist 
literature. Val Plumwood, in a useful critical review of this literature, has identified 
three main areas of theoretical inquiry that have sought to shed light on the parallels 
and links between the domination of nonhuman nature and the domination of 
women.5 These are (i) the complex history of philosophical dualism (subject/object, 
mind/body, culture/nature, science/art, and reason/emotion) that has its origin in 
classical philosophy; 6 (ii) the "masculine" and mechanistic imagery associated with 
5. Val Plumwood, "Ecofeminism: An Overview and Discussion of Positions and 
Arguments," Australasian Journal of Philosophy  64 (1986): 120-38. Plumwood's 
article provides a much needed critical contribution to the ecofeminist literature and it 
has helped to inspire the analytical map of ecofeminism that I present below. Since 
drafting this chapter, I have discovered that Val Plumwood presented a broadly 
similar analytical approach to mine in Plumwood, "Women, Humanity and Nature," 
Radical Philosophy (Spring 1988): 16-24. 
6. Two pioneering books on this aspect that are widely cited in the ecofeminist 
literature are Rosemary Radford Ruether, New Woman New Earth: Sexist Ideologies  
Andaumanlibgratign (New York: Seabury Press, 1975) and Elizabeth Dodson Gray, 
Green Paradise Lost (Wellesley, Massachusetts: Roundtable Press, 1981). It is 
important to note that this line of inquiry is not unique to ecofeminism but has been 
pursued by a wide range of ecophilosophers. The special contribution of 
ecoferninism, however, has been to focus on the fact that women are often associated 
with the inferior side of these dualistic categories. 
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the rise of modem science from the 16th century; 7 and (iii) the process of gender 
formation, that is, the different paths of psycho-sexual development experienced by 
men and women.8 To this list I would add (iv) the changing division of labour 
wrought by the development of the market economy. 9 It is surprising to find that this 
fourth area of inquiry is the least examined area in the ecofeminist literature (hence its 
exclusion from Plumwood's list), although it would seem to have just as important a 
bearing on the contemporary nature of environmental destruction and the oppression 
of women as the other areas of inquiry listed above. For example, the specific 
division of labour under capitalism helps to account for the nature and scale of 
participation by men and women in environmentally destructive activities (i.e., with 
many more men in science and industry and many more women performing the role 
of consumer and householder). 
Taken together, these different areas of inquiry (philosophical, 
psychological, and social and political) have helped to shed considerable light on the 
mutually reinforcing relationship between patriarchy and the domination of nature, 
although I will be arguing that no single avenue of inquiry has been able to 
demonstrate that there is a necessary link between these two forms of domination. 
Indeed, I intend to show that the theoretical explanations provided by some of these 
areas of ecofeminist inquiry have tended to undermine, or at least limit, the force and 
7. Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women. Ecology and the Scientific  
Revolution (London: Wildwood House, 1982); Brian Easlea, Science and Sexual  
Oppression: Patriarchy's Confrontation with Woman and Nature (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981); Joan Rothschild, ed., Machina Ex Den; and Evelyn 
Fox Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1985). Again, these developments have also been explored by other environmental 
philosophers although usually not from a specifically feminist perspective. See, for 
example, William Leiss, The Domination of Nature (Boston: Beacon Press, 1974) and 
Fritjof Capra, The Turning Point: Science. Society. and the Rising Culture (London: 
Fontana, 1983). 
8. Isaac D. Balbus, "A Neo-Hegelian, Feminist, Psychoanalytic Perspective on 
Ecology," Telos 52 (1982): 140-55; Balbus, Marxism and Domination: A 
Neo-Hegelian. Feminist. Psychoanalytical Theory of Sexual. Political and  
Technological Liberation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); Keller, 
Reflections on Gender and Science; and Keller, "Women, Science, and Popular 
Mythology," in Machina Ex Dea: Feminist Perspectives on Technology, ed. Joan 
Rothschild (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), pp. 130-46. 
9. See, for example, Ruether, New Woman New Earth, Chapter 8. 
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applicability of other areas of ecofeminist inquiry. Moreover, while it has been 
shown that some of these developments (e.g., the rise of modem science and the 
development of commodity relations) have in many cases served to reinforce the 
domination of women and nonhuman nature, these developments have at the same 
time created new kinds of freedoms and opportunities for women (e.g., contraception, 
domestic labour saving devices, and new educational and employment opportunities). 
The two-sided nature of these developments has created a considerable divergence in 
feminist perspectives, particularly with regard to the role of science and technology. 
This divergence has largely turned on how feminist theorists have treated the 
supposed affinity between women and nature, that is, whether this affinity is rejected, 
embraced, or sought to be transcended. 
In view of the centrality in ecofeminist theory of what I shall for 
convenience call "the ecofeminist problematic" (i.e., the idea that women are 
somehow closer to, or have a deeper affinity or keener sense of interrelatedness with, 
nonhuman nature than men), I have chosen this as the conceptual lens through which 
the literature will be examined. The following discussion will therefore address three 
general kinds of feminist response to the ecofeminist problematic. These responses 
turn on whether the affinity of women and nonhuman nature is (i) rejected (whether 
as a pernicious mythology or, at best, a distorted truth) on the grounds that it retards 
women's development as free subjects, (ii) embraced in a positive affirmation of the 
nonhuman world and of women's special connectedness with that world, or 
(iii) transcended in favour of a gender neutral model of the self that affirms both the 
nonhuman world and humanity's connectedness with that world. 10 In many respects, 
the major ecofeminist debate has been between those who wish to embrace the 
connection and those who wish to transcend it, since most of those who reject the 
10. Of course, most ecofeminists claim to support a philosophical perspective that 
transcends the dualistic thinking that is seen to lie behind the domination of women 
and nonhuman nature so that neither woman nor nonhuman nature is considered to be 
the Other. I argue, however, that whether ecofeminist theorists actually transcend 
such dualism is a function of the sorts of characteristics that imbue their ideal of what 
it means to be human, their attitude toward science and technology, the ways in which 
they evaluate the stereotypical qualities of the feminine and the masculine, and the 
ways in which they envision our relationship to the nonhuman world. 
333 
association do not see any special affinity between ecology and feminism (one 
important exceptions is Janet Biehl, as I note below). However, a discussion of this 
latter category is necessary since it poses a challenge to the whole ecofeminist 
theoretical enterprise. 
Before outlining these positions, it should be borne in mind that what 
follows is merely a conceptual map that has been applied to the ecofeminist literature 
in order to clarify and critically evaluate the claims of ecofeminism from an 
ecocentric perspective. Its usefulness can be judged by the degree to which it sheds 
light on ecofeminist debates, highlights difficulties and inconsistencies in some of the 
arguments raised, and helps us to see some of the essential areas of difference in 
philosophical perspective within and across ecofeminist and wider Green circles. 
However, it should be remembered that these differences are not hard and fast; they 
merely represent different areas of emphasis, different leanings, and different 
practical preoccupations. 
Rejecting the Feminine: The Body as Prison  
Although the feminist existentialist Simone de Beauvoir was not an 
=feminist scholar, her observations on the relationship between woman, man, and 
nature in The Second Sex have been widely drawn upon by contemporary ecofeminist 
theorists of varying persuasions. 11 It is therefore somewhat ironic that de Beauvoir 
herself rejected the association of woman and nature on the ground that, historically, 
it has served to inhibit women's own process of becoming free, independent existents. 
I will therefore launch my discussion of the ecofeminist problematic by outlining de 
11. Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. and ed. H. M. Parshley 
(Harmondsworth, U. K.: Penguin, 1982); de Beauvoir's use of the term "nature" is 
somewhat ambiguous in that it sometimes applies to the nonhuman world or "external 
nature" but more usually is intended to refer to the nonhuman world and that aspect of 
humanity that is biologically bounded. This reflects de Beauvoir's view of humans as 
partially natural or biological beings (embedded within nature) but mostly or 
essentially transcendent beings (able to rise above the natural "givens" of existence). 
This explains why de Beauvoir usually opposes culture to nature. Although I use the 
term "nature" in this inquiry to encompass "all that is" (i.e., the human and nonhuman 
world), the term will be used in de Beauvoir's (more usual) sense in the following 
discussion of de Beauvoir's ideas. 
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Beauvoir's position on the matter, since it (and similar accounts) serve as a useful 
counterpoint to the radical ecofeminist position that will be examined. 
In her wide ranging exploration of the "second sex," de Beauvoir observed 
that women - like nonhuman animals - have usually been more preoccupied with the 
regeneration and repetition of life whereas men have usually been free to seek ways 
of transcending life by remodelling, reshaping, and recreating the future through 
technology and symbols. Whereas women's activity has usually been perishable, 
involving "lower level" transformations of nature, men's activity has usually been 
more lasting, involving major transformations of nature and culture. Woman's body 
and its functions have meant that she has been "more enslaved to the species than the 
male" and "her animality ... more manifest." 
De Beauvoir has also described woman as "a wished for intermediary" 
between man and nature. According to the biblical myth, she was given to him "so 
that he might possess her and fertilize her as he owns and fertilizes the soil; and 
through her he makes all nature his realm." 12 Yet nature inspires ambivalent feelings 
in man: 
He exploits her, but she crushes him, he is born of her and dies in her, she is the 
source of his being and the realm that he subjugates to his will; Nature is a vein 
of gross material in which the soul is imprisoned, and she is the supreme reality; 
she is contingent and Idea, the finite and the whole; she is what opposes the 
SpAit and the Spirit itself ... Woman sums up nature as Mother, Wife, and Idea 
••• 
According to de Beauvoir, regarding woman as the Other has not only served the 
economic interests of man, it has also conformed to his "ontological and moral 
pretensions," that is, to man's desire to set himself up as "sovereign subject." 14 
Woman's misfortune "is to have been biologically destined for the repetition of Life, 
when even in her own view Life does not carry within itself its reasons for being, 
reasons that are more important than the life itself." 15 That this should be seen as a 
12. de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, p. 183. 
13. Ibid., pp. 176-77. 
14. Ibid., p. 171. 
15. Ibid., p. 96. 
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misfortune arises from de Beauvoir's existentialist philosophy. To be fully human is • 
to take responsibility for one's own being and actively transcend the givens of 
existence through conscious and creative activity, through full participation in the 
realm of culture. In this respect, de Beauvoir accepts the idea that nature is but "a 
vein of gross material in which the soul is imprisoned." 16 Culture, on the other hand 
... must be apprehended through the free action of a transcendence; that is, the 
free spirit with all its riches must project itself towards an empty heaven that it 
is to poWate; but if a thousand persistent bonds hold it to earth, its surge is 
broken.' ' 
Yet de Beauvoir observes that women need not always be tethered to the earth in this 
way since new technologies - particularly new forms of contraception and domestic 
labour saving devices - and new educational and employment opportunities for 
women have gradually eroded the contrast between women as confined, immanent, 
and enslaved to their bodies and men as free, creative, and transcendent subjects. As 
a result of these developments, the door is being increasingly opened for women to 
affirm their status as subject by becoming more active, productive, and creative. 
Women, argues de Beauvoir, now have a much greater opportunity to regard the 
Universe as their own and assume responsibility for it, by changing it, thinking about 
it, revealing it. In short, de Beauvoir believes that women share men's aspirations for 
sovereignty: 
For she, too, is an existent, she feels the urge to surpass, and her project is not 
mere repetition but transcendence towards a different futurq a in her heart of 
hearts she finds confirmation of the masculine pretensions. 1° 
As to whether the free woman will be any different to the free man, de Beauvoir 
makes no prediction: 
It is not sure that her "ideational worlds" will be different from those of men, 
since it will be through attaining the same situation as theirs that she will find 
emancipation; to say in what degree she will remain different, in what degree 
these differences will retain their importance - this would be to hazard bold 
predictions indeed [my emphasis]. '- 
16. Ibid., p. 176. 
17. Ibid., p. 721. 
18. Ibid., p. 96. 
19. Ibid., p. 724. 
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Clearly, de Beauvoir is no biological determinist. That women should have 
been kept in a state of Otherness and inferiority for so long is accounted for by the 
success of men's aspirations to transcend the givens of existence, a success perhaps 
having been initially secured by their superior physical strength. Nowadays, 
however, it is no longer the case that "anatomy determines destiny" in the way that it 
has in the past. 
What is significant for present purposes is that while de Beauvoir discusses 
the association of woman and nature as Other and as inferior to the male realm of 
culture, her challenge is directed toward the status of women, not the status of nature. 
She does not question what she sees as the male aspiration for sovereignty via the 
domination of nature. Nor does she question the valuation of nature as inferior and 
Other. Indeed, she reinforces this valuation in her plea that women now join men in 
their project of transcending nature so that women too may participate as free human 
beings in the realm of culture. In short, de Beauvoir's position is that women have 
been second class citizens by virtue of their closer affinity to, and embeddedness in, 
nature and that they are now able to transcend that embeddedness by taking a step lig 
in the hierarchy of being. Her exploration of the second sex is one that shows how 
women have been excluded from, and how they might now be included in, the 
hitherto male dominated realm of culture. 
The anthropologist Sherry Ortner has taken a similar approach in her 
influential essay "Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?" where she describes 
women as traditionally occupying a "middle status' on the hierarchy of being from 
culture to nature," mediating between the two and performing a kind of conversion 
function.2° According to Ortner, this mediating element might also explain why 
20. Sherry B. Ortner, "Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?," in Women. 
Culture and Society, eds. Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo and Louise Lampshire 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), pp. 67-87 at p. 84. Ortner argues that 
women have been subordinated to men in every known society on the ground that 
they have been identified with something that every culture devalues as a lower order 
of existence than itself - nature (p. 72). Ortner rejects biological determinism, 
however, and argues instead that biological differences only take on a 
superior/inferior significance within the framework of a culturally defined value  
system. However, she claims that the treatment of women as second class citizens for 
being closer to nature (as distinct from being equated with nature) is a cultural  
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women are not only devalued but also circumscribed, "since culture must maintain 
control over its (pragmatic and symbolic) mechanism for the conversion of culture 
into nature."21 Yet Ormer, like de Beauvoir, does not question this "masculine" 
conception of the cultural project. Culture, according to Ortner, is "the transcendence, 
by means of systems of thought and technology, of the natural givens of existence." 22 
And, like de Beauvoir, Ortner agrees that: 
Ultimately, both men and women can and must be equally involved in projects 
of creativity and transcendence. Only then will women be seen a jtli.gned with 
culture. in culture's ongoing dialectic with nature [my emphasis]. 4 
While the plea for women to enjoy equal recognition is entirely justifiable 
from an ecocentric perspective, de Beauvoir's and Ortner's means of achieving that 
recognition (i.e., by women seeking full participation in a culture that regards nature 
as that "vein of gross material in which the soul is imprisoned") is highly problematic. 
In accepting the assumed inferiority of the natural realm and the idea that women 
have been more bound up in this realm than men, this kind of response to the 
ecofeminist problematic is compelled to regard the body as a shackle that holds 
women back from full participation in the "male realm" of culture. This not only 
downgrades nature (and the body) but also elevates the domineering sensibility of 
stereotypical "masculine culture" in a way that reinforces the human/nonhuman 
hierarchy of being that has been roundly criticized by ecofeminists, 
deep/transpersonal ecologists, social ecologists, and other ecophilosophers. From an 
ecocentric perspective, it is thoroughly anthropocentric to believe that there is 
something ennobling in a culture that sets itself above nature and assumes that what is 
distinctive about humans is more worthy than, rather than simply different to, the 
universal. This is because (i) women's bodily functions makes "her animality more 
manifest"; (ii) her social roles, which are domestic and particular rather than public 
and universal, are seen as less important than men's; and (iii) her psychic structure is 
more emotional, sentimental, "irrational," concrete, this-worldly, and subjective than 
men's. However, this psychic structure is the result of social-structural arrangements  
rather than biological givens. 
21. Ibid., p. 87. See also Marilyn French, Beyond Power: Women. Men and Morality 
(London: Abacus, 1986), pp. 96-100. 
22. Ortner, "Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?," p. 84. 
23. Ibid., p. 87. 
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distinctive features of the nonhuman realm. As we saw in Chapter 2, this 
anthropocentric idea of the "differential imperative" asserts that we become more 
human and more virtuous if we maximise our "species-specific differentia." 24 In 
adopting and endorsing an active definition of culture that selects and celebrates what 
most distinguishes human societies from other animal societies (the ability to 
transform and transcend nature on a large scale through technology and symbols) both 
de Beauvoir and Ortner remain firmly wedded to the Enlightenment ideal of the 
progressive liberation of humans from all traditional and natural limits. In contrast, 
the ecological model of internal relations that informs ecocentrism emphasizes that 
humans are part of nature and that there are no absolute boundaries in nature, only 
relative boundaries. From the point of view of this perspective, it is philosophically 
misguided to believe that we can attain radical autonomy of thought and action and 
become fully sovereign subjects. Whatever our pretensions to complete sovereignty, 
the human condition is such that we can never be entirely "free" of these relationships 
and interconnections. This is not a tragedy but a rather a profound insight into the 
nature of things. If embraced positively, it can lead to a greater sense of care and 
responsibility toward other beings. 
De Beauvoir's existentialist conception of what it means to be "fully human" 
shares the Marxist feminist (and, to some extent, liberal feminist) concern to open up 
opportunities for women to participate in the hitherto male dominated public realm 
and pursue options other than, or in addition to, child-bearing and child-rearing. 
Marxist feminism, in particular, raises the issue of gender in relation to both the 
sphere of production and reproduction under capitalism. In this respect, Engels' views 
in The Origin of the Family. Private Property. and the State are pertinent: 
The emancipation of women will only be possible when women can take part in 
production on a large scale, and domestic work no longer claims anything but 
an insignificant amount of time. And only now has that become possible 
through modern large-scale industry, which does not merely permit of the 
employment of female labour over a wide range, but positively demands it, 
24. John Rodman, "Paradigm Change in Political Science, American Behavioral 
Scientist 24 (1980): 49-78 at p. 54. 
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while it also tends towards endii private domestic labour by changing it more 
and more into a public industry. 
In Engels' society of the future, there will no longer be men and women but workers 
on an equal footing, sharing in scientific socialism's creation of abundant wealth. In 
this sense, women may be seen as having a convergence of interest with the 
proletariat insofar as both can be set free through economic development and 
technical innovations that harness and manipulate the forces of nature to human 
benefit. 
Perhaps the culmination of the feminist tendency toward technological 
optimism and a rejection of the body can be found in Shulamith Firestone's Ih 
Dialectic of Sex, where technology is seen as coming to the rescue of women by 
enabling the elimination of all sexual distinction and hence women's oppression. 
Firestone (who draws heavily on Marx's materialist conception of history) endorses 
modern technologies that break down women's ties with child-bearing and 
child-rearing - contraception, and extra-uterine gestation (i.e., test tube babies) - 
indeed, anything that would free women from the "tyranny of their reproductive 
biology" and diffuse child-bearing and child-rearing responsibilities. In her own 
terms, this would bring about a victory over the Kingdom of Nature: 
The "natural" is not necessarily a "human value." Humanity has begun to 
outgrow nature: we can no longer justify the maintenance of a discriminatory 
sex class system on grounds of its origins in Nature. h° 
Although there are important differences in the work of the above feminist 
theorists (de Beauvoir, for example, would reject historical materialism as too 
limited), they all share the same general (i.e., Enlightenment) orientation toward the 
nonhuman world and toward science and technology. With respect to the nonhuman 
world, the general orientation is anthropocentric; with respect to science and 
technology, the general orientation is uncritical and optimistic (although this tendency 
25. Friedrich Engels, The Origin of the Family. Private Property and the State  
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1940), p. 184. 
26. Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution  
(New York: William Morrow, 1970), p. 10. In Firestone's view, pregnancy and 
childbirth are "barbaric" and "painful"; accordingly, the natural childbirth movement 
is seen as reactionary and inimical to the liberation of women. 
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is clearly much stronger in Firestone than in de Beauvoir or Ortner). Not surprisingly, 
Firestone has been roundly attacked by radical feminists who argue that women 
should celebrate rather than reject what is distinctive about the female body. 
Moreover, radical feminists have been quick to counsel against women pinning their 
faith in advanced technology as a prerequisite for the emancipation of women on the 
ground that it (especially reproductive technology) is a male controlled domain. 27 
More generally, Adrienne Rich has remarked that 
... many women see any appeal to the physical as a denial of mind. We have 
been perceived for too many centuries as pure Nature, exploited and raped like 
the earth and solauystem; small wonder if we now long to become Culture: 
pure spirit, mind.B° 
It is clear, then, that there is nothing ecocentric about de Beauvoir's feminist 
existentialism or about Marxist feminism (I shall collectively refer to the theorists 
discussed in this section as the "cultural feminists"). They challenge neither 
anthropocentrism nor the technological domination of nature. However, it is 
important to be clear as to why this is so. It is not simply that they regard the 
historical and symbolic association of woman and nature as burdensome. It is this 
combined with their uncritical acceptance of human/nonhuman hierarchy of being 
(which encompasses the culture/nature dichotomy) and their aspiration for a certain 
kind of freedom or sovereignty (radical autonomy of thought and action) that leads 
this group of feminists to adopt an anthropocentric and technologically optimistic 
posture toward the world. Given this, it should be at least theoretically possible for 
ecologically concerned feminists to agree that the woman/nature association has been 
historically burdensome without necessarily endorsing a human/nonhuman 
hierarchical dualism and all that it entails (e.g., that the body is a shackle, that culture 
must dominate/transcend nature if it is to advance, that the human quest is the 
attainment of radical autonomy of thought and action). Let us now explore how 
=feminist theorists have approached these issues. 
27. For a general discussion, see Alison M. Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human 
Nature (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1983), pp. 85-98. 
28. Adrienne Rich, Of Women Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution 
(London: Virago, 1977), p. 285. 
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Celebrating the Feminine: The Body as the Natural  
Home and Source of Earth-Wisdom 
This second group of radical feminist theorists (whom I shall describe as 
"radical ecofeminists") in many ways represent the "flip side" of the cultural feminists 
in terms of their response to the ecofeminist problematic (although their shared 
concern for improving the status of women should not be overlooked). 29 Whereas 
cultural feminists have rejected the association of women and nature as burdensome, 
radical ecofeminists, while recognizing that the association has been used to oppress 
women in the past, have nonetheless embraced the idea of woman's 
immanence/rootedness in nature as a source of empowerment for women and the 
basis of a critique of the male domination of women and nonhuman nature. 
According to Adrienne Rich: 
The repossession by women of our bodies will bring far more essential change 
to human society than the seizing of the means of production by workers. The 
female body has been both territory and machine, virgin wilderness to be 
exploited and assembly-line turning out life. We need to imagipe a world in 
which every woman is the presiding genius of her own body.-/u 
This is an explicitly =feminist project since it celebrates what has traditionally been 
regarded as Other - both woman and nonhuman nature - in the context of a 
far-reaching critique of hierarchical dualism and "masculine" culture. 31 Indeed, it is 
this notion of "female immanence" in nature that provides the basis of the 
controversial ecofeminist claim that women have a special vantage point from which 
29. Joan Griscom has drawn a distinction between "social feminism" and "nature 
feminism," which corresponds to my distinction between cultural feminism and 
radical ecofeminism. See Joan L. Griscom, "On Healing the Nature/History Split in 
Feminist Thought," Heresies 13 (1981): 4-9 at p. 5. 
30. Rich, aWsman3s2m, p. 285. 
31. Major radical ecofeminists include Susan Griffin, Woman and Nature: The  
Roaring Inside Her (New York: Harper and Row, 1978); Mary Daly, Gyn/Ecology:  
The Meta-Ethics of Radical Feminism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978); Adrienne Rich, 
Of Woman Born; Starhawk, 	 Spiral cs_Ltagn. imuith_c Qt_t_t_ums....1 	An n R 	f 
the Great Goddess (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1979); Elizabeth Dodson Gray, 
aegn2aLaikag_425.1; Ariel Kay Salleh, "Deeper than Deep Ecology: The Ecofeminist 
Connection," Environmental Ethics 6 (1984): 339-45; Ynestra King, "Toward an 
Ecological Feminism and a Feminist Ecology"; and Jim Cheney, "Eco-feminism and 
Deep Ecology." 
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to examine the domination of nature and a corresponding special interest in protecting 
nature. Rather than aspire to join men in what de Beauvoir believes is an ascent from 
nature, radical ecofeminists seek to subvert the dominant valuation of what human 
characteristics and activities are most valuable. This project entails a rejection of 
many of the "cultural conquests" of men and a celebration of the previously 
undervalued nurturing characteristics of women. In this respect, the emphasis is less 
on the need for women to attain the same situation as men in the public sphere and 
more on the need for men to become increasingly involved in the domestic and 
child-rearing sphere. In this new valuation, the body (like nature at large) is not seen 
as limiting - as that "vein of gross material in which the soul is imprisoned" (as de 
Beauvoir saw it). Rather, nature is celebrated by radical ecofeminists as the "earthly 
home" of our experience of the world while the body - far from being considered a 
shackle - is celebrated as the porous membrane through which we are intimately 
connected to all living beings. 
In contrast to the more secular and rationality-based leanings of cultural 
feminists, many radical ecofeminists are vitally interested in cultivating a feminist 
spirituality, whether it be through retrieving the insights of nonhierarchical 
pre-Christian cultures or reviving other earth-based traditional practices (e.g., 
celebrating the Goddess-oriented culture of Old Europe, pagan rituals, Gala, the body, 
natural cycles, and the experience of connectedness and embodiment in general). 32 
In this respect, most radical ecofeminists would have much sympathy with Gary 
Snyder's sentiment that "our troubles began with the invention of male deities located 
off the planet"33 
32. See, for example, Charlene Spretnak, The Spiritual Dimension of Green Politics  
(Santa Fe, New Mexico: Bear and Company, n.d.); reprinted as Appendix C in 
Charlene Spretnalc and Fritjof Capra, Green Politics: The Global Promise (London: 
Paladin, 1986), pp. 230-58; Starhawk, Dreaming the Dark: Magic. Sex. and Politics  
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1982); and Judith Plant, ed., Healing the Wounds, Part Three 
("She is Alive in You: Ecofeminist Spirituality"), pp. 115-88. 
33. Gary Snyder, "Anarchism, Buddhism, and Political Economy," lecture delivered 
at the Fort Mason Centre, San Francisco, 27 February 1984 (quoted by Charlene 
Spretnak, "The Spiritual Dimensions of Green Politics," in Spretnak and Capra, Green 
Politics, p. 238.) 
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As part of their critique of hierarchical dualism, radical ecofeminists have 
been particularly critical of the Judaeo-Christian heritage. According to the 
ecofeminist theologian Elizabeth Dodson Gray, the Christian idea of dominion over 
other beings found in Genesis 1:26 "is paternalistic, clothed still in hierarchical 
categories, and subtly related to such old ideas as 'enlightened slave owners' and 'the 
white man's burden.' It means being "graciously responsible for that which is below 
us."34 In Dodson Gray's view, we need to move toward an "embodied 
ecospirituality" and re-myth Genesis in a way that honours diversity by moving our 
culture "to a creation-based valuing of all parts of nature." 35 
According to Spretnak, ecofeminism proceeds from a holistic, ecological 
perspective that is avowedly post-modern, post-patriarchal, and post-humanist. 36 In 
this respect, radical ecofeminism has much in common with other ecocentric 
approaches, such as deep or transpersonal ecology, that have developed 
nonanthropocentric and nonhierarchical philosophies from the ecological insights of 
interconnectedness and mutuality. Both proceed from a process oriented, relational 
image of nature where all organisms are viewed as "knots in the biospherical net or 
field of intrinsic [i.e., internal] relations," to borrow Arne Naess's description. 37 
Radical ecofeminists, like other ecocentric theorists, have also pointed to the 
similarities between the ecological world-view and modern physics. 38 As Elizabeth 
Dodson Gray has put it, the root of the modern ecological crisis is that "we do not 
34. Elizabeth Dodson Gray, Green Paradise Lost, p. 140. 
35. Ibid., p. 148. 
36. Charlene Spretnak, "The Spiritual Dimension of Green Politics," pp. 234-38. 
37. Arne Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. A 
Summary," Inquiry, 16(1973): 95-100 at p. 95. 
38. Ecofeminists who have pointed to these similarities include Marti Kheel, "The 
Liberation of Nature: A Circular Affair," Environmental Ethics 7 (1985): 135-49 at 
p. 136, and Dodson Gray, Green Paradise Lost, Chapter 7. Other ecocentric 
philosophers who have drawn attention to these similarities include Warwick Fox, 
"Deep Ecology: A New Philosophy of our Time?" The Ecologist 14 (1984): 194-200; 
J. Baird Callicott, "The Metaphysical Implications of Ecology," Environmental Ethics 
8 (1986): 301-16; and Michael Zimmerman, "Quantum Theory, Intrinsic Value and 
Panentheism, Environmental Ethics 10 (1988): 3-30. 
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understand who we are"; when we realize that we are intimately connected with the 
larger whole then "what hurts any part of my larger system hurts me." 39 
The particular ecological sensibility cultivated by radical ecofeminism 
would appear to be indistinguishable from the "wider identification approach" of 
transpersonal ecology but for two significant differences. The first relates to the ldnds  
of identificatiott that are emphasised and the kinds of self that identify; the second 
relates to the kinds of theoretical explanation offered to account for the environmental 
crisis, which give rise to different cultural and political strategies. I will consider 
each of these aspects in turn. 
(i) Radical Ecofeminism's Personal and Gender 
Specific Sense of Self 
The sense of self defended by radical ecofeminism is both 	I and 
gender specific. In the words of Elizabeth Dodson Gray, sickness, pregnancy, and 
childbirth enable women to discover that 
... all of you is in that body. Your mind and your will and everything that has 
ever been or ever will be of you is "in" and "expressed through" and 
"experiencing" with that woman's body that is your own. That body i a your self 
... I must now always include my body whenever I thinof myself. I must now 
shape a self-concept which has a women's bodily form. 
In Dodson Gray's sense of self, we are identified in gender terms, that is, we are first 
and foremost a woman or a man rather than a human, and it is from our eender 
perspective that we identify with the larger whole. This differs from the transpersonal 
ecology sense of self (explained and discussed in Chapters 2 and 7) in two important 
respects. First, Dodson Gray (like most radical ecofeminists) emphasizes a form of 
identification with the world that is based on personal contact and, hence, familiarity. 
In contrast, transpersonal ecology theorists, while recognizing that personally based 
39. Elizabeth Dodson Gray, Green Paradise Lost, pp. 84 and 85. 
40. Ibid., p. 81. In providing this kind of emphasis to the self, Gray is attempting to 
mount a challenge to the disembodied nature of spiritual concerns. For example, she 
writes that "we have pretended our selfhood was only 'clothed' in body, 'dwelling in 
body,' unjustly 'imprisoned' in body, while our immortal souls, our vast and beautiful 
selfhoods, could soar off to higher realms where baths were not necessary and where 
illness and pain, aging and dying, did not exist" (p. 92). 
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kinds of identification have a significant place in everyday life, emphasize a 
cosmologically based form of identification. Second, one's gender identity forms an 
integral part of the ecofeminist process of identification whereas it is not particularly 
relevant to the transpersonal ecology process of cosmological identification!" 
Indeed, transpersonal ecologists object to the radical ecofeminist's emphasis 
on personally based identification on the ground that this form of identification can 
lead to excessive partiality, attachment, possessiveness, and parochialism. 42 Instead, 
transpersonal ecologists argue for a cosmologically based approach to identification, 
that is, an approach that "proceeds from a sense of the cosmos (such as that provided 
by the image of the tree of life) and works inward to each particular individual's sense 
of commonality with other entities."43 Fox describes this as an "outside-in" rather 
than "inside-out" approach. As we saw in the previous chapter, cosmologically based 
identification represents a more impartial, inclusive, and, hence, more egalitarian 
approach to identification than does a personally based approach in that it leads one to 
identify with all of the human and nonhuman world irrespective of one's personal 
involvement. This does not mean, however, that transpersonal ecologists wish to 
deny the significance of personally based identification - indeed, Fox acknowledges 
that this kind of identification is the easiest and most immediate experience of 
identification available to humans. Rather, transpersonal ecologists simply seek to 
locate personally based identification in a wider cosmological context. 
Some ecofeminists, in turn, object that this wider identification approach of 
transpersonal ecology is hyper-rational, disembodied, and/or "masculine."" 
41. See Fox, "The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate," pp. 12-13. 
42. Fox, Transpersonal Ecology, pp. 414-17. 
43. Ibid., pp. 408-9. 
44. See Janet Biehl, "It's Deep, But is it Broad?"; Ariel Kay Salleh, "Deeper than 
Deep Ecology"; and Jim Cheney, "The Neo-Stoicism of Radical Environmentalism," 
Environmental Ethics 11(1989): 293-325. Cheney's paper is, in part, a response to 
Warwick Fox, Approaching Deep Ecology: A Response to Richard Sylvan's Critique 
of Deep Ecology, Environmental Studies Occasional Paper no. 20 (Hobart: Centre for 
Environmental Studies, University of Tasmania, 1986). Fox has replied to a 
pre-publication version of Cheney's critique in Fox, "The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism 
Debate," pp. 11-13. 
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However, this objection misconstrues transpersonal ecology. The cosmological 
emphasis of transpersonal ecology does not mean that it is other-worldly or 
disembodied. Quite the contrary. Transpersonal ecology is concerned to develop a 
this-wordly, lived sense of our commonality with all beings. Moreover, many deep or 
transpersonal ecology theorists (like many ecofeminists) emphasize the importance of 
the body as a porous membrane interacting with the rest of nature and as a medium of 
identification. In a recent interview, for example, George Sessions - a leading deep 
ecologist - observed: 
It seems important to note that urbanized people are often alienated from their 
bodies, too, and so we don't experience ourselves as part of nature or recognize 
our connectedness to the evolutionary process through our body. And yet, a 
wilderness lives inside us. 
We are like an ecosystem. We tend, however, to see ourselves (mind and 
body) dualistically and mechanistically as a management problem over which 
we must be in control instead of allgwing the wisdom of the body and the mind, 
our natural ecosystem to function.'" 
From a transpersonal ecology perspective, then, there is nothing 
disembodied about the cosmological emphasis of transpersonal ecology. Moreover, 
as Fox argues, this kind of identification does not seek to draw specific gender 
boundaries in that it is a kind of identification that is available to both women and 
men.' 6 
However, a more significant difference between ecofeminism and 
ecocentrism (particularly that kind of ecocentric approach defended by transpersonal 
ecology) arises in relation to the further claim made by some ecofeminists that there is 
something special about women's experience that makes women better placed than 
mo, to identify with nonhuman beings, ecological processes, and the larger whole. 
This argument takes two forms (although these are not always clearly differentiated). 
On the one hand, it is often claimed that this privileged eco-wisdom arises by virtue 
of what is unique about women's bodies. Here, the special connection between 
women and nature is usually presented as something that is grounded in women's 
45. George Sessions, interview, Creation Magazine, June 1989, p. 7 (this citation 
refers to the prepublication manuscript). See also Dolores LaChapelle, $acred Land, 
Sacred Sex: Rapture of the Deep (Silverton, Colorado: Finn Hill Arts, 1988). 
46. See Fox, "The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate," pp. 12-13. 
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reproductive capabilities. On the other hand, it is often claimed that this special 
eco-wisdom arises by virtue of women's oppression. Here, the special connection 
between women and nature is regarded more as a convenient ideological construct of 
patriarchy. However, the separate reality of women that has resulted from this 
historical association is nonetheless heralded as the basis of an alternative, more 
caring morality. I will refer to these two arguments as the "body-based argument" 
and the "oppression argument" respectively. In both cases, the connection between 
woman and nature is embraced as a source of special insight and empowerment for 
women. 
A leading proponent of the "body-based argument" is Elizabeth Dodson 
Gray, who has claimed that women's bodily experiences (e.g., ovulation, 
menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth, suckling the young) confer on women a greater 
sense of connectedness with life than men: 
I am asserting that there is a definite limit to the perception of men. It is a limit 
imposed upon their consciousness by the lack of certain bodily experiences 
which are present in the life of woman. No matter how androgynous men may 
become, it is therefore not possible for men alone to lead us into a society with 
a fully developed sense of its limited but harmonious place in nature ... because 
/he male's is simply a much diminished experience of,body. of natural, 
processes. and of future generations [my emphasis]. 41 
Similarly, Ariel Kay Salleh has argued: 
Women's monthly fertility cycle, the tiring symbiosis of pregnancy, the wrench 
of childbirth and the pleasure of suckling an infant, these things already ground 
women's consciousness in the knowledge of being coterminous with Nature... 
[Deep Ecology] overlooks the point that if women's lived experience were 
recognized as meaningful and were given legitimation in our culture, it could 
provide an immediate "living" social basis for the alternative consciousness 
which the deep ecologist is trying to formulate and introduce as an abstract 
ethical construct. Won already, to borrow Devall's turn of phrase, "flow with 
the system of nature."4° 
However, Salleh also has recourse to the oppression-argument: 
47. Elizabeth Dodson Gray, Green Paradise Lost, p. 114. It must be noted that not all 
ecofeminists pursue this particular line of argument. Charlene Spretnak, for example, 
has stated: "I agree with most critics of modem religion who surmise that 
post-modern religion will have 'more to do with the body.' I believe we need only pay 
Attention to our body wisdom rather than seeking transcendence 'above' the body to 
the realms of the sky god." Spretnak goes on to argue, however, that both men and 
women are capable of learning from the teachings of what she calls "body parables." 
See Spretnak, "The Spiritual Dimension of Green Politics," p. 243. 
48. Salleh, "Deeper than Deep Ecology," p. 340. 
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... the traditional feminine role runs counter to the exploitive technical 
rationality which is currently the requisite masculine norm. In place of the 
disdain that the feminine role receives from all quarters, "the separate reality" of 
this role could well be taken seriously by ecologists and re-examined as a 
legitimate source of alternative values ... forlierein lies the basis of a genuinely - 
grounded and nurturant environmentalism.'Y 
Similarly, Ynestra King has argued that women have a special role to play in bringing 
about a "rational reenchantment [of nature] that brings together spiritual and material, 
being and knowing."5° Like Salleh, King argues that this special role arises by virtue 
of the women's unique vantage point, enabling women to "act as a bridge for men, 
back to the parts of themselves they have denied." 51 However, in King's view (contra 
Gray), it is not because women are "more natural" or more ecologically attuned but 
rather because they have been oppressed that women are in a better position to 
imagine an alternative vision from the vantage point of critical otherness. 52 More 
recently, Salleh has resiled from her earlier position (where she used bsah the 
body-based and the oppression argument) by resting her case on solely the oppression 
argument: 
Ecofeminists ... argue that by constructing feminine experience in this way [i.e., 
as closer to nature], patriarchy placed women in a privileged nurturant relation 
to other living things. Hence the value of feminine insights in a time of 
eco-catastrophe. It's not that women are actually closer to nature than men, 
clearly we all live in continuity with gaia. But throughout history, men have 
chosen to set themselves apart, usually "over and above" nature and women. j3 
49. Salleh, "Deeper than Deep Ecology," pp. 342-43. Jim Cheney mounts a similar 
case in arguing (drawing on Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice [Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1982]) that women speak in a "different voice" and have a different 
and better morality to men (i.e., one that is personal, emotional, and contextualized 
rather than impersonal, rational, and abstract) and that an environmental ethic must 
speak in this "different voice" (Cheney, "Ecofeminism and Deep Ecology"). 
50. King, "Feminism and the Revolt of Nature," p. 14. 
51. Ibid. See also King, "Toward an Ecological Feminism," p. 123. 
52. A similar argument is mounted by Janet Biehl ("It's Deep, But is it Broad?"), who 
rejects the idea that women are inherently closer to nature than men, claiming it to be 
an ideological construct that has been used to oppress women. 
53. Ariel Salleh, "Stirrings of a New Renaissance," Island Magazine, Autumn 1989, 
pp. 26-31 at p. 26. Yet in the same article, in a discussion of nondualist feminist 
epistemology and women's sense of continuity with the world, Salleh again returns to 
the body-based argument in suggesting that "maybe the sensual symbiosis of another 
human living inside oneself is the archetype of this" (p. 28). 
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Now none of the ecofeminists cited above seek to exclude men from the task 
of building an alternative ecological society. Indeed, their social and political goal is 
to transcend old stereotypes and arrive at a new balance between female and male 
perceptions that recognizes that humans come in two different forms. 54 Yet while 
radical ecofeminism does not purport to be exclusivist, it nonetheless has this effect 
insofar as it seeks not simply to render visible but to privilege women's experience of 
the world on the grounds of women's sexual and/or gender identity (which map onto 
the body-based and oppression-based arguments respectively). 55 I will examine 
these sex and gender aspects of the claim in turn. 
Ecofeminist theorists who rest their case on women's biological differences 
embrace the historical and symbolic association between women and nature as 
evidence that women g im in fact closer to nature and are therefore better placed than 
men to speak on its behalf and lead the way in ecological reconstruction. While it 
cannot be denied that male and female bodily experiences do differ in a number of 
important respects, to claim that the particular experiences that are unique to women 
confer on women a superior (as distinct from merely special and different) insight into 
our relatedness with life is highly problematic from both a social and ecological 
perspective. Such an approach comes close to turning the tables of the status quo by 
54. According to Gray: "What lies ahead is a new interplay of male and female 
perspectives which goes beyond old stereotypes, a mutuality and symbiosis in which 
both are truly autonomous. I do not think masculine and feminine will then be 
understood in terms of androgyny and Jungian categories - which seem to me to 
accept that 'masculine' is innately rational and active, 'feminine' is innately intuitive 
and passive. I doubt also that masculine and feminine will be cast in Yin/Yang terms 
- which again confine the one to activity and the other to passivity" (Green Paradise  
Lag, p. 153). And Salleh: "... ecofeminism is not about setting women up in power, 
as such, it is about getting what are called 'feminine' values reinstated to a culture that 
is badly skewed the other way" ("Stirrings of a New Renaissance," p. 30). Similarly, 
King has argued that the connection between woman and nature can be used as "a 
vantage point for creating a different kind of culture and politics that would integrate 
intuitive/spiritual and rational forms of knowledge, embracing both science and magic 
insofar as they enable us to transform the nature/culture distinction itself and to 
envision and create a free, ecological society" ("Toward an Ecological Feminism," 
p. 123). 
55. By sexual identity I mean anatomically expressed genetic differences; by gender 
identity, I mean the "cultural overlay" (the different social roles and positions in the 
social hierarchy) that has been built on sexual differences. This is merely a useful 
analytical construct; it is accepted that there is no clear divide between an individual's 
experience of her or his sexual and gender identity. 
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asking men to defer to the special body consciousness and associated "nurturing 
moral insights" of women on the highly contentious premise that men have, as Gray 
asserts, a "much diminished experience of body, of natural processes, and of future 
generations." It thus raises a new kind of "differential imperative" to that discussed 
by Rodman in that it suggests that women become better or more worthy beings (i.e., 
beings who are at once more "womanly" and more ecologically aware) if they 
axi mi se not their species-specific differentia but rather their su-specific differentia. 
Despite the claim by radical ecofeminists that their alternative transcends old 
dichotomies, it is hard to see how this kind of approach can lead to a new harmony 
between the sexes in view of the extent to which it privileges women's biological 
differences and associated eco-wisdom. Whereas cultural feminists sought to reaffirm 
their solidarity with men at the expense of the rest of nature, radical feminists may be  
seen as seeking to reaffirm their solidarity with the rest of nature at the expense of 
men. Indeed, theorists such as Gray come close to being hoist by their own petard in 
that they introduce a new hierarchical dualism that subtly condemns man to an 
inferior status (of Otherness) by suggesting that man's biology renders him incapable 
of participating in the particular kind of body-based consciousness that is claimed to 
confer on women a keener awareness of ecological connectedness. Yet, as other 
ecofeminists and transpersonal ecologists show, there is no a priori reason why men 
and women cannot both participate in personally and cosmologically body based 
forms of identification.56 To the extent that the body awareness of interrelatedness 
may differ between men and women, there is no reason why either should be socially 
elevated as superior to the other. 
The insights of the cultural feminists provide an important counterpoint 
here. Cultural feminists observe that new technologies and the industrial revolution 
have reduced the importance of sexual differences between men and women; they 
56. See, for example, Spretnak, "The Spiritual Dimension of Green Politics"; 
LaChapelle, Earth Wisdom (Los Angeles: Guild of Tutors Press, 1978); LaChapelle, 
Sacred Land. Sacred Sex; and John Seed, Joanna Macy, Pat Fleming, and Arne Naess, 
Thinking like a Mountain: Towards a Council of All Beings (Santa Cruz: New 
Society Publishers, 1988). 
351 
also point out that the nurturing qualities usually associated with women are for the 
most part attributed to the social division of labour and therefore can be made more 
culturally diffuse through shared parenting (the latter reform is, of course, strongly 
supported by radical feminists). Finally, as Joan Griscom observes, 
... simply because women are abla to bear children does not mean that doing so 
is essential to our nature. Contraception clarifies this distinction: the ability to 
give birth can now be suppressed, and there are powerful ecological pressure§4n 
favour of this. In this context, it is important that biology no/ be our destiny.J 
The oppression argument - that women are in a better position to critically 
evaluate ecological practices and envision an alternative society by virtue of their 
oppression rather than their biology - provides a more defensible reason for paying 
special attention to the experiences of women (subject to certain qualifications that I 
introduce below). Here, attention is focused on the cultural attributes of gender 
(rather than biological differences per se), and on the power relations that have flowed 
from these cultural distinctions, in order to challenge the dominant androcentric 
paradigm of human nature. That women have been less implicated than men in major 
activities and centres of ecological destruction (e.g., the military, the boardroom, 
science, and bureaucracy) is itself a good reason to hear what women have to say on 
the subject. To the extent that women do not conform to the dominant androcentric 
paradigm, they clearly do occupy a vantage point of "critical otherness" from which 
they can offer a different way of looking at the problems of both patriarchy and 
ecological destruction. Of course, the same can be said of other minority groups in 
society such as indigenous tribespeople, ethnic minorities, and other oppressed groups 
who have been under-represented in social and economic decision-making - a point 
that should not be forgotten if we are concerned to develop a comprehensive 
emancipatory theory, as I argue below. 
This oppression argument has strong parallels with the elevation of "the 
worker" in socialist theory in that it calls attention to the previously ignored or 
undervalued vantage point of the oppressed. Now this process of "rendering visible 
the invisible" certainly forms an indispensable part of the emancipatory process. It 
57. Griscom, "On Healing the Nature/History Split," p. 8. 
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provides the space for oppressed groups to "speak out," it builds confidence and 
self-esteem by recognizing and affirming the experience of the downtrodden and 
forgotten, and it enables others to empathize with their plight (here, the feminist 
practice of "consciousness raising" within a supportive group context provides an 
exemplary illustration of this kind of empowerment.) And, as already noted, it also 
provides a fresh, critical perspective on dominant valuations and legitimations of 
existing practices. But is it going too far to suggest that "women's subordinate 
position means that, unlike men, women do not have an interest in mystifying reality 
and so are likely to develop a clearer and more trustworthy understanding of the 
world"?58 
Many radical ecofeminists have taken insufficient heed of the problems 
(both practical and theoretical) associated with this last mentioned claim. A strong 
identification with, and glorification of, the vantage point of the oppressed can 
sometimes lead to an excessive partiality, an attitude of "Us versus Them," and a 
tendency to believe that the victim can do no wrong. As Jane Flax has argued in a 
different context, 
... the notion of a feminist standpoint also assumes that the oppressed are not in 
fundamental ways damaged by their social experience. On the contrary, this 
position assumes that the oppressed have uvivileged (and not just different) 
relation and ability to comprehend reality.' 
Indeed, criticisms of this kind that have been levelled against radical feminist 
theorists in general are particularly pertinent here since most of the ecofeminist 
theorists discussed above largely proceed on the basis of this problematic radical 
feminist assumption. As Joan Cocks has pointedly observed, radical feminism 
... assumes, against every lesson of history, that to be a member of an oppressor 
group is ipso facto to know exactly what one is doing, and to be a member of an 
oppressed group is to be morally innocent or better still, morally good ... A 
refusal to attend to the complexities of consciousness shows up in its claims that 
men are single-minded enough to go about with the sole desire of manipulating 
women, and intellinnt enough to act on that desire with any great and 
consistent success.w 
58. Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature, p. 384. 
59. Jane Flax, "Postmodernism and Gender Relations Theory," Signs 12 (1987): 
621-43 at p. 642. 
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An over-identification with the perspective (as distinct from the suffering) of the 
victim can ultimately inhibit the emancipatory process by offering an analysis that 
(i) denies the extent to which many women may be complicit in the domination of 
nature; (ii) overlooks the various ways in which men have been oppressed by limiting 
"masculine stereotypes"; and (iii) is blind to other social forces and prejudices that do 
not bear on the question of gender. It can also give rise to an excessive righteousness 
and a confrontational stance that can lead to the making of ill-considered 
generalizations that often serve to alienate hostile and sympathetic men alike. Cocks 
also points to what she describes as a "curious collusion" between radical feminism 
and the hyper-rational male hegemony that it so vehemently opposes: 
... in completely condemning the dominant order, women's culture is pressed to 
present itself as that order's perfect opposite, and so as the reverse image of the 
order's self image. The more avidly it describes itself as all the established 
society is not, the more it shows itself an unwitting prisoner of the established 
conceptual schema, whichAlelineates for it definition and counter definition, 
image and counter image.°I 
While a challenge to "malestream rationality" is certainly in order, a simple 
reversal of the human characteristics that are considered to be valuable will merely 
lead to problems of a different kind. That is, when radical feminism is taken to this 
kind of extreme, such a response merely serves to foreclose the possibility of 
transcending dominant and oppressive cultural dichotomies since it seeks to replace 
the hyper-rational, impersonal, and abstract "male" standard of human virtue with an 
excessively particular, personal, and emotional "female" standard. Yet simply 
substituting love, sentiment, and personal affiliation for abstract justice can lead to 
excessive possessiveness, parochialism, and even xenophobia. As Fox explains, the 
problem with those forms of affiliation and identification that are purely personal is 
that they "can slip so easily - and imperceptibly - into attachment and 
60. Joan Cocks, "Wordless Emotions: Some Critical Reflections on Radical • 
Feminism," Politics and Society 13 (1984): 27-57 at p. 30. Similarly, Fox has argued 
that this kind of refusal to attend to the complexities of social relations can lead to the 
problems of scapegoating and inauthenticity, or over- and under-inclusiveness in 
social theorizing. The result is to target all men as oppressors (and blameworthy) and 
all women as oppressed (and blameless). See Fox, "The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism 
Debate," pp. 13-14. See also Zimmerman, "Feminism, Deep Ecology, and 
Environmental Ethics," pp. 40-41. 
61. Cocks, "Wordless Emotions," p. 35. 
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proprietorship."62 Emphasizing the emotional, personal, and particular over the 
rational, impersonal, and general also tends toward the adoption of a simplistic and 
overly hostile posture toward science and technology. 63 Yet as Evelyn Fox Keller 
argues, it is not the scientific enterprise per se that is the problem, it the "masculine 
biases" (and I would add racist and anthropocentric prejudices) that have distorted this 
enterprise that must be challenged; remove them and science will become potentially 
liberating (this argument is dealt with more fully in the third section.) A new social 
and environmental ethic must take account of what Carol Pateman has referred to (in 
a different context) as the dialectic between the private, individual, and particular and 
the public, social, and universal.
So far, I have been concerned to register the "down-side" of excessively 
privileging the vantage point of women. I will now explore how this kind of focus in 
radical ecofeminism bears upon the three major theoretical explanations that have 
been put forward by radical ecofeminist theorists to account for the domination of 
women and nature. These are the "patriarchy thesis," the "hierarchical dualism 
thesis," and the "psycho-sexual explanation" (each of these arguments will be 
explained and discussed in the following three subsections). When it comes to 
theorising, as Jaggar notes: 
Those who construct the standpoint of women must begin from women's 
experience as women describe it, but they must go beyond that experience 
theoreticallyajid ultimately may require that women's experience be 
redescribed. 
62. Fox, Transpersonal Ecology, p. 414. 
63. For example, Salleh has argued that "ecofeminists believe the current global crisis 
is a consequence of the traditional exclusion of women from patriarchal institutions; 
the most dangerous of these being 'science,' which replaces religion in our time as 
ruling myth." ("Stirrings of a New Renaissance," p. 26.) Is Salleh meaning to imply 
here that things would have been different if women had been properly represented in 
these institutions? If so, how would women have retained their "different voice" and 
not become co-opted by dominant institutions given that they would no longer occupy 
a vantage point of critical otherness? This remains unexplained. 
64. See Carol Pateman, "The Disorder of Women': Women, Love, and the Sense of 
Justice," Ethics 91(1980): 20-34 at p. 33. 
65. Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature, p. 384. 
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In the case of radical ecofeminism, privileging - rather than simply rendering visible 
and critically incorporating - the special insights of women (whether on grounds of 
sex and/or gender) has tended to lead to a lop-sided and reductionist analysis that 
gives a special priority to the concerns of feminism vis-a-vis ecology. 66 This is 
particularly apparent in the "patriarchy thesis." 
(ii) The Patriarchy Thesis 
The patriarchy thesis asserts that it is patriarchal consciousness that has 
given rise to not only the domination of women but also the domination of the 
nonhuman world. According to this argument, the special focus on anthropocentrism 
by ecocentric theorists is seen as deflecting attention away from the problem of 
gender hierarchy, which radical ecofeminists see as the real source of ecological 
degradation.° 
Yet the ecofeminist argument that patriarchy lies at the root of the 
domination of women And nature has serious flaws. It is one thing to note parallels in 
the logic or symbolic structure of different kinds of domination (surely this is enough 
to explain the strong resonance in the egalitarian orientations of the radical feminist 
and ecology movements - see Rosemary Radford Ruether's argument below) and 
another thing to argue that the kinds of domination that radical feminists and radical 
ecologists are addressing stem from the gne source. This is an ambitious and 
sweeping argument for ecofeminists to maintain since it is effectively asserting the 
existence of a causal relationship - that anthropocentrism is derived from and hence 
caused by patriarchy. This runs into the same difficulties as Bookchin's social 
66. Take, for instance, Janet Biehl's description of the ecofeminist project. According 
to Biehl, the "aspiration of the revolutionary heart of the feminist and ecofeminist 
movement" is to overcome the self-effacement and marginalization that women have 
suffered for millenia and to strive "for a full recognition of their subjectivity and 
selfhood in a new [nonhierarchical] society" ("It's Deep, But is it Broad?" p. 2A). 
Biehl's principal concern is clearly with women's oppression rather than the 
domination of nature and her principal target is patriarchy and social hierarchy rather 
than anthropocentrism. 
67. For a sensitive survey of this debate see Michael Zimmerman, "Feminism, Deep 
Ecology and Environmental Ethics," pp. 37-38; for a deep ecology response see Fox, 
"The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate"; and Alan E. Wittbecker, "Deep 
Anthropology: Ecology and Human Order," Environmental Ethics 8 (1986): 261-70. 
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• hierarchy thesis, which I discussed in the previous chapter. It means that it must be 
shown that patriarchy not only pmsla=1 but also gave rise to andropocentrism - in 
other words, that there is a necessary connection between the two phenomena. How, 
then, do we explain the existence of patriarchy in traditional societies that have lived 
in harmony with the natural world? 68 How do we explain the existence of "scientific 
socialism" (recall Engels' vision) where the possibility of egalitarian social/sexual 
relations is premised on the instrumental manipulation and domination of the 
nonhuman world (modern Cuba perhaps comes closest to following this model in 
practice)?° Both examples demonstrate the absence of a =Go= link between the 
two phenomena, which implies that patriarchy and the domination of nonhuman 
nature can each be the product of quite different historical developments. It follows 
that the emancipation of women need not necessarily lead to the emancipation of the 
nonhuman world and vice versa - indeed, the cultural feminist perspective discussed 
above provides a clear example of how the emancipation of women is to be achieved 
at the expense of the nonhuman world.70 
The above criticisms of the ecofeminist case are not intended to deny that 
patriarchy and andropocentrism can be mutually reinforcing where they do occur 
together. In this respect, both women and the nonhuman world can indeed be seen to 
68. See Joan Babberger, "The Myth of Matriarchy: Why Men Rule in Primitive 
Societies," in Woman. Culture. and Society, eds. Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo and 
Louise Lamphere (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), pp. 263-80, and 
Marilyn French, Beyond Power, pp. 96-100. 
69. Of course, Cuba falls well short of realizing its ideal of achieving a thoroughgoing 
egalitarian society. The important point, however, is that such a society is logically 
possible. Fox makes the same point in observing that the "green' critique of socialism 
(and other egalitarian social and political theories) proceeds from precisely this 
recognition that a socially egalitarian society does not necessarily imply an 
ecologically benign society" (Fox, "The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate," p. 15). 
70. As Fox - who has made similar points in his response to ecofeminist (and related) 
critiques of deep ecology - points out, such a claim is not only facile and misleading, 
it also serves to further legitimize and perpetuate our traditional preoccupation with 
human problems at the expense of the nonhuman world (ibid., pp. 15-16). It would, 
of course, be equally simplistic and reductionistic for ecocentric theorists to claim that 
anthropocentrism is ibg "real root" of the ecological crisis, ignoring social relations 
and technology. This, however, is to be distinguished from Fox's argument, which I 
introduced in the previous chapter, that andropocentrism is nonetheless the most 
fundamental legitimating ideology with respect to human domination. 
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have a mutual "interest" in emancipation from the status of Otherness. Yet those 
ecofeminists who seek to explain the historical conjunction between these two 
phenomena via the prism of patriarchy suffer from a degree of circularity in trying to 
find a causal explanation in what is a complex pattern of mutual reinforcement Was 
it man's contempt for woman (who was associated with nature) or man's contempt for 
nature (which was associated with woman) that led to the domination of nature and/or 
women? For example, Ynestra King has argued, on the one hand, that the domination 
of women is "the prototype of other forms of domination" (of which the domination 
of nature is but one example). On the other hand, she has noted the mutual 
reinforcement between patriarchy and the domination of nature and argue that 
... the building of Western industrial civilization in opposition to nature interacts 
dialectically with and reinforces the subjugation of women because womenAre 
believed to be closer to nature in this culture against nature [my emphasis]." 
This second statement suggests that it is male culture's opposition to nature (with 
whom women were identified) - rather than opposition to women per se - that is the 
root of the problem, yet the source of this opposition is not explained by proponents 
of the patriarchy thesis. 
• 	 (iii) The Hierarchical Dualism Thesis 
Other ecofeminists, such as the theologian Rosemary Radford Ruether, have 
located the philosophical source of the link between patriarchy and anthropocentrism 
in hierarchical or "transcendent dualism": 
Fundamentally this is rooted in an effort to deny one's mortality, to identify 
essential (male) humanity with a transcendent divine sphere beyond the matrix 
of coming-to-be-and-passing-away. By the same token, woman became 
identified with the sphere of finitude that one must deny in order to negate one's 
own origins and inclusion in this realm. The woman, the body, and the world 
were the lower half of a dualism that must be declared posterior to, created by, 
subject to, and ultimately alien to the nature of (male) consciousness, in whose 
image man made his God. a) 
 
 to this line of argument, hierarchical or transcendent dualism laid the 
philosophical foundation for both the domination of women and the domination of 
71. King, "Toward an Ecological Feminism and a Feminist Ecology," p. 119. 
72. Ruether, New Woman New Earth, p. 195. 
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nonhuman nature. In particular, the range of dualisms contained in the God-Man-
Woman-Nature hierarchy of being provided the mechanism by which both women 
and nature might be associated and downgraded - at least at the symbolic and 
conceptual levels. This hierarchical dualism thesis thus provides a more general, 
"higher order" explanation than the patriarchy thesis (which claims that it was 
patriarchy that laid the foundation for anthropocentrism). That is, if patriarchy and 
anthropocentrism are different manifestations of a more overarching hierarchical 
dualism then the replacement of that overarching dualism with, say, an ecocentric 
philosophical perspective would necessarily remove the conceptual foundations for 
both the domination of women and the domination of the nonhuman world. (Recall 
that the cultural feminist response to this hierarchy was to discover how women might 
climb up the hierarchy of being and join the "male rung.") This is indeed a promising 
philosophical insight that provides a useful conceptual handle on the relationship 
between the domination of women and nature. It helps, for example, to explain why 
patriarchy and anthropocentrism can be mutually reinforcing when they do occur 
together - without assigning any necessary temporal or causal priority to one or the 
other. It remains, of course, an empirical question as to how, and to what extent, 
hierarchical dualism is expressed through the social structures and ecological 
practices of different societies in different historical epochs. For example, in those 
societies in which such a perspective is dominant, the degree of actual environmental 
destruction will, other things being equal, be a function of a society's technological 
capability. 
Yet many ecofeminists might argue that the hierarchical dualism argument 
is itself question begging since we are still left wondering why it is that men seem to 
be more prone to adopting such a view of the world than women. If we assume that 
this is the case simply for the sake of argument, how might this be explained? One 
simple and obvious explanation might be that it suits men. That is, such a hierarchy 
of being (i.e., God, Man, Woman, rest of Nature) is self-serving in that it provides a 
legitimation for the greater social status and power held by men vis-a-vis women. 
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Many radical ecofenainists, however, have offered a more complex, more 
psychologically probing, and more contentious explanation that addresses what is 
seen as a male predisposition toward perceiving the world in hierarchical/dualistic 
terms. 
(iv) The Psycho-Sexual Explanation 
According to the psycho-sexual explanation, men are more likely than 
women to perceive the world in hierarchical/dualistic terms because of their different 
psycho-sexual development. This development is seen as resulting in men tending to 
feel more separate from, and women tending to feel more connected to, the world 
around them. This argument also provides an alternative (psycho-sexual) explanation 
for the link between patriarchy and anthropocentrism. It maintains that there is 
indeed something about the separate reality of women that makes them less likely to 
perceive other humans and the nonhuman world as Other but that this is attributed to 
their early psychological development rather than to their oppression. 
The theoretical underpinnings for the psycho-sexual explanation put forward 
by some radical ecofeminists to account for the respective "hard" and "soft" 
boundaries of the "masculine" and "feminine" sense of self is the theory of object 
relations - that branch of psychoanalytic theory concerned with the development of 
the self in relation to others.73 Isaac Balbus, who has developed this theory at length, 
has argued that mother-monopolized child-rearing serves to structure male 
consciousness in such a way that men fail to perceive either women or nature as 
subjects.74 The argument runs as follows. The young infant's painful discovery of 
self-identity, and hence separateness from the world, differs between the girl child 
and the boy child in mother-monopolized child-rearing societies. The boy child must 
not only undergo the painful loss of dependence on the love object, the mother, (as do 
73. See Dorothy Dinnerstein, The Mermaid and the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements  
and Human Malaise (New York: Harper and Row, 1977) and Nancy Chodorow, Ih 
Reproduction of Mothering (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). 
74. Balbus, "A Neo-Hegelian, Feminist, Psychoanalytic Perspective on Ecology," and 
Balbus, Marxism and Domination. See also Gray, Green Paradise Lost, especially 
Part I. 
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girls) but also define his gender in opposition to that which is both experienced and 
defined as feminine, his mother - who becomes the "Other." Whereas both girl and 
boy infants experience some hostility toward their mother for being the person who 
shatters their illusion of omnipotence, the resentment is more intense in boys since 
they must go through a twofold dis-identification in discovering their self and gender. 
As Balbus puts it: 
When the initial-love object and authority figure of the infant is a woman, the 
unconscious resentment that inevitably accompanies the terrible necessity of 
separating from the being with whom one has been, and with whom one wishes 
to forever remain, symbiotically related is necessarily transferred to all those 
who represent this being, i.e., to women in general, who becomq in the process 
the scapegoats for the inescapable pain of the human condition.'J 
The result is that boys are more likely to experience themselves as separate from 
others whereas girls are more likely to define themselves in relation to others, i.e., as 
subject-subject rather than subject-object Moreover, since there are no boundaries in 
the infant's first contact with the mother and since the mother is the primordial 
background/source of the infant's being, she is identified with nature (note that this 
step in the argument is asserted, not argued). It is not just Mother but Mother Nature 
that becomes the repository for the male's unconscious attitude of resentment. That 
is, mother-monopolized child-rearing engenders male contempt of the female and 
nature, so that men must struggle against both to attain their masculine selfhood. 76 
According to Balbus, object psychology enables us to see that the rape of 
nature "is no mere metaphor, but actually and accurately captures the unconscious, 
incestuous psychological underpinnings of the contemporary exploitation of the 
eco-system."77 The solution to this problem - shared parenting - will mean that the 
mother will no longer be the exclusive, earliest "Other" and the infant will develop a 
more diffuse gender differentiation, relating to the world as subject-subject. Balbus 
employs his theory to explain, among other things, why women are disproportionately 
75. Balbus, "A Neo-Hegelian, Feminist, Psychoanalytic Perspective on Ecology," 
p. 146. 
76. Ibid., p. 148. 
77. Ibid., p. 147. 
361 
active in the ecology and peace movements and why this support is more likely to 
come from feminist women, and to predict that male support for these movements is 
likely to grow as child-rearing practices are transformed from mother-monopolized to 
shared parenting. 
It would provide too much of a digression to deal exhaustively with the 
many criticisms that have been levelled against the kind of psychological explanation 
provided by Balbus. It will suffice merely to list these major criticisms before 
moving on to discuss what I take to be the most salient of these criticisms for present 
purposes. The major criticisms that are usually directed against the kind of 
psycho-sexual explanation provided by Balbus may be summarized as follows. First, 
Balbus falsely universalizes childhood experience, usually to the Western middle 
class norm, ignoring differences in class, race, culture, and historical epoch. Second, 
his theory assumes that our characters are fixed in our formative years and pays little 
attention to the fact that we can undergo important psychological development 
throughout our post-infant lives. Third, Balbus's particular account is pervaded with 
"an inflationary estimation of maternal power" insofar as it fails to consider the role 
of the father figure in the identity formation of both the boy and girl child (not all 
object relations theorists, however, overlook the father figure in this way). 78 Fourth, 
the theory is ultimately speculative. There are no clear criteria of confirmation, 
insofar as there is a range of other equally plausible psychological narratives that 
could conceivably account for gender development and the formation of the feminine 
and masculine psyche. 
However, the major problem with Balbus's thesis is that he offers only a 
one-way analysis that focuses on how child-rearing determines culture, thereby 
overlooking the extent to which culture and social structure can condition 
child-rearing. Balbus thus attempts to reduce patriarchy to psychology, ignoring the 
reciprocal interplay between social structure, the division of labour, and employment 
opportunities. As Adler observes, whereas Marx fetishizes the mode of production, 
78. See Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science, p. 111, footnote 16. 
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Balbus fetishizes the mode of child-rearing and regards everything else as 
epiphenomenal.79 
The last point is particularly important to the present discussion. Rosemary 
Radford Ruether's broad overview of the way in which industrialization has helped to 
shape the formation of gender provides an important corrective to the tendency in 
many ecofeminist to overrate the importance of the psycho-sexual origins of 
patriarchy and anthropocentrism and underrate the importance of the material (i.e., 
socio-economic) factors that influence gender formation. Ruether points out how, as 
male work became increasingly dissociated from the home and collectivized under 
the factory system, the home was transformed from being the main sphere of 
production "to a consumer unit in society, totally dependent upon a separate work 
structure no longer under its control." 8° Women became increasingly confined to the 
sphere of reproduction - private, isolated child-rearing and housekeeping havens that 
freed men to enter into the public, productive, civil sphere. (And here, advertisers 
have been quick to exploit women's role as both chief buyer and chief sexual image.) 
This split in bourgeois society between private and public morality, the former 
emotional and particular, the latter rational and universal, helped to structure the 
experience of men and women, thereby helping both to shape and reinforce the 
different moral universes of men and women. According to Ruether, the cultivation 
of an ecological sense of self that affirms others in a state of reciprocal 
interdependence demands changes not only in the nuclear family structure (here, she 
envisages shared parenting in the context of a kibbutz-type community that would 
enable the communalization of child-rearing, cooking, and housework) but also a 
thoroughgoing "democratization of decision-making over technological development 
and equalization of its benefits." 81 In short, Ruether argues that the women's and 
79. Frank Adler, "Reply to Balbus," Telos 52 (1982): 156-58. 
80. Ruether, New Woman New Earth, p. 197. 
81. Ibid., p. 205. 
363 
ecology movements must unite to reshape basic socio-economic relations and the 
underlying values of society. 82 
While the theory of object relations may be seen as offering some interesting 
(though speculative) insights into the process of gender formation in mother 
monopolized child-rearing societies, its explanation of the link between patriarchy 
and anthropocentrism is quite tenuous. That is, even if we assume that Balbus's 
theory stands as an adequate explanation for 5exism, it does not satisfactorily account 
for anthropocentrism or "repressive technology" because it fails to explain why the 
young male's hostility toward the mother is also projected on to the nonhuman world. 
This crucial linkage between women and nature is merely asserted by saying that the 
mother is the primordial background and source of the infant's being (and somehow 
presumably "like nature"). 
Now Balbus might reply that the link is provided by the different male and 
female "modes of symbolization" that result from mother monopolized child-rearing, 
which give rise to different ways of relating to others (i.e., subject-object 
[domineering], subject-subject [reciprocal]) and that this is also transferred to the 
nonhuman world. However, he does not spell out the mechanism of this transference. 
Evelyn Fox Keller, who draws on a more sophisticated variant of object relations 
theory that includes the father figure, has sought to address this linkage more 
specifically through the prism of science. According to Keller, it is not that men 
simply transfer their contempt of, and distance from, women to the nonhuman world 
(as Balbus seems to suggest), but rather that men's overly demarcated sense of self 
distorts their practice of science and the way they relate to their subject matter, 
namely, nature. That is, Keller employs object relations theory not in order to 
challenge science per se but rather to challenge the "masculine bias" of scientists and 
thereby direct attention to the psyches of those who practice science. 83 (Keller uses 
82. Ibid., p. 204. Note that Ruether, unlike Dodson Gray, cautions women against 
accepting the role of romantic, nurturing earth mother (p. 203). 
83. Keller's general acceptance of the objectivity of science (once it is rid of 
"masculine bias") has drawn criticism from other feminist theorists who dispute such 
objectivity and emphasise instead the social construction of science. See, for 
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the notion of "masculine bias" to encompass such ideas of self-detachment or distance 
from the "object" studied and the quest for mastery). 
Like Balbus, Keller draws on the theory of object relations in support of the 
idea that men tend to have an excessively defined and women an inadequately defined 
sense of self, suggesting that 
... one possible outcome of these processes is that boys may be more inclined 
towards excessive and girls toward inadequate delineation: growin into men 
who have difficulty loving and women who retreat from science. °' 
However, Keller is somewhat critical of object relations theory in its "preoccupation 
with autonomy as a developmental goal and its corresponding neglect of 
connectedness to others." 85 That is, it assumes that autonomy can only be achieved 
by sacrificing one's sense of interrelatedness. Keller argues that human autonomy 
needs to be reconceived as a dynamic process that is no longer threatened by 
connectedness to others and which focuses on the reciprocal interplay between self 
and other. Keller concludes that such a conception of dynamic autonomy would 
facilitate a parallel conception of dynamic objectivity in science and in our 
relationship to nature. 
According to Keller's argument, the vantage point of women vis-a-vis 
science is special not because it is feminine per se, but simply because it is less 
constrained by a masculine identity. 86 (In this respect, Keller departs from radical 
ecofeminists such as Salleh and King, who herald the feminine aslue alternative 
human ideal.) Keller's main concern is to unearth what she sees as part of the (male) 
example, Ann Dugdale, "Keller's Degendered Science," Thesis Eleven 21(1988): 
117-28. 
84. Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science, p. 89. 
85. Ibid., p. 72. 
86. See Keller, "Women, Science, and Popular Mythology," p. 142, and Keller, 
Reflections on Gender and Science. Keller argues that the Nobel prize winner 
Barbara McClintock provides a good example of a woman scientist who was not 
constrained by a masculine identity and who practiced "dynamic objectivity." 
According to Keller, McClintock did not have a specific gender commitment, but she 
did have "deviant" values and methodological style, that is, a "feeling for the 
organism" and a recognition of and attentiveness to the uniqueness of individual 
organisms - traits that are often found in the naturalist tradition. See Evelyn Fox 
Keller, A Feeling for the Organism: The Life and Work of Barbara McClintock (New 
York: Freeman, 1983). 
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emotional substructure of science so that we may rescue science and "preserve the 
things that science has taught us, in order to be more objective." 87 Her account 
clearly goes much further than Balbus's in seeking to explain how the "masculine" 
hostility toward the "feminine" is projected onto the nonhuman world through the 
practice of science. Moreover, rather than embrace the feminine as It alternative 
mode of relating to others, Keller defends a developmental norm of "dynamic 
autonomy" that seeks to transcend the limitations of both the masculine and feminine 
models of self and other. This is a commendable norm irrespective of whether one 
accepts the other theoretical claims put forward by Keller. Nonetheless, her 
explanation for men's contempt for woman and nonhuman nature still rests on the 
reductionist and highly speculative account of gender development provided by object 
relations theory. 
In any event, the case against mother-monopolized child-rearing - which 
seeks to explain the male association of, and contempt for, women and nonhuman 
nature - is contradicted by other ecofeminist explanations of patriarchy and 
anthropocentrism. As Carolyn Merchant has shown, the identification of female with 
nature has not always been negative. Prior to the Scientific Revolution the prevailing 
image of nature was not that of a wild, fearsome women that needed to be subdued 
and controlled. Rather, the earth was seen as a nurturing and bountiful mother - an 
image that tended to invoke respect and protective care. Merchant's thesis counts 
against the theory of object relations in that there is nothing to suggest that mothers 
were not the primary child-rearers before the 16th and 17th centuries when the 
organismic, earth mother metaphor prevailed. 88 According to Merchant, the real 
87. Keller, "Women, Science, and Popular Mythology," p. 178. 
88. Merchant, The Death of Nature. Balbus notes this point but seeks to explain the 
more symbiotic relationship with nature characteristic of "primitive" societies with 
mother-monopolized child-rearing on the basis that the child enjoys a longer 
nurturing period - and hence a stronger primary identification - with the mother, the 
symbolization of nature. However, for the male child the separation from the mother 
comes much later in the form of harsh initiation rites, which gives rise to intense 
hostility to the mother, but not the natural world (see Balbus, "A Neo-Hegelian, 
Feminist, Psychoanalytic Perspective on Ecology," pp. 149-50). This explanation is, 
however, highly speculative and reductionist. 
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trouble began with the rise and eventual triumph of a mechanistic world-view that 
inaugurated a detached, omnipresent self that could manipulate nature to "expand 
human empire." (Those pressing the critique of hierarchical dualism would trace the 
philosophical antecedents of this mechanistic world-view to ancient Greece; 
mind/body dualism did not originate with Descartes but rather can be traced back as 
far as Plato. 89) 
The theory of object relations has not only been used to shore up the 
patriarchy thesis (i.e., that androcentrism lies at the root of the ecological crisis, that 
the problem is essentially psycho-sexual in origin) but also to support the associated 
claim that "the separate reality" and nurturing consciousness of women should 
provide the basis of an alternative social and environmental ethic. As we have seen, 
the "feminine" sense of self is considered by radical ecofeminists to be preferable to 
the "masculine" sense of self on the ground that it gives rise to a personal, reciprocal, 
emotional, and contextualized "caring ethic" as opposed to an abstract, rights-based 
ideal of justice.9° Yet if the theory of object relations tells us anything (and Keller is 
alive to this point), it is that both the prevailing male and female sense of self is 
deficient - that the former is excessively delineated whereas the latter is not delineated 
enough.91 This would seem to undermine the claim that a new environmental ethic 
ought to speak in the "different voice" of women, suggesting instead that both the 
89. See, for example, George Sessions, "Anthropocentrism and the Environmental 
Crisis," Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 2 (1974): 71-81, especially at p. 76. 
90. See Jim Cheney, "Ecofeminism and Deep Ecology"; Ariel Salleh, "Deeper than 
Deep Ecology"; and Marti ICheel, "The Liberation of Nature." 
91. Indeed, this latter argument is used by Janet Biehl to argue Against women 
cultivating the wider sense of self defended by deep/transpersonal ecologists on the 
ground that it is an insult to women! That is, Biehl considers that deep/transpersonal 
ecologists are asking women to "regress" to the passive, egoless state that they have 
endured for so long - just when they are learning to become more active, assertive, 
and creative. Like Murray Bookchin, and unlike most radical ecofeminists, Biehl is 
suspicious of Goddess worship, Taoism, or other spiritual paths that foster humility 
on the pound that these practices lead to an obliteration of self. This, however, is 
clearly a misreading of deep/transpersonal ecology. As the above discussion makes 
clear, transpersonal ecology seeks the cultivation of an empathic orientation toward 
all beings, whether male or female, human or nonhuman. It emphasizes an expansive, 
relational, field-like sense of self in contrast to a narrow, atornistic, particle-like sense 
of self. This clearly involves a widening and maturing of self rather than a loss of 
Se.f. 
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stereotypical masculine and feminine senses of self need to be transcended - not only 
by shared parenting but also by other kinds of social and cultural change (such as 
those envisaged by Ruether). 
* * * 
What, then, can we conclude from the preceding survey of radical 
ecofeminism? Where has the celebration of the body, nurturance, and femininity led 
ecofeminism and what theoretical light has been shed on the relationship between 
patriarchy and the domination of nature? Are ecology and feminism natural allies as 
ecofeminists claim or is the relationship merely a contingent one? 
Ecofeminist scholarship has drawn attention to the conceptual parallels, 
symbolic resonances, and areas of practical overlap in both the critical and 
constructive tasks of the radical wings of the ecology movement and the women's 
movement. It has pointed to a range of philosophical antecedents and historical 
events that have undoubtedly contributed to our understanding of the dialectical 
interplay between the domination of women and the domination of nonhuman nature. 
Hierarchical dualism, the rise of modern science and a mechanistic world-view, the 
complex process of gender formation, and the changing division of labour under 
capitalism all clearly have an important bearing on this interrelationship. Yet the 
above critique makes it clear that the patriarchy thesis has been unable to demonstrate 
a necessary link between the domination of women and the domination of nature. 
Indeed, I have sought to show how some avenues of inquiry, for example, Merchant's 
historical inquiry into the rise of mechanistic materialism, have served to undermine 
or at least limit the applicability of others, for example, Balbus's and Keller's 
psycho-sexual explanation. The above survey also makes it clear that while radical 
ecofeminism has a greater affinity with an ecological perspective than other strands of 
feminism, it nevertheless provides an inadequate theoretical grounding for a general 
emancipatory movement for ecological and social reconstruction. This inadequacy 
arises not simply from the reductionist and speculative nature of the patriarchy thesis 
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and the psycho-sexual explanation but also from the problems associated with 
uncritically accepting the "separate reality" of women. 
The hierarchical dualism thesis, on the other hand, provides an important 
contribution to ecocentric emancipatory theory. It does this by conceptually linking 
together patriarchy and anthropocentrism without asserting any necessary causal or 
temporal connection. According to this thesis, both patriarchy and anthropocentrism 
may be seen as particular manifestations of hierarchical dualism - manifestations that 
are often mutually reinforcing. For example, we saw in Chapter 2 that 
anthropocentrism is often used to legitimate the domination of people on the ground 
that certain powerful or privileged groups and classes are deemed to possess 
particular qualities (e.g., reason) that they claim make them more fully human (and 
hence kla animal-like) than other groups and classes.92 The hierarchical dualism 
thesis helps us to see how the success of this kind of legitimation depends on a 
general acceptance of the differential imperative or, more generally, a concept of the 
human that is set apart from the rest of the animal world on a hierarchy of being. 93 
It is important to emphasize, however, that this hierarchical dualism thesis 
only addresses the social/philosophical legitimation given for (as distinct from social 
causation of) these two forms of domination. 94 In particular, it does not follow from 
this thesis that the removal of patriarchy will necessarily see an end to the domination 
of the nonhuman world in practice. Nor will the removal of anthropocentrism 
necessarily signal the end of patriarchy in practice. In both cases, institutional and 
technological changes will also be required. However, the transcendence of a 
hierarchical/dualistic mode of perceiving the world and the cultivation of an 
ecological sense of self that affirms others (both humans and nonhumans) in a state of 
reciprocal interdependence will undermine the conceptual apparatus that has 
92. See in particular Fox, "The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate," and Plumwood, 
"Women, Humanity and Nature." 
93. For a similar point, see Plumwood, "Women, Humanity and Nature," p. 18. 
94. This distinction is clearly made by Fox in "The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism 
Debate." 
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legitimated both anthropocentrism and patriarchy. This reciprocal mode of 
perceiving the world is precisely the kind of perspective defended by ecocentrism. 
In the following section, I intend to show that, paradoxically, attempts to 
redress the inadequacies of radical ecofeminism through a new "transformative 
feminism" only serve to reinforce the need for a more general emancipatory theory 
that incorporates feminist insights in a broader theoretical framework. 
Transcending Both Masculine and Feminine:  
Attaining Human Virtue  
Rather than reject or embrace the idea that women are closer to nature than 
men, many ecocentric and ecofeminist theorists have responded to the ecofeminist 
problematic by seeking to transcend masculine and feminine stereotypes by arguing 
for the cultivation of a new kind of =sm. This does not mean that the new 
ecological person must be thoroughly androgynous or gender neutral (there is no good 
reason why both men and women's bodily differences should not be celebrated), only  
that a person's sex is not considered to have an important bearing on the human  
qualities that are needed to heal the rift between humans and the rest of nature. As 
Don E. Marietta has put it: 
We are talking about people who cultivate the best qualities of human beings, 
regardless of the traditional assignment of those to one sex. These qualities of 
character w1  behaviour indicate, I believe, the values supported by 
feminism. 
Similarly, Val Plumwood has argued that what we now need is "an account of the 
human ideal for both sexes, which accepts the undesirability of the domination of 
nature associated with masculinity."96 Such an ideal must flow from a critique of 
95. Don E. Marietta, "Environmentalism, Feminism, and the Future of American 
Society," The Humanist 44 (1984): 15-18, 30 at p. 18. Other theorists sympathetic 
with this kind of approach include Warwick Fox, Joan Griscom, Patsy Hallen, Evelyn 
Fox Keller, Val Plumwood, Alan Wittbecker, Michael Zimmerman (all references 
cited above). I have already noted that many radical ecofeminists also claim to 
support this kind of approach (see, for example, King, "Feminism and the Revolt of 
Nature," p. 14). However, these claims are counteracted by the radical ecofeminist 
defence of the "separate reality" of women as providing the basis of ill& future human 
ideal. 
96. Plumwood, "Women, Humanity and Nature," p. 22. 
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Jail masculinity and femininity and be linked to a "systematic transcendence of the 
wider set of dualisms," (e.g., mind/body, reason/emotion, public/private). 97 
Moreover, as Plumwood explains, the characteristics that make up this new human 
ideal might well be associated more with one gender than another. However, these 
characteristics will still be "degendered in the sense that they won't be selected 
because of their connection with one gender rather than the other, but on the basis of 
independent considerations." 98 
Clearly, radical feminism does not provide an appropriate theoretical 
framework for the cultivation of this kind of ecological citizen. But is there another 
kind of feminism that is adequate to the task or must we look beyond feminism? 
According to Karen Warren, socialist feminism (which weds the insights of 
traditional Marxism with those of radical feminism) might appear to provide the most 
promising theoretical framework for cultivating the kind of egalitarian society that 
would nurture this new kind of person." However, Warren acknowledges that 
socialist feminism (like socialism in general) has traditionally been anthropocentric 
insofar as its overriding concern is for human autonomy of thought and action. 
Moreover, while the ecological crisis is a matter of concern to many socialist 
feminists, it is not usually cast as a specifically feminist issue. Indeed, Warren's 
survey of four leading versions of feminism (liberal, radical, Marxist, and socialist) 
has led her to conclude that none provide an adequate grounding for =feminism. 
What is needed, Warren argues, is "an integrative and transformative feminism ... 
[that] makes a responsible ecological perspective central to feminist theory and 
practice." 10° 
97. Ibid., p. 23. 
98. Ibid. 
99. Karen J. Warren, "Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections," Environmental 
Ethics 9 (1987): 3-20 at p. 17. Rosemary Radford Ruether also comes close to this 
position. 
100. Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
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What would such a feminism look like? According to Warren, a 
transformative feminism would (i) become a movement to end all forms of oppression 
and, accordingly, would seek to make explicit the connections between all forms of 
domination; (ii) provide a central theoretical place for the diversity of women's 
experience as an oppressed group, but also support a "politics of difference" by 
encouraging other oppressed groups to collectively assert their own needs; (iii) reject 
"the logic of domination and the patriarchal conceptual framework that gives rise to 
it" (this aspect remains problematic - see below); (iv) seek to cultivate ways of seeing 
ourselves as co-members of a nonhierarchical yet diverse community that is based on 
caring, reciprocal relations; (v) recast traditional ethical concerns to make a central 
place for these values of care, reciprocity, and trust; and (vi) challenge the patriarchal 
bias in science and technology and redirect these activities so that they are brought 
into the service of preserving rather than destroying life. 101 
Note that Warren's transformative feminism does not herald the feminine 
ideal as the social ideal. Moreover, it rejects the idea that women have a privileged 
eco-wisdom (whether attributable to their nature, nurture, or oppression). What it 
does seek is the recognition of the diversity of experience of All oppressed groups, 
women being but one example. Nonetheless Warren's transformative feminism does 
reiterate the ecofeminist claim that the patriarchal framework provides the conceptual 
basis for other kinds of domination. This claim, however, is explicitly assumed rather 
than examined by Warren. That is, her intention is not to defend ecofeminism but 
merely to assess the adequacy of four leading versions of feminism to discover which, 
if any, can provide a theoretical grounding for ecofeminism (on the assumption that 
"ecofeminism is true or at least plausible"). 102  Our previous discussion has made it 
clear, however, that the patriarchy thesis is untenable and that the relationship 
between the domination of women and the domination of the nonhuman world is 
better understood as a mutually reinforcing dialectic. A revised transformative 
101. Warren, "Feminism and Ecology," pp. 18-20. 
102. Ibid., p. 5. 
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feminism must therefore be concerned to trace this dialectic while also recognizing 
that there are other social perspectives and practices that reinforce other kinds of 
domination that do not have a necessary bearing on the sex/gender system (e.g., 
anthropocentrism, racism, and the domination of one class by another). 
Warren's final point concerning the patriarchal biases in science warrants a 
more extended discussion since it might appear to revive the radical ecofeminist claim 
that women are able to bring a superior (as distinct from simply a different) 
perspective to bear (whether "feminine" or "feminist") on our understanding and 
practice of science. Yet Warren's rejection of the idea that women's reproductive 
capabilities are essential to women's nature makes it clear that it is not women's 
biology but rather women's different (and undervalued) social experience that gives 
them a vantage point of "critical otherness" from which to examine male-dominated 
science (recall that we called this "the oppression argument"). Moreover, the 
problems associated with the radical feminist project of privileging the voice of 
oppressed women and inverting the dominant social valuation of the masculine 
vis-a-vis the feminine do not apply here since Warren's transformative feminism is 
seeking to transcend these very categories. Indeed, the argument concerning "critical 
otherness" is accepted by Warren as having equal force in respect of other  
marginalized or oppressed groups who have traditionally been underrepresented in 
science (this includes male scientists who do not conform to the "masculine ideal"). 
Warren does not attempt to develop this point since her concern is merely to 
signpost how a transformative feminism dglit approach the question of science and 
technology. However, Evelyn Fox Keller's notion of a degendered science (discussed 
in the previous section) would seem to be consistent with transformative feminism, 
Keller's reliance on object relations theory notwithstanding. This is because Keller's 
vision is of a gender-free science that is premised on the transformation of the 
categories of male and female, mind and nature. Rather than substituting a one-sided 
masculine ideal with an equally one-sided feminine ideal, Keller is concerned with 
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... the reclamation, from within science, of science as a human (i e , gender free) 
instead of a masculine project, and the renunciation of the division,qf emotional 
and intellectual labour that maintains science as a male preserve. "-' 3 
Keller sees hierarchical dualisms such as male/female, reason/emotion, and 
transcendent/immanent as powerful mythologies that cannot be regarded as either true 
or false - "rather, by their very nature they bear a degree of contingent truth." 104 
These mythologies have not only ensured that many more scientists are men (via a 
self-selection process) but also influenced the very definition of science, resulting in a 
distorted conception of scientific objectivity, that is, that science is a subjectless form 
of knowledge. Quoting Piaget, Keller describes this kind of objectivity as an 
"anthropocentric illusion ... ignoring the existence of self and thence regarding one's 
own perspective as immediately objective and absolute." 105 However, Keller (unlike 
most radical ecofeminists) argues that there is nothing wrong with the quest for 
objectivity when it is recognized and approached as a process and search for 
... a characterization of our experience which transcends local, parochial 
vantage points, which transcends the expression of particular needs and fears, 
and which accordingly supports consensual agreement. As such, objectivity can 
be understood as a quiRtgssentially human goal, even if it is a goal that can be 
never quite achieved. w° 
What is needed, then, is not "the introduction of a specifically female culture 
into science" but rather the adoption of a new developmental norm based on the 
actualization of "dynamic autonomy." Such a norm would recognize a degree of 
103.Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science, p. 178. Patsy Hanen, on the other 
hand, has argued that Keller's vision is exactly that sought by ecofeminism. Halien 
writes: "Keller notes that McClintock is not a feminist scientist, since McClintock's 
vision was of a science not based on sex or gender. But here Keller misses the point: 
feminism wishes just that. Feminism seeks to transcend the dividing dichotomies 
between masculine and feminine and to found a new science on McClintock's vision" 
(see Hanen, "Making Peace with Nature: Why Ecology Needs Feminism," The 
Trumpeter 4 [1987]: 3-14 at p. 7). Hallen is arguing that the very transcendence of 
hierarchical dualism is to be found in the eco-feminist vision or way of being in the 
world, which is a process oriented, "I-thou" relation rather than a relation of 
detachment and domination that is characteristic of "malestream" science. In this 
way, science can be reclaimed as a human rather than a masculine project (ibid., p. 4.) 
My quibble with Hanen concerns her choice of labels, not the substance of her 
argument. 
104. Keller, "Women, Science, and Popular Mythology," p. 133. 
105. Ibid., pp. 134-35. The quote is from Jean Piaget, Child's Conception of the 
World (Totowa, N. J.; Littlefield, Adams, 1972), p. 34. 
106.Keller, "Women, Science, and Popular Mythology," p. 134. 
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active, personal responsibility in the context of "soft boundaries" between self and 
other. 1°7 Indeed, Keller accepts that it is not enough simply to instigate new patterns 
of parenting (where the nurturance and care of children is shared by mother and 
father). We must also examine our beliefs about science by challenging its apparent 
neutrality and exposing its limitations and "masculine" pretensions. 
However, it is not only "masculine" biases that can "distort" the practice of 
science. Anthropocentric prejudices, which may be grounded, say, in certain religious 
beliefs or philosophical frameworks (which may persist notwithstanding the 
institution of shared parenting), can be equally problematic, as I have argued at length 
in Chapter 5 in my critique of Habermas's understanding of the scientific project. If a 
transformative feminism is to make a "responsible ecological perspective central to 
feminist theory and practice" (to quote Warren) then its critique of science must also 
deal with these and other kinds of prejudices as well. 
Conclusion 
Ecofeminist theory has considerably enriched our appreciation of the 
complex interrelationships between the domination of women and the domination of 
the nonhuman world. Nonetheless, I have argued that radical ecofeminist theorists 
have not demonstrated a necessary link between patriarchy and anthropocentrism in a 
way that can justify the argument that patriarchy is Lk source (whether conceptual or 
historical) of the ecological crisis. The hierarchical dualism thesis, on the other hand, 
provides a "higher order" explanation that addresses the common kind of 
social/philosophical legitimation given for anthropocentrism and patriarchy in a way 
that does not claim any temporal or causal connection between the two phenomena. 
Moreover, in this chapter I have pointed to many problems and inconsistencies within 
radical ecofeminism - problems that other sympathetic theorists have sought to 
overcome in a revised, transformative feminism. The question remains, however, 
whether this transformative feminism, which builds on the important ecofeminist 
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107. Ibid., p. 143. 
critique of hierarchical dualism, can now stand as an adequate ecocentric 
emancipatory theory. 
If we further revise transformative feminism to remove Warren's assumption 
(in point [iii] of her outline of transformative feminism) that the patriarchy thesis is 
defensible, then we arrive at an interesting paradox concerning the status of 
ecofeminist theory. That is, we have seen that there are serious conceptual and 
practical problems associated with certain radical ecofeminist claims; however, to the 
extent that these problems are addressed through a revised, ecologically oriented, 
transformative feminism then the resulting body of theory loses its uniquely feminist 
character and becomes instead a general ecocentric emancipatory theory. In other 
words, if the special experiences and critical perspectives of a oppressed groups are 
treated as prima facie valid and fed into the general emancipatory theoretical project, 
there seems to be nothing left in the theoretical endeavour to warrant it being 
described as a specifically feminist one. 108 
In any event, an ecocentric perspective serves as a more appropriate 
overarching theoretical matrix for emancipation writ large because it seeks to 
accommodate inter-human emancipatory struggles within a broader, ecological 
framework. That is, it starts with the "big picture" concerning our relationship to 
other life-forms and then proceeds from the general to the particular by locating 
specific social struggles within a larger ecological matrix. In this way it provides the 
means for establishing the outer ecological limits within which the different needs of 
human emancipatory movements can be addressed and harmonized in order to ensure 
that the interests of the nonhuman world are not continually sacrificed in the name of 
human emancipation. The emancipatory concerns of new social movements - 
including the women's movement - may thus be seen as nesting within an ecocentric 
108. In responding to ecofeminist critiques of deep or transpersonal ecology's 
preoccupation with anthropocentrism, Fox asks the pointed question: why don't 
ecofeminists also criticize deep ecologists for being neutral with regard to class, race, 
etc., rather than just gender? Two reasons might be: (i) to do so would detract from 
the ecofeminist preoccupation with patriarchy, and (ii) to do so would leave 
ecofeminism vulnerable to the same criticism (see Fox, "The Deep 
Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate and its Parallels," p. 14). 
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framework. To be sure, the revised transformative feminism outlined above has 
arrived at a similar position from the opposite direction by working progressively 
from the particular to the general to the point where it has become virtually 
indistinguishable from an ecocentric perspective. However, the "outside-in" approach 
of ecocentrism (particularly that of transpersonal ecology) is preferable to the 
"inside-out" approach of ecofeminism in that the former is more likely to promote an 
inclusive sense of self through its emphasis on cosmologically based identification 
rather than just personally based identification. Moreover, as I argued above, such a 
general theory warrants a more general label that does not privilege the concerns of 
any particular human emancipatory movement. 
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Conclusion 
One of the main objectives of this inquiry has been to expose the deeply 
ingrained anthropocentric assumptions in modern political thought and to show how 
they have contributed to the ecological crisis we now face. Moreover, we have seen 
that these anthropocentric assumptions have been used to legitimate different kinds of 
social and political domination, such as patriarchy, imperialism, and racism. Indeed, 
the argument that anthropocentrism is implicated in different forms of human 
domination should be enough to alert the staunchest of human-centred political 
theorists to the need for a greater dialogue with environmental philosophy. This 
inquiry has hopefully been a step in that direction. 
A more specific objective of this inquiry has been to articulate and develop 
an ecocentric Green political theory in the course of an examination of the major 
currents of Green political thought. The parameters of this inquiry were laid down in 
Part I, where I distinguished Green political theory from the other main ecopolitical 
approaches that have emerged since the 1960s, namely, the participatory approach 
and the survivalist approach. I showed that Green political theory may be 
characterized by its concern to reconcile the ecopolitical themes of democratic 
participation and survival through the more encompassing theme of emancipation. I 
then divided Green or emancipatory ecopolitical theory into an anthropocentric 
stream and an ecocentric stream and argued that the latter provided the most 
promising and encompassing framework for the resolution of social and ecological 
problems. Having characterized Green or emancipatory ecopolitical theory, I 
identified those modern political traditions that warranted examination in terms of 
their actual or potential compatibility with emancipatory ecopolitical goals, namely, 
neo-Marxism, democratic socialism, anarchism, and feminism. 
In Part II, I provided a detailed examination of the ecologically oriented 
revisions of these post-liberal, egalitarian, and communitarian traditions. The 
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ecologically informed versions of these traditions were identified as humanist 
eco-Marxism (including Critical Theory), democratic ecosocialism, ecoanarchism, 
and ecoferninism. (Orthodox eco-Marxism was included in this examination as a foil 
or point of departure for, rather than as an example of, emancipatory ecopolitical 
theory.) The principal purpose of this examination was to establish which of these 
approaches were most compatible with the ecocentric perspective defended in 
Chapter 2, and to outline, where appropriate, how each approach might be further 
developed in an ecocentric direction. 
What, then, are the major findings of Part II? I showed that ecoanarchism 
and ecofeminism are the most ecocentric of the various emancipatory ecopolitical 
theories examined, whereas the three families of ecosocialism all clearly belong to the 
anthropocentric stream of emancipatory ecopolitical thought. Notwithstanding this 
finding, I argued that the anti-statist political framework defended by ecoanarchists 
(and implicitly supported, although not addressed, by ecofeminists) was neither the 
only nor the most appropriate means for the realization of ecocentric emancipatory 
goals in the context of the modem world. I argued that a fundamentally revised 
version of democratic ecosocialism, that is, a democratic ecosocialism that rested on 
ecocentric rather than anthropocentric foundations, provided the most comprehensive 
political framework for emancipation writ large. 
In the case of the three families of ecosocialism, I showed that the degree of 
anthropocentrism tended to diminish as we moved from orthodox eco-Marxism to 
humanist eco-Marxism (including Critical Theory) and then to democratic 
ecosocialism, which I described as largely post-Marxist. Moreover, I argued that 
although the two families of eco-Marxism could not be divested of their 
anthropocentric assumptions without seriously distorting the theoretical categories of 
Marxism and Neo-Marxism on which they are based, this did not apply to democratic 
ecosocialism. I argued that democratic ecosocialism had the potential to be revised in 
an ecocentric direction simply by extending its theoretical horizons, that is, by 
extending its fundamental norm of respect for all persons to encompass respect for all 
life-forms and ecological entities. This would bring about the necessary shift in the 
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democratic ecosocialist response to wilderness and human population issues while 
incorporating other democratic ecosocialist goals such as the "new internationalism," 
production for human need, and economic and social democracy. 
On the matter of political forms, I argued that the decision making structures 
defended by democratic ecosocialists provide an important counterpoint to the 
anti-statist decision making structures defended by ecoanarchists. Indeed, there is 
considerable irony in one of the major conclusions of this inquiry: that the political 
forms defended by democratic ecosocialists - who are anthropocentric (albeit in a 
passive rather than active way) - are better able to realize ecocentric emancipatory 
goals than those defended by ecoanarchists - who are largely ecocentric. In 
particular, I argued that there are sound ecocentric reasons for not ceding absolute 
political power to small, local communities. However, I argued that there is certainly 
a need to break down the excessive concentration of political and economic power in 
the nation state, large corporations, and bureaucracies - a feat that can be best carried 
out by a democratic national parliament. 
In the case of ecoanarchism, I showed that the two tributaries of 
ecocommunal thought - ecotnonasticism and bioregionalism - were more ecocentric 
than the social ecology of Murray Bookchin. Nonetheless, I concluded that an 
ecocentric perspective was not adequately reflected in the political forms 
recommended by ecoanarchism. This is because the case for local sovereignty 
provides no institutional recognition of the many different layers of social and 
ecological community that cohere beyond the level of the local community. I also 
argued that the ecoanarchist case for ceding sovereignty to local communities rests on 
a somewhat naive and over-optimistic model of human nature. In particular, I pointed 
out that "small" is not "beautiful" when the rule of the nation state is replaced with the 
rule of the local community in circumstances where that local community is 
impoverished and its local ecosystem is poorly endowed or denuded, or where the 
local community chooses, or is forced by economic necessity to adopt, a development 
path that undermines the local ecosystem. 
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More generally, I argued that we face a highly unstable future and that we 
cannot afford to relinquish the institutional gains of parliamentary democracy and the 
(however imperfect) checks and balances they provide against the abuse of power - at 
least not until such time as an ecocentric consciousness has fully permeated our 
political culture. Instead, we should be concerned to revitalize these institutional 
gains by strengthening such checks and balances and then using the forum of 
parliament to democratize society at large by breaking down excessive concentrations 
of political and economic power. This includes breaking down the sovereignty of the 
nation state and dispersing appropriate areas of its political power both "up" (i.e., to 
interregional and international democratic decision malting bodies) and "down" (i.e., 
to local decision making bodies such as municipal governments). A multi-levelled 
political decision making structure of this kind is more theoretically compatible with 
an ecocentric perspective than the kind of local sovereignty defended by 
ecoanarchism in that the former provides a far greater institutional recognition of the 
different levels of social and ecological community in the world. Such a 
multi-levelled decision making structure is also better able to implement ecocentric 
emancipatory goals. In particular, it is better able to secure the international, 
inter-regional, and inter-community agreement that is essential to dealing with the 
ecological crisis and better able to maintain basic standards of income, health, 
education, and welfare between communities, regions, and nations. 
Notwithstanding my criticisms of ecoanarchist political forms, I consider 
that ecoanarchism has made, and will continue to make, a vital contribution to the 
development of an appropriate ecocentric emancipatory culture - a culture that is 
infused with a sense of connectedness both between humans and between humans and 
the nonhuman world, a democratic ethos, and a sense of personal, civic, and 
ecological responsibility. Indeed, it must be emphasized that many of the 
ecoanarchist theories examined in Chapter 7 do not even address, or address in only a 
cursory way, the question of political forms at a general societal level. In particular, 
most defenders of ecomonasticism and many bioregional theorists are less concerned 
with bringing about general economic and political structural change (at least in the 
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first instance) and more concerned to facilitate cultural renewal by establishing 
exemplary ecological communities within the "shell" of existing society. By 
encouraging people to exercise existing political and economic freedoms and engage 
in small scale, local experiments of this kind, these ecoanarchists are concerned to 
develop peaceful ways of facilitating what Roszak has called the "creative 
disintegration" of industrial society. 
The ecofetninist contribution to Green political theory is one that focuses on 
the relationship between the domination of women and the domination of the 
nonhuman world rather than on the question of the particular political institutions that 
might foster a socially and ecologically responsible society. However, I pointed out 
that the strong anti-hierarchical orientation of ecofeminism suggests that it would 
have considerable sympathy with ecoanarchist political forms. 
The special theoretical focus of ecofeminism has generated some valuable 
new insights. In particular, ecofeminists (as well as some ecocentric theorists) have 
pointed to the similar ideology of domination that underlies anthropocentrism and 
patriarchy. Just as anthropocentrism rests on a concept of the human that is set apart 
from the rest of the animal world, patriarchy rests on a concept of the human that is 
based on "masculine" qualities that are deemed to be even more fully human, and 
therefore of a less animal-like nature, than feminine qualities. In other words, 
patriarchy rests on a hierarchy of being that not only posits humans above the rest of 
nature but also posits men above women. We saw how this mode of legitimizing the 
domination of women also underlies other forms of human domination such as racism 
and imperialism. The emancipation of women, other oppressed groups, and the 
nonhuman world requires that this self-serving hierarchy of being be rejected in 
favour of a non-hierarchical perspective that celebrates the diversity of human and 
nonhuman beings. 
Notwithstanding these important contributions, there were many 
shortcomings in the various theoretical explanations provided by radical ecofeminists 
to account for the association between patriarchy and anthropocentrism. In particular, 
we found that ecofeminism has not been able to demonstrate that there is a necessary 
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link between these two forms of domination, as some theorists have claimed or 
implied. The removal of patriarchy will not necessarily see an end to the domination 
of the nonhuman world. As ecocentric theorists point out, it is not difficult to 
envisage a society in which social egalitarianism is achieved at the pxpense of the 
nonhuman world (as we saw in Chapter 4, orthodox socialism aspired to precisely this 
kind of society). 
Our examination of ecOfeminism also identified a number of problems 
associated with the claims that women, by virtue of their oppression and/or 
reproductive functions, are more ecologically attuned than men and that the different 
psychological characteristics of women ought to provide the basis for the 
development of a new environmental ethic. I concluded that women gig have a 
special vantage point from which to critically evaluate existing ecological problems 
and develop an alternative ecological ethic, but that the perspective of women should 
not be uncritically accepted nor theoretically privileged vis-a-vis the perspectives of 
other oppressed groups. 
Whereas radical ecofeminism embraces the association of women with 
nature and celebrates a specifically "feminine" sensibility as the most appropriate 
sensibility for an ecological society, I outlined an alternative "transformative 
feminism" that seeks to transcend the dichotomies of "masculine" and "feminine" 
through the cultivation of a new kind of person. This approach includes a critique of 
traditional notions of both masculinity and femininity and seeks the cultivation of an 
ecological sense of self that affirms others (both humans and nonhumans) in a state of 
reciprocal interdependence. I concluded that this approach is thoroughly compatible 
with an ecocentric perspective. I suggested further that it was more accurate and 
appropriate to describe this general theory as an ecocentric emancipatory theory 
rather than as "transformative feminism" since it does not seek to privilege, a priori, 
the experience or concerns of women vis-a-vis the experience or concerns of other 
oppressed groups. 
* * * 
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Having drawn together my major findings I would like, in the closing pages 
of this inquiry, to offer some further observations on the dialogue between democratic 
ecosocialism and ecoanarchism concerning strategy, institutional design, and the role 
of the state given that this dialogue has emerged as the sharpest political counterpoint 
within emancipatory ecopolitical thought. As a preface to these observations, it is 
important to acknowledge that this particular dialogue is a very familiar political 
dialogue that is not unique to Green political circles. As I explained in Chapter 1, the 
principal newness or distinctiveness of Green political thought (and this applies more 
to the ecocentric than the anthropocentric stream) is not to be found primarily in the 
particular political forms or strategies suggested by Green theorists. Rather, it lies 
primarily in the different ecophilosophical perspective that is brought to bear upon 
contemporary social and ecological problems, the different and more encompassing 
kind of critique that is applied to existing social, political, and economic institutions, 
and the different and more encompassing ethical and political justifications provided 
for the various (and more or less familiar) decision making arrangements and 
strategies that are proposed. I can now illustrate what I mean by this, using the 
example of bioregionalism, which is arguably the most politically innovative 
approach to emancipatory ecopolitics. While the idea that political decision making 
units should conform to ecological criteria such as watersheds is quite novel, the 
actual political forms proposed by bioregional theorists - a patchwork of 
self-governing communities loosely linked together in a bioregional confederation - 
have long been advocated by anarchist theorists. The distinctiveness of 
bioregionalism, however, lies in the primary, ecological justification given for 
adopting these forms, namely, that they will facilitate a greater awareness of, and 
sense of co-habitation with, the local ecosystem and the myriad nonhuman life-forms 
that inhabit it and thereby facilitate the bioregional practice of "reinhabitation." It 
should be clear by now that my challenge to bioregionalism in this inquiry has to do 
with whether bioregional political forms are the most appropriate means for the 
realization of bioregional goals rather than with the bioregional goals themselves, 
which ecocentric theorists would generally endorse. 
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The dialogue between democratic ecosocialism and ecoanarchism 
concerning strategy, institutional design, and the role of the state not only provides 
the sharpest political counterpoint within emancipatory ecopolitical theory but also 
provides a major counterpoint within Green movement circles. It is currently being 
played out in thy-to-thy Green politics between the pragmatist and the 
fundamentalist wings of the Green movement, that is, between those who want to take 
the electoral route and gain political power and those who want to bring about change 
at the grassroots level and thereby avoid being corrupted by what is seen as the 
"power politics" of hierarchical institutions. I must hasten to add here that while all 
ecoanarchists are fundamentalists, not all democratic ecosocialists are pragmatists; 
however, it is a fair generalization to say that democratic ecosocialists incline toward 
a more pragmatic strategy in that they are concerned to bring about systemic changes, 
which, in turn, require the capture of state power through the ballot box. 
Although I have defended the institution of parliament against the 
ecoanarchist critique, I have emphasized that ecoanarchism nonetheless has a vital 
and continuing role to play in the further development of an ecocentric emancipatory 
political culture. As Alex Comfort has observed, anarchism must be seen more as an 
attitude than as a programme - 
Anarchists do not plan revolutions - but when they become numerous ... [they] 
constitute active, unbiddable and exemplary lumps in the general porridge of 
society. If numerous enough, they begin to affect the types of choices which 
societies make.' 
Moreover, I consider that further refinements in ecocentric Green political theory will 
emerge out of the continuing dialogue between ecoanarchists and democratic 
ecosocialists. As we have seen, the prime concern of most ecoanarchists is with 
"right action" and authenticity rather than with political expediency or the conquest of 
power. The political goal is generally one of inducing or inviting change through 
education and exemplary action, leading to the withering of support for hierarchical 
institutions. If this proves ultimately to be ineffectual, then so be it, since 
1. Alex Comfort, "Preface" in Harold Barclay, People Without Government (London: 
Kahn & Averill with Cienfuegos Press, 1982), p. 8. 
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ecoanarchists - consistent with their high ideals of individual and community 
autonomy and personal responsibility - seek to avoid deciding a way of life for others. 
Democratic ecosocialists, however, are critical of ecoanarchism for being 
"voluntarist," utopian, and ultimately marginal and ineffectual. Democratic 
ecosocialists are concerned with the practical negation of the economic and political 
domination that arises under capitalism and totalitarianism and, to this end, are 
concerned to develop a theoretical understanding of society that will generate a 
successful politics of transition on a far-reaching scale. In this respect, democratic 
ecosocialists argue that it is not enough simply to encourage people to engage in 
voluntary, exemplary action by means of an appeal to the common good - as if 
everyone has an equal interest in social and ecological reform. Rather, they argue that 
ecoanarchism must recognize and address the fact that certain classes have a material 
interest in maintaining the status quo. Democratic ecosocialists also argue that it is 
utopian and idealistic to encourage only voluntary action and "small experiments" and 
not address systemic problems. In particular, they argue that it is naive to by-pass the 
state in the expectation that it will wither away without a struggle by the simple 
transfer of allegiances. Finally, they argue that ecoanarchists either ignore or do not 
adequately address questions such as uniform civil rights, basic welfare and 
redistributive justice, revenue raising, intergovernmental co-operation, and 
international representation. 
I have already endorsed and further developed many aspects of the 
democratic ecosocialist critique of ecoanarchism and need not repeat these points 
again. What I do want to reiterate, however, is that my critique should not be taken as 
a rejection of the contribution of utopian thinking in Green political thought. In an 
illuminating discussion on utopianism, Ruth Levitas distinguishes between 
utopianism as form (i.e., the Blueprint) and utopianism as function (i.e., venturing 
beyond the given, releasing the imaginative faculties, and providing a heuristic of 
future possibilities): "The point then becomes not whether one agrees or disagrees 
with the institutional arrangement, but rather that the utopian experiment disrupts the 
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taken-for-granted nature of the present" 2 Ecoanarchism (particularly 
ecomonasticism and bioregionalism), along with the new genre of "ecotopian" 
literature by anarchist and feminist writers, provides an invaluable service to 
emancipatory ecopolitical discourse by stimulating our imaginative faculties and 
providing what E. P. Thompson has called "the education of desire" - an education 
that "opens the way to aspiration. „3  To dismiss this educative function of utopianism 
is to deny a major impulse to progressive political engagement and severely limit the 
means by which we may examine what passes for "common sense.” 
Nonetheless, the Green movement will ultimately stand or fall on its ability 
to generate practical alternatives to the advanced industrial way of life. As 
democratic ecosocialists such as E. P. Thompson and Raymond Williams have rightly 
argued, it is important to connect utopian aspirations with analysis and human 
experience rather than allow them to settle as a mere mental compensation for, or a 
means of escape from, the shortcomings of the status quo. Without this kind of 
connection, such aspirations will remain in the realm of what Ernst Bloch has called 
an "abstract utopia" as distinct from a "concrete utopia."4 To be realized, the 
aspirations released by utopianism must be dialectically related to one's knowledge of 
the present thereby uniting desire with analysis, and leading to informed cultural, 
social, and political engagement The ecocentric Green movement needs idealists And 
pragmatists, creativity 	critical analysis, grassroots activity usl institutional 
support if it is to achieve its long term aims. 
2. Ruth Levitas, "Marxism, Romanticism and Utopia: Ernst Bloch and William 
Morris," Radical Philosophy (Spring 1989): 27-36 at p. 33. 
3. E. P. Thompson, William Morris: Romantic to Revolutionary (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1976), p. 791. For a stimulating discussion of ecotopian literature, 
see George Sessions, "Ecophilosophy, Utopias, and Education," Journal of 
Environmental Education 15 (1983): 27-42. 
4. See Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope, trans. N. Plaice, S. Plaice, and Paul Knight 
(London: Basil Blackwell, 1986). For a discussion of Bloch's ideas, see Levitas, 
"Marxism, Romanticism and Utopia." 
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